The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
With regards to the IL-76 shootdown (whoever did it), we have no evidence to believe that there were POW on it. The UKR claim of S-300 missiles is clearly false (no massive fireball), but I dont believe anything from RU without corroboration. I have heard claims that the known flight path of this airplane makes it highly unlikely to have had POW on it.

To be honest, why the f&ck would anyone fly a fat, slow target well within known Patriot range ? Massively stupid.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
With regards to the IL-76 shootdown (whoever did it), we have no evidence to believe that there were POW on it. The UKR claim of S-300 missiles is clearly false (no massive fireball), but I dont believe anything from RU without corroboration. I have heard claims that the known flight path of this airplane makes it highly unlikely to have had POW on it.

To be honest, why the f&ck would anyone fly a fat, slow target well within known Patriot range ? Massively stupid.
There were no Patriots within that area. Ukraine only has 2-3 operational batteries of the system. Ukraine also doesn't have full SAM coverage of its own airspace. They've done this "forward deploy missile ambush" approach before, also in Belgorod so it's a thing that they're known for. In sections of the front where Russia is watching, this often doesn't go well. Ukraine has lost multiple batteries of S-300s across the Dnepr when they tried to position them there, also IRIS-Ts. But where Russia is not watching this can be devastatingly effective.

With Finland, and the eventual addition of Sweden joining NATO the enclave of Kaliningrad is becoming more difficult to hang onto. In addition the fleet there has become more vulnerable. Now only Orbon stands in the way of Sweden joining. There are rumors of a possible Referendum in Kaliningrad. The heavy military presence in the area is bound to make the population nervous with high friction between NATO and Russia since the enclave would be a primary target. With the possibility of losing this outpost they really need to hang onto Crimea.
Leaving aside social media bullsh*t, what exactly makes you think Kaliningrad is going to be lost and how do you envision this happening?
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
RU nees to assume there is a roving battery in the area - anywhere near the front. Time and time again elements of the RU fixed and rotary winged units get schwacked from a Patriot battery.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
Leaving aside social media bullsh*t, what exactly makes you think Kaliningrad is going to be lost and how do you envision this happening?
What I think is what I stated: nothing more. I am open to the possibility. The video mentioned a partial referendum with a high proportion wanting to leave Russia. I stated this as a rumor since there is no confirmation. The vid caught my eye since the enclave is now basically surrounded by NATO.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I was often thinking about how they operate deep into Russian territory. Walking 600 km would be extremely difficult. Yet, using any form of transportation would expose you to random check by the police or the military. If you travel a few hundreds km by train, road or bus, you are almost sure to have your document checked by a patrol at least once, not counting every time you board a public transportation. Since the beginning of the full scale war, Russians need a pass to move to or from certain regions inside their own country. Men of military age have to request an authorisation to leave their own town or municipality (when they have to travel some distance) and have to give a valid justification for their trip.
The closer to a military base the higher the risk. They would need very good forged documents, good informations about local areas and police habits, and be able to speak without noticeable Ukrainian accent (even the so-called ethnic Russians from Ukraine would be immediately recognised as Ukrainians).

So it's not totally crazy that they choose to go on foot and sleep in the forest. Thought I imagine they buy their food locally because carrying food for one month is not possible.
I would speculate (in fact, I am pretty sure in this speculation of mine) that the likelihood of being exposed or caught walking the distance and sleeping in forests for 20 to 30 nights is significantly higher than any other means of transportation, such as getting a vehicle and driving that distance in one to three days (or (much) longer if necessary), sleeping in reasonable conditions in some flat, etc.

I also know quite a few people in Russia, people who travel within the country for business and outside of it for business and pleasure, some ex-military, still within the age group you are referring to. There are no checks every time you board a public transit, or any special authorizations, etc. Not much had actually changed in this regard. I am not sure what the source of your information is (perhaps like mine in this post, ie people we know), but I can attest that they do not live in the “gestapo” type environment. They are free to pack up and leave any time they want, really.


The comments on the "Passenger list" are interesting but is it a real piece of evidence presented by the Russians or not?

