Post 1 of 5: Learn from each other, please
1. The amount of Russian equipment Ukraine will seize in their advance, if they succeed in their push along the Dnipro river banks in Kherson, will be totally unprecedented.
(a) The Russians are running to stop being encircled. But its open country along the banks of the Dnipro river as the Ukrainian Army herd the trapped Russian Army to set up a defence line at the Nova Kakhovka dam and a second line at the Inhulets river.
(b) Some Russians will fight but others will escape over the Nova Kakhovka dam (if the defences there fall), but most will retreat to Inhulets. There will be tons of trapped Russian equipment that cannot cross back to the other side of the Inhulets river. The Antonovsky bridge is destroyed. Once the Russians are trapped there, we could be looking at a mass surrender in Kherson. Russia will have to confront an unprecedented type of loss.
(c) The Americans may be supplying Ukraine with weapons but the Russians seem to be trying to match American efforts at the Inhulets River. We can see this from a mile off.
Defence forces around the world would be learning an incredible amount at the moment and I think there will be massive changes to things like force structures, procurement priorities and defense tech design and development in the very near future, based on learnings from Ukraine.
2. You may be misinformed — procurement priorities in a logical planning process in countries like Finland, Korea or Isreal would not be affected. IMHO, some Australian politicians and think tanks, like ASPI, are in the business of destroying your country’s needed military capabilities by refusing at times to act on recommendations (or making timely investments), to enable an Australian armoured brigade to fight a near-peer enemy. Australia is a force contributor, in coalition with the Americans in war. You are a country that can’t fight by itself in a near peer war without America.
3. Australian politics has ensured that your country’s army is an unbalanced force. As a balanced force of 70,000 troops, Singapore’s 3rd Division, 6th Division and 9th Divisions are operating HIMARS since 2009 —in May 2022, 13 years later, Australia finally requests for 20 M142 HIMARS. The level of armour we have in a Singapore Armoured Brigade (SAB) or a motorised Singapore Infantry Brigade (SIB) is viewed by many as overmatch for our notional enemy. See the video below for the varied types and the ecology of armour, on street display for a city fight, for a SAB and a SIB.
(a) In Ukraine, Bushmasters are pushed to the front in such a way that it can end up facing a column of Russian BMP-2 / BMP-3 IFVs, BTR-70s / BTR-80s and Russian tanks — don’t learn the wrong lesson from the war in Ukraine. The M113 AS4 in Australian Army service will eventually be replaced in coming years by the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) capability being delivered under Project LAND 400 Phase 3. M113s are APCs, not IFVs. Doctrine for their use is different. Bet you don’t know that.
(b) Modern balanced forces are in a rush retire all M113s because the tech used for protection is so badly dated — it is no longer threat relevant. In the Planning-Readiness-Execute-Assess (PREA) cycle, a war is part of the feedback loops. In the current PREA loop, planners notice that Ukrainian troops are dying because the belly armour of the M113s suck so bad. But guess what? It’s design as an APC is much better than a technical or a Soviet era BMP-2 IFV or BTR-70 / BTR-80.
(c) Like a MRAP, the Bushmaster is a protected mobility vehicle, it can’t fight a Russian BMP-3 IFV.
And MRAPs are a South African invention — the Casspir infantry mobility vehicle was developed for the South African Defence Force in the 1980s, IIRC. But guess what? MRAPs can’t fight IFVs with 30mm cannons. There is no need to write a ton of bullsh!t, if you don’t know or understand the difference (between MRAPs/PMVs, APCs & IFVs) because I can assure you that like me,
@Big_Zucchini, knows how these are to be employed in war.
(d) The US in this tranche is shipping 200 MaxxPro MRAPs because Ukrainian troops in Soviet era APCs, BTR-3s and M113s are dying from anti-tank mines. Thus far, Russia did not or could not execute combined arms operations in Ukraine — therefore, we need to be careful about drawing the wrong warfare lessons from it.
4. With a population of 25.8 million, the entire Australian Army of 60,330 is comprised of 2 divisions — do you know how small that is for a country of this size? No one preparing for a near peer fight (eg. Poland, US, Korea & India) are training at brigade level — they are training at division level, in two sided-exercises, while concurrently trying to sort out the logistics of moving divisions to fight concurrently in Corp sectors or to echelon divisions, to exploit the engagement of a division with the enemy forces by pushing another division into a fight.
(a) The Australian Army is so tiny, it can’t deploy even a single division — your current goal is to have the resources to deploy a brigade as a course of action (COA) to a regional security contingency. Thankfully, with 2 LHDs, a LPD and a fleet of C-17s, the RAN and RAAF combined are almost there. If a contingency occurs in Korea, your country will just be a minor force contributor.
(b) In Korea with a population of 51.3 million, the ROK Army of 464,000 comprises of 9 corps, (36 divisions), plan to fight at Corps and above. The Australian Army does not have Corp Commander because you don’t have the forces. Speaking of Korea, in the Battle of Maryang San, “3 RAR used 900,000 rounds of small arms, 5,000 grenades and 7,000 mortar rounds during the five-day battle.” I can tell you that Australian does not have the logistics means to ship this amount of ammo, per battalion, to a remote island for it’s sole division.
(c) Keep in mind that the PLA methodically assembles capabilities and tactics under its concept of systems warfare, which targets perceived vulnerabilities of expected Japanese/American forces and plans. As a situation moves toward conflict, the PLA shifts to the “readiness” phase, in which it postures specific units and tailors COAs for expected operations.
5. In FPDA, Australia is the leader but it is the SAF that provides mass, if a true peer war contingency occurs.
(a) In a true sh!t hit the fan peer enemy contingent, it will take Australia 12 to 18 months to ramp up its force structure, to its max. war fighting size of 2 divisions. In the meanwhile, our conscripts in 3 divisions will have to hold the line for FPDA forces for 3 to 6 months, while screaming for help from anyone, including Uncle SAM.
(b) For Singapore, the SAF does not fight as a Corp because we don’t want to resource it, at this time. The need does not arise for Singapore to fight above the division level. The SAF’s division (with its SAB as its armoured punch and 2 SIBs to deliver infantry), is a force for overmatch in our threat matrix and we don’t want to appear to be capable of fighting a ‘peer’ enemy of America — naming a competitor as an enemy is a sure way to make one.
