The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

TScott

Member
No doubt but how much of the so called lessons are stuff we already knew?



Like various other armies which had an overmatch over their enemies but ultimately did not achieve their objectives.



Given that we're still learning new things about WW1 and 2; it'll be a long while before we get the whole picture on this war.

Bad logistics, poor leadership, poor intelligence, precision weapons, training, unmanned systems have probably contributed to Russia's problems

It was a combination of various things which should also serve as a wake up call to other armies who might find themselves in a similar position but against an opponent which - unlike Russia - has trained to conduct a high tech; high intensity protracted war.




Well if they can't and the Ukrainians are able to sustain this tempo indefinitely; then the Russians will be out of the Ukraine eventually. Personally I don't see that happening anytime soon. Sooner or later things will slow down until they resume in intensity again and by that time the Russians hope they'll be in a better position.
I don't agree with the bolded.

Defence forces around the world would be learning an incredible amount at the moment and I think there will be massive changes to things like force structures, procurement priorities and defense tech design and development in the very near future, based on learnings from Ukraine.

To infer that countries already knew how a war of this nature would play out based on Bosnia and lessons learned from Afghanistan/Iraq and even WW2 and WW1 is re-writing history a bit.

We've never had a super power like Russia engage in a full scale war against a Western Country with the population resources of someone like Ukraine, and fought logistically (by proxy) with most of the other western major military powers with a suite of the most advanced weaponry available.

If we knew most of the lessons regarding Ukraine (I will use Australia as an example), I doubt Aus would be waiting on the delivery of our first land based mobile rocket launcher platform. HIMARS has been one of the major factors in turning the tide of this war in the last month and Ukraine hasn't even deployed ATACMS to the battlefield yet. They are arguably the single most valuable bit of kit Ukraine are deploying at the moment based on their operational effectiveness so far. Even though the nature of the Ukraine War and Australia's land based Army and their requirements and scope of involvement are completely different, I'm predicting Aus makes a much greater further investment in more HIMARS launchers in the near future following the effectiveness of HIMARS in defending a land invasion against a supposedly greater military force (Ring any bells?)

Ukraine will be known as the war of the drone and autonomous platforms . It very much might be a turning point in world history regarding the the importance of armor. Whilst it will always remain a key pillar of any land force, it's never been as vulnerable in it's history as in this war.

It very much changes theories regarding "nothing can beat simple boots on the ground", doctrine regarding modern defensive positions and retention rates of infantry in a truly modern battlefield. One of the biggest killing machines to date in the war has been a $1500 civilian fishing drone dropping bait bombs with rigged grenades, reaching formally impenetrable defensive positions in traditional combat doctrine, results previously only really achievable with air superiority and massive investment in high cost air platforms.

Again, I will use Aus as an example, I know the Australian Army already have a wide range of drones in their inventory now numbered in the thousand(s), however, I'm predicting further investment goes into hyperdrive following Ukraine. Ukraine has shown their effectiveness even at a micro level, that they can become a force multiplier at a basic level.

I could keep going on and on regarding precision artillery, vulnerabilities in modern armor design not exposed to this extent in a modern war, the relative back seat the air force and navy's etc have played so far. But others can probably better articulate it than me.


But I expect a lot of things to change once the dust (literally) settles on Ukraine, with a lot of modern militaries.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
To infer that countries already knew how a war of this nature would play out based on Bosnia and lessons learned from Afghanistan/Iraq and even WW2 and WW1 is re-writing history a bit.
Quite a bit of what we're seeing now with regards to information warfare [including the use of OSINT]; the innovative use of UASs [including commercial ones dropping grenades which we first saw in 2015] and the key part they play in kill chains: the need for arty to be able relocate fast; the potential of EW; the vulnerability of certain types of AD systems against low flying targets with a minimal RCS and IR signature; the need for armoured vehicles to be adequately supported; the importance of decentralised logistics; etc, we saw in Syria, Libya, Nargano Krabakh, the 2015 Donbas campaign; Yemen; etc.

