The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor · Mar 10, 2023

Karl Franz said:
Zelenskyy has shown that he understands the importance of showmanship as well as creating the narrative and I mean that in the best possible way. Many wars in the past have been won thanks to a charismatic leader that is able to sway public opinion as well as inspire both those who are fighting and those who are keeping the country running.

The importance of such things should never be underestimated, however is a symbolic victory a thing Ukraine needs right now when they have shown they can achieve real victories like the one at Izium?

It might be. Izyum was what, 6 months ago? It's not clear. And again it's one thing to overrun badly overstretched Russian positions on a second front. It's another to actually halt and reverse Russia's offensive.

On the other hand if the Ukrainians have come to a conclusion that they cannot breakthrough Russian lines it would make sense to keep the reserves as a counterweight to 150k Russians that are still not deployed. As you have pointed out the one who commits its reserves first will be at a serious disadvantage.

I actually haven't pointed that out. I pointed out that Russia would be at a disadvantage if it deploys it's reserves first. Ukraine would only be at a disadvantage if it doesn't make good use of those reserves. The difference is in my opinion is that Russia realistically can't make good use of their reserves in any sort of major offensive. Russia's minor pushes around Avdeevka, Kupyansk, Kremennaya, Zaporozhye, Ugledar, are realistically all Russia can do successfully at this point, at least in my opinion. Russian social media sources still think most of the mobilized units don't have proper armored vehicles or artillery to support them with the bottleneck being the factories, both production and overhauls. Artemovsk/Bakhmut is the biggest Russian effort, mostly opportunistic and spearheaded by Wagner, though at this point it's far more then just them involved. Stopping that biggest effort matters not for the sake of the city but for the sake of stopping the effort. Again, assuming this is a good time to do that. The problem for Ukraine would be committing elements of 6 newly formed brigades piecemeal to a meatgrinder battle around Artemovsk/Bakhmut without achieving anything decisive. If these units are just needed to hold the roads open while the fight continues as it has been, this is a bad move.

If however the Russians are indeed stretched thin and there is a chance to deal them a blow without committing too much of your own reserves then I would begin to understand their course of action, but this also is risky, commits too much of your reserves and you wont have enough to stop the Russians when they deploy their own, commit too little and you might lose the battle anyway. In the end, as you say, we will have to wait and see.

I don't think they're committing all or even half. Iirc they have ~30 new brigades. They're committing 6, and even then not necessarily completely.

Karl Franz · Mar 10, 2023

Feanor said:
It might be. Izyum was what, 6 months ago? It's not clear. And again it's one thing to overrun badly overstretched Russian positions on a second front. It's another to actually halt and reverse Russia's offensive.

If the choice is between symbolic victory or nothing/stalemate then symbolic victory it is, however if the choice is between a symbolic victory and possible real victory (for example cutting a land bridge to Crimea) then it is definitely the latter. Ukrainians kinda box themselves in with stated war goal of returning to the 91 border and have to pursue offensive operations, while the Russians can hold the line as it is today and still claim some kind of victory in Ukraine.

Feanor said:
I actually haven't pointed that out. I pointed out that Russia would be at a disadvantage if it deploys it's reserves first. Ukraine would only be at a disadvantage if it doesn't make good use of those reserves. The difference is in my opinion is that Russia realistically can't make good use of their reserves in any sort of major offensive. Russia's minor pushes around Avdeevka, Kupyansk, Kremennaya, Zaporozhye, Ugledar, are realistically all Russia can do successfully at this point, at least in my opinion. Russian social media sources still think most of the mobilized units don't have proper armored vehicles or artillery to support them with the bottleneck being the factories, both production and overhauls. Artemovsk/Bakhmut is the biggest Russian effort, mostly opportunistic and spearheaded by Wagner, though at this point it's far more then just them involved. Stopping that biggest effort matters not for the sake of the city but for the sake of stopping the effort. Again, assuming this is a good time to do that. The problem for Ukraine would be committing elements of 6 newly formed brigades piecemeal to a meatgrinder battle around Artemovsk/Bakhmut without achieving anything decisive. If these units are just needed to hold the roads open while the fight continues as it has been, this is a bad move.

