- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #3,521
The translation helps and makes a lot more sense. Thank you for providing that.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
"certain NATO armies" -- you are probably right if you are referring to non-US armies.
NATO as a whole would almost certainly perform much better. One important difference being the significant SEAD/DEAD capabilities of NATO (mainly through NATOs largest member the US) in combination with massive, superior air force capabilities in all fields. Had NATO attacked Ukraine they would have been able to neutralized Ukrainian SAMs quite effectively, and with massive fighter fleet of F-22, F-35, F-16, F-15, Super Hornets, Typhoon, Rafale and Gripens supported by good AEW&C / elint/sigint capabilities, a large tanker fleet and NATO would have a huge advantage. Add to that stealthy B2s and the advantage becomes even more apparent.
Add to this much better and more precise missiles and PGMs (a large percentage of Russian missiles malfunctioned or did not hit the target), much better logistics capabilities, higher morale, better training of soldiers, less corruption, it's difficult to see how they would not perform better.
NATO have military "weaknesses" of course, many of them probably different from Russia. Including: Little appetite for taking risk or accepting loss of soldiers' lives, very restrictive ROEs (both strength and weakness), and lack of some types of equipment including tanks & artillery, in general too little ammunition, and of course lack of experience in fighting a modern large-scale conflicts with drones and cyber playing increasingly important roles.
NATO has huge resources, of course, but with so many countries it can be difficult to agree . Also a question would be how effective NATO forces would fight together. After all it's 30 countries, some of them quite different from each others. Even if they train together regularly, fighting a war would most likely be something else.
The Swedish government has announced a new package for Ukraine:
Anti-ship missiles "Robot 17" (hellfire)
AG 90s (Barrett M82 12,7mm) with ammunition
5,000 pansarskott 86 (AT4)
60 million SEK (6 million USD) to NATO's Ukraine fund(!)
578 million SEK (60 million USD) to the Ukranian central bank fund for military equipment
100 million SEK (10 million USD) to UN and EU funding mechanisms
Extra ändringsbudget med ytterligare stöd till Ukraina - Regeringen.se
Anti-ship missiles "Robot 17" (hellfire)
AG 90s (Barrett M82 12,7mm) with ammunition
5,000 pansarskott 86 (AT4)
60 million SEK (6 million USD) to NATO's Ukraine fund(!)
578 million SEK (60 million USD) to the Ukranian central bank fund for military equipment
100 million SEK (10 million USD) to UN and EU funding mechanisms
Extra ändringsbudget med ytterligare stöd till Ukraina - Regeringen.se
GermanHerman
Active Member
It seems Turkey (Turkiye) has decided to donate one drone to Ukraine -- so money collected in Lithuania can be used for ammo and other support instead:
Arvydas Anušauskas on Twitter: "It is UNBELIEVABLE but just agreed to give the Bayraktar that gathered money for,
FOR FREE. It is amazing! For the gathered money we will buy the needed ammunition for the Bayraktar and the rest of money will also go for support of . Thank you Türkiye! " / Twitter
In other news, Poland is selling 60 155mm Krabs to Ukraine, in addition to 18 Krabs already donated.
Poland to sell 60 Krab self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine (ukrinform.net)
Also reports that Ukraine has bought some M109 from Belgium: Jimmy on Twitter: "Ukraine has acquired an unknown number of ex-Belgian Army M109A4BE 155mm self propelled howitzers. The transfer was (probably deliberately) slightly opaque, but involved a private Belgian military surplus dealer which delivered the vehicles to Ukraine. https://t.co/X500x6CgOZ" / Twitter
Arvydas Anušauskas on Twitter: "It is UNBELIEVABLE but just agreed to give the Bayraktar that gathered money for,
FOR FREE. It is amazing! For the gathered money we will buy the needed ammunition for the Bayraktar and the rest of money will also go for support of . Thank you Türkiye! " / TwitterIn other news, Poland is selling 60 155mm Krabs to Ukraine, in addition to 18 Krabs already donated.
Poland to sell 60 Krab self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine (ukrinform.net)
Also reports that Ukraine has bought some M109 from Belgium: Jimmy on Twitter: "Ukraine has acquired an unknown number of ex-Belgian Army M109A4BE 155mm self propelled howitzers. The transfer was (probably deliberately) slightly opaque, but involved a private Belgian military surplus dealer which delivered the vehicles to Ukraine. https://t.co/X500x6CgOZ" / Twitter
If you say so... Personally I have no idea but I know that what appears sound on paper or PowerPoint slides can differ to what's sound in actual reality.
As was pointed out in a video I posted about the Ukraine air war; SEAD is one of the hardest things to do and the Ukraine is a large country with an extensive AD network.
Granted but there are various examples of countries in conflicts which when analysed based on capabilities and other things; ''it's difficult to see how they would not perform better''.
Like the Russian military which was not geared to launch a strategic offensive on 3 fronts comprising several axis in a country as large as the Ukraine; it's highly questionable whether NATO armies [irrespective of several advantages they have over Russia] would perform better if faced with a similar operational scenario; the ability to sustain/maintain the momentum of such a large scale offensive over the distances and size of operational areas as encountered in the Ukraine; rather than being on the defensive with all the inherent advantages . As for logistics; with the exception of the U.S. I would argue that most NATO armies would not be able to sustain themselves in such a high temp protracted conflict; it would be the U.S. which would have to assist at great cost to itself.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The Ukrainian invasion has been a huge wake-up event for NATO members. The rapid depletion of PGMs and other military kit in modern warfare is not easily replaced so there is now a real push to increase inventories, something the US has been pushing for. Europeans have finally realized they have been far to dependant on the US which can’t continue with the same level of support due to shifting focus towards the Pacific. The Europeans really need to get their defence industries into gear producing military kit efficiently and in sufficient annual quantities.
It is indeed a ''wake up call'' but ultimately NATO is a defensive alliance and its ability to conduct a large scale protracted high intensity strategic offensive is questionable. Kosovo should also and was to a certain level a 'wake up call'' as it exposed various deficiencies on the part of the Europeans and their reliance on the U.S.
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John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Questionable at the present time, perhaps, but if military spending increases continue as promised the capability might exist in the future.
Whilst it doesn't account or explain all the successes the Ukrainians have achieved; we still can't discount the major value the Ukrainians have gained from training assistance/exchanges with the U.S. military both at a formal and informal level.
edition.cnn.com
''In one instance, a Washington National Guard member was sitting at home a few weeks ago when his phone rang, Baldwin recounted and a spokeswoman for the Washington Guard confirmed. On the other end was a Ukrainian soldier with a "desperate plea" for help for his friend. The Ukrainian experienced a misfire of his Javelin, an anti-tank missile that has proven devastatingly effective against Russia's armored vehicles. But this one wasn't working. The Washington Guardsmen coached the Ukrainian through the misfire procedures, allowing him to fire on the Russian tank.