Sure this war; like others; offers various important lessons but it also offers reminders of various things we already knew. On HIMARs nobody is discounting it's effectiveness but it isn't only HIMARs but HIMARs and a effective strike/recce capability including external assistance provided.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian troops inside Dudchany, with Russian forces blowing the crossing across the water reservoir to slow down the advance. It's unclear why the breakthrough was so successful here specifically.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kherson-Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog.

The "ghost of Kherson", another video, this time dropping a grenade on a SUV or pickup truck.


Russia's 237 VDV Rgt delivering fires somewhere in Kherson region.


Russia has managed to drop an Iranian Mohajer-6 UCAV into the Black Sea near Odessa.


Russian Geran'-2 strikes in Odessa.


Air defenses firing over Odessa.


Strikes on the Antonov bridge continue.


A hotel in Kherson got hit.


A destroyed 2S6 Kherson region, towards Krivoy Rog, allegedly Ukrainian but... Russian is far more likely. Ukraine operated single digits of the type before this war and had no way of sourcing more. Presumably some captured Russian ones could have been used to increase the quantity but not drastically. Russia on the other hand operates many of them.


A column of Ukrainian YPR-765s passing by 3 destroyed vehicles of the same type in Andreevka. This is one of the villages at the base of the Sukhoi Stavok salient.


A column of Ukrainian M113s, Kherson region. I count 6.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian Shahed-126/Geran'-2 flying over Ukrainian positions, Dnepropetrovsk region.


One was allegedly shot down there.


Russian T-90M towing a Ukrainian T-72M1, captured, Zaporozhye region.


In Melitopol' a Ukrainian civilian car blew up. It was allegedly transporting explosives, and was presumably part of Ukraine's resistance in the city.


LDNR Front.


Russian Msta-S fires near Mar'inka.


Allegedly a failed Ukrainian attack at Mar'inka. Warning footage of corpses.


HARM fragments on the streets of Yenakievo, Donetsk region.


Alchevsk, Lugansk region, got hit.


Russia.

Mobilization efforts continue.


A fresh batch of volunteers continue preparations for deployment to Ukraine in Chechnya.


Russian mobilized personnel were issued rusty AKMs.


Russia is sending a composite company to Ukraine from Severomorsk, it's apparently the third company of a composite btln formed out of Russian service members. Note these are not irregulars. They clearly have modern body armor and helmets, but their uniforms and kit are more haphazard. It's mostly Russian army standard, but some of it looks like MVD kit. It's possible this is a mix of MVD and MoD personnel.


A training center has been set up in Arkhangel'sk for those who are going to serve as contract soldiers in the Russian military. However... Russia recently equated the status of mobilized personnel with contract soldiers so... is it for them? Unclear. Veterans are going to be instructors here.


The son of Aksenov, Russia's head of Crimea, has been called up as part of the mobilization. Given the generally fairly low levels of popular support for the war its very important for Russian leadership to set the example and appear to be good citizens in this mobilization effort.


Russia is using the Tu-214R again, these advanced aircraft have been conspicuously absent during most of this war.


Equipment pulled from storage, BMP-2s, BMP-1KSh, T-80BVs, and T-62Ms with K-1 tiles added.


Misc.

A Russian Su-34(30SM?) with a burning engine. Unclear if it went down.


Russian night time sniper ops. Location and context unclear.


Ukrainian M777A2s firing Excalibur shells.


A destroyed Ukrainian T-64BM, location and context unclear.


Iveco LAV IIIs in Ukraine, location and context unclear.


Ukrainian MaxxPro stuck in the mud. Location and context unclear.


NATO/EU.


German AT2 SCATMIN cluster munitions carrying anti-tank mines have been confirmed in Ukraine.


US PMCs from the Mozart Group training Ukrainian forces near the front line.


More HARM missiles being shipped to Ukraine.


