The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Latest reports I've seen are that the Russians have said they have withdrawn from Lyman. No reports of numbers of prisoners.
There is apparently still fighting on the eastern outskirts. But it looks like a withdrawal in progress.

Ukrainian column gets hit near Yampol', possibly footage from the 29th.


Ukrainian forces at the entrance to Liman.


Russian artillery fires near Liman.


Meanwhile Russian MoD acknowledges a withdrawal forced by the threat of encirclement.

 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
There is apparently still fighting on the eastern outskirts. But it looks like a withdrawal in progress.

Ukrainian column gets hit near Yampol', possibly footage from the 29th.


Ukrainian forces at the entrance to Liman.


Russian artillery fires near Liman.


Meanwhile Russian MoD acknowledges a withdrawal forced by the threat of encirclement.

For a few days there have been reports of encirclement of the soldiers in Lyman and that the only way out was via a road without concealment from artillery
Russia will have to ask Ukraine to allow troops out of “Lyman cauldron” - advisor to Zelensky's office chief (ukrinform.net) Russia Withdraws Forces From Lyman In Major Victory For Ukraine (rferl.org)
Ukraine Situation Report: Russian-Occupied City Of Lyman Falls (thedrive.com)
Is it accurate to suggest that Russian forces were allowed to leave largely unhindered after originally not being allowed to withdraw ?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
For a few days there have been reports of encirclement of the soldiers in Lyman and that the only way out was via a road without concealment from artillery
Russia will have to ask Ukraine to allow troops out of “Lyman cauldron” - advisor to Zelensky's office chief (ukrinform.net) Russia Withdraws Forces From Lyman In Major Victory For Ukraine (rferl.org)
Ukraine Situation Report: Russian-Occupied City Of Lyman Falls (thedrive.com)
Is it accurate to suggest that Russian forces were allowed to leave largely unhindered after originally not being allowed to withdraw ?
I don't think it is. I think they had to fight their way out with significant casualties. It's not actually clear how firm Russia's front line is even now, east of Liman.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third phase.

First phase - Blitz into Kyiv and every major city, on multiple fronts, with massive air and sea elements. Utter failure.
Second phase - Consolidation in a strip single that encompasses eastern Ukraine and a slow offensive along entire front. Limited success including capture of several strategic areas.
Third phase - Defense of multiple strategic points. So far, a limited failure.

 

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Third phase - Defense of multiple strategic points. So far, a limited failure.
I wonder what the next phase would be. Fortify Crimea and the pocket of eastern Ukraine they held before the start of the invasion, in the hope they don't get totally defeated?

The war still has a way to go, but so far Russia's plans have all failed. They're barely holding on to Plan C, and if Kherson falls they'll probably have to move on to Plan D.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member

Although this was written months ago the points made are still valid and thought provoking. The writer challenges the assumptions that the Russians did badly because they aren't like "us" and the Ukrainians have done well because they're like "us".

"What if, however, the analysts are seeing the lessons from Ukraine incorrectly, through lenses refracted by their own biases and hubris? What if the key variable is not the professionalism of the Russian military, but the nature of this war?"

"This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices
"

"These experts also offer comforting conclusions: The good guys, who look like us, are beating the bad guys, with our help. It is a righteous war. We would do just fine. These are also dangerous conclusions, from two perspectives.

"First, they validate current U.S. approaches without looking beyond first-order explanations for Russian inadequacies to learn from them. In the parlance of how the U.S. military parses things — doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, facilities, and policy — the Russian military is similar in most of these areas to the U.S. military with two glaring exceptions — their obvious deficiencies in leadership and people. This shows the validity of our doctrine, organizations, training, and materiel — both on hand and being developed for competition and potential conflict with China and Russia. There’s no need to look behind these doors if the real problem is people and leaders
."

"As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is"

As Michael Kofman keeps reminding us; it's still early days and there's a lot we don't know. He also points out that it would be a mistake to assume the U.S. army - an army superior in various areas compared to Russia's - would fare better.

As for Russian plans; I can't see them doing anything but to try and hold what ground they have for the next few months until things improve for them. They've lost the initiative.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I wonder what the next phase would be. Fortify Crimea and the pocket of eastern Ukraine they held before the start of the invasion, in the hope they don't get totally defeated?

