The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Does Russia have the capacity to launch its own "Spring offensive " ? I understand that Russia recently has used many of the recent reservists in wide ranging attacks but how much of this was a full committal it should nominally have significant advantages in military equipment despite earlier losses
I have my doubts. Major offensive movements are impossible without the comms situation being rectified. There's no evidence Russia is purchasing retranslator stations in large amounts. A series of smaller offensives are likelier. I think that, assuming the Ukrainian counter-attack doesn't start yet, they will aim at Avdeevka, Mar'inka, Kupyansk, and Seversk. If all are gained without committing the second half of the mobilized forces, that would already be quite the success. If Russia commits the second half of their mobilized personnel before the Ukrainian offensive lands, Russia will be screwed because they won't have reserves to counter that move with. And if they can get Ukraine to commit their newly formed units piecemeal to fight in attrition battles along current hot spots, that, in my opinion, would be the only strategic success Russia can hope for here. Attrition on a level that would get Ukraine to run out of bodies would take years. But trained bodies? That's a different story.

Like I said earlier, Russian territorial gains are basically meaningless strategically speaking. Of course they could try to grab Kharkov, attacking from Russian territory, or Zaporozhye by a big push through the front there.

Berdyansk is the logical place with a large payoff. So logical, that the RU know it and have fortified accordingly.
Ukraine's counter attack at Kharkov region was so forseeable social media was ranting about it before it even started. Did Russia fortify Balakleya, Izyum, or anywhere else really? It sure would be smart of Russia to dig deep in Zaporozhye area to protect from a Ukrainian breakthrough. Are they doing it though?

I wonder if the UKR are capable of a set-piece fortified line penetration without taking ghastly casualties.
If Kherson is any indication, then no. Ukraine took massive losses, beating their head against those defenses. It ultimately worked because they could hit a very small number of Russian crossings with 20k+ of Russian troops sitting on those lines. On the flip side, Ukraine has been able to afford ghastly casualties. Russia far less so.

EDIT: On the subject of Ukrainian losses, a look from the other side. There's a grain of salt since Ukrainian sources also have the motivation of advocating for more military aid, but I suspect that this probably isn't too far off. It meshes well with sources from the Russian side.

 
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At lakes

Well-Known Member
Czech company sees boom in market for fake tanks, HIMARS

The Ukrainians may be very interested in this product, Blow up rubber tank decoy's. The boss of the Czech company making them would not confirm that the Ukrainians have any but one would expect they have more than a passing interest in them. Wasting a million dollar missile to blow up a 10k balloon is good economics. The price is dependent on which of the 30 different varieties you want but it could go up to 100K.

Not a new concept the Allies had blow up rubber Sherman Tank decoys deployed after the D Day landings.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Feb 1st-2nd

Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Sudoplatov volunteer btln apparently has Turkish fighters in it together with Serbian ones.


Oskol Front.

Destroyed Ukrainian BTR-4 and BMP-3 near Novoselkovskoe.


Russia's 144th Motor-rifles using MT-12s as artillery.


Russian National Guard mortar crew using a BMP-1 for transport. This is where a self-propelled mortar would be very useful. And the BMP-1 could be handed over to the motor-rifles who are short on vehicles.


LDNR Front.

Ukrainian MT-LB getting hit near Seversk.


Wagner forces have taken the Sakko and Vancetti village north of Soledar.


Wagner forces in Nikolaevka, north of Soledar.


Knocked out and captured Kipri MRAP near Blagodatnoe. This is the second relatively intact vehicle of the type Russia has captured.


Ukrainian infantry taking fire, Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


A destroyed M113 near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


A destroyed Ukrainian pickup truck in Artemovsk/Bakhmut. With the scarcity of actual armored vehicles, unarmored vehicles are more and more common.


Ukrainian infantry digging in outside Artemovsk/Bakhmut. These are likely defenses west of the town intended to form a new front line once the town falls.


Ukrainian Stormer SAM near Ugledar. Ukraine reportedly received 6 of them. It's unclear whether they're all there.


Russian LMUR strikes on alleged Ukrainian military storage near Ugledar.


132nd Bde, former DNR 3rd Motor-Rifles, using Rapira MT-12s as artillery.


A residential building in Kramatorsk got hit, presumably a Russian strike. Reportedly 3 civilians killed, and 18 wounded.


Russia.