He talks about the use of the word "were" , but I do know that Russian English auto translates (personal experience,) can get things horribly wrong.
I don’t believe it is being used as evidence (I haven’t seen much of the past events though). Just a list of names released by what’s her name of the RT. It is certainly not a passenger manifest.

The word in question is in past tense. Russian is not, however, as “simple” as English, haha. The literal translation of the word in question (находившихся) would be “were being (present)”, I would think. It certainly isn’t “were”. Not that it changes anything. Would it be used in something official, such as a passenger manifest? Not really. Was there one to begin with? Who knows. Was it put together after the fact? Can’t state anything about the list of names itself, but the title was surely written in after. Don’t think it matters and we shall yet see. Maybe…
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
A quick way to address the deaths of "POW,S" on this plane would for the bodies to be provided to the Red Cross who could determine cause and time of death and identification where possible ,Im sure Ukraine would have no problems providing an equal number of deceased Russian servicemen
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
A quick way to address the deaths of "POW,S" on this plane would for the bodies to be provided to the Red Cross who could determine cause and time of death and identification where possible ,Im sure Ukraine would have no problems providing an equal number of deceased Russian servicemen
That isn’t likely to happen, whatever the case is, for obvious reasons.

I think reasonable questions to ask are where were the POWs transported from; where are they (those “eligible” for exchanged) usually kept; where the thousands that were exchanged prior were kept before being exchanged, were any transported on an airplane prior; if yes then from where and to where; how normal is this practice, and so on. How many were supposed to be exchanged in this round?
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
I understand many are kept in Siberia and flown back ,this aircraft was just in from Iran and taking off in a Easterly direction according to internet sources away from Ukraine
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Why would they be kept in Siberia? Doesn’t make much sense to me.

I’d personally be cautious about the flight plans and other info from any sources for the time being.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
With Finland, and the eventual addition of Sweden joining NATO the enclave of Kaliningrad is becoming more difficult to hang onto. In addition the fleet there has become more vulnerable. Now only Orbon stands in the way of Sweden joining. There are rumors of a possible Referendum in Kaliningrad. The heavy military presence in the area is bound to make the population nervous with high friction between NATO and Russia since the enclave would be a primary target. With the possibility of losing this outpost they really need to hang onto Crimea.
How is there any possibility of losing Kaliningrad unless Putin goes completely mad & goes to war with NATO? Nobody's going to attack it unless Russia attacks NATO. In that case, the possible loss of Kaliningrad would be a minor issue.

A secession referendum wouldn't be allowed. The heavy military presence you mention is the armed forces of Russia, so likely to be loyal to Russia & willing to suppress any attempts to secede if ordered to.

Crimea is very different. It's in a different sea. Possession of Crimea has no effect on what happens in the Baltic, just as possession of Kaliningrad has no effect on what happens in the Black Sea.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Why not? Far from Ukraine, which could be seen as an advantage, & there's a long Russian tradition of keeping prisoners in Siberia.
Russian social media is saying they were being kept near Mariupol' and presumably were taken to Rostov-na-Donu and flown from there.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Why not? Far from Ukraine, which could be seen as an advantage, & there's a long Russian tradition of keeping prisoners in Siberia.
I don’t know, it just doesn’t make sense. While it may be a long Russian tradition (and why it is assumed by many to be the case, in addition to the UA propaganda), Siberia has always been a permanent dislocation of convicted individuals. Not a temporary pre-trial sort of area.

Siberia is also too far from any courtrooms where the trials are held, and they are being held. I would imagine those not on trial would be considered suitable for exchange and, again, it would make no sense to keep them too far away because they would have to be brought back. In fact, holding these people in the annexed territories provides an advantage for situations when Ukraine attacks certain facilities, such a prison a while ago, killing a number of the Ukrainian prisoners of war, allegedly. So there is a propaganda value there as well. But mostly it does seem to be logistically impractical.

From everything I heard prior, the prisoners are held in Mariupol, Olinevka, Donetsk, Rostov-on-Don, Taganrog, and other areas near Ukraine, as well as recently annexed areas. While Forbes isn’t exactly reliable, the following article mentions a few of the aforementioned locations.