Reportedly France is planning another delivery of CAESAR howitzers.

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Quite a bit of what we're seeing now with regards to information warfare [including the use of OSINT]; the innovative use of UASs [including commercial ones dropping grenades which we first saw in 2015] and the key part they play in kill chains: the need for arty to be able relocate fast; the potential of EW; the vulnerability of certain types of AD systems against low flying targets with a minimal RCS and IR signature; the need for armoured vehicles to be adequately supported; the importance of decentralised logistics; etc, we saw in Syria, Libya, Nargano Krabakh, the 2015 Donbas campaign; Yemen; etc.

Sure this war; like others; offers various important lessons but it also offers reminders of various things we already knew. On HIMARs nobody is discounting it's effectiveness but it isn't only HIMARs but HIMARs and a effective strike/recce capability including external assistance provided.
Yemen, Syria, Libya, and the 2015 Donbas conflicts were different because they weren't full near peer state on state open conflicts. However Nargano Krabakh showed the impacts that UAV could have on the battlefield. The current Russo - Ukrainian war is the first full near peer state on state open war where all the current new technologies available to both sides are being used. It is rather obvious that Ukraine has adapted to them a lot more quickly than Russia, especially because in many cases it hasn't had a choice but too.
The air war is a classic example of one side performing effective but limited air denial [we saw this in Kosovo; albeit on a much smaller and less effective scale] but my question is did the Ukrainians plan for a limited air denial strategy from the start or was it something adopted out of sheer necessity once the war erupted? I really doubt that they planned to go head to head against the Russians in the air. To be fair the Russians too have achieve limited air denial; Ukrainian planes are very wary of Russian AD.
If you read the article it states quite clearly that the Ukrainians had to organise this strategy on the fly. It wasn't preplanned.
They no doubt have been taught various lessons but whether they can actually implement those lessons is another matter. There is also the question of how well the Russians or any army in the midst of war; is able to innovate or adapt.
Ahem, any military force that fails to adapt in the midst of a war will be defeat. The oft used phrase "adapt, improvise, and overcome" is exactly that, because if you don't you will die. The Russians aren't adapting and improvising because it's not in their military nature to do so. They still are to wedded to the Soviet model where the Plan is sacrosanct and any changes, no matter how small, must be approved at the highest level. So decisions get kicked upstairs because commanders don't want to take responsibility and by the time any decision is made it's generally to late to take advantage of what can be a very fluid and dynamic situation.
Apart from effective SEAD strikes made possible by HARM; are the Ukranians really deploying air power more effectively than the Russians? HARM strikes have been well publised but how effective have they really been?
Well the Ukrainians are able to move relatively freely without overhead eyes watching them so I think that answers your question. The Russians are unable to provide air cover of any type for their air breathing ISR assets.
It's also often overlooked that quite a bit of what the Ukrainians have managed to do was helped by Western intel. I've long questioned the claim that this war teaches us many new things; as opposed to reminding us or validating things we already knew.
War teaches us new things always because we generally forget the lessons of the last one during the peace in between. Not everything we learn is new because some lessons have to be retaught, but still there are concepts that up until a good war that are only theory and whilst they may have worked and looked good in trials and exercises, it is not until a full on war that they are fully put to the test and proven one way or the other. The Ukrainians are doing things that haven't been accepted as standard wisdom, but they are working and have saved the Ukrainians a lot of grief in some cases. Not everything has worked for them but that's part of the learnings as well.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 3, 9 pm ET

Full article
: Institute for the Study of War

The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.

