The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Minor aside, but I suspect nobody knows how to fight a nuclear war. It's one of those where I think the reality will put a fat black line through any well-laid plans.
You bunker down in well supplied deep mineshafts…at least according to Dr. Strangelove.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Is there any information on how much rail traffic is using the rail lines on the Kerch causeway ? A few social media spots claim there is no rail traffic, but I would like to find hard data.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Summary in English of an interview with General Michel Yakovleff (retired French general.): Michael Shurkin on Twitter: / Twitter

It's often interesting to look at the "French" perspective since it is sometimes different from the Anglo-Saxon perspective. He praises the Ukrainians and believe (as do many other observers) that they have "already won". One interesting hypothesis:
This article provides some further background from a U.S veterans perspective over the years prior in Ukraine's development of its armed forces ,certainly the comment that learning was two ways in that Americans realised they did not know how to fight Russian forces and were learning from Ukrainians
Ukraine Transformed Its Own Military, but U.S. Training Still Helps (foreignpolicy.com)
There is this report earlier from C.N.N. that the U.S and Ukraine "War Gamed " plans for Kherson
US wargamed with Ukraine ahead of counteroffensive and encouraged more limited mission | CNN Politics
In regards to French training of Ukrainian troops France has appeared to have very little ,so perhaps its understandable for a French generals views
Ukraine’s military recruits need training. Only one of Europe’s giants is pulling its weight – POLITICO
 

relic88

Member
For the pros here, what realistic danger is there for another offensive into the north of Ukraine from Belarus? What value does Belarus contribute to such an operation?
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
For the pros here, what realistic danger is there for another offensive into the north of Ukraine from Belarus? What value does Belarus contribute to such an operation?
The chance is small. For Russia to make it any worthwhile force they would have to strip units away from the Southern and Eastern front which just makes the chance of Ukraine retaking more territory all that much greater. Even if they relied on the Belarusian army to provide the bulk then its also a very risky move by Russia as there is a high chance the Belarusian army would overthrow Lukashenko which could very well lead to best case for Russia Belarus remaining nuetral or worst case Belarus siding actively with Ukraine or some where in between. What Belarus provides for Russia is just a distraction. It allows them to launch missile attacks from their territory and forces Ukraine to deploy personnel, resources and equipment on a front that has a very low chance of becoming active.
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
For the pros here, what realistic danger is there for another offensive into the north of Ukraine from Belarus? What value does Belarus contribute to such an operation?
I am not a pro but there is no realistic danger. It will be a minor distraction but will not change the overall balance. Ukraine's Territorial Forces has been preparing for such a possibility since May. Ukraine won't even need to pull an army unit from the east. It may complicate logistics since an active defence will require ammo and fuel and so on, but realistically Belarus and Russia are not putting together enough force to be a credible threat from that direction.

Belarus will contribute little. Their army is estimated to be 50 thousand or so (source: BBC), Russia is sending 9000 troops to Belarus. That adds up to may 60 thousand total, which is too little especially since Ukraine has prepared defenses. If Russia sends 200,000 that will be a threat, but if they do that then Russia won't have enough to send to Eastern Ukraine and Ukraine will respond by shifting troops accordingly. Alternatively Belarus could activate their reserves and conduct their own mobilization, but that will endanger Lukashenko's position way more. As far as I can tell the Belarusian people don't consider this their war. They're fine letting Russia use their bases and they're fine sending tanks and ammo to Russia, but I don't think they will actually accept dying for Russia.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I am not a pro but there is no realistic danger. It will be a minor distraction but will not change the overall balance. Ukraine's Territorial Forces has been preparing for such a possibility since May. Ukraine won't even need to pull an army unit from the east. It may complicate logistics since an active defence will require ammo and fuel and so on, but realistically Belarus and Russia are not putting together enough force to be a credible threat from that direction.