I think Siberia has a sort of a “traditional” sound to it and some grim history, so it is a convenient location to throw around for propaganda purposes, including “they are building camps for the people they forcefully relocate from and kidnap in Ukraine”, etc. I would think most reasonable individuals understand that it is rubbish.


Russians are saying that Ukraine has been given a 15-minute warning about the flight and insisting that they acknowledged the receipt of the info. Ukraine, of course, denies. There was also some drone action reported minutes before the crash, according to the same Reuters article:


According to the Russian sources, the exchange was supposed to be for 192 people (from each side). There were 65 on this flight and 80 more on another that was turned around and returned to the point of take off.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Vladlen Tatarsky, a pro war Russian military blogger has been assasinated in a cafe in St.Petersburg.


After Daria Dughina, this is another high profile assasination of pro-war propagandists.
Quoted for context and continuity.

The 26-year old lady who brought the bomb that killed Tatarsky was convicted on the charges of terrorism among others and sentenced to 27 years in prison. This is reportedly the harshest sentence for a female in the modern Russian history.


Edit: not that I specifically follow criminal proceedings in Russia, but off the top of my head I can’t think of anyone sentenced to serve such a long term in Russia.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Don’t think this has been posted yet (sorry if it was and I missed it):


NATO signed a 1.1 billion euro ($1.2 billion) contract for hundreds of thousands of 155mm artillery rounds on Tuesday, some of which will be supplied to Ukraine after Kyiv complained of ammunition shortages.

"The war in Ukraine has become a battle of ammunition," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters after a signing ceremony at the Western military alliance's headquarters in Brussels.


It’s almost funny how Stoltenberg refers to the present situation when talking about this order. Also note that the article says “some of which will be supplied to Ukraine” (after Kyiv complained of ammunition shortages). Then comes the next part:

The contract is likely to yield about 220,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, with the first deliveries expected at the end of 2025, the official told Reuters.

So another order for a couple hundred thousand shells. With the first deliveries taking place in about 2 years. Only some of them (maybe) will be delivered to Ukraine. Also:

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) struck the deal on behalf of several allies who will either pass on the shells to Ukraine or use them to stock up their own depleted inventories.

I wouldn’t be surprised that it is for the latter, which would make a lot more sense. Russia will have produced at least 4 million by then, just by looking at their current reported production of about 2M annually and increasing. North Korea will produce some as well by then, some of which will surely be supplied to Russia if the need is still there. Iranians may chime in as well if times are pressing, I am sure. Then there is the big elephant there too that someone likes to call Jina.

The order was placed with Nexter and Junghans.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
I wouldn’t be surprised that it is for the latter, which would make a lot more sense. Russia will have produced at least 4 million by then, just by looking at their current reported production of about 2M annually and increasing. North Korea will produce some as well by then, some of which will surely be supplied to Russia if the need is still there. Iranians may chime in as well if times are pressing, I am sure. Then there is the big elephant there too that someone likes to call Jina.
Do we have hard evidence of RU arty production numbers ? Furthermore, how much of the production is new vs refurbished shells ?
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Do we have hard evidence of RU arty production numbers ? Furthermore, how much of the production is new vs refurbished shells ?
Not sure what would be considered to be hard evidence, really. All based on the estimates by various people and they vary greatly, some of which were posted here previously by me. 2 million seems to be the average of those. Some estimates go as high as 4-4.5 million of new production and refurbished shells per year plus the significant supplies from North Korea that also vary in estimates from about 1 to 2 million shells. The latter is an ongoing process however, which is in contrast to the supplies or rather a transfer from South Korea to Ukraine that was a one time deal as far as we know.

This is a freshly released article by Kofman, Lee, and Massicot, which I actually came here to post.


This is a great read! It discusses the challenges and strategy for the next while among other things. But on the subject of shell production, the authors suggest that the current Russian rate of fire of at least 10,000 shells per day (the number also lines up with other estimates I saw elsewhere) “will be sustainable by 2025 in excess of that number”. They also suggest that the West will not be able to achieve a parity in this department (I think this kind of obvious from the past and ongoing reports, including those cited here).