  • Ukrainian forces have made substantial gains around Lyman and in northern Kherson Oblast over the last 24 hours. The Russian units defeated on these fronts were previously considered to be among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin may use the appointment of Lieutenant-General Roman Berdnikov to the command of the Western Military District to redirect blame for recent or future Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast.
  • Russian officials released the director of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, whom they had illegally detained, and are likely continuing to undermine Ukrainian control of the plant.
  • Ukrainian forces made advances on the Oskil River-Kreminna line towards the Luhansk oblast border.
  • Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kherson Oblast.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin is introducing punitive measures to target the Russian bureaucratic institutions responsible for the execution of partial mobilization.
  • Russian officials acknowledged that the Kremlin intends to invade, occupy, and illegally annex additional Ukrainian territory in the south and east and may alter the claimed borders of its occupied territories.
  • The Russian State Duma approved the Kremlin’s illegal accession treaties on October 3 and laid out the administrative timeline for integrating illegally annexed Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation.


Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains around Lyman and in Kherson Oblast in the last 48 hours.
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops made significant breakthroughs in northern Kherson Oblast between October 2 and 3.[1] Geolocated footage corroborates Russian claims that Ukrainian troops are continuing to push east of Lyman and may have broken through the Luhansk Oblast border in the direction of Kreminna.[2] As ISW has previously reported, the Russian groupings in northern Kherson Oblast and on the Lyman front were largely comprised of units that had been regarded as among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces before the war.[3] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army reportedly withdrew from Lyman to rear positions near Kreminna before October 2.[4] Russian sources previously reported that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), especially the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, are active in Kherson Oblast.[5] Both the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division were previously lauded as some of Russia’s most elite forces, and their apparent failures to hold territory against major Ukrainian counter-offensive actions is consistent with ISW’s previous assessment that even the most elite Russian military forces are becoming increasingly degraded as the war continues. This phenomenon was also visible in the collapse of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army earlier in the Kharkiv counter-offensive.[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin may be continuing efforts to redirect blame for recent Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian outlet РБК (RBK), citing sources within the Russian regime, reported on October 3 that Lieutenant-General Roman Berdnikov has replaced Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev as commander of the Western Military District (WMD).[7] As ISW previously assessed, WMD units have been largely operating in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast over the last few months but without a clear commander. Zhuravlev has not been seen for some time, and Putin cycled through two commanders of the “western grouping of forces" in two weeks. Putin may be attempting to redirect the growing anger for Russian losses in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman by assigning a new face prominently to the WMD.[8] This announcement may also be an effort to shield Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), from widespread criticism for recent Russian failures around Lyman.[9] Putin may seek to shift the blame for future Russian losses in Kharkiv and possibly Luhansk Oblasts to Berdnikov. Criticism of Lapin in recent days has served as a catalyst for wider breakdown within the Russian nationalist information space, and Berdnikov’s appointment may be intended to distract and redirect that growing dissatisfaction.

Russian officials released Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) director Ihor Murashov from detention and are likely continuing to undermine Ukrainian control of the plant. Energoatom reported that the Russian military detained Director General of the ZNPP Ihor Murashov on September 30 and released him into Ukrainian-controlled territory on October 3 following talks with International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Raphael Grossi.[10] Russian officials will likely not allow Murashov to return to his position at the ZNPP. Russian officials will likely attempt to use their physical removal of Murashov to assert further control over the nuclear power plant.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Ukraine cancels autumn conscription and postpones demobilization: Zelensky cancels autumn conscription, postpones demobilization (kyivindependent.com)

What are the implications of this? There have been a lot of speculations regarding both RU and UKR losses. We know that RU has started a huge mobilization effort, probably to compensate for significant losses. If UKR had similar losses, would it make sense to cancel autumn conscription?
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Ukraine cancels autumn conscription and postpones demobilization: Zelensky cancels autumn conscription, postpones demobilization (kyivindependent.com)

What are the implications of this? There have been a lot of speculations regarding both RU and UKR losses. We know that RU has started a huge mobilization effort, probably to compensate for significant losses. If UKR had similar losses, would it make sense to cancel autumn conscription?
Nothing? Recall at the start of the conflict, Ukraine banned men aged 18 - 60 from leaving the country and did a general mobilization.