Without that phone call - and the relationship behind it - the Ukrainian soldier would not have been able to defeat the tank, Baldwin said.''
Bond between Americans and Ukrainian forces they trained remains strong as war grinds on | CNN Politics
The war in Ukraine became real for Col. Robert Swertfager on day one.
edition.cnn.com
''In one instance, a Washington National Guard member was sitting at home a few weeks ago when his phone rang, Baldwin recounted and a spokeswoman for the Washington Guard confirmed. On the other end was a Ukrainian soldier with a "desperate plea" for help for his friend. The Ukrainian experienced a misfire of his Javelin, an anti-tank missile that has proven devastatingly effective against Russia's armored vehicles. But this one wasn't working. The Washington Guardsmen coached the Ukrainian through the misfire procedures, allowing him to fire on the Russian tank.
Without that phone call - and the relationship behind it - the Ukrainian soldier would not have been able to defeat the tank, Baldwin said.''
An article by a foreigner who was in the Ukraine; he met and interviewed key Ukrainian officials and walked the ground. Well worth reading.
Interestingly he mentions the use of a hypersonic missile by the Russians to take out a Ukrainian arty position. Strangely he mentions Stinger as ''being the most sophisticated''; I would have thought that Starstreak by virtue of being newer; a beam rider and harder to counter; as being 'being the most sophisticated'' = the again ''most sophisticated'' doesn't equate to ''most effective'' He also mentions Kursk as being the ''largest tank battle in history''; I was under the impression that battles in the 1973 Ramadhan/Yom Kippur war involved more tanks than Kursk. Like non state actors and state actors in Syria, Iraq and Libya the Ukrainians resorted to innovation; using YouTube; Google Earth and WhatsApp.
Apparently Russian EW [employed effectively in the Donbass years ago and much more widely deployed and integrated to various levels compared to Western armies] was very effective at Kiev; most reports which have filtered out indicate that due to a number of reasons EW [like various other Russian capabilities] was not employed as effectively as expected.
''Russian electronic warfare (EW) was vicious and effective at the beginning of the Battle for Kyiv. The Ukrainian forces were often “blinded” by it, it took down their eyes and ears, and often fell back to old fashioned runners when their communications went down. The two commanders with whom I spoke shook their heads when remembering it[8]. They noted that Russian artillery, EW, and drones were superior in every way, to include in significant numerical superiority. Despite these disadvantages, however, it was superior leadership, morale, innovation and the will to fight for their country that favored the Ukrainians.''
Interestingly he mentions the use of a hypersonic missile by the Russians to take out a Ukrainian arty position. Strangely he mentions Stinger as ''being the most sophisticated''; I would have thought that Starstreak by virtue of being newer; a beam rider and harder to counter; as being 'being the most sophisticated'' = the again ''most sophisticated'' doesn't equate to ''most effective'' He also mentions Kursk as being the ''largest tank battle in history''; I was under the impression that battles in the 1973 Ramadhan/Yom Kippur war involved more tanks than Kursk. Like non state actors and state actors in Syria, Iraq and Libya the Ukrainians resorted to innovation; using YouTube; Google Earth and WhatsApp.
Apparently Russian EW [employed effectively in the Donbass years ago and much more widely deployed and integrated to various levels compared to Western armies] was very effective at Kiev; most reports which have filtered out indicate that due to a number of reasons EW [like various other Russian capabilities] was not employed as effectively as expected.
''Russian electronic warfare (EW) was vicious and effective at the beginning of the Battle for Kyiv. The Ukrainian forces were often “blinded” by it, it took down their eyes and ears, and often fell back to old fashioned runners when their communications went down. The two commanders with whom I spoke shook their heads when remembering it[8]. They noted that Russian artillery, EW, and drones were superior in every way, to include in significant numerical superiority. Despite these disadvantages, however, it was superior leadership, morale, innovation and the will to fight for their country that favored the Ukrainians.''
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- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #3,532
Update.
Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.
Russian Kalibr launches continue.
vk.com
Russian struck a bridge near Nikolaev.
t.me
More footage of the alleged Ukrainian offensive in Kherson region at Davydov Brod.
t.me
Russian sources are alleging that neither of the Raptor boats that were hit by the Bayraktar near Zmeiniy actually sank and instead both were recovered and are being repaired.
t.me
A video from the 18th Independent Marine Bde, Ukrainian. They claim they lost 80 people in 4 days.
t.me
A giant line in Nikolaev, allegedly in line for food.
t.me
Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk-Krivoy Rog.
3 apparently Ukrainian 2S1s getting hit near allegedly Krivoy Rog.
vk.com
A Ukrainian EW setup captured near Krivoy Rog. Note I haven't heard of any significant Russian offensives there. So it raises questions. The equipment allegedly came from the 35th Marine Bde.
vk.com
t.me
Russian security forces detain an alleged Ukrainian infiltrator team near Melitopol'. Note there have been scattered reports of partisan resistance in the area, so these might well be local resistance rather then Ukrainian infiltrators.
t.me
Kharkov-Sumy.
Russian strike, allegedly Krasnopol', somewhere near Kharkov.
vk.com
Battle damage from Russian strikes in Kharkov.
t.me
t.me
Ukrainian forces launching a Switchblade somewhere near Kharkov.
t.me
Izyum Salient.
Russian or rebel Grads firing somewhere near Liman.
vk.com
Russian TOS-1 firing somewhere near Izyum.
vk.com
t.me
Destroyed BTR-80 and truck near Dibrovo, Liman area. Vehicles are allegedly Ukrainian. Note the slat armor, the 79th Air-mobile Bde was spotted with similar looking screens.
t.me
vk.com
Destroyed truck (can't tell if ZiL or Ural) with a ZU-23-2 near Liman. Allegedly Ukrainian.
t.me
Captured Ukrainian DShKM somewhere near Izyum.
vk.com
Russian troops apparently in overrun Ukrainian positions near Dolgen'koe.
t.me
LDNR Front.
Fighting has started around Svyatogorsk.
t.me
Rebel mortar crews firing on Kamyshevakha.
t.me
DNR 9th Regiment near Avdeevka shelling Ukrainian positions with what I think is a Giatsint-B.
vk.com
Russian sniper apparently near Avdeevka working with a captured American Desert Tech SRS-A2 sniper rifle.
vk.com
Destroyed ZIL-131, Ukrainian, in Soledar.
Rebel MT-LB with a BMP-1 turret.
vk.com
Ukrainian Triton armored car captured and being used by rebel forces.
vk.com
t.me
Ukrainian mechanized formation riding BMP-1s allegedly the outskirts of Severodonetsk. We haven't seen large numbers of Ukrainian armored vehicles in one place before.
Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk.
The West.
The Beskid railroad tunnel under the Carpathians allegedly got hit by Russian cruise missiles. It's quite a massive tunnel so it's unclear if the strike was successful.
vk.com
Russia.
Missile launches out of Belgorod area.
t.me
Mariupol'.