To relate the 220,000 shells order some of which may or may not reach Ukraine at the end of 2025, mentioned in my previous post, the authors of the article cited above indicate that Ukraine was firing 225,000 shells per month during the summer (up from 90,000 the previous winter) and that was not sufficient. Something to think about.

Back to the Russian production. This article somewhat sums up some of the estimates and their sources:


Note the UK Defense estimate of 1M at best, being the jokers that they seem to be. The Estonians suggest that the new production and refurbishment combined add up to as much as 3.5M and will reach 4.5M this year. If the Estonians are correct (they like to exaggerate), Russia can already sustain 10,000 shells per day rate of fire. That does not account for the NK supplies. But I believe the Estonians are way overestimating as that’s their forte.

The numbers for the NK supplies also vary. The last article puts the number at over 2M. Importantly, however, the article states that NK factories are running at full capacities for the Russians.

This recent tweet (it’s a good thread too) from Tatarigami suggest the delivery of about 1.57M shells from North Korea:


Or for those without Twitter account:


One also shouldn’t forget about Krasnopol production. It had definitely increased but the extent is unknown (except for the RU saying they are producing 25x more, lol). But even the Brits don’t deny the increased production, but rather explain it by the failure of production of conventional munitions, lol:

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Here is a tweet from Anthony King in regard to strategy in Ukraine. This one is a bit of a counter argument to the article by Kofman et al I cited above. Some may call it pessimistic and disagree (possibly a majority); on the contrary, I actually believe this is a more realistic scenario, even with good amount of optimism for me. Anyway, here it is:


And for those without a Twitter account:


I stated several times that, in my opinion, the best time for the negotiations was when the first counteroffensive was culminating in the fall of 2022. I also stated back in the winter of 2023 (if not earlier) that I didn't believe the Ukrainians would be able to make any more significant gains. I still believe this is the case, now reinforced. From the fall of 2022 and on, it is mainly loss of lives, collection of debt, and, perhaps, eventual economic collapse and a failed state (this could be seen as pessimism that is based on reality as outlined below).

While many still do not see this as an issue, for whatever reason, the situation in Ukraine is not sustainable. Perhaps, the situation in Russia is not sustainable in the long term economically speaking either, but Ukraine is on the brink of collapse every month or two without significant external aid. This is probably a broken record on my part, but here is another article from today at Politico outlining the fiscal situation in Ukraine with lots of graphs (could be better):


While spending all (literally) of their internal revenue on defense (and likely still wouldn’t be able to hold their current positions without the aid previously supplied), they are definitely not in the position of breaking the Russian lines without the western military aid in higher quantities (and qualities?) than have already been supplied. Whether we (the west) posses such quantities of the equipment to donate is questionable to begin with (the answer is most likely no). It has been shown for a while now and lately reinforced multiple times that we are in no position to supply the artillery munitions in numbers anywhere near to those demanded by the war. Kofman et al suggest that the promised 1M shells by the EU may materialize by 2025. As per their own writing, however, that amount was used in 4 months of the UA offensive and it was still not sufficient. So a million shells in 2 years (to note, it is still not a certainty) plus the American supplies that also stretch between restocking and supplying Israel and Ukraine is not even remotely close to what is needed (Kofman et al suggest that the western production capacity cannot sustain UA demands even for the defensive purposes). Dumping the remaining stocks of cluster munitions would help, but, again, it is not sufficient.

Many, including the authors of the aforementioned article, suggest that drone manufacturing may help substituting for some of the artillery power. Well, my counterargument is imagine the UA forces heading into their latest offensive without the South Korean artillery shells, but some quantity of FPV drones instead. I would propose that it would not go very well for them and would go much better for the Russians. Therefore, based on my speculation (though, I am certain it would be pretty hard to argue against it), while these assets are crucial for the current war, they are not substitute for the artillery.

Another suggestion that is circulated around is the Taurus missiles that will take down the bridge over the Kerch Strait. First of all, we are not certain such a strike would be successful to begin with. Assuming it was successful, I would again propose that, while it would certainly complicate things for the Russians (likely temporarily), it would not have a significant effect on the situation on the frontline without significant gains on the ground, which I do not believe are feasible for the UAF due to the reasons described above and below. Kofman et al support my position in their article as well.