I would tend to agree that Russian offensive potential is limited. I remember listening to a Prigozhin interview few weeks back where he stated that the Russians would need 1,5 years, to clear the territory they now claim as their own, which means he did not expect a major offensive any time soon. It's definitely clear that Russians were not prepared for this kind of conflict (nobody was), and it's very difficult to get data on Russian arms production, the only thing I could say with some certainty is that they are definitely transitioning to war economy and the peak of arms production is expected in the second half of next year (this is only an estimate so take it with a grain of salt).

As for the Ukrainian decision on deploying more troops, it falls down to whether there is a rational military calculus behind it or whether something else is guiding their decisions.

Feanor said:
I don't think they're committing all or even half. Iirc they have ~30 new brigades. They're committing 6, and even then not necessarily completely.

Six so far, but I get the point. It will be interesting to see how things progress.

John Fedup · Mar 10, 2023

The looming question is how far do things need to deteriorate for Russia before China steps in with significant military aid. Depending on their Taiwan invasion plans, China may want to reserve kit for their own invasion plans (albeit China's production capacity may make the need moot).

ngatimozart · Mar 10, 2023

Apparently Wagner have run into problems and have temporarily ceased operations in Bakhmut having what they claim as a "tactical pause". According to the article Prizhokin's calls aren't being accepted by the Russian military, who have taken offence at his disparagements of them. So it appears that the Russian military have ceased supply of ammo, stores, weapons etc., to Wagner.

KipPotapych · Mar 11, 2023

^ I saw that earlier today. Also saw Prigozhin stating that there may be a shortage of artillery ammunition for the regular army as well. It sure isn’t easy to figure out what is actually happening and what the strategy is on both sides.

If there is an actual shortage of munitions on the Russian side (we know for a fact that there is a shortage on the Ukrainian side), then trying to stop the Russian advancement in Bakhmut while inflicting serious damage on the man-count could be a sound strategy. Keep in mind that the numbers should flip (though not necessarily) if Ukrainians start pushing back in the area. However, the reports have been indicating that it is basically Wagner (and mainly their prisoner recruits) who made most of the advancement and took most of the losses in Bakhmut and only for the past week or so there appeared reports about the better Wagner and Russian Army troops heading in. On the other hand, the reports have indicated for months that the Ukrainians are losing a good mix of elite troops and those who pretty much have been taken in the middle of the street somewhere in X-town/city, issued a kit, and sent to the frontline the next day (which is a waste and a shame). So the quality of soldiers lost on the two sides is not necessarily the same. Also, the estimates of 10-to-1 and 7-to-1 losses made by the Ukrainians are obviously not reliable; the 5-to-1 made by more reliable sources are also not necessarily true. The Russians reported that VSU lost 11,000 in February in Bakhmut, which is also not reliable. The western estimates the Russians lost 10,000 to 30,000 in Bakhmut from the beginning (ie all 9-ish (?) months inclusive). Who knows what is actually happening.

There were also reports that Ukrainians have been taking significant losses else where, so the Bakhmut battle makes sense from the Ukrainian perspective in order to “equalize” the amount of losses. For example, this Financial Times article mentions the following:

“Ukraine is losing people all along the front line but Bakhmut has given them a unique opportunity to kill lots of Russians too, given the [meat grinder] tactics the Russians use,” the western official said.

In this Newsweek article, McFaul, who has been an outspoken proponent of sending more sophisticated weapons, as well as aircraft, to Ukraine, says that he isn’t sure that Ukrainians can hold the line (in the mid to long term perspective):

Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul is "nervous" about the current state of the war in Ukraine, saying that the "stalemated" conflict could raise concern about Ukraine's ability to hold their ground on the battlefield.

"It's been basically stuck for several months and that makes me nervous," McFaul told former Obama adviser David Axelrod on Thursday's podcast episode of the Axe Files. "That makes me nervous about the ability of the Ukrainians to hold on and to keep us engaged in the long haul."

It is not easy to make out what is happening anymore. Make a guess and then wait and see what happens seems to be the way to go.

Another thing to consider in whether to try holding Bakhmut or retreat, there isn't much there beyond practically all the way to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. If one looks at the satellite imagery, there is a lot of open fields in between with little sparsely populated areas. Slavyansk and Kramatorsk are big cities with combined population of about 270,000 prior to the war. That is about 4 Bahkmuts and bringing that level of destruction there isn’t very appealing.