The war still has a way to go, but so far Russia's plans have all failed. They're barely holding on to Plan C, and if Kherson falls they'll probably have to move on to Plan D.
I believe there's only a certain capacity to which Ukraine can defeat Russia. Pushing it into smaller areas certainly doesn't improve Ukraine's tactical superiority as it means Russia can defend few areas better.
Given Ukraine's desire to liberate its territories and nothing beyond it, we might see 2014-era artillery exchanges being a common occurrence, but along the actual Russia-Ukraine border and not Donbass.
In that situation, Russia would likely have some superiority, due to a higher capacity to produce war material.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
UKR forces have entered Torske.


I wonder how long they can keep this tempo up.

Supposedly there is a UKR armored attack in the Kherson region, but Im trying to corroborate that.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
UKR forces have entered Torske.


I wonder how long they can keep this tempo up.

Supposedly there is a UKR armored attack in the Kherson region, but Im trying to corroborate that.

I can confirm. There's a Ukrainian attack on the Krivoy Rog axis that has gained some ground.

 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Deep State Map is now showing the armored push towards Dudchany, along the Dnepr. UKR is finally breaking loose in Kherson ?

Supposedly Strelkov tweeted the same, but I would like to see confirmation. I dont place much faith in a single twitter.

@vikingatespam How about a link to said map so that the rest of us can judge for ourselves.

Ngatimozart.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa-Krivoy Rog.

A rare 2B26 Grad firing in Kherson region. A handful of these Kamaz-based Grads were delivered a while ago.


There is reportedly a failed Ukrainian attack at Ternovie Pody, with 2 POWs and a destroyed BMP. We can also see a damaged BMP-2, but I suspect it's Russian. Ukrainian BMP-2 sightings are rare, while in Russia it's the most common IFV. It's also painted in standard Soviet green, while Ukraine typically repaints their vehicles.


Another Ukrainian attack took place at Pravdino where it also failed with losses. We can see what appear to be Ukrainian MBTs and BMPs getting hit.
Russian strikes, somewhere in the south.


I believe this shot is also from Pravdino. We can see a destroyed BMP (1?) in the back, a destroyed BMP-2 in the front, and a Ukrainian Novator armored car. I suspect all vehicles are Ukrainian.


More footage of the failed attack at Pravdino. You can see the same groupings of destroyed vehicles that we saw above.


I think this is also Pravdino.


A BMP-2 and BTR-3 captured after a failed Ukrainian attack.


A destroyed Husky TSV, Kherson region. Unclear if one of the ones we've seen previously or another one taken out.


Allegedly a Ukrainian team trying to cross the Dnepr and getting hit.


Russian strikes on Ukrainian positions in Belogorka, Kherson region. Allegedly the 76th VDV striking.


Russian strikes on Nikolaev.


Russian strikes on Krivoy Rog. At least some are apparently done by loitering munitions.


Apparently Russia hit the South-Ukrainian NPP.


Russian loitering munition strikes in Odessa. Some port structures and the naval HQ got hit. Ukrainian troops apparently attempted to bring it down with small-arms fire.


Battle damage in Kherson. There was another significant series of strikes there. Targets hit include a fire station.


More footage of battle damage to the Antonov bridge.


Battle damage in Novaya Kahovka. One of the targets was apparently a power grid substation.


Geran'-2 fragments, Nikolaev region.


Russia has put up additional crossing points at the Novo-Kahovskaya dam.


Russia is also repairing the crossing at the dam itself.


A pair of Russian Tu-95MS were spotted over Kherson region. It's unclear why, since their main weapon is a cruise missile with very long range.


Russian National Guard in Skadovsk.


Some footage of the referendum in Kherson region.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian UAV-directed AGS-17 fires.


Russian Buk SAM firing, target unclear, Zaporozhye region.


Russian strikes on Ukrainian troops, Zaporozhye region.


Russian strikes in Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk.


One of the targets in Zaporozhye was a hotel. Another was a powergrid substation.


Russian forces apparently captured a T-72M1 in Zaporozhye area.


The cooling pipes of the Zaporozhskaya NPP are damaged, allegedly Ukrainian shelling.


Allegedly a Ukrainian strike hit grain storage facilities in Tokamak, Zaporozhye region.


Some footage from the referendum in Zaporozhye region.