Belarus will contribute little. Their army is estimated to be 50 thousand or so (source: BBC), Russia is sending 9000 troops to Belarus. That adds up to may 60 thousand total, which is too little especially since Ukraine has prepared defenses. If Russia sends 200,000 that will be a threat, but if they do that then Russia won't have enough to send to Eastern Ukraine and Ukraine will respond by shifting troops accordingly. Alternatively Belarus could activate their reserves and conduct their own mobilization, but that will endanger Lukashenko's position way more. As far as I can tell the Belarusian people don't consider this their war. They're fine letting Russia use their bases and they're fine sending tanks and ammo to Russia, but I don't think they will actually accept dying for Russia.
Russia isn't sending 9000. Russia and Belarus are forming a joint grouping of 9000. Reportedly most of these will be Belarussian troops. From what I've read we're looking at 2-3k Russian troops.

For the pros here, what realistic danger is there for another offensive into the north of Ukraine from Belarus? What value does Belarus contribute to such an operation?
I suspect that in exchange for Belarus letting Russia use their equipment stocks, Russia is providing extra troops to Belarus as part of a security element. After all there are serious NATO forces just west and north of them.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
There are some reports of an attack on Russia's Black sea fleet in Sevastopol. Russia, and local leaders report "All UAVs have been shot down. Nothing has been hit in the city. We remain calm. The situation is under control." Current information is conflicting with some reports of sunken ships???


 

STURM

Well-Known Member
At the request of the Iranian Foreign Minister there was a phone discussion between the Foreign Minister's of Iran and the Ukranian. To be expected Iran denied it had supplied Russia any UASs and the Ukraine demanded that supplies cease. The Ukrainians claim that they've shot down some 300 Shaheds and that Russia has over 2,000 but of course there's no way to say for sure.

Personally I get annoyed when experts/analysts keep pointing out that the Shahed isn't a game changer; that it won't change the final outcome of the war and that it's unsophisticated. All this is irrelevant; the fact remains that it's causing damage to both civilian and military targets and that the Russians seem to have them in numbers.

In another report I read somewhere a day or so ago the Ukrainians gave the percentages for ballistic and cruise missiles they claim the Russians are left with. To me; whilst it's fine to claim that Russia only has X percent of Iskanders and Kalibres left; the pertinent question is how many did Russia actuallty have at the start of the invasion?

We can only hope that the Ukrainians sort out the damage caused to their energy and water infrastructure sooner rather than later or it will be civilians who end up suffering the most. Russia has been condemned for its attacks on civilian infrastructure and rightly so but such is the world we live in with its selective amnesia and hypocrisy that condemnations have come from those who themselves targeted civilian infrastructure in Iraq and Serbia [they were very open about it] which led to civilian suffering but hardly impacted the Iraqi and Serbian leadership.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
A prominent Russian journalist is accidentally killed by a stray bullet in Crimea. I have trouble understanding how this could happen. I wonder if perhaps she said something controversial? I guess it's just my western view of the world. We are probably more safety conscious. I would like to think that we put more value in human life. At least in the life of "our citizens".

 
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Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Russians are claiming that this is UK tech.
I can only assume this is propaganda for domestic consumption, as the UK doesn't have suicide drones. Yes we are developing drones for different projects, but these are either for things like target practice or logistical support.

It's like the claim that we were responsible for the Nordstream explosion - might as well blame the Swedes.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I'm translating this story of a recently mobilized Russian soldier in its entirety.

Первая неделя - полёт нормальный

"I should have signed a contract or joined the orchestra [orchestra is a nickname for Russian PMCs - f.]

General impression from the first week; I should either have signed up as a contract soldier or joined the orchestra.

The last time I participated in what could be called combat action was 08.08 [Georgian war - f.]. Our group covered the deployment of specialists during mine clearing and the initial deployment of the 4th Air Army.
After the described events, thanks to our Abkhaz brothers, I managed to acquire quite a bit of gear at the local market. As a result I arrived the mobilization point looking quite pretty.
Saying we were a diverse group is to say nothing. Theoretically everyone can be divided into three types first and most common, people who served as conscripts usually for one year and again usually who held a rifle only during their oath ceremony. Second group; specialists, artillery comms, drivers. Third group - us, people with combat experience. But here everything is also not the same. Since a recent time, you get the combat veteran mark for merely crossing the border [presumably the border of a combat zone - f.] So some of those who had been to war had never fired at other people.