A ship allegedly loaded with steel sheets is exiting the port of Mariupol', escorted by Russian gunboats. Note the Shmel' gunboats have an MLRS that may have been used to bombard Azovstal'.
afirsov.livejournal.com
Russian mineclearing in and around Marirupol' continues.
vk.com
Misc.
Russian TOS-1A takes return fire on live camera from Ukrainian artillery. Location unclear.
gurkhan.blogspot.com
Russian Su-25 after a MANPADS hit.
vk.com
Russian Msta-S operations in Ukraine. Note how they hide in the treeline. This is likely an attempt to evade detection by UAVs.
vk.com
Russian soldier with a captured M-136A1 rocket launcher.
vk.com
Apparently the head designer at Antonov was arrested for posting pro-Russian messages on the internet.
ria.ru
Another look at the up-armored BMP-2.
A Russian UR-77 uparmored, somewhere in Ukraine. The type is very lightly armored and is being used near the front line.
More up-armored Russian trucks.
vk.com
Ukrainian forces allegedly using a pick-up truck based MLRS.
t.me
Ukrainian soldier with Germany anti-tank mines. Location and context unclear.
vk.com
A DP-27 with a supressor and an optical sight.
t.me
Russian repair unit working in Ukraine.
vk.com
Russian Palantine EW and SIGINT system in Ukraine.
vk.com
NATO/EU.
Ukraine is set to receive M-270 MLRS and HIMARS from the US, UK, and Germany.
bmpd.livejournal.com
bmpd.livejournal.com
vk.com
We have first confirmation of US-supplied Mi-17s in Ukraine.
t.me
Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.
Russian Kalibr launches continue.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian struck a bridge near Nikolaev.
Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны
‼️ Армия России нанесла ракетный удар по ж/д мосту у Николаева, - оперомандование ВСУ "Юг" 4 российские ракеты разрушили железнодорожный мост в районе села Трихаты. t.me/RVvoenkor
t.me
More footage of the alleged Ukrainian offensive in Kherson region at Davydov Brod.
Dambiev
⚡️Видео "успешного" наступления ВСУ в районе н.п.Давыдов Брод⚡️ Про потери ВСУ мы писали в предыдущих постах⚠️
t.me
Russian sources are alleging that neither of the Raptor boats that were hit by the Bayraktar near Zmeiniy actually sank and instead both were recovered and are being repaired.
Морская мощь государства
Как всегда, с течением времени "перемога" превращается в "зраду". Собственно, так же получилось и в этот раз! Широко разрекламированные украинской стороной видеокадры с турецкого убер-ваффе с поражением двух российских катеров типа "Раптор" в начале мая, громко озаглавленные как "Байрактары...
t.me
A video from the 18th Independent Marine Bde, Ukrainian. They claim they lost 80 people in 4 days.
Colonelcassad
18-й отдельный батальон морской пехоты ВСУ. Наступление на Николаевском направлении. За 4 дня наступления не взяли ни одного населенного пункта. Официально потеряли 80 человек убитыми и ранеными. По их данным - еще больше - убитыми, ранеными, пленными. Просят Зеленского что-то с этим сделать.
t.me
A giant line in Nikolaev, allegedly in line for food.
Z операция / Покровск Мирноград Селидово Гродовка
"Голодные очереди" в Николаеве стали обыденностью — как в этом видео, снятом на Шевченко, 19 Здесь горожане ждут буханки хлеба и польской "гуманитарной консервы". Экипажи Скорой помощи дежурят как из-за июньской жары, так и из-за ожидаемых голодных обмороков. Всё это происходит на фуне...
t.me
Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk-Krivoy Rog.
3 apparently Ukrainian 2S1s getting hit near allegedly Krivoy Rog.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
A Ukrainian EW setup captured near Krivoy Rog. Note I haven't heard of any significant Russian offensives there. So it raises questions. The equipment allegedly came from the 35th Marine Bde.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Херсонский Вестник
⚡️⚡️Очередные подарки от убегающей 35 бригады морской пехоты ВСУ. ⚡️⚡️ На фотографиях комплекс РЭБ "НОТА", оставленный под Кривым Рогом. Теперь позиции украинской армии будут свободно поражаться российскими ударными беспилотными средствами. В условиях ограниченных поставок западного вооружения...
t.me
Russian security forces detain an alleged Ukrainian infiltrator team near Melitopol'. Note there have been scattered reports of partisan resistance in the area, so these might well be local resistance rather then Ukrainian infiltrators.
Владимир Рогов
❌Теперь это можно показать - ликвидация ДРГ На днях в Мелитопольском районе была выявлена и нейтрализована ДРГ террористов Зеленского. Спасибо нашим ребятам за блестяще выполненную работу! Террористическое образование УГИЛ должно быть ликвидировано! #РаботаемБратья Владимир Рогов
t.me
Kharkov-Sumy.
Russian strike, allegedly Krasnopol', somewhere near Kharkov.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Battle damage from Russian strikes in Kharkov.
Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны
‼️ Горят цели в Харькове в результате ракетных ударов Ранее стало известно, что взорвано промышленное предприятие в Безлюдовке t.me/RVvoenkor
t.me
Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны
‼️ Ракетные удары нанесены по промышленному объекту в Харькове, над городов зарево от мощного пожара в районе Безлюдовки t.me/RVvoenkor
t.me
Ukrainian forces launching a Switchblade somewhere near Kharkov.
АГЕНТ ГОСДЕПА
❗Запуск американского барражирующего боеприпаса Switchblade 300 силами ВСУ в окрестностях Харькова.
t.me
Izyum Salient.
Russian or rebel Grads firing somewhere near Liman.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian TOS-1 firing somewhere near Izyum.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
РаZвед_ДоZор
Работа "Хохлопека" по укрытиям укрорейха в Изюмском районе. В ВСУ все еще рады, что ТОС-1A не участвовал в параде 9 мая? @razved_dozor
t.me
Destroyed BTR-80 and truck near Dibrovo, Liman area. Vehicles are allegedly Ukrainian. Note the slat armor, the 79th Air-mobile Bde was spotted with similar looking screens.
Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны
‼️ Диброва взято Отважными: окрестности села завалены уничтоженной техникой ВСУ Лиманский район ДНР. Отважные продвигаются вперед к Святогорску и Славянску! #эксклюзив с фронта t.me/RVvoenkor
t.me
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Destroyed truck (can't tell if ZiL or Ural) with a ZU-23-2 near Liman. Allegedly Ukrainian.
Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны
‼️Отважные оставляют после себя сожжённую вражескую технику и свободную от нацизма землю На кадрах уничтоженная зенитная установка ЗУ-23-2 ВСУ под Лиманом #эксклюзив с фронта t.me/RVvoenkor
t.me
Captured Ukrainian DShKM somewhere near Izyum.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian troops apparently in overrun Ukrainian positions near Dolgen'koe.
