What the Ukrainian Army needs and what it gets are different things. They really need SF trained foreign personnel to train the trainers — to improve the quality of military instruction for their recon teams & other specialists (like ATGM teams & snipers), but that is not how these foreign fighters are being used — in a way that is a pity.From what I have heard, talking to someone who is going through the process, the UKR embassy does some sort of check, but I would be surprised if this was anything other than cursory criminal record check.
Being shot at is not the main reason foreigners are getting out.I would also imagine that some fraction of people who went over with the right motivations, but no actual 11B experience, probably returned in a hurry when they realized the reality of being on a 2-way rifle range.
Yes but how many of these foreign volunteers actually are actually qualified to provide such training? Ex military they may be but not necessarily SF or sniper trained. Also after 100 days of war there's also the likely possibility that some locals might have more combat experience than the foreign volunteers.They really need SF trained foreign personnel to train the trainers — to improve the quality of military instruction for their recon teams & other specialists (like ATGM teams & snipers), but that is not how these foreign fighters are being used — in a way that is a pity.
It might well be true, but how many of these experienced locals actually get to rotate out of frontline combat into a training role to build the next generation? I do not have facts for Ukraine, but history (WWII) shows that when the situation gets desperate, countries will throw their best and most experienced forces repeatedly into the cauldron to stem losses.Also after 100 days of war there's also the likely possibility that some locals might have more combat experience than the foreign volunteers.
Ukraine is not running out of manpower. So far the intensity of the fighting and the scale of casualties simply isn't high enough for that. If that's your point, you are completely correct. For practical purposes both Russia and Ukraine currently have unlimited manpower reserves in principle. The issue is the effectiveness of mobilizing those reserves, and the willingness of various state apparatuses to take steps to do so. For example, if Russia were to send commissariat service members to beaches to draft people, it would cause a huge uproar. But Ukraine is currently doing it.Thanks -- if we assume 30-35 million it is still a significant number of people. The population of Finland when the winter war started in 1939 was 3.7 million people. Whereas the population of the USSR at that time was estimated to 168 million. Russia's population today is around 145 million.
I wouldn't be surprised if these numbers were fairly accurate. Oryx lists confirmed by photos kills. Ukrainian OPSEC has been reasonably good. Consider how rare sightings of Ukrainian T-64BVs have become. T-80BVs have disappeared almost entirely (they were mainly used by the Marines and Airmobile Bdes). Meanwhile we see the "new" T-72Ms in larger quantities and greater frequencies. I suspect Ukraine has gone through anywhere from 30-60% of their pre-war inventory for any given ground forces equipment types.National Defense Magazine published an Interview with Denys Sharapov, Ukraine’s deputy minister of the defense in charge of procurement, and Brig. Gen. Volodymyr Karpenko, land forces command logistics commander.
These are, as stated, very rough approximations made up by a single officer during the interview. In addition some have pointed out that ukraine might overstate its current losses in order to heighten the pressure on donor nations to send more aid (Arestovich stating 500 kia per day for example seems extremly high).
For context Oryx lists as today 192 Tanks, 135 IFV (+88 AFV / 67 APC / 104 IMV) and 34 towed + 40 SP artillery systems as losses for the UAF.
Given how little we hear about the situation the UAF are in I thought it would still be interesting for some of you.
Experience is only valuable if it leads to changes in how units operate, and if it's institutionalized, analyzed, and understood. Prime example, the Syrian Arab Army has a very high volume of experience, but their ability to put that experience to good use is limited. As a result, a country with minimal recent combat experience (South Korea for example) can often perform much better. Militaries are organizations and institutional strength is different from individual experience.Yes but how many of these foreign volunteers actually are actually qualified to provide such training? Ex military they may be but no necessarily SF or sniper trained. Also after 100 days of war there's also the likely possibility that some locals might have more combat experience than the foreign volunteers.
Yes but how many of these foreign volunteers actually are actually qualified to provide such training? Ex military they may be but no necessarily SF or sniper trained. Also after 100 days of war there's also the likely possibility that some locals might have more combat experience than the foreign volunteers.