Another issue is UA manpower. This was already discussed here previously to a certain extent. What hadn’t been discussed, I believe, is the current proposal to decrease the age of those eligible for mobilization to 25 from the current 27. The effect on already, in my opinion, catastrophic demographic situation in Ukraine (discussed previously a while ago and a bit below) is not going to be negligible, but is it going to have much positive effect on the Ukrainian armed forces at all? According to Kofman et al (and other sources I saw previously support their position as well), “the Ukrainian military will struggle to conduct offensive operations if the average age continues to climb well into the 40s”. Would this change in the mobilization eligibility greatly affect the average age of a soldier on the battlefield? My guess (with nothing to support it with at this moment) is it would still remain in the forties and have only marginal effect on the overall performance of the troops. Furthermore, by Budanov’s admission that was cited earlier (a couple of weeks ago?) by Fredled, the actual return on the battlefield from these forcefully mobilized “young guns” is very little.

Here is another bit that refers back to the fiscal issues, but also touches on the demographics subject:

Svyrydenko said she hoped the EU would approve support in February and deliver the funds before the end of March. But she also said this would not be enough.

Kyiv has been trying to save cash and reprioritise expenditure since September, when western support began to falter. It has increased a windfall tax on banks to 50 per cent and transferred revenues from a 1.5 per cent supplemental income tax from local to central government. But it is already facing a shortfall, the minister said. About $5bn in disbursements from international donors and lenders in December “won’t be sufficient” to cover spending needs.

Svyrydenko said Ukraine would prioritise defence and debt servicing which meant “there’s a huge risk of underfunding of certain social sectors”. Kyiv might have to delay paying wages for 500,000 civil servants and 1.4mn teachers and benefits for 10mn pensioners if foreign aid did not come through, she said.


From Financial Times (dated Dec 27, 2023):


Note the last number in the last paragraph - 10 million people collecting pension in the country of… well, I see 37.5M everywhere (for example, here, but other places provide similar or the same number). It is most certainly not anywhere near 37M; likely low 30s or high 20s would be my guess. I think to say that about a third of the country is at the retirement age would be a safe estimate. In Canada, for example, this number represents 19% of the population and it is an issue (for a country that is not at war). One would likely come to a conclusion that the fertility rate is not overly high either and they would be exactly right.

About 93,500 infants were born in Ukraine in the first half of this year, 28% fewer than during the same period in 2021 before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of the country. While the birth rate in Ukraine had already declined over the past decade, the exodus of the country's female population and the security risks linked to the war have had a catastrophic impact.

According to the worst-case scenario estimated by Ella Libanova, director of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the current population of approximately 37 million could fall to 26 million over the next 10 years.


From DW (dated Oct 5, 2023):


I would again caution about the 37M initial number, it is way to high of a number.

There are quite a few more issues to be addressed here, but this all the time I have at the moment. So, to conclude this post, I believe King’s proposal has quite a bit of optimistic reality in it.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Here is a tweet from Anthony King in regard to strategy in Ukraine. This one is a bit of a counter argument to the article by Kofman et al I cited above. Some may call it pessimistic and disagree (possibly a majority); on the contrary, I actually believe this is a more realistic scenario, even with good amount of optimism for me. Anyway, here it is:


And for those without a Twitter account:


I stated several times that, in my opinion, the best time for the negotiations was when the first counteroffensive was culminating in the fall of 2022. I also stated back in the winter of 2023 (if not earlier) that I didn't believe the Ukrainians would be able to make any more significant gains. I still believe this is the case, now reinforced. From the fall of 2022 and on, it is mainly loss of lives, collection of debt, and, perhaps, eventual economic collapse and a failed state (this could be seen as pessimism that is based on reality as outlined below).