Поддубный |Z|О|V| edition
Гвардейцы Петраковского полка продолжают успешное наступление на Изюмском направлении, где противник сформировал один из самых мощных укрепленных районов на подступах к Славянску. Продолжается продвижение от н. п. Долгенькое. Подразделения ВСУ несут огромные потери. Картина страшная и киевский...
t.me
LDNR Front.
Fighting has started around Svyatogorsk.
Colonelcassad
Начались бои за Святогорск. Есть также сообщения, что нацики подорвали мост через Северский Донец, но пока фото/видео пруфов нет.
t.me
Rebel mortar crews firing on Kamyshevakha.
Боевой (Military photographer)
Камышеваха... Работа минометного расчета по ВСУ... Больше фотографий смотрите на РИА @rian_ru и @nezhurka и @riaphoto
t.me
DNR 9th Regiment near Avdeevka shelling Ukrainian positions with what I think is a Giatsint-B.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian sniper apparently near Avdeevka working with a captured American Desert Tech SRS-A2 sniper rifle.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Destroyed ZIL-131, Ukrainian, in Soledar.
Rebel MT-LB with a BMP-1 turret.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Ukrainian Triton armored car captured and being used by rebel forces.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Уголок Ситха
Z-Трофей. Трофейный украинский бронеавтомобиль *Тритон* с боевым модулем ОБМ в составе сил ВСН.
t.me
Ukrainian mechanized formation riding BMP-1s allegedly the outskirts of Severodonetsk. We haven't seen large numbers of Ukrainian armored vehicles in one place before.
Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk.
The West.
The Beskid railroad tunnel under the Carpathians allegedly got hit by Russian cruise missiles. It's quite a massive tunnel so it's unclear if the strike was successful.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russia.
Missile launches out of Belgorod area.
Рыбарь
Пуски баллистических ракет из приграничных с Украиной районов в сторону Харькова. Местные СМИ сообщают о взрывах в Мерефе. #Россия #Украина #Харьков @rybar *Поддержать нас: 4377 7278 0407 7977
t.me
Mariupol'.
A ship allegedly loaded with steel sheets is exiting the port of Mariupol', escorted by Russian gunboats. Note the Shmel' gunboats have an MLRS that may have been used to bombard Azovstal'.
Флот не только в in being
Караван: Груженный листовой сталью сухогруз Астрахань выходит из ждановского мариупольского порта. В ордере каравана три бронекатера Шмель (пр. 1204). Судя по вешке, ведут протраленным фарватером. Мысля тут посетила - одна из особенностей Шмелей - 140-мм пусковая…
afirsov.livejournal.com
Russian mineclearing in and around Marirupol' continues.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Misc.
Russian TOS-1A takes return fire on live camera from Ukrainian artillery. Location unclear.
Gur Khan attacks!
gurkhan.blogspot.com
Russian Su-25 after a MANPADS hit.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian Msta-S operations in Ukraine. Note how they hide in the treeline. This is likely an attempt to evade detection by UAVs.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian soldier with a captured M-136A1 rocket launcher.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Apparently the head designer at Antonov was arrested for posting pro-Russian messages on the internet.
На Украине задержали инженера-конструктора "Антонова"
Ведущего инженера-конструктора авиапредприятия "Антонов" задержали на Украине за поддержку спецоперации России, сообщили в прокуратуре Киевской области. РИА Новости, 31.05.2022
ria.ru
Another look at the up-armored BMP-2.
БМП-2 с экранами и решётками.
После ремонтного подразделения под Донецком. Экраны, как мне видится, от Т-80У.
shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com
A Russian UR-77 uparmored, somewhere in Ukraine. The type is very lightly armored and is being used near the front line.
More up-armored Russian trucks.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Ukrainian forces allegedly using a pick-up truck based MLRS.
По ИГИЛовским заветам (2).
Пикап L200 с пакетом 122мм ПУ. Это не Сирия или Африка! Это "сильнейшая армия Европы" (с)!
shusharmor.livejournal.com
Военный обозреватель
Украинские военные применяют самодельные РСЗО в зоне боевых действий. Аналогичные кустарным способом изготовленные реактивные установки активно применялись боевиками в Ираке и Сирии. #Украина @new_militarycolumnist
t.me
Ukrainian soldier with Germany anti-tank mines. Location and context unclear.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
A DP-27 with a supressor and an optical sight.
Dambiev
Украинские националисты проапгрейдили советский пулемет ДП-27, установив глушитель и прицел.
t.me
Russian repair unit working in Ukraine.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
Russian Palantine EW and SIGINT system in Ukraine.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
NATO/EU.
Ukraine is set to receive M-270 MLRS and HIMARS from the US, UK, and Germany.
США поставят Украине ракетные комплексы HIMARS
1 июня 2022 года президент США Джо Байден объявил о новом пакете военной помощи Украине. Согласно сообщению министерства обороны США, объем нового пакета составляет 700 млн долл. Общая сумма официально выделенной Киеву американской военной помощи с начала российской специальной военной операции на…
bmpd.livejournal.com
Германия и Великобритания планируют передачу Украине ракетных комплексов MLRS
Вслед за объявленным Соединенными Штатами 1 июня 2022 года решением о передаче в качестве военной помощи Украине наземных ракетных комплексов М142 HIMARS с высокоточными ракетами GMLRS, стало известно о намерениях Германии и Великобритании передать Украине из наличия своих вооруженных сил…
bmpd.livejournal.com
VK.com | VK
vk.com
We have first confirmation of US-supplied Mi-17s in Ukraine.
ANNA NEWS
Украина донашивает афганскую технику В Сети появилось изображение одного из вертолётов Ми-17, переданного США ВВС Киевского режима. Это один из вертолётов, который ранее использовался ВВС Афганистана (об этом говорит характерный камуфляж). Ранее ВВС Афганистана отказались от эксплуатации этих...
t.me
Yet to have a read but will deffintly make time today, From the small amount you posted seems to be an unbiased reporting on the Pro's and Cons of each side which if accurate already puts that journalist in my good books, Those ones are few and far between.
All comes down to level of sophistication vs ease to learn, deploy and do the job. While some times needed some times you just need to KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid). I would argue the Starstreak more has learnt from the over complicated Stinger system and has turned it into a better easier system, Stinger more sophisticated (read complicated) but Starstreak will require less training, and can still get the job done just as well if not better.
Kursk had between the Axis and Soviet forces give or take 8,000 tanks which are said to have taken part in the battle, The 1973 Ramadhan/Yom Kippur war while the Arab forces had a lot more tanks not all of them where deployed, All in all About 3,600 tanks from the Arab forces are stated to have gone in against Israel's 1,700.
This does have me wondering about it, Best I can come up with no enough of their units where equipped to not get affected by their own EW which those units are know heavily damaged or they had such a simple mission (Move straight down that road till you hit Kiev) that its effects on their own forces where considered a hinderance. Now they are fighting along such a broad front with Ukraine launching limited attacks when either needed or seen as in their favour they cant afford to have their forces blinded.