2. Agreed. Thanks for the firm rebuttal to STURM’s admittedly rare bullshit. What are the truths we should look out for? Artillery as the king of battle, remain the greatest killer on the battlefield and flooded plains with mud continues to suck the momentum out of armies. The rate at which the Ukrainian Army can absorb western 155mm artillery may determine the outcome of the war in some cases.Experience is only valuable if it leads to changes in how units operate, and if it's institutionalized, analyzed, and understood. Prime example, the Syrian Arab Army has a very high volume of experience, but their ability to put that experience to good use is limited. As a result, a country with minimal recent combat experience (South Korea for example) can often perform much better. Militaries are organizations and institutional strength is different from individual experience.
3. My apologies for my unfiltered thoughts in response to your critique; 90% of what you write in your posts is excellent but there’s 10% that is coloured by a lens with no bearing on the ‘truth’ of a post.Yes but how many of these foreign volunteers actually are actually qualified to provide such training?
5. Go look in detail of the SF types that are moving in roving teams in Ukraine instead of disagreeing for the sake of disagreement. Like you, I have done some basic reading about the Ukrainian Army — it’s strength is often mischaracterised in the press in an over simplistic way by some (claiming that NCOs make the difference). There is more nuance involved than that.Ex military they may be but not necessarily SF or sniper trained.
6. If you want to be a critic taking pot shots, get the facts right. The Ukrainian Army has been fighting for years, since 2014 — it’s not just the last 100 days.Also after 100 days of war there's also the likely possibility that some locals might have more combat experience than the foreign volunteers.
Can you be more specific, and ideally provide the reports in question? It's very hard to speak to something so vague. I'm sure there's regular corruption and theft.There have been reports that weapons even first aid having been diverted in Ukraine from its forces is it known how much and who has been behind this and what steps are being taken to curtail this????
is there any value add in what you are saying — disagreeing for the sake of appearances?
I wasn't taking taking pot shots or disagreeing for the sake of doing so. I get no added value from doing that, not do I get any satisfaction from it.6. If you want to be a critic taking pot shots, get the facts right. The Ukrainian Army has been fighting for years, since 2014 — it’s not just the last 100 days.
An Earlier reportCan you be more specific, and ideally provide the reports in question? It's very hard to speak to something so vague. I'm sure there's regular corruption and theft.
Gotcha, that makes sense. I've seen similar reports though without much detail from Russian sources. It makes sense too. Ukraine has been selling weapons to all kinds of customers for a long time. Honestly I don't think this is a major concern at this time, unless the scale threatens to undermine the war effort. Ukraine has one hell of an anti-corruption effort to make if it has any chance of joining the EU or NATO. And in the past Ukraine's elites have been unwilling to do so. But none of this can be done until after the war.An Earlier report
Ukraine Is Losing Fewer Weapons to Theft, but High-Level Corruption Persists - Defense One
Risk of weapons vanishing as over 20 countries send arms to Ukraine - Responsible Statecraft
Certainly this article on the transfer of Russian helicopter to Ukraine without permission is interesting when the U.S had originally promised Russia only to do so with its permission
Weapons transfers to Ukraine raise fear of arms smuggling - The Washington Post
The classification of lists of items delivered from Germany to Ukraine has been lifted and lists are now being published by the government itself in full:From the German side the information remains fully classified (since about the beginning of this month), and the DPA list can generally be seen as fairly incomplete as it restricts itself to only weapons, ammunition and explosives.
Even pro-ukranian accounts are reporting abnormal advances by Russian forces around the Zolote salient. It remains to be seem if it is product of an organized retreat by the ukranian army or a colapse of the front lines.It appears two smaller pockets are being formed around Severodonetsk-Lisichansk area. One is in Gorskoe-Zolotoe, where it appears one road is left open to Lisichansk, and the road is under Russian fire. It's unclear how many Ukrainian troops are there, but recently there were quite a few, as Zolotoe is a strong point that Russia has assaulted unsuccessfully several times. The other is the Azot factory which appears to be cut off from Lisichansk. In both cases it's probably still possible for small groups to exit, but a large and organized force, especially with vehicles and heavy equipment, will have a problem. Defeats in these locations will set the stage for closing the noose around Lisichansk. A successful Ukrainian withdrawal will make it much easier to hold the Seversk-Lisichansk road open, and possibly stall for quite some more in Lisichansk.
I think that's Russia attempting to encircle it. If it was a collapse, they advances would be on the front line in Zolotoe itself. Ukraine had success holding the entrenched lines facing the front, but less so defending the flanks and communication lines.Even pro-ukranian accounts are reporting abnormal advances by Russian forces around the Zolote salient. It remains to be seem if it is product of an organized retreat by the ukranian army or a colapse of the front lines.