The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[ngatimozart]

115 Russian National Guard service members refused deployment to Ukraine, are being dishonorably discharged.

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The dishonourable discharges for refusing orders to deploy to a combat zone appears to be relatively light for such an offence. For one that's mutiny and in wartime in the Russian military it would be a death sentence offence. It certainly would be in the US military. In the NZDF it would attract a sentence of imprisonment. So what's happening to the mutineers after the dishonourable discharge? Will they be executed, or sent to a gulag?

 

[Feanor]

The dishonourable discharges for refusing orders to deploy to a combat zone appears to be relatively light for such an offence. For one that's mutiny and in wartime in the Russian military it would be a death sentence offence. It certainly would be in the US military. In the NZDF it would attract a sentence of imprisonment. So what's happening to the mutineers after the dishonourable discharge? Will they be executed, or sent to a gulag?

Ok several things to untangle here.

First and foremost the modern Russian military is very light on enforcing contracts for volunteer soldiers. Back during the 2006 program for contract soldiers the terms included a room in a soldiers dormitory, rather then housing in a barracks. When units failed to provide these amenities, soldiers were allowed to break their contract since they had signed up for certain living conditions. While prosecution is possible, this isn't really mutiny. They're not refusing to follow all orders. They're just refusing this particular order. They can definitely be prosecuted and very well might be. But there's no guarantee they will be. Consider to what lengths Russian leadership has gone to avoid the image of soldiers being forced into this war. Russia has preferred irregular volunteer units to mobilizing or even to just using conscripts doing their regular service.

Second of all, I strongly doubt the US military would execute service members for refusing say a deployment to Afghanistan. The soldiers certainly wouldn't get away with it. But I really can't see the US executing them. I guess it depends on your definition of wartime...

Third of all GULag was disbanded in the 50s... Russia has a system of prisons and colonies for people. Also a system of disciplinary btlns (penal btlns) for service members. It's basically prison but for service members.

So... are they going to prison? I don't know. Possibly, but I have my doubts A dishonorable discharge coupled with being blacklisted from government service for life is my assessment. Russia already has uncomfortable questions to answer at home about this war. Executing 115 service members isn't a good move. Maybe they will prosecute those they see as ringleaders. Russia does currently have a death penalty but there's an indefinite moratorium in effect. Some recent moves show that this might change, but applying it retroactively and to your own service members is unlikely.

EDIT: I've also seen persistent rumors on Russian social media about soldiers and mercenaries refusing to participate in certain offensive operations. I have no substantiation, and it's hard to say for sure what the situation is.

 

[Rock the kasbah]

I've attached a few photos here I found over at the drive

https://www.thedrive.com/uploads/2022/05/26/Screen-Shot-2022-05-26-at-6.41.21-PM.png?auto=webp&auto=webp&optimize=high&quality=70&width=1920

A couple of cossacks apparently

https://www.thedrive.com/uploads/2022/05/27/FToYZUMXwAMS_eR.jpeg?auto=webp&optimize=high&quality=70&width=1920

Their ride
And a quote from the old bloke ( I wouldn't say that in hearing distance of him )
Grandad Cossack summed up Ukraine's fighting ethos and his reasoning for making a stand, even with equipment from last century.
“At least one Cossack will remain — and Ukraine will be reborn,” he said. "No one will live on this land except the Cossacks. And every Ukrainian is a Cossack.”
Mods I'm unsure of copyright stuff please delete if I am stealing or something

 

[Stuart M]

I've attached a few photos here I found over at the drive

https://www.thedrive.com/uploads/2022/05/26/Screen-Shot-2022-05-26-at-6.41.21-PM.png?auto=webp&auto=webp&optimize=high&quality=70&width=1920

A couple of cossacks apparently

https://www.thedrive.com/uploads/2022/05/27/FToYZUMXwAMS_eR.jpeg?auto=webp&optimize=high&quality=70&width=1920

Their ride
And a quote from the old bloke ( I wouldn't say that in hearing distance of him )
Grandad Cossack summed up Ukraine's fighting ethos and his reasoning for making a stand, even with equipment from last century.
“At least one Cossack will remain — and Ukraine will be reborn,” he said. "No one will live on this land except the Cossacks. And every Ukrainian is a Cossack.”
Mods I'm unsure of copyright stuff please delete if I am stealing or something

I don't know about who will win this, but when you've got gents like this, Pipes, Mos, mohawks and Maxims, those two blokes are winning on the sheer style front.