ISW Upgrades. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 1, 5:30pm ET
Main Points
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication (GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened. Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian counter-offensives from the north.
Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian counterattacks in late May.[1] Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.[2] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces “will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the Donbas offensive operation so heavily.
Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan” project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.[4] A Russian Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[6] Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional attack. Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.[7] The production plant was an economically-significant resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to maintain and take control of the plant’s production capabilities. Russian forces similarly destroyed the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, which had considerable industrial significance for Ukraine and could have been economically exploited by Russian occupiers if they had not destroyed it. While the Azot plant in Severodonetsk was less productive on whole than Azovstal, its destruction is part of the systemic failure of Russian forces to take effective control of the economic and industrial capabilities of occupied territory. Russian forces will likely continue to destroy productive infrastructure and continually undermine the economic benefits they could have hoped to gain from occupied territories.
Full article at link above or pdf can be downloaded here
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 1 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 1, 5:30pm ET
Main Points
- Russian forces reportedly made incremental advances north of Slovyansk but likely have not yet been able to take control of the road into Slovyansk.
- Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Lysychansk from the south and west in order to avoid having to fight across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk but are having limited successes so far.
- Russian troops made incremental gains north of Avdiivka.
- Russian troops reportedly destroyed Ukrainian-built bridges over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid in response to Ukrainian counteroffensive pressure.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast has gotten the attention of Russian forces in the area, and the Russians are scrambling to secure the vital ground line of communication (GLOC) the Ukrainians have threatened. Ukrainian forces carried out a series of organized counterattacks targeting settlements on the eastern bank of the Ihulets River that are very close to a key highway supporting Russian forces further north. The Russians have responded by destroying the bridges the Ukrainians used in one of those counterattacks and other bridges across the river in an effort to hold their line against anticipated continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations. Ukrainian forces are likely still close enough to the highway to disrupt its use as a main supply route, potentially undermining the Russians’ ability to hold against Ukrainian counter-offensives from the north.
Russian milbloggers are expressing growing alarm about the threat of Ukrainian counteroffensives in the areas Russian forces have deprioritized while concentrating on Severodonetsk. Russian milbloggers have increasingly focused on tracking the rate of Ukrainian counterattacks in late May.[1] Pro-Russian Telegram channel “Dmitriyev” (over 100,000 followers) reported that Ukrainian forces are fully capable of inflicting ”painful and cutting blows” on Russian GLOCs in Kherson, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by July-August due to lack of adequate Russian defensive forces in the areas.[2] Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces “will grope for weakness” in Russian defenses in Kherson Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers are effectively criticizing the Russian military command for endangering Russian territorial gains across other axes by prioritizing the Donbas offensive operation so heavily.
Russian authorities are likely anticipating Ukrainian partisan pressure in Luhansk Oblast. The Main Ukrainian Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on June 1 the launch of the “Luhansk partisan” project to galvanize resistance to Russian attempts to consolidate control of Luhansk Oblast.[4] A Russian Telegram channel reported that the Russian Internal Ministry is sending a special detachment of its employees on “leave” to the Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), which is a likely attempt to reinforce Russian administrative presence in the LNR in the face of growing internal and partisan discontent.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces moved a battalion tactical group (BTG) to Kupyansk, a Russian-controlled city in eastern Kharkiv Oblast along the P07 highway within 30 kilometers of the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[6] Kupyansk is far from the front lines and in no apparent danger of imminent Ukrainian conventional attack. Taken together, the reported deployment of Internal Ministry employees and a BTG suggest that Russian forces are anticipating partisan resistance against their attempts to gain control of Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continue to undermine the economic viability of areas they are attempting to capture. Russian forces reportedly hit the “Azot” fertilizer production plant in Severodonetsk on May 31 and caused the dissemination of toxic nitric acid smoke.[7] The production plant was an economically-significant resource for Severodonetsk and the Luhansk region and it would have been prudent for Russian forces to maintain and take control of the plant’s production capabilities. Russian forces similarly destroyed the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol, which had considerable industrial significance for Ukraine and could have been economically exploited by Russian occupiers if they had not destroyed it. While the Azot plant in Severodonetsk was less productive on whole than Azovstal, its destruction is part of the systemic failure of Russian forces to take effective control of the economic and industrial capabilities of occupied territory. Russian forces will likely continue to destroy productive infrastructure and continually undermine the economic benefits they could have hoped to gain from occupied territories.
Full article at link above or pdf can be downloaded here
ISW Upgrades. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 2, 6:15pm ET
Main Points.
Russian forces continued to make incremental, grinding, and costly progress in eastern Ukraine on June 2. Russian troops continued operations to capture Severodonetsk and further operations to capture Lysychansk. Russian military leadership will likely use the capture of these two cities to claim they have “liberated” all of Luhansk Oblast before turning to Donetsk Oblast but Russian forces are unlikely to have the forces necessary to take substantial territory in Donetsk Oblast after suffering further losses around Severodonetsk. Russian forces are evidently limited by terrain in the Donbas and will continue to face challenges crossing the Siverskyi Donets River to complete the encirclement of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and make further advances westward of Lyman towards Slovyansk via Raihorodok.[1]
Russian military leadership continues to experience complications with sufficient force generation and maintaining the morale of mobilized personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 1st Army Corps, under Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army, is conducting forced mobilization in occupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian forced mobilization is highly unlikely to generate meaningful combat power and will exacerbate low morale and poor discipline in Russian and proxy units. The 113th Regiment of the DNR posted a video appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 2 wherein forcibly-mobilized soldiers complain they have spent the entire war on the frontline in Kherson without food or medicine, and that mobilization committees did not conduct requisite medical screenings and admitted individuals whose medical conditions should have disqualified them from service.[3] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate additionally released an intercepted phone conversation wherein DNR soldiers similarly complained that physically unfit individuals were forced into service and that mobilized units are experiencing mass drunkenness and general disorder.[4] Russian forces are additionally struggling to successfully rotate servicemen in and out of combat. Spokesperson for the Odesa Military Administration Maksym Marchenko stated that 30 to 40% of Russian personnel that rotated out of Ukraine refused to return, forcing Russian commanders to send unprepared and unmotivated units back into combat.[5] This is consistent with complaints made by DNR servicemen that rotation practices are contributing to poor morale and dissatisfaction within units that have been forcibly mobilized.[6]
Russian occupation authorities continue to face challenges establishing permanent societal control in newly occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupational administrations “are [only] created on paper” and are incapable of controlling local populations, enforcing the use of the Russian ruble, or conducting bureaucratic processes.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Ukrainian civilians welcome partisan activity that systematically sabotages Russian occupation rule.
Full article at link above or pdf can be downloaded here
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 2, 6:15pm ET
Main Points.