Volunteers leaving for the front from Grozny. Note they're not just Chechens, the training center at Gudermes has become a major pipeline for volunteers from all regions.


Misc.

A captured BMP-3 destroyed by Russian forces.


A Ukrainian BTR-80, allegedly abandoned.


Ukraine's 47th Bde has been spotted operating M88A2 Hercules armored evacuators. This unit is the first Ukrainian formation to operate western tank guns on their M-55S. They're also getting some of the first Bradleys.


Allegedly Russian forces showing off a captured Maxim gun.


Ukrainian forces with new Oshkosh M1070s carrying a pair of PzH-2000.


Ukraine has begun production of 82mm mortar shells. We see domestic produced 82mm shells on the front lines.


Russia is apparently stripping parts from even destroyed enemy vehicles to get spares.


More footage of Ukraine's mobilization efforts.

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
An interesting development. Rheinmettall is apparently in discussions with Ukraine regarding Rheinmettall building KF51 Panther tanks in Ukraine. Rheinmetall in talks on building tank factory in Ukraine - report. Rheinmettall claim that they could build 400 tanks per year.

Bovington Tank Museum on reasons why Ukraine requires tanks.

The right arm of the free world, FN FAL / L1A1 SLR variants have been spotted in Ukraine. :cool:

Looks like Ukraine is using bespoke, specialised anti drone weapons. Quite an interesting development.

Drive article on why Ukraine should have the MQ-9A Reaper The Case For Ukraine Acquiring MQ-9 Reapers. Personally I think that the MQ-9B SkyGuardian would be the better option.

UK Forces Net article on Russia deploying vintage AFV in Ukraine. Ukraine: Russia deploying 'vintage' armoured personnel carriers amid mounting vehicle losses. Well, we have known that the Russians have had to reach into old stocks. Will be panic time in the Kremlin if they start fielding T-34/85s and IS-3 tanks.

Oryx list of latest Russian Equipment Losses.
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Source

Full list: Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine

Latest List of Russian Aircraft Losses

Latest List of Ukrainian Aircraft Losses

JDAMs are now operational in Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/Aviation_Intel/status/1632940230440538113?

Warmapper Bakhmut update.
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It appears that Russian forces have advanced into secure eastern bank areas that have been abandoned by Ukraine.

Warmapper Russo - Ukraine War update.

Rare video of Ukrainian An-26 tactical airlift operations.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I am sure that the Russians are quite capable of trucking ammo to artillery on the high ground. Whilst the bulk of their logistics are rail dependent, they don't need rail to extend right to the frontlines like it did during WW1. Hence the topography would work for them. It is dangerous to underestimate the Russians because they are relearning the basics and learning new lessons. Their biggest problem is their C2 system.
I am sure they are quite capable. I was just referring to the post asking whether Bakhmut itself has some superior topography compared to the surrounding areas for potential artillery placement in order to move the Ukrainians further west. I don’t think it is. However, they simply cannot move further west without taking Bakhmut or at least prior to pushing most of the VSU out (to pound the rest after). The railroad will be of importance if the offensive further west and north is successful.

I actually think I might be overestimating the RU forces. I believe if they fix a few issues, VSU won't be able to stop them (and question whether they can now). If they are capable of fixing these issues is very questionable though. My understanding is they still do not even have secured comms for the most part - a few reports I read, basically interviews of injured soldiers or those at the front lines, indicate that this is the case; some saying that this is being solved, but being solved in Russia is a very relative term and the timeline may be close to indefinite.

A sharpened entrenching tool is a very good hand to hand combat weapon. It's a large long handled slashing blade and very effective. The sharper the better.
While this is true, the UK MoD quite heavily implies that the shovel defines the Russian capabilities, as well as the mindset dating back to 19th century. You mentioned before that they are a reliable and valuable source (sorry, I somehow skipped that post earlier). For some things, perhaps. Their Twitter, however, with these little updates, is not. Frankly, many of their posts are simply propaganda, often being an echo chambers for the MoD of Ukraine. Consider the shovel post, for example. Pure propaganda. They even casually mention that

One of the reservists described being ‘neither physically nor psychologically’ prepared for the action.