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Upgrades. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 27
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 27 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
May 27, 7:30pm ET

Main Points.

• Russian forces began direct assaults on built-up areas of Severodonetsk without having fully encircled the city and will likely struggle to take ground in the city itself.
• Russian forces in Lyman appear to be dividing their efforts—attacking both southwest to support stalled forces in Izyum and southeast to advance on Siversk; they will likely struggle to accomplish either objective in the coming days.
• Russian forces in Popasna seek to advance north to support the encirclement of Severodonestk rather than advancing west toward Bakhmut.
• Positions northeast of Kharkiv City remain largely static, with no major attacks by either Russian or Ukrainian forces.
• Russian forces continue to fortify their defensive positions along the southern axis and advance efforts to integrate the Kherson region into Russian economic and political structures.

Russian forces began direct assaults on Severodonetsk on May 27 despite not yet having fully encircled the town.
Russian forces have performed poorly in operations in built-up urban terrain throughout the war to date and are unlikely to be able to advance rapidly in Severodonetsk itself. Russian forces continue to make steady and incremental gains around the city but have not yet encircled the Ukrainian defenders. Ukrainian forces continue to maintain defenses across eastern Ukraine and have slowed most Russian lines of advance. Russian forces will likely continue to make incremental advances and may succeed in encircling Severodonetsk in the coming days, but Russian operations around Izyum remain stalled and Russian forces will likely be unable to increase the pace of their advances.

Full report at link above or pdf can be downloaded here.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 28
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 28 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
May 28, 7:30pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin is inflicting unspeakable suffering on Ukrainians and demanding horrible sacrifices of his own people in an effort to seize a city that does not merit the cost, even for him.

Main Points

• Russian forces pressed the ground assault on Severodonetsk and its environs, making limited gains.
• Russian forces in Kharkiv continue to focus efforts on preventing a Ukrainian counteroffensive from reaching the international border between Kharkiv and Belgorod.
• Ukrainian forces began a counteroffensive near the Kherson-Mykolaiv oblast border approximately 70 km to the northeast of Kherson City that may have crossed the Inhulets River.
• Russia’s use of stored T-62 tanks in the southern axis indicates Russia’s continued materiel and force generation problems.
• Ukrainian partisan activity continues to impose costs on Russian occupation forces in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine that aimed to seize and occupy the entire country has become a desperate and bloody offensive to capture a single city in the east while defending important but limited gains in the south and east. Ukraine has twice forced Putin to define down his military objectives. Ukraine defeated Russia in the Battle of Kyiv, forcing Putin to reduce his subsequent military objectives to seizing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine stopped him from achieving that aim as well, forcing him to focus on completing the seizure of Luhansk Oblast alone. Putin is now hurling men and munitions at the last remaining major population center in that oblast, Severodonetsk, as if taking it would win the war for the Kremlin. He is wrong. When the Battle of Severodonetsk ends, regardless of which side holds the city, the Russian offensive at the operational and strategic levels will likely have culminated, giving Ukraine the chance to restart its operational-level counteroffensives to push Russian forces back.

Ukrainian forces are also suffering serious losses in the Battle of Severodonetsk, as are Ukrainian civilians and infrastructure. The Russians have concentrated a much higher proportion of their available offensive combat power to take Severodonetsk than the Ukrainians, however, shaping the attrition gradient generally in Kyiv’s favor. The Ukrainians continue to receive supplies and materiel from their allies as well, however slow and limited that flow may be. The Russians, in contrast, continue to manifest clear signs that they are burning through their available reserves of manpower and materiel with no reason to expect relief in the coming months.