- Russian operations to advance on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman continue to make little progress and are unlikely to do so in the coming days, as Russian forces continue to prioritize Severodonetsk at the expense of other axes of advance.
- Russian forces continued assaults against Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in order to claim full control of Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces made incremental advances around Avdiivka.
- Ukrainian counteroffensives in northwestern Kherson Oblast pushed Russian forces to the eastern bank of the Inhulets River and will likely continue to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the T2207 highway.
- The Kremlin continued to pursue inconsistent occupational measures in southern Ukraine, indicating both widespread Ukrainian resistance and likely Kremlin indecision on how to integrate occupied territory.
Russian forces continued to make incremental, grinding, and costly progress in eastern Ukraine on June 2. Russian troops continued operations to capture Severodonetsk and further operations to capture Lysychansk. Russian military leadership will likely use the capture of these two cities to claim they have “liberated” all of Luhansk Oblast before turning to Donetsk Oblast but Russian forces are unlikely to have the forces necessary to take substantial territory in Donetsk Oblast after suffering further losses around Severodonetsk. Russian forces are evidently limited by terrain in the Donbas and will continue to face challenges crossing the Siverskyi Donets River to complete the encirclement of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and make further advances westward of Lyman towards Slovyansk via Raihorodok.[1]
Russian military leadership continues to experience complications with sufficient force generation and maintaining the morale of mobilized personnel. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Donetsk People’s Republic’s (DNR) 1st Army Corps, under Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army, is conducting forced mobilization in occupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian forced mobilization is highly unlikely to generate meaningful combat power and will exacerbate low morale and poor discipline in Russian and proxy units. The 113th Regiment of the DNR posted a video appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 2 wherein forcibly-mobilized soldiers complain they have spent the entire war on the frontline in Kherson without food or medicine, and that mobilization committees did not conduct requisite medical screenings and admitted individuals whose medical conditions should have disqualified them from service.[3] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate additionally released an intercepted phone conversation wherein DNR soldiers similarly complained that physically unfit individuals were forced into service and that mobilized units are experiencing mass drunkenness and general disorder.[4] Russian forces are additionally struggling to successfully rotate servicemen in and out of combat. Spokesperson for the Odesa Military Administration Maksym Marchenko stated that 30 to 40% of Russian personnel that rotated out of Ukraine refused to return, forcing Russian commanders to send unprepared and unmotivated units back into combat.[5] This is consistent with complaints made by DNR servicemen that rotation practices are contributing to poor morale and dissatisfaction within units that have been forcibly mobilized.[6]
Russian occupation authorities continue to face challenges establishing permanent societal control in newly occupied Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian occupational administrations “are [only] created on paper” and are incapable of controlling local populations, enforcing the use of the Russian ruble, or conducting bureaucratic processes.[7] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Ukrainian civilians welcome partisan activity that systematically sabotages Russian occupation rule.
Full article at link above or pdf can be downloaded here
ISW Upgrades. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 3, 7:30 pm ET
Main Points.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces will “accelerate” the “special military operation” in Ukraine in a meeting with Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov on June 3, though Russian forces are unlikely to be able to do so. Kadyrov said that Shoigu has “identified new tasks” that will improve the effectiveness of Russian offensive maneuvers and improve Russian tactics.[1] Kadyrov did not specify which tasks Russian forces will undertake to speed up their pace. Shoigu previously claimed on May 24 that Russian forces were making slow progress in eastern Ukraine to avoid civilian casualties.[2] In a retrospective on the 100th day of the war, the UK Defense Ministry stated that Russian forces will likely establish control over Luhansk Oblast in the next two weeks, though only at significant further cost.[3] The UK Defense Ministry further noted that Russian forces on all other axes have gone over to defensive operations to concentrate all available forces in Severodonetsk, and stated Russia will need to commit sizable investment of manpower and equipment—that it will be unable to generate quickly, if at all—to advance beyond Luhansk Oblast.
A Russian milblogger published a lengthy message on June 3 claiming that nearly the entire 35th Combined Arms Army has been destroyed in Izyum due to incompetent Russian commanders. A Russian milblogger under the pseudonym Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that Russian commanders did not account for combat challenges in the Izyum woods, leading to significant losses in the 64th and 38th Separate Guard Motor Rifle Brigades, which he reported now have less than 100 servicemen in total.[4] Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian commanders failed to provide necessary equipment to units fighting in wooded terrain and did not repair Russian heavy artillery in a timely manner. Russian forces also reportedly lacked effective communication with command centers and relied on messengers due to the shortage of encrypted phones. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that the lack of communications between Russian units and commanders allowed Ukrainian forces to strike Russian advanced positions with drones. Russian private military company servicemen from Wagner also refused to participate in combat, leading to a significant lack of advances on the Izyum axis. While ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, they are consistent with previous reports of Russian operations and high casualties on the Izyum axis.
Russian and proxy forces reportedly have not sufficiently prepared frontline units with medical supplies, leading to abysmal medical care. Boytsovyi Kot Murz criticized the Russian Defense Ministry for failing to prepare medical equipment and field hospitals for wounded servicemen.[5] Russian commanders reportedly failed to learn lessons from the lack of medical equipment during the Battle of Debaltseve in 2015 and are repeating similar mistakes. Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian forces do not provide frontline troops with high pressure bandages and other supplies necessary to address limb injuries in time. Boytsovyi Kot Murz compared expired and underprepared Russian first aid kits to higher quality Ukrainian supplies and claimed that Russian forces do not have volunteer support that could address the shortages in military equipment. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that only Russian infantry, that he claimed has been defeated, had necessary medical training—while newly recruited reservists are incapable of providing first aid. Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that Russian medics are conducting an unnecessary number of limb amputations due to the lack medical equipment provided by the Russian Defense Ministry. These claims are consistent with past reports of poor Russian medical care in frontline units, and these conditions are likely a major contributing factor to Russian demoralization and the growing refusal of servicemen to return to frontline units.
Ukrainian forces report that Russian electronic warfare (EW) units are increasingly threatening Ukrainian air reconnaissance in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are increasingly jamming all possible signals and hindering Ukrainian drone operations.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff has previously reported that Russian forces intensified EW operations in Donbas, likely in an effort to obstruct Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance and drone strikes on Russian units.[7]
Full article at link above or pdf can be downloaded here
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 3, 7:30 pm ET
Main Points.
- Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults southeast and southwest of Izyum and west of Lyman but remain unlikely to secure major advances towards Slovyansk.
- Russian forces made minor gains in the eastern part of Severodonetsk, but Ukrainian forces continues to launch localized counterattacks in Severodonetsk and its outskirts.
- Russian forces did not attempt to launch assaults on Avdiivka.
- Russian forces failed to regain lost positions in northeastern Kherson Oblast and continued to defend previously occupied positions.