I would imagine those who are not already fighting would have already left the country earlier this year since they were <18. Would an autunm conscription (I suppose their normal cycle) make any sense at this point?
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Yemen, Syria, Libya, and the 2015 Donbas conflicts were different because they weren't full near peer state on state open conflicts.
No they weren't but we saw how various actors made innovative use of both military and commercial grade UASs and we saw the widespread innovative use of OSINT; as well as apps and tablets; things we later saw in the Ukraine. We've seen small decentralised groups of Ukranians operating effectively against larger forces; we saw that in Yemen and Lebanon.

All those conflicts were non peer ones as you say but quite a bit of what we've seen and are seeing in the Ukraine we saw in those conflicts.

However Nargano Krabakh showed the impacts that UAV could have on the battlefield.
We already saw the impact UASs can have in Libya [previously described as the largest UAS war], Syria [by the Turks who created very effective kill chains and the Israelis who.we're successful against various types of AD systems] and the Donbas; even if on a much smaller scale than in the Ukraine invasion. In the Donbas we saw how the Russians effectively used UASs in tactical role paired with arty, MLRS and EW. Way before the Ukanians rigged homemade and commercial UASs with explosives we saw that in Syria and Iraq.

I'm not saying the Ukrainians aren't adaptive, innovative or resourceful; of course they are and full credit when due but a lot of what they're doing; we've seen before.

What's surprising about the role UASs are playing in the Ukraine is not the successes they've achieved or their widespread use [we expected this] but the fact they were able to operate in the face of strong AD and EW. Prior to this war I had doubts that Ukranian UASs would would be able to operate because of EW. Turns out I was wrong; Russian EW has been effective but not decisive

Ahem, any military force that fails to adapt in the midst of a war will be defeat.
Innovation in peacetime is hard enough; much more so with adaptation in the midst of a war.

The Russians aren't adapting and improvising because it's not in their military nature to do so. They still are to wedded to the Soviet model where the Plan is sacrosanct and any changes, no matter how small, must be approved at the highest level.
I think there's more to it than that. The Russians may not have a history of adaptation they way others do but it's not something entirely unknown to them either. We saw various forms of adaptation in various wars including Afghanistan [the Soviets], Chechnya, Syria, etc. Granted they may lack the institutionalised means to adapt rapidly or effectively but it's not as if they never done it.

Well the Ukrainians are able to move relatively freely without overhead eyes watching them so I think that answers your question. The Russians are unable to provide air cover of any type for their air breathing ISR assets
Indeed but Russian manned and unmanned assets are still operating and AD systems still are a major inhibitor preventing the Ukrainians from fully deploying what air power they have. Irrespective of the fact that HARM strikes were well publisised we have no firm indicator as to how effectively they've degraded the Russian GBAD.
 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Nothing? Recall at the start of the conflict, Ukraine banned men aged 18 - 60 from leaving the country and did a general mobilization.

I would imagine those who are not already fighting would have already left the country earlier this year since they were <18. Would an autunm conscription (I suppose their normal cycle) make any sense at this point?
1. Not all Ukrainian males below the age of 18 were fleeing Ukraine
2. Many refugees have actually returned. Despite ongoing war and lack of access to care, many refugees return to Ukraine (who.int)