Evidence of eroding military professionalism in the Russian officer corps is mounting. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian commanders are attempting to preserve military equipment by forbidding drivers from evacuating wounded servicemen or providing supplies to units that have advanced too far.[1] Refusing to risk equipment to evacuate wounded personnel on the battlefield—other than in extraordinary circumstances—is a remarkable violation of core principles of military professionalism. Such behavior can have serious impacts on morale and the willingness of soldiers to fight and risk getting injured beyond their own defensive lines. ISW cannot independently confirm the GUR’s report, but commentary by Russian milbloggers offers some circumstantial support for it. Russian milblogger Alexander Zhychkovskiy criticized the Russian military command’s disregard for reservists on the deprioritized Zaporizhia Oblast front. Zhychkovskiy reported that Russian commanders trapped lightly-equipped infantry units in areas of intense Ukrainian artillery fire without significant artillery support and did not rotate other units through those areas to relieve them.[2] Zhychkovskiy noted that Russian commanders are responsible for high losses and cases of insanity among servicemen. Another milblogger, Alexander Khodarkovsky, said that Russian commanders are not sending reinforcements in a timely matter, preventing Russian forces from resting between ground assaults.[3]

Waning professionalism among Russia’s officers could present Ukrainian forces with opportunities. Russian morale, already low, may drop further if such behavior is widespread and continues. If Russian troops stuck on secondary axes lose their will to fight as the Battle for Severdonetsk consumes much of the available Russian offensive combat power, Ukraine may have a chance to launch significant counteroffensives with good prospects for success. That prospect is uncertain, and Ukraine may not have the ability to take advantage of an opportunity even if it presents itself, but the current pattern of Russian operations is generating serious vulnerabilities that Kyiv will likely attempt to exploit.

Full report at link above or pdf can be downloaded here.

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Updates. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 29
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
May 29, 5:30 pm ET

Main Points.

• Russian forces continued attempts to take full control of Severodonetsk.
• Russian forces continued offensives southeast of Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances toward Slovyansk.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) northeast of Bakhmut and appear unlikely to attempt to directly assault the city.
• The Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast has forced Russian troops to take up defensive positions and will likely disrupt Russian efforts to effectively dig in and consolidate control of occupied areas along the Southern Axis.

New reports confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful limited counterattack near the Kherson-Mykolaiv oblast border on May 28, forcing Russian forces onto the defensive. This Ukrainian counterattack is likely intended to disrupt Russian efforts to establish strong defensive positions along the Southern Axis. While the Ukrainian counterattack does not appear likely to retake substantial territory in the near term, it will likely disrupt Russian operations and potentially force Russia to deploy reinforcements to the Kherson region, which is predominantly held by sub-standard units. Ukrainian counterattacks may additionally slow Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of occupied southern Ukraine.[1]

Russian forces continued to assault Severodonetsk on May 29 but did not make any confirmed advances; Russian progress in intense urban combat will likely be slow. The Russian campaign in eastern Ukraine—which previously aimed to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts—is now focused almost entirely on Severodonetsk. Russian troops are unlikely to be able to conduct multiple simultaneous operations and will likely further deprioritize advances southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman in favor of concentrating available forces on Severodonetsk in the coming days.

Full report at link above or pdf can be downloaded here.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 30
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
May 30, 3:30pm ET

Main Points.

• Russian forces continued to incrementally capture areas of Severodonetsk but have not yet fully encircled the city.
• Russian forces focused on regrouping near Izyum to renew offensives towards Slovyansk and Barvinkove and conducted only minor, unsuccessful, attacks. Russian forces are making incremental advances towards Slovyansk and seek to assault the city itself in the coming weeks, but are unlikely to achieve decisive gains.
• Russian forces in Kharkiv continue to focus efforts on preventing a Ukrainian counteroffensive from reaching the international border between Kharkiv and Belgorod, and Ukrainian forces have not conducted any significant operations in the area in recent days.
• The limited Ukrainian counterattack in northern Kherson Oblast did not take any further ground in the last 48 hours but has disrupted Russian operations. Russian forces launched several unsuccessful attacks against the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east bank of the Inhulets River.
• Mounting casualties among Russian junior officers will further degrade Russian morale and command and control capabilities.