Russia is reportedly forming a btln of locals in Zaporozhye region. Note, Russia has twice previously announced the formation of units out of locals in occupied areas. Nothing has materialized after the initial announcement and some PR-footage.


Kharkov-Sumy.

Russian strikes landing in Kharkov.


One of the targets allegedly a fuel storage facility.


Battle damage in Kharkov to the rail station. Reportedly this is a Tornado-S strike.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Oskol Front.

Russian mortar fires near Liman, pre-withdrawal.


Ukrainian BTR-(70?), a near-miss ATGM.


A destroyed Ukrainian Mamba Mk2 (1st link), Varta (2nd/3rd link) and Novator (4th link) armored cars.


Destroyed BTR-4 near Kupyansk.


A Russian medic who was in Izyum shares some interesting details about their operations. According to him 95% of Russian WIA are wounded by explosions. Reportedly he's part of a volunteer btln where people serve on 3 month contracts.


LDNR Front.

Apparently another Ukrainian attack on Peski got hit.


Russian T-90A in action near Mar'inka.


DNR Kaskad btln taking out two Ukrainian MT-12 Rapira guns near Ugledar.


Russian strikes on Ukrainian forces near Ugledar.


Russian strikes on Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Russian/rebel troops firing incendiary munitions at Ukrainian positions in Ozernoe.


Fires burn after recent strikes in Kramatorsk.


Shelling of Donetsk continues. Warning footage of corpses.


The Slavyansk power plant after recent strikes.


Battle damage in Pervomaysk, allegedly a HIMARS strike.


Overrun Ukrainian positions near substation Donbasskaya 750, near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Footage of Russian Wagner fighters near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


A look at the Wagner fighter's Chekan armored truck. It's been seen before in Libya. At least two existed at one point. This one is currently near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Footage of the LNR 6th Cossack Rgt.


DNR forces are reporting they've taken the villange of Zhovanka. Note the map in the post shows Mayorka not under control, but it was earlier reportedly taken. Veracity of all of this is unclear.


Footage from the referendum in Mariupol'.


Russia.

Russian air defenses firing, Belgorod region.


An unmanned naval system was destroyed near Sevastopol'. It apparently failed to reach it's target and then either self-destructed or was destroyed by Russian forces. The third link has good photos of the system. It might be a western-supplied system, it certainly doesn't look like anything I'm familiar with.


Allegedly a Ukrainian UAV shot down over Dzhankoy, Crimea.


Another allegedly Ukrainian UAV landed in the Nizhnegorskiy region of Crimea. Reportedly Ukraine is putting red stars on the wings to disguise the UAVs as Russian.


Russian town of Valuyki was hit hard recently, a downed Tochka can be seen there.


Russian troops apparently firing illumination rounds on the border with Kharkov region.


The Alga volunteer btln from Tatarstan is receiving new armored trucks.


Russian transport planes have begun flying to Iran, presumably picking up more UAVs.


Footage from Russia's mobilization efforts. Long lines around the military commissariat offices. It's unclear why it's being done in this rushed and poorly organized manner. The military bureaucracy is clearly not ready for the influx of people.


Russian State Duma Deputy Yuriy Shvytkin has apparently volunteered to be mobilized for the war effort. He is a retired VDV officer that subsequently served as a commander in an MVD SOBR unit.


Russia has apparently replaced it's head of logistics, General Bulgakov. It's unclear where he is going and who is replacing him.


Misc.

Russian T-80BVM firing on Ukrainian infantry. Location and context unclear.


Russian T-72B takes an ATGM hit but apparently survives.


Ukrainian pickup truck firing an SPG-9. Location and context unclear.


Apparently Russian SpN in action, Ukraine. Based on the uniforms I suspect these are National Guard.


A downed Ukrainian Su-25, location and context unclear.


Destroyed BTR-3, Ukrainian, somewhere in the South.


Ukrainian armored Humvee destroyed, allegedly by a tank shell.


Ukrainian soldiers cheering a destroyed vehicle, but it's a Ukrainain BTR-4.


Ukrainian Kozak armored car destroyed, location and context unclear.


A captured YPR-765, possibly the same one we've seen before.


Russian tanks with improvised up-armoring.


Russian armored Ural truck. This time not haphazard.


Ukrainian technical with a 240. Location and context unclear.


Russian Su-34 ops, with Kh-29 missiles.


