Part 3 of 3: Updates on Lyman & beyond
I would submit that even with Chinese involvement, a full economic mobilization for industrial war would still put the collective West ahead. But I don't think that's what's on the table.
7. Unless the Russians screw up, operationally, the picture on the Kherson front is complex and dynamic. In Kherson, Ukrainian forces are at risk from Russian artillery fire onto their positions. It can happen, but I suspect this will not be an easy rush through territory on the scale seen at Kharkiv. However, we can trace the general pattern—that is Ukraine dictating the operational tempo at the moment. Therefore, I suspect that Alexander Stubb is over optimistic in his thinking the medium-to-long term predictions from the war on Ukraine.
(a) I agree that with Alexander Stubb that in the short term, Russia’s strategy has not changed. The aim is to secure a land link to the Crimean peninsula and continue the weaponisation of energy. The referenda and annexation of semi-occupied regions, combined with the late partial mobilisation of troops, are expected of Putin.
(b) I strongly believe that it is at the medium term that the West will stumble. The key variable in the medium term is Western resilience. Is Europe able to stay united over the second half of 2023 or will Putin be able to split the pack of the Europeans in general vs the Eastern Europeans?
(c) I suspect that increasingly, US public interest in supporting the war in Ukraine will dim — certainly by 2024, if not earlier. If the war ends in 2024 orc” late 2025, the reconstruction and integration of Ukraine will entail so much money that both EU members and NATO members will begin to act in a manner to reflect their usual selfish desires.
8. While a potential short-term Russian tactical defeats in Ukraine raises many interesting questions. It becomes an opportunity to surmise on outcomes for EU, NATO and Russia. IMO, a tactical Russian defeat in the short-term does not automatically mean an Ukrainian victory in the long term.
9. More good news on the Kherson front for Ukraine. This move, as Dr Mike Martin, says has been repeated now several times.
(a) In the latest move, the Ukrainian Army has broken though Russian positions and driven down the T-04-03 HWY. The terrain along T-04-03 Hwy down to Nova Kakhovka is flat with no cover. The fact that the Ukrainian Army has penetrated over 70km into Russian lines in Kherson Oblast, shows the degree of collapse.
(b) This move down T-04-03 HWY will get around the Russians in static defence and will mean that pockets in the future will collapse. Combat also reported in the urban areas of the town of Dudchny. I initially thought Dr Mike Martin was too optimistic but it turns out to be true.
(c) There are unconfirmed reports that Ukraine Forces advanced up to 70km along the Dnieper river and are advancing 'towards the direction of Beryslav'. They have also managed earlier, to arrive at Zolota Balka, Leninske, Khreschenivka (visual confirmation that Ukrainian troops have entered the town) and Liubymivka (contested since middle of Aug 2022).
10. I have seen too many supporters wrongly call the quick Ukrainian advance at Kharkiv earlier a “thunder run”, when it was not. Likewise, when the initial offensive at Kherson met with little progress 3 weeks ago, Russian propaganda tried to present as a victory, when it was not.
(a) Early Ukrainian success at Kharkiv drained Russian ability to conduct a full scale counter attack in Kherson — which is why the Ukrainian Army can nibble at the edges of a strong static Russian defence, to make their initial determination at Kherson Oblast meaningless. The 70km advance towards the direction of Beryslav' rather than the city itself, is a sign of the Russians in trouble.
(b) Russian military bloggers confirming previous information that Ukrainians used widespread deception — including using Russian identifying marks Z and V on vehicles — to penetrate deep behind Russian lines in Kherson. IMHO, the Russians have lost both air superiority and fires superiority at at Kherson Oblast (with Ukraine’s FSCL moving forward faster than Russian sense and strike)— if not the Russians would have killed this squeeze play.