- Russian occupation authorities began issuing Russian passports in Kherson City and Melitopol, though they continue to face challenges establishing societal control over occupied territories and ending Ukrainian partisan actions.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian forces will “accelerate” the “special military operation” in Ukraine in a meeting with Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov on June 3, though Russian forces are unlikely to be able to do so. Kadyrov said that Shoigu has “identified new tasks” that will improve the effectiveness of Russian offensive maneuvers and improve Russian tactics.[1] Kadyrov did not specify which tasks Russian forces will undertake to speed up their pace. Shoigu previously claimed on May 24 that Russian forces were making slow progress in eastern Ukraine to avoid civilian casualties.[2] In a retrospective on the 100th day of the war, the UK Defense Ministry stated that Russian forces will likely establish control over Luhansk Oblast in the next two weeks, though only at significant further cost.[3] The UK Defense Ministry further noted that Russian forces on all other axes have gone over to defensive operations to concentrate all available forces in Severodonetsk, and stated Russia will need to commit sizable investment of manpower and equipment—that it will be unable to generate quickly, if at all—to advance beyond Luhansk Oblast.
A Russian milblogger published a lengthy message on June 3 claiming that nearly the entire 35th Combined Arms Army has been destroyed in Izyum due to incompetent Russian commanders. A Russian milblogger under the pseudonym Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that Russian commanders did not account for combat challenges in the Izyum woods, leading to significant losses in the 64th and 38th Separate Guard Motor Rifle Brigades, which he reported now have less than 100 servicemen in total.[4] Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian commanders failed to provide necessary equipment to units fighting in wooded terrain and did not repair Russian heavy artillery in a timely manner. Russian forces also reportedly lacked effective communication with command centers and relied on messengers due to the shortage of encrypted phones. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that the lack of communications between Russian units and commanders allowed Ukrainian forces to strike Russian advanced positions with drones. Russian private military company servicemen from Wagner also refused to participate in combat, leading to a significant lack of advances on the Izyum axis. While ISW cannot independently confirm these reports, they are consistent with previous reports of Russian operations and high casualties on the Izyum axis.
Russian and proxy forces reportedly have not sufficiently prepared frontline units with medical supplies, leading to abysmal medical care. Boytsovyi Kot Murz criticized the Russian Defense Ministry for failing to prepare medical equipment and field hospitals for wounded servicemen.[5] Russian commanders reportedly failed to learn lessons from the lack of medical equipment during the Battle of Debaltseve in 2015 and are repeating similar mistakes. Boytsovyi Kot Murz claimed that Russian forces do not provide frontline troops with high pressure bandages and other supplies necessary to address limb injuries in time. Boytsovyi Kot Murz compared expired and underprepared Russian first aid kits to higher quality Ukrainian supplies and claimed that Russian forces do not have volunteer support that could address the shortages in military equipment. Boytsovyi Kot Murz noted that only Russian infantry, that he claimed has been defeated, had necessary medical training—while newly recruited reservists are incapable of providing first aid. Boytsovyi Kot Murz said that Russian medics are conducting an unnecessary number of limb amputations due to the lack medical equipment provided by the Russian Defense Ministry. These claims are consistent with past reports of poor Russian medical care in frontline units, and these conditions are likely a major contributing factor to Russian demoralization and the growing refusal of servicemen to return to frontline units.
Ukrainian forces report that Russian electronic warfare (EW) units are increasingly threatening Ukrainian air reconnaissance in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are increasingly jamming all possible signals and hindering Ukrainian drone operations.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff has previously reported that Russian forces intensified EW operations in Donbas, likely in an effort to obstruct Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance and drone strikes on Russian units.[7]
Full article at link above or pdf can be downloaded here
ISW Upgrades. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 4, 6:00 pm ET
Main Points.
Ukrainian forces are successfully slowing down Russian operations to encircle Ukrainian positions in Luhansk Oblast as well as Russian frontal assaults in Severodonetsk through prudent and effective local counterattacks in Severodonetsk and their defense of the western Siverskyi Donets riverbank. Ukrainian officials reported on June 3 that Ukrainian defenders pushed back against Russian advances in Severodonetsk and are actively hindering Russian advances on Lysychansk from the southwest.[1] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai disagreed with the UK Defense Ministry forecast on June 3 that Russian forces will seize the remaining 10% of the oblast in the next two weeks, claiming that Ukrainian forces have enough reinforcements and equipment to conduct further counterattacks and defend their positions.[2] Haidai noted that Russian forces wrongfully believe in their own successes, enabling Ukrainian defenders to inflict high losses against unsuspecting Chechen units. Pro-Russian milblogger Voenkor Kotyenok Z claimed that Russian forces are unlikely to break through Ukrainian defenses in Lysychansk from Severodonetsk (through continued frontal assaults and an opposed crossing of the Siverskyi Donetsk River) and will likely need to complete the drive from Popasna if they hope to capture Lysychansk.[3] Voenkor Kotyenok Z claimed that Ukrainian forces could prevent Russian river crossings from Severodonetsk and highlighted that Russian forces have not yet secured access to two key highways to Lysychansk.
The Ukrainian government and military are furthermore discussing the battle of Severodonetsk in increasingly confident terms and are likely successfully blunting the Russian military’s major commitment of reserves to the grinding battle for the city. While Russian forces may still be able to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and Ukrainian forces are likely more degraded than Haidai’s statements imply, Ukrainian defenses remain strong in this pivotal theater. The Russian military has concentrated all of its available resources on this single battle to make only modest gains. The Ukrainian military contrarily retains the flexibility and confidence to not only conduct localized counterattacks elsewhere in Ukraine (such as north of Kherson) but conduct effective counterattacks into the teeth of Russian assaults in Severodonetsk that reportedly retook 20% of the city in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian government’s confidence in directly stating its forces can hold Severodonetsk for more than two weeks and willingness to conduct local counterattacks, rather than strictly remaining on the defensive, is a marked shift from Ukrainian statements as recently as May 28 that Ukrainian forces might withdraw from Severodonetsk to avoid encirclement.[4]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on June 3 that Russia will continue its “special military operation” in Ukraine until Russia achieves all of its objectives.[5] Peskov noted that Russia has already “liberated” many settlements since the start of the operation. Kremlin officials have begun steadily returning to their original claims about the successes of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in contrast to previous statements in late May explaining the slow pace of the war.[6] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu also claimed on June 3 that Russian forces are adopting new unspecified tasks to accelerate the progress of the war.[7] The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to announce some sort of victory in eastern Ukraine while preparing for a protracted war. The Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist political goals for Ukraine even though it has been forced to revise downward its immediate military objectives.
Full article at link above. No pdf today.
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 4 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
June 4, 6:00 pm ET
Main Points.
- Ukrainian forces conducted successful local counterattacks in Severodonetsk and Russian progress in direct assaults on the city and wider operations to encircle it remain slow. Ukrainian defenses in eastern Ukraine remain effective.
- Russian forces launched a series of unsuccessful offensive operations southwest of Izyum and in the Lyman area.