While many still do not see this as an issue, for whatever reason, the situation in Ukraine is not sustainable. Perhaps, the situation in Russia is not sustainable in the long term economically speaking either, but Ukraine is on the brink of collapse every month or two without significant external aid. This is probably a broken record on my part, but here is another article from today at Politico outlining the fiscal situation in Ukraine with lots of graphs (could be better):


While spending all (literally) of their internal revenue on defense (and likely still wouldn’t be able to hold their current positions without the aid previously supplied), they are definitely not in the position of breaking the Russian lines without the western military aid in higher quantities (and qualities?) than have already been supplied. Whether we (the west) posses such quantities of the equipment to donate is questionable to begin with (the answer is most likely no). It has been shown for a while now and lately reinforced multiple times that we are in no position to supply the artillery munitions in numbers anywhere near to those demanded by the war. Kofman et al suggest that the promised 1M shells by the EU may materialize by 2025. As per their own writing, however, that amount was used in 4 months of the UA offensive and it was still not sufficient. So a million shells in 2 years (to note, it is still not a certainty) plus the American supplies that also stretch between restocking and supplying Israel and Ukraine is not even remotely close to what is needed (Kofman et al suggest that the western production capacity cannot sustain UA demands even for the defensive purposes). Dumping the remaining stocks of cluster munitions would help, but, again, it is not sufficient.

Many, including the authors of the aforementioned article, suggest that drone manufacturing may help substituting for some of the artillery power. Well, my counterargument is imagine the UA forces heading into their latest offensive without the South Korean artillery shells, but some quantity of FPV drones instead. I would propose that it would not go very well for them and would go much better for the Russians. Therefore, based on my speculation (though, I am certain it would be pretty hard to argue against it), while these assets are crucial for the current war, they are not substitute for the artillery.

Another suggestion that is circulated around is the Taurus missiles that will take down the bridge over the Kerch Strait. First of all, we are not certain such a strike would be successful to begin with. Assuming it was successful, I would again propose that, while it would certainly complicate things for the Russians (likely temporarily), it would not have a significant effect on the situation on the frontline without significant gains on the ground, which I do not believe are feasible for the UAF due to the reasons described above and below. Kofman et al support my position in their article as well.

Another issue is UA manpower. This was already discussed here previously to a certain extent. What hadn’t been discussed, I believe, is the current proposal to decrease the age of those eligible for mobilization to 25 from the current 27. The effect on already, in my opinion, catastrophic demographic situation in Ukraine (discussed previously a while ago and a bit below) is not going to be negligible, but is it going to have much positive effect on the Ukrainian armed forces at all? According to Kofman et al (and other sources I saw previously support their position as well), “the Ukrainian military will struggle to conduct offensive operations if the average age continues to climb well into the 40s”. Would this change in the mobilization eligibility greatly affect the average age of a soldier on the battlefield? My guess (with nothing to support it with at this moment) is it would still remain in the forties and have only marginal effect on the overall performance of the troops. Furthermore, by Budanov’s admission that was cited earlier (a couple of weeks ago?) by Fredled, the actual return on the battlefield from these forcefully mobilized “young guns” is very little.

Here is another bit that refers back to the fiscal issues, but also touches on the demographics subject:

Svyrydenko said she hoped the EU would approve support in February and deliver the funds before the end of March. But she also said this would not be enough.

Kyiv has been trying to save cash and reprioritise expenditure since September, when western support began to falter. It has increased a windfall tax on banks to 50 per cent and transferred revenues from a 1.5 per cent supplemental income tax from local to central government. But it is already facing a shortfall, the minister said. About $5bn in disbursements from international donors and lenders in December “won’t be sufficient” to cover spending needs.

Svyrydenko said Ukraine would prioritise defence and debt servicing which meant “there’s a huge risk of underfunding of certain social sectors”. Kyiv might have to delay paying wages for 500,000 civil servants and 1.4mn teachers and benefits for 10mn pensioners if foreign aid did not come through, she said.


From Financial Times (dated Dec 27, 2023):


Note the last number in the last paragraph - 10 million people collecting pension in the country of… well, I see 37.5M everywhere (for example, here, but other places provide similar or the same number). It is most certainly not anywhere near 37M; likely low 30s or high 20s would be my guess. I think to say that about a third of the country is at the retirement age would be a safe estimate. In Canada, for example, this number represents 19% of the population and it is an issue (for a country that is not at war). One would likely come to a conclusion that the fertility rate is not overly high either and they would be exactly right.