According to UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, over 10 million border crossings from Ukraine to the European Union (EU) took place from late February until mid-August. In the same period, there were also over 4 million crossings the other way, from the EU into Ukraine – the majority being refugees returning home.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
What's surprising about the role UASs are playing in the Ukraine is not the successes they've achieved or their widespread use [we expected this] but the fact they were able to operate in the face of strong AD and EW.
Do you have any evidence that UKR UAS have been able to operate successfully when facing "strong AD and EW"? Keep in mind, having e.g., S-300 in a region is not enough; it must also be fully operational including sensors working properly, and also manned by trained operators that are focusing on the task at hand, and are not busy drinking, smoking, or sleeping.
I think there's more to it than that. The Russians may not have a history of adaptation they way others do but it's not something entirely unknown to them either. We saw various forms of adaptation in various wars including Afghanistan [the Soviets], Chechnya, Syria, etc. Granted they may lack the institutionalised means to adapt rapidly or effectively but it's not as if they never done it.
I think many Russian soldiers (including many of their officers) lack a will to fight. Corruption plays an important part. It seems to me that the motivation many Russian soldiers (including high ranking officers) had for joining the army was to maximize personal profit; either by looting from the locals or stealing from the Russian army. This will affect morale both directly and indirectly and also shift focus from what was supposed to be main objective (winning a war). Corruption in the Russian Armed Forces | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org) Russian
Soldiers Send Home 58 Tons of Looted Items from Ukraine — Investigation - The Moscow Times
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
Do you have any evidence that UKR UAS have been able to operate successfully when facing "strong AD and EW"?
Would you agree with that Ukrainian UASs are still operating whether "successfully" or not? We know from reports [I posted links week ago] that the Ukrainians reported increasingly effective Russian EW which has has had some bearing on the ability to deploy UASs but has not prevented them from operating.

Keep in mind, having e.g., S-300 in a region is not enough; it must also be fully operational including sensors working properly, and also manned by trained operators that are focusing on the task at hand, and are not busy drinking, smoking, or sleeping.
I'm very aware that there can be a profound difference between having a system and having a system which one can operate effectively but thank you for the reminder...

I'm also aware that whatever shortcomings there may be in Russians systems or there way they are operated; that they have accounted for a share of Ukrainian air assets.

Corruption plays an important part
So we keep being reminded and yes there is no doubt but as Michael Kofman points out [in a link I posted weeks ago]; the corruption angle has been overstated and not all problems are the result of corruption.

I'm certainly no Michael Kofman but I will say that even if there was absolutely no corruption; the invasion still would have failed given manpower issues; unrealistic goals driven by flawed assumptions; a highly ambitious plan comprising non mutually supporting attacks from the north, north west; south west and south with inadequate resources and an army not suited for a protracted high level intensify fight of this magnitude.

It seems to me that the motivation many Russian soldiers (including high ranking officers) had for joining the army was to maximize personal profit; either by looting from the locals or stealing from the Russian army.
I have no idea thus I will not speculate.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member

IF accurate then the Kherson bridgehead is in serious trouble. Have read some claims that this push will go as far as the Inhulets river which will put any resupply well within range of standard artillery with out having to rely on specialty ammunition or HIMAR's.

With the Russian forces allegedly throwing all reerves trying to stop the push on Dudchany it has allowed the bridgehead over the Inhulets to break out which appears to be leading to a cascade failure in the front line that Russian doctrine is not equipped to stop. At this stage IMO the only thing that will stop them is Ukranian logistics not being able to keep up rather then any sound defence on the Russian part.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukraine cancels autumn conscription and postpones demobilization: Zelensky cancels autumn conscription, postpones demobilization (kyivindependent.com)

What are the implications of this? There have been a lot of speculations regarding both RU and UKR losses. We know that RU has started a huge mobilization effort, probably to compensate for significant losses. If UKR had similar losses, would it make sense to cancel autumn conscription?
I don't think this interpretation is correct. Ukraine already has a general mobilization in place and plenty of older people have been seen on the front line. It wouldn't make sense to not conscript 18 year olds when you're taking 45 year olds. What would make sense is 1) the training pipeline is full so there's no way to train and deploy more troops or 2) the mobilization process has superceded regular conscription and the regular conscription cycle is no longer necessary.

EDIT: Russian forces are withdrawing from the northern section of Kherson region. The stated reason is that they're looking to form a solid line of defense, instead of a series of positions. It sounds like they're once again short on forces.


And in the meantime Russian/rebel forces are advancing in Pervomayskoe, mirroring the situation in Kharkov where Russian front lines had collapsed in a broad section, but meanwhile the creeping offensive near Artemovsk/Bakhmut was continuing.