Common… Seriously? Not just propaganda, but also a poorly constructed one. It looks like they are basically aiming at the “masses” and they succeed most of the time because, in this case, for example, I saw at least a dozen of articles at various sources/media outlets (some are among the most reliable) picking up the “shovel bit” - ie, the Russians are sent to battle armed with shovels - and quoting that very tweet. Fyi, this (and the linked Telegram channel) is the source for the shovel tweet, as it is word for word summary of what has been said (in Russian) in the original: Мобилизованные из Серпухова рассказали, что их отправили на провальный штурм со стрелковым оружием и лопатами

Another example would be (and there are plenty of these) when they state something along the lines of the UA MoD confirms the AD intercepted 67 of 70 Russian missiles or 17 of 19 drones, etc. I am paraphrasing here (and making up the numbers), but I am sure you understand what I am saying if you are following their tweets.


Does Russia have the capacity to launch its own "Spring offensive " ? I understand that Russia recently has used many of the recent reservists in wide ranging attacks but how much of this was a full committal it should nominally have significant advantages in military equipment despite earlier losses
Very questionable and what we see today may be it, but I doubt it myself.

On the other hand, it is also not very clear how much of the Russian mobilized forces are currently (and have been) fighting.


Berdyansk is the logical place with a large payoff. So logical, that the RU know it and have fortified accordingly. I wonder if the UKR are capable of a set-piece fortified line penetration without taking ghastly casualties.
Berdyansk and Melitopol are too logical, in my opinion. I doubt they are capable and it is too much of a gamble. The Ukrainian Forces need to show that they are very (or at least) capable and this might not be the best place to do so. Who knows.

For the past couple of weeks I have seen plenty of reports (mainly from the Russian or Ukrainian side of the internet) that there is troop movement to Zaporozhye and Kupyansk. Interestingly, there were also reports about troop movement from Kherson to Kupyansk.

The latest reports also indicated that the Russians broke defences at Mariinka and cutting out Avdiivka from the supplies. These were from the .ru and .ua sources, so wait and see type of thing.
 

jref

Member
...the UK MoD quite heavily implies that the shovel defines the Russian capabilities, as well as the mindset dating back to 19th century.
I was thinking about linking the Tweet but then I remembered this is a serious forum. Well, the next question that comes to mind is, are western trained, western equipped Ukrainian Army soldiers getting pushed back by... conscripts armed with shovels?

Jokes aside, suppliers of lethal aid to any side of the conflict can be considered parties to the conflict and their statements should be taken with great scrutiny.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
An interesting development. Rheinmettall is apparently in discussions with Ukraine regarding Rheinmettall building KF51 Panther tanks in Ukraine. Rheinmetall in talks on building tank factory in Ukraine - report. Rheinmettall claim that they could build 400 tanks per year.
This is unlikely to be true. I believe there is a high chance this is a move directed at other European partners, particularly France, that Germany may want to either accelerate the MGCS, or outright impose some of its preferences, e.g. the 130mm gun.

The KF51, as is, is a Leopard 2 hull (unless Rheinmetall designs and produces a new hull) mated with a 130mm turret.
The turret is modular, and beyond a new gun and armor, features common interfaces that allow it to rather easily accept products developed among or for users.
A new armor is useful, albeit possible to retrofit on existing Leopard 2 tanks.
A new gun will be a liability. 120mm variants are more than sufficient against any T-72/80/90 variant out there, particularly with new ammunition and new variants of the 120mm. Ukraine will depend solely on a single nation's (Germany) arms regulations in that regard.
And finally, said commonality with other users is irrelevant so long as there are no other users. And others will be highly reluctant as long as new main gun standards aren't agreed upon within NATO.
I remind that within the joint Franco-German MGCS project, there is a struggle between both nations regarding main gun caliber choice. France promotes a scalable-pressure 140mm gun, and Germany promotes its own 130mm gun.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Some geolocation of one of the smashed Ukrainian columns. It's all the way west of Krasnoe, suggesting that Russia may have multiple sections of the road under fire. Note the column was pretty close to Chasov Yar.


This is unlikely to be true. I believe there is a high chance this is a move directed at other European partners, particularly France, that Germany may want to either accelerate the MGCS, or outright impose some of its preferences, e.g. the 130mm gun.