About 93,500 infants were born in Ukraine in the first half of this year, 28% fewer than during the same period in 2021 before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of the country. While the birth rate in Ukraine had already declined over the past decade, the exodus of the country's female population and the security risks linked to the war have had a catastrophic impact.

According to the worst-case scenario estimated by Ella Libanova, director of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the current population of approximately 37 million could fall to 26 million over the next 10 years.


From DW (dated Oct 5, 2023):


I would again caution about the 37M initial number, it is way to high of a number.

There are quite a few more issues to be addressed here, but this all the time I have at the moment. So, to conclude this post, I believe King’s proposal has quite a bit of optimistic reality in it.
Very optimistic. What if the alleged leaked document citing ~20 million left in government-held Ukraine is accurate? The demographic losses of the '14-'15 war were bad already, they're catastrophic now. Fortifying towns to make life hard of Russia is a good way to ensure Russia captures nothing but rubble until Ukraine runs out of manpower but does nothing to prevent Ukraine from running out of manpower. Right now the main issue isn't so much the frontline bodycount (though that's starting to get unpleasant as well), it's the expansion of scale of the conflict (Russia invaded with under 200k troops, with another ~35k LDNR forces, and is now at over 600k total), as well as the continuing exodus of the population. Of course you can always prevent people from leaving but also means investing resources, and it won't be met with public support (in point of fact it already isn't). And the more unwilling your fighting forces are, the higher the frontline casualties and the lower their effectiveness. It's a bit of a paradox, the less willing your mobilized forces are to die for their country the more likely they are in fact to die for their country (as opposed to actually being effective on the battlefield). This of course would go out the window in a mass surrender scenario, but that would take quite a bit more casualties.

The question really is, what's the best outcome for Ukraine as a country? And that's not something anyone is really asking. It's all about whether they can defeat Russia.
 

Redshift

Active Member
Very optimistic. What if the alleged leaked document citing ~20 million left in government-held Ukraine is accurate? The demographic losses of the '14-'15 war were bad already, they're catastrophic now. Fortifying towns to make life hard of Russia is a good way to ensure Russia captures nothing but rubble until Ukraine runs out of manpower but does nothing to prevent Ukraine from running out of manpower. Right now the main issue isn't so much the frontline bodycount (though that's starting to get unpleasant as well), it's the expansion of scale of the conflict (Russia invaded with under 200k troops, with another ~35k LDNR forces, and is now at over 600k total), as well as the continuing exodus of the population. Of course you can always prevent people from leaving but also means investing resources, and it won't be met with public support (in point of fact it already isn't). And the more unwilling your fighting forces are, the higher the frontline casualties and the lower their effectiveness. It's a bit of a paradox, the less willing your mobilized forces are to die for their country the more likely they are in fact to die for their country (as opposed to actually being effective on the battlefield). This of course would go out the window in a mass surrender scenario, but that would take quite a bit more casualties.

The question really is, what's the best outcome for Ukraine as a country? And that's not something anyone is really asking. It's all about whether they can defeat Russia.
The best outcome right now is if the Russians cease attacking Ukraine and, as they have no intention of leaving occupied Ukraine, adopt a purely defensive position.

If as you say Ukraine is running out of people to fight them then Russia continuing offensive operations is, in my view, an attempt to eradicate Ukraine as a viable entity, culture, people likely with a view to repopulate the territory with "ethnic" Russians much as happened in Kaliningrad.

Ukraine is never going to be able to retake occupied Ukraine by force of arms and to be honest they, and we in the west, should recognise this as an unpleasant but incontrovertible fact.

Whilst Russia continues to attack Ukraine the West should continue to supply weapons, so for me the way I see it is the ball is in the Russians hands. If Russia ceased attacks on Ukraine and holds what they have Western support will fall away rapidly , much bluster will be made (everywhere) , and it is certainly possible that what remains of Ukraine will continue to be supplied with arms to counter another attack in the future, and some form of NATO membership might be on the cards in the mid to distant future.

I don't see many other outcomes myself.
 
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