Russian Mi-28Ns over Ukraine. Note the rocket pods and lack of ATGMs.


Russia and Ukraine have done a major exchange of POWs with reportedly 55 Russian and rebel POWs exchanged for ~200 Ukrainian ones, including Azov leadership and foreign fighters. Reportedly Ukraine also handed over the Ukrainian politician Medvedchuk, who is not a combatant nor a POW but is being exchanged like one. This questionable practice goes back to 2014.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
NATO/EU.

Germany will hand over 4 more PzH-2000s to Ukraine. This will bring Ukraine's total inventory to 22.


Ukraine is reportedly receiving 28 T-55-M55S tanks from Slovenia. These are MBTs with a NATO standard 105mm gun. If correct this indicates the beginning of a transition to western-style MBT guns, and opens the door on deliveries of M-60s and Leo-1s.


Croatian-supplied M46 130mm Soviet howitzers have been spotted in Ukraine. I think this is their first sighting.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I'm now 9 days behind. Unfortunately it's moving in the wrong direction.
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Deep State Map is now showing the armored push towards Dudchany, along the Dnepr. UKR is finally breaking loose in Kherson ?

Supposedly Strelkov tweeted the same, but I would like to see confirmation. I dont place much faith in a single twitter.
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewe...S&ll=47.15854092741412,33.59473196169771&z=10

According to google their are unconfirmed reports they are already at Dudchany.

According to @WarMonitor3 on Twitter Russian forces are trying to throw any reserves they have to hold the line and apperantly Russian forces have been using Telegram to call in air support...... Which if accurate is not only very desperate but also very dangerous especially if some one decides to start throw out false targets to mess with the RuAF and f***s it up.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=180u1IkUjtjpdJWnIC0AxTKSiqK4G6Pez&hl=en_US&ll=47.15854092741412,33.59473196169771&z=10

According to google their are unconfirmed reports they are already at Dudchany.

According to @WarMonitor3 on Twitter Russian forces are trying to throw any reserves they have to hold the line and apperantly Russian forces have been using Telegram to call in air support...... Which if accurate is not only very desperate but also very dangerous especially if some one decides to start throw out false targets to mess with the RuAF and f***s it up.
I am happy to see something breaking loose in the Kherson region, but I await pictoral proof of this breakthrough.

Who would be insane enough to try and drop air or artillery support using social media
 

vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
I am happy to see something breaking loose in the Kherson region, but I await pictoral proof of this breakthrough.

Who would be insane enough to try and drop air or artillery support using social media
I agree on waiting for confirmation of claims which is why I like google maps, gives you the rough unit locations with confirmed and unconfirmed territorial changes

As to insane enough I'm not so sure it's a fact of being sane or not but rather an indication of 1. The breakdown in communication and 2. IMO a perfect picture to show the top down model of Russian command and control is far too slow to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances on the front so the blokes in the trenches are trying to bypass command and speak directly to who they need to.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
As to insane enough I'm not so sure it's a fact of being sane or not but rather an indication of 1. The breakdown in communication and 2. IMO a perfect picture to show the top down model of Russian command and control is far too slow to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances on the front so the blokes in the trenches are trying to bypass command and speak directly to who they need to.
I imagine how this goes:

Ru unit: NET, this is RU 1, requesting artillery support at 8675309, over
NET: RU1, why are you sending me donkey porn, over
RU1: what ? We didnt send that, but I have a great deal on car insurance, over
NET: RU1, are you the real RU1, over

and so on....
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
ISW Updates.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
October 1, 7 pm ET

Full article:
The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.

  • Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.
  • Russia is likely setting conditions to assume legal responsibility for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
  • Ukrainian troops are continuing to conduct counteroffensive operations in Kherson Oblast and setting conditions for future advances.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas of Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued routine strikes against Ukrainian rear areas in the south.
  • Russian military leadership is continuing to compromise the future reconstitution of the force by prioritizing the immediate mobilization of as many bodies as possible for ongoing fighting in Ukraine.
  • Russian mobilization authorities continue to carry out discriminatory mobilization practices.


Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces inflicted another significant operational defeat on Russia and liberated Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, on October 1.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lyman to “more advantageous positions” to avoid the “threat of encirclement” in the settlement.[1] Social media footage and Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces have entered Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.