Mounting casualties among Russian junior officers will likely further degrade Russian capabilities and lead to further morale breakdowns. The UK Ministry of Defense stated on May 30 that Russian forces have suffered devastating losses amongst mid and junior ranking officers. The UK MoD reported that battalion and brigade level officers continue to deploy forwards and into harm's way—rather than commanding from rear areas and delegating to lower-ranking officers—due to senior Russian officers holding them to an “uncompromising level of responsibility” for their units.[1] The British Defense Ministry further reported that junior officers are in charge of low-level tactical operations due to a lack of professionalism and modernization within the Russian Armed Forces and that the continued losses of these junior officers will complicate command and control efforts, particularly in Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) cobbled together from the survivors of multiple other units.[2] ISW previously assessed that continued demoralization and poor command and control among Russian forces could present Ukrainian forces opportunities to conduct prudent counteroffensives, particularly as the Russian military continues to pour resources into the battle of Severodonetsk at the cost of other lines of effort.

Domestic dissent within Russian military circles, claiming that the Kremlin is not doing enough to win the war, continues to grow. Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Igor Girkin (also known as Strelkov) condemned Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements about the priority of the “special operation” in Ukraine being the liberation of the Donbas.[3] Girkin claimed that the Kremlin has forgone the ideological underpinnings of the conflict by focusing the conflict on the Donbas, rather than the entirety of Ukraine. Girkin complained that Kremlin officials are no longer questioning the legitimacy of the existence of Ukraine and that the concepts of “denazification” and “demilitarization” have been forgotten. Girkin accused the Kremlin of appeasement policies and stated that the threat of defeat continues to grow.

Girkin’s dissent is emblematic of continued shifts within circles of Russian military enthusiasts and ex-servicemen. As ISW has previously reported, the Kremlin has repeatedly revised its objectives for the war in Ukraine downwards due to battlefield failures. The Kremlin is increasingly facing discontent not from Russians opposed to the war as a whole, but military and nationalist figures angry at Russian losses and frustrated with shifting Kremlin framing of the war. Russian officials are increasingly unable to employ the same ideological justifications for the invasion in the face of clear setbacks, and a lack of concrete military gains within Ukraine will continue to foment domestic dissatisfaction with the war.

Full report at link above or pdf can be downloaded here.

 

[swerve]

EDIT: On Severodonetsk, it appears Russian and rebel forces have taken the residential areas but Ukrainian forces have withdrawn, some into the Azot factory, some into Lisichansk. It's not clear whether they will attempt a last stand or if they will attempt to withdraw. For the time being the road through Seversk is still open (though its will within artillery range). I don't think this was intentional on Russia's part. Rather this is the consequences of that failed river crossing that Belogorovka. It was supposed to have been the northern pincer to meet the breakout from Popasnaya. Ukraine will likely be able to reform defences around Artemovsk and Slavyansk-Kramatorsk. Those will likely be the next targets for the offensive.

As far as I can tell from public reports the heaviest fighting in the areas seems to be at Severodonetsk. Aerial images of Rubizhne (a few km to the north) show what looks like almost total destruction. That suggests that rather than trying to encircle the Ukrainians (who appear to have conducted a fighting retreat into, & perhaps now from, Severodonetsk) the Russians have been attacking the point of the salient head-on since the failed river crossing. One could postulate that the Russian attack was meant to pin the Ukrainians for a pincer movement, but it's been going on a long time for that. One could also postulate that the Ukrainian defence was meant to buy time for construction of defences further west, but I don't know enough to judge if that idea has any merit.

 

[Feanor]

As far as I can tell from public reports the heaviest fighting in the areas seems to be at Severodonetsk.

I think this is accurate. Major urban centers are the strong points of Ukrainian defense.

Aerial images of Rubizhne (a few km to the north) show what looks like almost total destruction. That suggests that rather than trying to encircle the Ukrainians (who appear to have conducted a fighting retreat into, & perhaps now from, Severodonetsk) the Russians have been attacking the point of the salient head-on since the failed river crossing.