 
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Vivendi

Well-Known Member
I don't think this interpretation is correct. Ukraine already has a general mobilization in place and plenty of older people have been seen on the front line. It wouldn't make sense to not conscript 18 year olds when you're taking 45 year olds. What would make sense is 1) the training pipeline is full so there's no way to train and deploy more troops or 2) the mobilization process has superceded regular conscription and the regular conscription cycle is no longer necessary.
If Ukraine had lacked soldiers and also had a narrow training pipeline (in spite of soldiers being trained in the UK, Germany, Norway, Poland, Denmark and elsewhere??) then they could have postponed instead of cancelling the conscription, but they did not postpone, they cancelled. So, it seems to me that Ukraine is not desperate, and instead confident in their current pool of soldiers. Some have raised the question if Ukraine would have enough soldiers moving forward due to potentially heavy losses. It seems you agree that's not the case.

Interestingly Russia has not cancelled their autumn conscription but delayed it by one month. Presumably because they are not able to train conscripts and the mobilized forces at the same time.

In other news, Russia says they have mobilized 200,000 soldiers so far. At the same time, roughly the same number of Russian men have escaped to Kazakhstan since the "partial mobilization" was announced, according to the Financial Times Moscow Bureau Chef: Presumably many of those fleeing are somewhat more resourceful than those that did not manage to escape... I am guessing many of them even had jobs... This does not look very good for Russia, the brain drain was significant even before the mobilization. The bulk of 200,000 mobilized soldiers should arrive just in time for winter. It remains to be seen if Russia will be able to equip them all with proper winter equipment.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
If Ukraine had lacked soldiers and also had a narrow training pipeline (in spite of soldiers being trained in the UK, Germany, Norway, Poland, Denmark and elsewhere??) then they could have postponed instead of cancelling the conscription, but they did not postpone, they cancelled. So, it seems to me that Ukraine is not desperate, and instead confident in their current pool of soldiers. Some have raised the question if Ukraine would have enough soldiers moving forward due to potentially heavy losses. It seems you agree that's not the case.
Ukraine has enough soldiers. There is no shortage. Training pipeline throughput is a relative quantity. If Ukraine can train ~50k soldiers per month (not a real number just a hypothetical) and is already pulling this many through regular mobilization processes, does it make sense to also run the traditional fall conscription campaign?

Interestingly Russia has not cancelled their autumn conscription but delayed it by one month. Presumably because they are not able to train conscripts and the mobilized forces at the same time.
Maybe. Or maybe the military commissariats can't process that many at the same time. Russia also hasn't cancelled their demobilization. Russia and Ukraine retain a conscription system inherited from the USSR. Soldiers are drafted, serve their time, and then are demobbed. Ukraine is cancelling their demob for obvious reasons, and is also cancelling their fall draft. Russia isn't cancelling their demob so needs to replace the departing soldiers with someone. Hence fall draft continues.

In other news, Russia says they have mobilized 200,000 soldiers so far. At the same time 200,000 Russian men have escaped to Kazhakstan since the "partial mobilization" was announced, according to the Financial Times Moscow Bureau Chef: Presumably many of those fleeing are somewhat more resourceful than those that did not manage to escape... I am guessing many of them even had jobs... This does not look very good for Russia, the brain drain was significant even before the mobilization. The bulk of 200,000 mobilized soldiers should arrive just in time for winter. It remains to be seen if Russia be able to equip them all with proper winter equipment.
There is also a divide within Russia about attitudes towards this war. It's just resources that separate those who leave and those who stay. Remember, Russia fought this war for months with an all volunteer force. Even when Russia's regular MoD contract soldier program was insufficient, Russia pulled a number of volunteer formations before resorting to the draft. Someone in Russia is happy to go fight in this war. Someone is happy to take their remote IT job and move to Tbilisi or Tselinograd, I mean Astana, I mean Nur-Sultan, I mean... wait, Astana again? ( :oops: )
 
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