The KF51, as is, is a Leopard 2 hull (unless Rheinmetall designs and produces a new hull) mated with a 130mm turret.
The turret is modular, and beyond a new gun and armor, features common interfaces that allow it to rather easily accept products developed among or for users.
A new armor is useful, albeit possible to retrofit on existing Leopard 2 tanks.
A new gun will be a liability. 120mm variants are more than sufficient against any T-72/80/90 variant out there, particularly with new ammunition and new variants of the 120mm. Ukraine will depend solely on a single nation's (Germany) arms regulations in that regard.
And finally, said commonality with other users is irrelevant so long as there are no other users. And others will be highly reluctant as long as new main gun standards aren't agreed upon within NATO.
I remind that within the joint Franco-German MGCS project, there is a struggle between both nations regarding main gun caliber choice. France promotes a scalable-pressure 140mm gun, and Germany promotes its own 130mm gun.
It could be that they're planning for the after-war period. I think it's very unlikely that they're going to build a factory in Ukraine during the war, but I think it's obvious that Russia isn't going to swallow all of Ukraine, which means a large pro-western Ukraine will be left. And Rheinmetall might be staking their claim in advance for the post-war re-armament of the Ukrainian military.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update on Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

So it appears Ukraine is still holding the line in Artemovsk/Bakhmut, along the river, and the AZOM factory in the center-north area of the town. There are Ukrainian counter-attacks reported along the road through Krasnoe and Stupochki. There also appear to be reinforcement arriving in Chasov Yar. Reports also continue to come in of freshly mobilized soldiers being sent into the fight without proper training. I think two things are happening. Ukraine is still sending as many freshly mobilized troops as they can into this fight, but I think we're seeing some newly formed units arriving too, signaling that some of Ukraine's reserves are being committed. So far it's not too many, at least from the footage. Though this may actually be worse. Committing large reserves could at least reverse the situation, and provide viable counter-attacks deblockading the city. But feeding units in piecemeal could be worse. On the other hand limited reserves could be enough to counter-attack and keep the roads open. Realistically pushing Russia back towards Klescheevka, and either taking the village or at least keeping it pressured there, could keep the southern road open reliably.

It appears fresh Ukrainian forces are arriving in Chasov Yar riding a mix of ex-Soviet and western vehicles. Large numbers of identical looking M113 variants are spotted, suggesting a unit riding them has shown up.


Also Ukraine has apparently repaired one of the blown bridges out of the city. Reportedly the bridge was mined, and the explosives detonated due to Russian shelling.


Wagner forces are holding Dubovo-Vasilevka north north east of Chasov Yar, and a staging area for an advance on Bogdanovka. Rybar previously reported Wagner forces there, but it wasn't entirely clear. It's possible the village was contested.


Meanwhile in an interview, a Ukrainian soldier in Artemovsk/Bakhmut shared in an interview that some mobilized Ukrainian soldiers got as little as 3 days of training before being sent into the battle.

 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
I am not keeping track but why is Artemovsk/Bakhmut so important? Political reasons or there is a real military value?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
I am not keeping track but why is Artemovsk/Bakhmut so important? Political reasons or there is a real military value?
It has a symbolic value because both sides have attached national prestige to the outcome of the battle. It is suggested that Ukraine is using the Bakhmut battle to bleed Russia dry of troops and armaments. Certainly the "human wave" tactics employed by Russia doesn't help the Russian military effort in the long term, because it doesn't have an unlimited supply of troops.

The Russian missile strikes on Wednesday took out the power connection to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant forcing it to run all of its diesel generators. This is quite dangerous because if electrical power isn't supplied to the NPP, it will melt down. The diesel generators only have a 14 day fuel supply.

The Transnistrian separatists have claimed that the Ukrainians attempted an assassination of their leader. Moldova separatists say Ukrainian plot against leader foiled. This has the hallmarks of a Russian disinformation operation, because Chisinau has already uncovered a Russian attempted coup to take over Moldova. Moldovan president warns of Russian agent infiltration.

ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
March 8, 7:45 pm ET

Full article:
Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


  • Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on March 8 that Russian forces captured all of eastern Bakhmut, a claim consistent with available visual evidence
  • Russian forces remain unlikely to exploit a breakthrough beyond Bakhmut if Russian forces capture the city.
  • The Kremlin may be attempting to establish a new Russian government-controlled armed formation billed as a volunteer unit through the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.
  • A US official denied that US intelligence assessed that a pro-Ukrainian group sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022.
  • German and Polish officials announced that Germany and Poland will deliver 28 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine in March 2023, which will bolster Ukraine’s capabilities to conduct a counteroffensive amidst high Russian tank losses.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on March 8 but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement around the city.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
  • Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces landed on the Dnipro River Delta islands for the third consecutive day.
  • The Kremlin is doubling down on reviving volunteer recruitment campaigns throughout Russia and occupied Ukraine.
  • Russian hospitals are continuing to form new medical centers in Russia in an effort to maximize the capacity for overfilling hospitals in occupied territories to treat wounded Russian servicemen.
 