Initially it looked like the breakout at Popasnaya could potentially encircle Ukrainian forces at Severodonetsk-Lisichansk. Now however it appears Russia is satisfied with threatening encirclement and creating a major problem for the supply line, while continuing to attack into the city. Ukrainian resistance in Severodonetsk also appears to be significantly less then it was in Mariupol', at least from what I can see. This isn't really surprising, since Mariupol' was defended by the 36th Marines, a professional and motivated combat unit, as well as Azov who also have a reputation for willingness to fight. Severodonetsk seems to be defended predominantly by territorial defense forces. It's possible Russia sees this and thinks they will be easier to break.

One could postulate that the Russian attack was meant to pin the Ukrainians for a pincer movement, but it's been going on a long time for that.

I've seen reports that Russia is still trying to break through Ukrainian defenses and cut that last supply route but so far has failed.

One could also postulate that the Ukrainian defence was meant to buy time for construction of defences further west, but I don't know enough to judge if that idea has any merit.

Strategically speaking, anything that buys time is good for Ukraine. Unfortunately this often looks ugly for the units at the front. Especially when it's territorial defense with little to no armor or artillery. I'm sure defenses further west are being prepared around Artemovsk and Slavyansk-Kramatorsk. I don't think we have a way to check if that's the particular reason/timeline for the continued fighting at Severodonetsk. The timeline and ability to defend it might depend on literally the willingness of these units to fight, the intensity of the Russian assault, and even on sheer dumb luck. A lucky strike taking out a Russian supply column could significantly slow down and delay the Russian assault, giving Ukraine more time. An unlucky Russian strike on a Ukrainian supply column could leave the units there without enough ammo to continue defending the cities.

 

[OPSSG]

Update No. 1 on Severodonetsk & other sectors

1. A battle of a division sector is the battle of a division’s reserves; but thus far this has been avoided by Ukraine — this is because Biden is treating the war in Ukraine like the Cuban Missile Crisis; but with the Soviets quarantining Cuba and setting the red lines for how far the Americans are permitted to proceed with the arming of Ukraine.

As far as I can tell from public reports the heaviest fighting in the areas seems to be at Severodonetsk.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1531777596345790465

2. ISW said Russian forces continued to incrementally capture areas of Severodonetsk but have yet to fully encircle the city. It looks like Severodonetsk will fall to the Russians.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1531677669439508485

3. Given the terrain, Ukrainians have no choice but to conduct a fighting retreat from Severodonetsk right now.

 

[Feanor]

Update.

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Russian strike, allegedly Kherson region.

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Strike, apparently Russian, in allegedly Kherson area. It appears a mechanized element is dismounting, possibly for an attack, and it's getting hit. This in principle fits with the Russian claim of a failed Ukrainian offensive in the area.

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The Zatoka bridge, Odessa region, apparently got hit again.

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Colonelcassad

Железнодорожный мост в Затоке после очередного прилета.

t.me

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Fragments of an Kh-22A missile found near Odessa.

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The North.

Brand new Russian anti-tank mines were spotted in Kiev region. They're a top-attack munition that reacts to sound. They apparently self-deactivate after 10 days.

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Новейшие российские противокрышевые противотанковые мины ПТКМ-1Р применяются против украинской бронетехники.

gurkhan.blogspot.com

A KIA Ukrainian pilot allegedly turned up in the Kiev water reservoir. This suggests that the unknown aircraft that crashed into it early in the war may have been a Ukrainian jet.

Повёрнутые на войне

Все помнят мартовское видео с палением чего то горящего в Киевское водохранилище и переможные комментарии про то, что сбит российский самолёт? Так вот то был укрореховский МиГ-29, а тело летчика, который утонул после катапультирования, лейтенанта Романа Пасулька выловили лишь на днях.

t.me

Kharkov-Sumy.

Another Russian strike on Merefe near Kharkov.

ANNA NEWS

Результат ракетного удара по ВСУ в Мерефе в Харьковской области. @anna_news

t.me

Ukrainian Furiya UAV went down in Kharkov area.

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Russian service member with a captured UAR-10 sniper rifle, allegedly Kharkov region.

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LDNR Front.