The attempt to mix veterans with "porcupines", in my opinion, is fundamentally flawed. As a staff sergeant I was given a mini-platoon of 16 snouts. I'll be honest, I started hitting them by the second day. I will have to trust these people to watch my back, and not everyone has realized that we're being re-trained. We've given up on physical training normatives almost immediately. Older comrades say that mobilized persons can't switch their mindste for civilian to miltiary in a week. Our group at the start of the second Chechen war spent 4 months preparing. I honestly don't know what we'll get here. Sorry for the confusing narrative. I have a lot of thoughts on my mind.

It's considered that everyone who served as a conscript is trained at least at a basic level. But right now I have to teach them everthing from scratch. Starting even with how to behave in garrison Our officers don't have a great grasp on how to transition people from a military to a civilian mindset. We were gathered and told they're counting on our help in this [presumably "we" means either NCOs or those with combat experience, in theory it would be the former, but considering this is the Russian Army and considering the authors own categories, likely the latter - f.]. Some of our ideas were shot down immediately as inhuman. Most people seem to think they're in a children's summer camp. I asked for permission to spend the evenings on additional training time. Thank god we got permission, otherwise I would quietly lose my mind. I'm trying to learn to use our new comm gear together with our comms specialists.

My equipment is completely my own. Some is left from previous deployments. Some I quickly purchased.The most important - norwegian boots LM. Camos I custom ordered due to my height. Elbow and kneepads, and gloves - NATO-style, thanks to the Abkhaz. A backpack with a camelback. Several types of cold weather undergarments for all occasions. Absolutely necessary, Kevlar inserts for my boots.

Some people came with money. Some with a lot of money. And having big money it's very easy to organize the sneaking in of nearly anything. Gentlemen officers... for whom it's a war.... [a reference to the Russian saying - for whom it's a war and for whom it's their own mother, a statement about war-time corruption - f.]

As I put above, in terms of physical fitness we're screwed. Most of your time won't be spent shooting, but walking, running, crawling, and sneaking. Most people can't even jog long distance. We haven't even attempted moving with partial or full combat loads. How I'm supposed to train porcupines on cross-country movement is unclear.

Mostly people haven't figured out where they are yet. Command has no experience of mobilizing people. Even contract NCOs that are supposed to be training people sometimes have a hard time relating to them on a pure psychological level. You're a 23-25 year old sergeant, but you're in charge of 40 year old men that mostly don't give a f*ck about you. Plus the collision of urban and rural mindsets.

Some people have in their heads roughly the following; we've come here to protect the motherland, and you're bothering us with your early rising, running, discipline, and training. Instead you should take us to the range and give us tons of ammo.

For "suit jackets", graduates of military courses, there are different kinds [in Russia some of those who go to college have the option of avoiding the draft by completing an ROTC-like officer program in college - f.] As our interactions show, some of the called up artillery officers graduated with math and physics degrees. We also have aviation maintenance specialists. Someone did their military courses on a torpedo boat near Murmansk. It's a random assortment.

A few men did their military courses on the GRAU 2A18, also known as a D-30. They've all been promised re-training. Although you don't need artillery skills to haul shells. Command says we have far more artillery then people who know how to use it.

Sambist
Some of my own comments.

The author of this considers the D-30 outdated. For Russian Land Forces pre-war, I guess this is true. They were mostly Msta-B, Msta-S, and some 2S3s (slowly being phased out). But for the VDV the D-30 was and is their primary howitzer. With this mobilization, if 122mm shells are available, we are likely to see it take front and center stage again.