Furthermore, if Bakhmut falls, Chasiv Yar will likely go shortly after. From there, they’ll be within reach of Konstantinovka, which, according to the reports, is a main supply hub and if that is lost, things will start changing south of it and it is a good chunk of land that Ukraine will have to fight hard to get back, especially if time lapses and Russians dig in.

Yet again, it isn’t clear how much of the Russian reserves were committed to fighting so far. I have seen some reports claiming that they are mainly dislocated at the second and third lines of defense. Again, who knows what the reality is. This is another quote from the Financial Times article linked above:

One western official said Russia had suffered “between 20,000 and 30,000 casualties over the past six months”, adding that most of them were mercenaries fighting for the Wagner private military company. Wagner’s operations have been largely focused on Bakhmut.

It is strongly suggested pretty much everywhere in the media referencing “official” reports that it is Wagner that is doing most of the “close encounter” fighting and taking most of the losses. ISW also only recently reported that the Russians are starting to commit their better units to the area. There is little to suggest otherwise anywhere, which kind of forces the conclusion that the Russian mobilized units are mainly intact and the secondary and tertiary defense lines reports may be close to reality. Whether those troops are ready (and for what) and well enough equipped is another question.

At the same time, the same article indicates the following:

Nato officials estimate one Ukrainian had been killed or injured for every five Russians. Ukrainian national security chief Oleksiy Danilov last week estimated the ratio was “one to seven in our favour”. Either way, it implies Ukraine could have suffered several thousand casualties defending the city although its superior medical care means proportionately fewer Ukrainians die on the battlefield.

The last sentence is rather interesting because they do not substantiate it in any way or reference anyone or anything in particular. I don’t believe there is anything to suggest that Ukraine has superior medical care. This is just to show that a lot of the reporting itself is questionable that only adds to the complexity of the situation for the “regular folk”.

On a separate note, and I am not going to look for the source right now (I have 97 tabs currently open on Ukraine alone), but I read a few times (all from Russian sources) in the past couple of days that there are about 40,000 Ukrainian troops dislocated in the Zaporozhia area that are waiting for the equipment to arrive. Grain/pound of salt is the way to go, of course.

swerve · Mar 11, 2023

KipPotapych said:
Another thing to consider in whether to try holding Bakhmut or retreat, there isn't much there beyond practically all the way to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. If one looks at the satellite imagery, there is a lot of open fields in between with little sparsely populated areas.

Bakhmut's in a valley. To the west the the ground rises. intercut with narrow valleys between the fields. There are patches of woodland, especially between Bakhmut & Chasiv Yar (which is over 200 metres higher: looking at the topography I can see why the roads run as they do), & some reservoirs & perhaps natural lakes. There's what looks like an irrigation canal zigzagging along the ridgeline, usually skirted by trees. Seems to be on an embankment in some places & a cutting in others.

It's not just open fields.

Karl Franz · Mar 11, 2023

KipPotapych said:
Another thing to consider in whether to try holding Bakhmut or retreat, there isn't much there beyond practically all the way to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. If one looks at the satellite imagery, there is a lot of open fields in between with little sparsely populated areas. Slavyansk and Kramatorsk are big cities with combined population of about 270,000 prior to the war. That is about 4 Bahkmuts and bringing that level of destruction there isn’t very appealing.

Furthermore, if Bakhmut falls, Chasiv Yar will likely go shortly after. From there, they’ll be within reach of Konstantinovka, which, according to the reports, is a main supply hub and if that is lost, things will start changing south of it and it is a good chunk of land that Ukraine will have to fight hard to get back, especially if time lapses and Russians dig in.

I don't think they are going for Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, if they were still holding along Seversky Donets river this could be a possibility but not any more. Looking at the map Konstantinovka imposes itself as the prize, not only is it a major supply hub, reaching it would create an opportunity to surround Ukrainian grouping in and around Turetsk/New York and if you continue along the highway westward you reach Pokrovsk which from as I understand all the supplies heading for the Donetsk front go through. As for possible Seversk cauldron I see this only in the case of opportunistic attack if the Ukrainians leave few troops in the area as a way of shortening the front but not a main focal point of a Russian effort. But one step at a time, first they need to take Bakhmut.