Stuart M

Well-Known Member
It has a symbolic value because both sides have attached national prestige to the outcome of the battle. It is suggested that Ukraine is using the Bakhmut battle to bleed Russia dry of troops and armaments. Certainly the "human wave" tactics employed by Russia doesn't help the Russian military effort in the long term, because it doesn't have an unlimited supply of troops.
Verdun
 

CJR

Active Member
I am not keeping track but why is Artemovsk/Bakhmut so important? Political reasons or there is a real military value?
Six months back when the Russians still held Izium pushing the Ukrainians out of Bakhmut offered the Russians a chance of forcing the Ukrainians into a large-scale withdrawal or even (in the in hindsight unlikely event the Russians managed a decisive breakthrough and managed competent exploitation of it) managing an encirclement of a significant part of the Ukrainian army.

Since then it's a combo of the sunk cost fallacy (mostly by the Russians, but arguably by Ukraine in the last month or so); a chance to let the Russians bang their heads against a brick-wall (to the Ukrainians up until maybe a month back) and national (Ukraine vs Russia)/organizational (Russian army vs Wagner) prestige.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
Just an addendum to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station situation.

The reactor has been shut down since September 2022. However, used nuclear fuel will radiate heat as part of its natural radioactive decay. The amount of heat generated will go down over time but until then the heat should be removed somehow. The usual method is to just remove the fuel from the reactor and put it in a pool of water for up to five years. Naturally the hot water has to be pumped out and cold water pumped in and this is where they require power.

If there is no power for a while, eventually the water will all evaporate. Nothing will happen for quite a while but air is way worse at removing heat compared to water. So temperature will rise. Leave it long enough (not sure when, a lot of factors are at play) and it may get hot enough to melt the steel alloy used as the fuel casing. If that happens, we get a meltdown.

However, we won't get another Chernobyl. We'd get a very localized and contained meltdown. It will be really hard to remove, but it should also remain in the storage pool.

tl;dr; there is actually some extra time after fuel runs out before anything bad will happen. And if it does, it will be contained in the power plant itself.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Apparently according tu UKr sources Russia launched 6 Kinzhals yesterday, for a missile type that was supposedly still in the final stages of testing at the start of the war, they sure are producing them quickly.

There is an OSINT twitter account, going by OSINTdefender, the account has previously reported a bunhc of things without sources, so I will not link them, but they claim that Russia has increased missile production by 40% in the last couple of months, again citing no sources. But realistically speaking is that even possible for them right now? Their PGM production was nothing to boast about pre sanctions, post sanctions, can their war economyeven have the ability boost sophisticated missile production?
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Apparently according tu UKr sources Russia launched 6 Kinzhals yesterday, for a missile type that was supposedly still in the final stages of testing at the start of the war, they sure are producing them quickly.

There is an OSINT twitter account, going by OSINTdefender, the account has previously reported a bunhc of things without sources, so I will not link them, but they claim that Russia has increased missile production by 40% in the last couple of months, again citing no sources. But realistically speaking is that even possible for them right now? Their PGM production was nothing to boast about pre sanctions, post sanctions, can their war economyeven have the ability boost sophisticated missile production?
These articles also suggests that missile production has increased possibly due to sanctions busting
Putin's Russia Dodges Sanctions for MilSpec Chips and Semiconductors - Bloomberg
Estimating Russia’s Kh-101 Production Capacity | FDD's Long War Journal
Russia increases production of Kinzhal hypersonic cruise missiles - The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
This article suggests some of the difficulty in shooting down incoming missiles is that they are hypersonic if not ballistic and current systems cannot engage possibly Sampit and Patriot systems supplied may address some of these threats
 
It appears Ukrainians are going all in in Bakhmut as we can see on a deployment map. I counted 6 new brigades arriving in the last two weeks, plus several smaller units, with 3 in the last few days (67th Mech, 4th Tank and 77th Airmobile), the last of which took heavy losses in the failed defense of Soledar so it's probably not at full strength, and this is on top of regular replacements to units still there. It appears Zelenskyy after meeting Zaluzhny and Syrsky decided to go all in, which is quite strange considering Zaluzhny advocated abandoning Bakhmut for several weeks now.