There is a general opinion in Russia, that seems to be supported by statements from pro-Russian social media sources, that this is the first time Russia is mobilizing "since Stalin". However this is fundamentally untrue. WWII is the last time Russia did a full mobilization. But partial mobilizations were conducted for the Chechen Wars and for the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. The machine is rusty and broken for sure. But this poor performance is attributable not even so much to the fall of the Soviet Union (it certainly contributed) but more so to both the professionalization of the Russian Army and the nature of the wars Russia has fought recently. Russia has optimized over the past ~20 years for fighting small wars with limited contingents of professional troops on rotational deployment. Russian conscripts haven't been regarded as meant for war since the early 2000s. Leaving aside the broader discussion of the value of a conscript force that is neither trained nor meant for war, the mobilization system was seen as a dinosaur that exists out of sheer inertia. Despite calling up of reservists for recent large scale exercises, the numbers called up were in the low hundreds. Not in the mid hundreds of thousands. This failure is a failure of decision-making and execution by Russian leadership rather then a natural consequence of an unused system. The Serdyukov-Gerasimov reforms were nixed and partially rolled back by Shoygu. One of the pieces of the reforms that never got anywhere was the reserve system. This is the direct consequence of that planning failure.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
The planners knew very well that the Russian army was structured and equipped for wars similar to what was encountered in Syria, Chechnya and Georgia; instead thanks to the political leadership the army was called upon to conduct a strategic offensive comprising 4 major [non mutually supportive] axis of advance in the 2nd largest country in Europe.

Making matters worst was an army with an acute manpower shortage; an army told that the enemy would collapse and an army not backed by an air force able to conduct a strategic air campaign. To be fair to the Russian air force its main thing was always supporting the army and gaining air superiority over the battlefield as opposed to overall air superiority as part of a strategic campaign.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Oct 16th-18th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Allegedly Orion footage taking out a Ukrainian tank, Kherson region. We haven't seen the type active in quite some time. It's plausible that Russia's small pre-war inventory was lost in action and this is a sign that some new ones have been produced.


Ukrainian BTR-70 column in action, Kherson region. Note, we already know how this ends. 5 destroyed BTRs of the type were spotted in this spot, with similar dispersion.


Destroyed vehicles, allegedly Ukrainian, on the Krivoy Rog axis. We have a T-72, a BMP-1, 2 BRM-1 or BMP-2s, 2 destroyed BMPs, type unknown, and some additional destroyed vehicles in the distance that are hard to make out.


Destroyed M113 and allegedly Ukrainian BMP, near Kherson.


Ukrainian Mastiff MRAP destroyed in Kherson region.


More footage of the same destroyed Ukrainian column we saw before.


Russian Shahed-136 and missile strikes in Odessa.


Shahed-136 over Krivoy Rog.


VDV Nona-S near Kherson.


Russia has apparently detained 90 Ukrainian "supporters" throughout Kherson and Zaporozhye region. It's unclear whether this was a mass detention recently or a running total.


The West.

We have reports of strikes in Vinnitsa and Zhitomyr.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian strikes in Dnepropetrovsk region.


One of the targets in Dnepropetrovsk was the Pridneprovskaya TES.


Ukrainian air defense radar getting hit by a Lancet strike.


Russian strike against a Ukrainian S-300... or is it? Note small explosion, and the fact that the radar isn't spinning. This might be a decoy.


This analysis claims the strike above was against a real S-300 TEL, not a decoy. But of course it could simply be a well made decoy. Or even a real TEL, just a non-functioning one pulled from storage.


This puts it all together, the radar and TEL strike, and with the crews running around, suggests the entire thing is real, and it's a Ukrainian S-300 unit getting taken out.


The Energodar city administration got hit.


Ukrainian tank column in Zaporozhye. Note the fact that Ukraine can move columns like this around is a sign of Russian C4ISR failure.


Russian National Guard in Energodar. Note the anti-UAV weapon.


The North.

Shahed-136 strikes landing in Kiev. Air defenses are firing. One of the targets is the UkrEnergo building that coordinates electrical grids across Ukraine. Another target is TES-6, a large powerplant. It appears at least one Kh-101 was downed. Strike are happening day and night. The massive quantity of footage and variety of strikes might indicate more munitions used against Kiev. Or it might just be a reflection of the number of people filming.


A MANPADS misses a Shahed-136 that later strikes the UkrEnergo office in Kiev.


Ukrainian air defenses firing near Brovary. They are likely trying to intercept inbounds for Kiev.


A map of some strikes in Kiev.


Poltava-Sumy.

A substation in Romny, Sumy region, got hit.

 
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