Feanor · Mar 11, 2023

swerve said:
Bakhmut's in a valley. To the west the the ground rises. intercut with narrow valleys between the fields. There are patches of woodland, especially between Bakhmut & Chasiv Yar (which is over 200 metres higher: looking at the topography I can see why the roads run as they do), & some reservoirs & perhaps natural lakes. There's what looks like an irrigation canal zigzagging along the ridgeline, usually skirted by trees. Seems to be on an embankment in some places & a cutting in others.

It's not just open fields.

KipPotapych said:
Another thing to consider in whether to try holding Bakhmut or retreat, there isn't much there beyond practically all the way to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. If one looks at the satellite imagery, there is a lot of open fields in between with little sparsely populated areas. Slavyansk and Kramatorsk are big cities with combined population of about 270,000 prior to the war. That is about 4 Bahkmuts and bringing that level of destruction there isn’t very appealing.

Furthermore, if Bakhmut falls, Chasiv Yar will likely go shortly after. From there, they’ll be within reach of Konstantinovka, which, according to the reports, is a main supply hub and if that is lost, things will start changing south of it and it is a good chunk of land that Ukraine will have to fight hard to get back, especially if time lapses and Russians dig in.

And it's far from open Russia will have the strength to keep pushing. Using AAA turrets from decommissioned naval ships to provide SHORAD is not an indication that things are well. It's entirely plausible that Russia will have to stop and regroup before advancing any further.

seaspear · Mar 11, 2023

Is it just the topography that could affect the fighting ,how does the early spring mud hamper vehicle movement?

Capt. Ironpants · Mar 11, 2023

Feanor said:
And it's far from open Russia will have the strength to keep pushing. Using AAA turrets from decommissioned naval ships to provide SHORAD is not an indication that things are well. It's entirely plausible that Russia will have to stop and regroup before advancing any further.

The propaganda war has been so crazy, I've been wondering whether that contraption was just another crazy deception or some crazy outlier thing. If you think it's for real and indicative of Russia's capabilities, then I will lean toward that being the reality.

I really appreciate this forum. It's a calm oasis of sanity and dispassionate analysis amidst great dust storms of propaganda coming from all sides. Thanks all!

Feanor · Mar 11, 2023

Capt. Ironpants said:
The propaganda war has been so crazy, I've been wondering whether that contraption was just another crazy deception or some crazy outlier thing. If you think it's for real and indicative of Russia's capabilities, then I will lean toward that being the reality.

I really appreciate this forum. It's a calm oasis of sanity and dispassionate analysis amidst great dust storms of propaganda coming from all sides. Thanks all!

It was quite the silly looking vehicle and made no sense. Until there was a video of this monstrosity riding on a train, with what look like several Strela-10s, and a ZSU-23-4. Then it all came into clarity. It's being used as AAA. And this is logical. These are ship-based AAA after all.

Moscow calling

У нас было МТ-ЛБ с 25-мм морской двуствольной пушкой 2М-3, ЗСУ-23-4 "Шилка" с четырьмя 23-мм пушками, и целое море другой военной техники. Не то, чтобы всё это было категорически необходимо в войне 21-го века, но если уж начал проводить Z-операцию, то к делу надо подходить серьёзно.

t.me

A look at the vehicles themselves. Note the youtube video has them parked next to the Strela-10s, and GAZ Sadko trucks, not used by the Russian military pre-war but now no doubt being procured as an emergency purchase. They reportedly belong to the 155th Marines. One might wonder why Russia doesn't simply pull more ZSU-23-4s or even ZSU-57-2s out of storage. I suspect, again, the bottleneck is the repair plants.

Он не одинок.

Как минимум их два. И, судя по всему, там уже не КПВТ а честные морские 25 мм. Я так понимаю, судя по постаменту, башня вращается?

shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com

Moscow calling

На вооружение имперской армии поступили новейшие, не имеющие аналогов во вселенной тяжёлые крейсеры типа "МТ-ЛБ". В качестве основного вооружения - турболазеры в сдвоенной турели, залп которых имеет мощность 2/3 залпа Звезды Смерти, для самообороны от истребителей повстанцев присутствует...