This is quite a gamble and appears Ukraine is using its reserves that were meant for offensive on the Zaporizhzhia line, as even if the units are not at full strength or fully deployed their size appears quite significant. As @koxinga already posted this is very strange to me as well, even if the Ukrainians manage to unblock the city and retain full or partial control over it, is it really worth all the manpower and resources invested in it, and on top of that is it really worth risking being unable to launch a spring/summer offensive?

As for casualties this is very debatable as I have seen a lot of speculation but no reliable numbers appear. However I will leave you with one statistic that people might find relevant, since April last year this has been called an artillery war and rightly so, both sides agree that more than three quarters of casualties have been caused by artillery. One side on average fires seven times more shells/rockets than the other and has ten times more artillery pieces. Whether this relates to casualty ratio we don't know but it certainly makes for a sobering reading.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears Ukrainians are going all in in Bakhmut as we can see on a deployment map. I counted 6 new brigades arriving in the last two weeks, plus several smaller units, with 3 in the last few days (67th Mech, 4th Tank and 77th Airmobile), the last of which took heavy losses in the failed defense of Soledar so it's probably not at full strength, and this is on top of regular replacements to units still there. It appears Zelenskyy after meeting Zaluzhny and Syrsky decided to go all in, which is quite strange considering Zaluzhny advocated abandoning Bakhmut for several weeks now.

This is quite a gamble and appears Ukraine is using its reserves that were meant for offensive on the Zaporizhzhia line, as even if the units are not at full strength or fully deployed their size appears quite significant. As @koxinga already posted this is very strange to me as well, even if the Ukrainians manage to unblock the city and retain full or partial control over it, is it really worth all the manpower and resources invested in it, and on top of that is it really worth risking being unable to launch a spring/summer offensive?

As for casualties this is very debatable as I have seen a lot of speculation but no reliable numbers appear. However I will leave you with one statistic that people might find relevant, since April last year this has been called an artillery war and rightly so, both sides agree that more than three quarters of casualties have been caused by artillery. One side on average fires seven times more shells/rockets than the other and has ten times more artillery pieces. Whether this relates to casualty ratio we don't know but it certainly makes for a sobering reading.
But it would make for one hell of a symbolic win. Actually u-turning Russia's offensive. Not hitting where Russia doesn't expect it, but outfighting Russia where Russia has chosen to attack. It might be the case that Zelensky needs the perceived win more then a real win. It might be the case that with the fresh Russian forces plugging all the gaps, Ukraine is far from certain of getting a win in the upcoming offensive and would like something else they can hold up as a victory. It could even be that Russia's offensive is stretched way too thin, and this is in fact a good opportunity to strike. We will have to wait and see.
 
But it would make for one hell of a symbolic win. Actually u-turning Russia's offensive. Not hitting where Russia doesn't expect it, but outfighting Russia where Russia has chosen to attack. It might be the case that Zelensky needs the perceived win more then a real win. It might be the case that with the fresh Russian forces plugging all the gaps, Ukraine is far from certain of getting a win in the upcoming offensive and would like something else they can hold up as a victory. It could even be that Russia's offensive is stretched way too thin, and this is in fact a good opportunity to strike. We will have to wait and see.
Zelenskyy has shown that he understands the importance of showmanship as well as creating the narrative and I mean that in the best possible way. Many wars in the past have been won thanks to a charismatic leader that is able to sway public opinion as well as inspire both those who are fighting and those who are keeping the country running.

The importance of such things should never be underestimated, however is a symbolic victory a thing Ukraine needs right now when they have shown they can achieve real victories like the one at Izium? On the other hand if the Ukrainians have come to a conclusion that they cannot breakthrough Russian lines it would make sense to keep the reserves as a counterweight to 150k Russians that are still not deployed. As you have pointed out the one who commits its reserves first will be at a serious disadvantage.

If however the Russians are indeed stretched thin and there is a chance to deal them a blow without committing too much of your own reserves then I would begin to understand their course of action, but this also is risky, commits too much of your reserves and you wont have enough to stop the Russians when they deploy their own, commit too little and you might lose the battle anyway. In the end, as you say, we will have to wait and see.
 
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