The Russian information space – composed of Kremlin propagandists, pundits, and milbloggers – registered the defeat as the result of the Russian military command’s failure to send reinforcements in a timely manner, while openly criticizing repeated bureaucratic failures during the mobilization.[2] Russian commentators overwhelmingly expressed their hopes that partial mobilization would generate enough force to resume offensive operations and regain the initiative. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, apparently devastated by the defeat in Lyman, called on Russia to continue to fight to ”liberate” the four annexed territories with all available means including low-yield nuclear weapons.[3]

Kadyrov’s rant is similar to the disorganized and often hyperbolic milblogger rants that call for the Kremlin to continue the war in Ukraine, and his call for the use of nuclear weapons was not representative of the discourse within the Russian information space. Russian federal TV channels and ultra-hawkish milbloggers have often discussed Russian nuclear capabilities as part of their efforts to stoke patriotic sentiments among Russian domestic audiences, and Kadyrov’s statement was not especially noteworthy in this context.

Kadyrov’s call for using tactical nuclear weapons is likely inconsistent with his demands to continue the “special military operation” to bring more Ukrainian territory under Russian control. The Russian military in its current state is almost certainly unable to operate on a nuclear battlefield even though it has the necessary equipment and has historically trained its units to do so. The chaotic agglomeration of exhausted contract soldiers, hastily mobilized reservists, conscripts, and mercenaries that currently comprise the Russian ground forces could not function in a nuclear environment. Any areas affected by Russian tactical nuclear weapons would thus be impassable for the Russians, likely precluding Russian advances. This consideration is another factor that reduces the likelihood of Russian tactical nuclear weapons use.

Kadyrov blamed the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, for failures around Lyman. Kadyrov’s attacks gained significant traction within the Russian information space and indicate that the rift between Russian traditional and non-traditional forces is likely growing. Kadyrov stated that Lapin, responsible for the ”central” group of forces in Ukraine, failed to properly equip units operating in the Lyman area and moved his headquarters far from the frontlines. Kadyrov also accused the Russian General Staff and specifically Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, of covering up Lapin’s failures. Wagner Group financier Evgeniy Prigozhin publicly agreed with Kadyrov’s criticism of Lapin, saying that the higher military command should fight “barefoot with machine guns on the frontlines.”[4] Milbloggers and state television hosts praised Kadyrov‘s and Prigozhin’s critiques of the Russian military command, adding that the command is corrupt and disinterested in Russian strategic goals.[5] Kadyrov, Lapin, and Prigozhin are all operating in the Donbas sector, and such comments indicate the strains within the Russian forces operating in Ukraine and their leadership. The Kremlin may be amplifying such criticism to set informational conditions for personnel changes within the higher military command in weeks to come.

The defeat around Lyman also indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin – who has reportedly been micromanaging Russian commanders on the ground – is deprioritizing defending Luhansk Oblast in favor of holding occupied territories in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian sources consistently indicate that Russian forces continued to reinforce Russian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, despite the recent collapse of the Kharkiv-Izyum front and even as the Russian positions around Lyman collapsed.[6] The decision not to reinforce vulnerable Kupyansk or Lyman front lines was almost certainly Putin’s, not that of the military command, and suggests that Putin cares far more about holding the strategic terrain of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts than he does about Luhansk Oblast.

Russia is likely setting conditions to assume legal responsibility for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Russian authorities detained the general director of the ZNPP, Ihor Murashov, on September 30.[7] A Russian miblogger claimed that Murashov’s detention will have no tangible impact on the operation of the plant since the power units are already shut down and stated that authorities are currently undertaking ”routine“ legal work to transfer control of the plant to Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom and create a new legal entity for the ZNPP.[8] Murashov’s detention and the ”legal” process of transferring control of the ZNPP to Rosatom are noteworthy indications that Russian authorities will likely seek to exploit their control of the ZNPP to pressure the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize the illegal Russian annexations of occupied Ukrainian territory by coercing it to acknowledge Russia‘s legal control over the ZNPP.

Russian forces conducted a failed ground attack on Kozacha Lopan in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack on Kozacha Lopan, 5km from the Kharkiv Oblast-Russia border.[9] Such attacks indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin likely retains the aim of regaining control of territory beyond the oblasts he has illegally annexed and is willing to allocate Russian military assets to such offensive actions rather than dedicating them to defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Donbas.
 
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