t.me

Открылась тайна военно - морских МТЛБ

Еще одно видео с партией МТ-ЛБ с установленными на них древними корабельными 25-мм артиллерийскими установками 2М-3М. Сообщается, что данная партия была переделана во Владивостоке и поступила в состав 155-й отдельной бригады морской пехоты by bmpd

shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com

EDIT: On a side note Russia has drastically stepped up air strikes over the past week hammering Malinovka area in Zaporozhye region, and Avdeevka. This led some commentators to conclude that Russia had managed to get a decent quantity of gliding bombs, or possibly some other relatively cheap PGM, but in at least one case an unexploded munition was a regular unguided FAB. This suggests significant degradation of Ukrainian air defenses, possibly exhaustion of stocks, possibly AA being pulled back to the maximum to defend the power grid, possibly even a cumulative effect of Russian SEAD efforts. It remains to be seen whether this develops into anything. At the end of the day even with mostly unguided bombs, Russia can do quite a bit of damage if the VVS have free reign in the skies. On the other hand this could be a temporary gap in Ukrainian air defenses that gets plugged with more western air defenses.

seaspear · Mar 11, 2023

I suppose the 155th marines may have been expecting replacement tanks from their recent troubles around Vuhledar , so it may come as a surprise

Feanor · Mar 12, 2023

seaspear said:
I suppose the 155th marines may have been expecting replacement tanks from their recent troubles around Vuhledar , so it may come as a surprise

I doubt these are replacements for MBTs in their ORBAT. They could hypothetically be IFV replacement, but considering the context, I think they're SHORAD, likely replacing ZSU-23-4s. Typically I would expect a MarBde to mirror Land Forces mixed air defense btlns, with one battery of AAA (ZU-23-2s, ZSU-23-4s, no Tunguskas since they don't fit in the BDK due to height), one battery of SAMs (Strela-10), and one battery of MANPADS. I actually don't know what the 155th Marines operate for their AAA battery pre-war. I don't have photos of any of their air defenses pre-war. It might even be less replacement of losses and more a desperate need for anything that can help counter UAS threat.

vikingatespam · Mar 12, 2023

Should we take the use of the AFV/naval turret frankenstein as an act of desperation or a clever field modification ? Last I heard, the UKR air and helicopter elements were not very active, so why the need ? Could these be used for anti-drone work (I have my doubts it would work well).

EDIT: 2M-3, manually aimed, hydraulic rotation 70 deg./sec, 65 round belt. Retrieved from storage ?

Feanor · Mar 12, 2023

vikingatespam said:
Should we take the use of the AFV/naval turret frankenstein as an act of desperation or a clever field modification ? Last I heard, the UKR air and helicopter elements were not very active, so why the need ? Could these be used for anti-drone work (I have my doubts it would work well).

I take it as desperation. This is worse then a normal ZSU-23-4 plenty of which are in storage. Definitely worse then Pantsyrs or Tunguskas, both of which Russia can produce. Why this? Again I suspect Russia can't produce or even overhaul enough regular AAA leading to this monstrosity.

Feanor said:
EDIT: On a side note Russia has drastically stepped up air strikes over the past week hammering Malinovka area in Zaporozhye region, and Avdeevka. This led some commentators to conclude that Russia had managed to get a decent quantity of gliding bombs, or possibly some other relatively cheap PGM, but in at least one case an unexploded munition was a regular unguided FAB. This suggests significant degradation of Ukrainian air defenses, possibly exhaustion of stocks, possibly AA being pulled back to the maximum to defend the power grid, possibly even a cumulative effect of Russian SEAD efforts. It remains to be seen whether this develops into anything. At the end of the day even with mostly unguided bombs, Russia can do quite a bit of damage if the VVS have free reign in the skies. On the other hand this could be a temporary gap in Ukrainian air defenses that gets plugged with more western air defenses.

Use of gliding bombs by Russia confirmed. One of them apparently failed and crashed inside Donetsk, showing off the wings similar to what we saw earlier on a Russian Su-34. If these can be introduced in large quantities they could significant improve Russia's ability to strike Ukrainian positions.

Moscow calling

Обломки УМПК (российский "наколенный" аналог JDAM) во дворе частного дома посёлка Октябрьский на окраине Донецка. Судя по всему, в полёте произошло разрушение креплений УМПК к ФАБ-500, поэтому саму полутонную бомбу найдут другие счастливчики.

t.me

Moscow calling

А вот и ФАБ-500 от УМПК, нашли на улице Грекова (Донецк, посёлок Октябрьский). Яблоко от яблони недалеко падает...

t.me

EDIT: Russian jets have been more active over Donetsk recently.

The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

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