- Russian forces continued to defend previously occupied positions around Kharkiv City and launched missile and artillery strikes against Ukrainian defenders.
- Russian forces did not attempt to launch assaults on settlements in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblast but continued to fire at Ukrainian positions throughout southern Ukraine.
- The Kremlin faces rising partisan activity in southern Ukraine despite Russian efforts to restrict movement and telecommunications access.
- Ukrainian officials are continuing negotiations for a prisoner exchange of the captured Mariupol defenders.
Ukrainian forces are successfully slowing down Russian operations to encircle Ukrainian positions in Luhansk Oblast as well as Russian frontal assaults in Severodonetsk through prudent and effective local counterattacks in Severodonetsk and their defense of the western Siverskyi Donets riverbank. Ukrainian officials reported on June 3 that Ukrainian defenders pushed back against Russian advances in Severodonetsk and are actively hindering Russian advances on Lysychansk from the southwest.[1] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai disagreed with the UK Defense Ministry forecast on June 3 that Russian forces will seize the remaining 10% of the oblast in the next two weeks, claiming that Ukrainian forces have enough reinforcements and equipment to conduct further counterattacks and defend their positions.[2] Haidai noted that Russian forces wrongfully believe in their own successes, enabling Ukrainian defenders to inflict high losses against unsuspecting Chechen units. Pro-Russian milblogger Voenkor Kotyenok Z claimed that Russian forces are unlikely to break through Ukrainian defenses in Lysychansk from Severodonetsk (through continued frontal assaults and an opposed crossing of the Siverskyi Donetsk River) and will likely need to complete the drive from Popasna if they hope to capture Lysychansk.[3] Voenkor Kotyenok Z claimed that Ukrainian forces could prevent Russian river crossings from Severodonetsk and highlighted that Russian forces have not yet secured access to two key highways to Lysychansk.
The Ukrainian government and military are furthermore discussing the battle of Severodonetsk in increasingly confident terms and are likely successfully blunting the Russian military’s major commitment of reserves to the grinding battle for the city. While Russian forces may still be able to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and Ukrainian forces are likely more degraded than Haidai’s statements imply, Ukrainian defenses remain strong in this pivotal theater. The Russian military has concentrated all of its available resources on this single battle to make only modest gains. The Ukrainian military contrarily retains the flexibility and confidence to not only conduct localized counterattacks elsewhere in Ukraine (such as north of Kherson) but conduct effective counterattacks into the teeth of Russian assaults in Severodonetsk that reportedly retook 20% of the city in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian government’s confidence in directly stating its forces can hold Severodonetsk for more than two weeks and willingness to conduct local counterattacks, rather than strictly remaining on the defensive, is a marked shift from Ukrainian statements as recently as May 28 that Ukrainian forces might withdraw from Severodonetsk to avoid encirclement.[4]
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated on June 3 that Russia will continue its “special military operation” in Ukraine until Russia achieves all of its objectives.[5] Peskov noted that Russia has already “liberated” many settlements since the start of the operation. Kremlin officials have begun steadily returning to their original claims about the successes of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in contrast to previous statements in late May explaining the slow pace of the war.[6] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu also claimed on June 3 that Russian forces are adopting new unspecified tasks to accelerate the progress of the war.[7] The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to announce some sort of victory in eastern Ukraine while preparing for a protracted war. The Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist political goals for Ukraine even though it has been forced to revise downward its immediate military objectives.
Full article at link above. No pdf today.
Beam riders take longer for crews to get proficient with; line of sight and have to be guided until impact.
I doubt if Army Group South and Centre; plus the various Soviet Fronts had 8,000. Over the decades the number of tanks deployed by both sides to the area and the number which were at Prokhorovka have been greatly exaggerated. George Nipe in his excellent and well researched
''Blood, Steel, and Myth. The II. SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943'' gives an accurate figure but I'm too lazy to get my copy out and have a look at the numbers.
A number of excellent articles on Russian EW are on the net. There were a number of reasons why EW wasn't employed as effectively as assumed and as was the case at the Donbas years ago. There are also reasons to believe that in some cases Russian Ew was effective but it's just that we didn't hear about it.
Deadly secret: Electronic warfare shapes Russia-Ukraine war
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — On Ukraine’s battlefields, the simple act of powering up a cellphone can beckon a rain of deathly skyfall.
apnews.com
Analysing the limitations of Russian EW capabilities in Ukraine
Despite Russia's plethora of systems and capabilities, their deployment or at the very least perceived impact in Ukraine has remained relatively muted throughout the first months of the conflict.
Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capability ‘Exposed’ In Ukraine War; Is Putin’s Techno-Savvy Army Losing The EW Battle?
The media coverage of the ongoing war in Ukraine is largely focused on the use of missiles, artillery aircraft and armored vehicles, etc but there is an invisible war going on between the two sides for the control of the electromagnetic spectrum. For lack of visual or emotional impact of the...
eurasiantimes.com
A Key Reason for Russia’s Colossal Electronic Warfare Failure in Ukraine
Six weeks into the war, it’s clear that Russian Electronic Warfare/Electronic Attack (EW/EA) systems have been largely ineffective.
www.thedefensepost.com
Deadly secret: Electronic warfare shapes Russia's war against Ukraine
Electronic warfare technology targets communications, navigation and guidance systems to locate, blind and deceive the enemy and direct lethal blows
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GermanHerman
Active Member
Colonelcassad
⚡️Сейчас массово появляется видео и фото прибытия русских танков в Херсонскую область. ⚡️ Танки движутся как в направлении Николаева, так и Кривого Рога. Сложно оценить их количество, но бронетехника не прекращает двигаться уже третьи сутки и днем, и ночью, скорее всего российские войска...
t.me
Can someone more knowledgable tell me if I'm correct in ID'ing these as T-62's?
Allegedly they are moving near Kherson towards the west and north.
Interestingly they took the time to install cage armor on top, yet I dont see any ERA.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #3,540
They certainly look like T-62s. It's possible they're T-62Ms that instead of ERA have additional armor on the front of the turret (I'yich's Brows). There have been recent rumors that the 177th Caspian Fleet Marines stood up a tank btln on T-62Ms. The choice of tank allegedly has to do with the carrying capacity of the landing boats that unit uses. So this could be the first sight of Russian army regulars riding T-62Ms in over a decade. But this of course is not confirmed.Colonelcassad
⚡️Сейчас массово появляется видео и фото прибытия русских танков в Херсонскую область. ⚡️ Танки движутся как в направлении Николаева, так и Кривого Рога. Сложно оценить их количество, но бронетехника не прекращает двигаться уже третьи сутки и днем, и ночью, скорее всего российские войска...
Can someone more knowledgable tell me if I'm correct in ID'ing these as T-62's?
Allegedly they are moving near Kherson towards the west and north.
Interestingly they took the time to install cage armor on top, yet I dont see any ERA.
See here: https://www.armyrecognition.com/ima...ense_industry_military_technology_640_002.jpg