Russian strikes, allegedly DNR area.

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Russian/rebel mortar strikes, allegedly near Novomihailovka.

Военная хроника

You can view and join @milchronicles right away.

t.me

Donetsk getting hit by apparently Ukrainian shelling.

Colonelcassad

С утра ВСУ ведут обстрел Ворошиловского района Донецка. https://t.me/chp_donetsk_vdnr

t.me

Destroyed BTR, apparently Ukrainian. Possibly a BTR-3.

Повёрнутые на войне

Дороги войны. БТР аэромогильной бригады ВСУ.

t.me

Frederic Leclerc, a French journalist, was apparently killed by shrapnel from artillery near Severodonetsk. Warning footage of corpses. I think the third link is a video of the moment.

Colonelcassad

Убитый французский журналист Фредерик Леклерк. Машину посекло осколками на выезде из Северодонецка. Один из осколков попал в шею Леклерку, в результате чего он быстро умер.

t.me

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Военный Осведомитель

Не стой под стрелой. Иностранные и украинские журналисты терлись рядом с украинскими военными и словили артиллерийский прилет. Ранение получил как минимум один украинский военный и один журналист.

t.me

Russian videoblogger with Chechen fighters in Severodonetsk. You can see considerable battle damage to the town, though it's not as bad as Mariupol'.

WarDonbass

⚡️Северодонецкий котёл⚡️Обстановка на 30.05.2022 Спецназ «Ахмат» продолжает наступление в Северодонецке. На данный момент уже около половины города занимают союзные войска. Украинские националисты, отступающие к Лисичанску, пользуются тем, что они находятся на возвышенности, и активно его...

t.me

Russian infantry in the center of Severodonetsk. Note the video is at least a 1.5 days old.

Военный Осведомитель

Силы ВС РФ продвигаются в Северодонецке

t.me

Chechen fighters in the center of Severodonetsk. Civilians can be seen in the streets. The bearded man on camera claims the residential areas are clear, and Ukrainian forces are in the industrial sector.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️ Видео спецназа Росгвардии из ЧР из Северодонецка Судя по кадрам, большая часть оккупированного ВСУ города в ЛНР под нашим контролем. По словам местных жителей, ВСУ окопались в промзоне, где большие "катакомбы". t.me/RVvoenkor

t.me

A civilian is being interview in Severodonetsk when an artillery shell lands nearby.

Неофициальный Безсонов

В сети появилось видео из Северодонецка. На нём зафиксирован момент попадания украинского снаряда во время съёмки интервью. @NeoficialniyBeZsonoV

t.me

Russian troops with civilians in Severodonetsk, who are apparently happy to see them. Note, Severodonetsk was part of the DNR at the very beginning, and generally attitudes of civilians in the south-east differ quite a bit from the rest of the country.

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Allegedly, 3rd Co 134th Territorial Defens Btln, Ukrainian, Severodonetsk.

Милитарист

Позиции 3-й роты 134-го тербата у жилого дома Северодонецка

t.me

Allegedly Ukrainian forces retreating near Mar'inka.

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Ka-52s over Popasnaya.

GREY ZONE

Пролёт армейской авиации в лице пары ударных винтокрылов Ка-52 «Аллигатор» над бойцами Группы Вагнера, освобождавшие в пеших порядках Попасную в Луганской области

t.me

A Russian pontoon crossing north-west of Liman.

Рыбарь

Спутниковый снимок окрестностей сел Торское и Заречное к северо-востоку от Лимана от компании Maxar. На фото отчетливо видна понтонная переправа через реку Жеребец рядом с подорванным мостом. Судя по всему, инженерные подразделения ВС РФ возвели ее еще в апреле во время наступления на Ямполь с...

t.me

Russian and LNR MChS sappers clearing UXO and mines from around power lines. This is the first time I've seen a Russian mineclearing robot in MChS hands.

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Russia.

300 Russian volunteers enlisted in the 155the Marine Bde, from Primorye, are preparing to head to Ukraine. They appear to be training with BTR-82As and BMP-3s. It's not 100% clear whether they're technically enlisted in it or actually a separate irregular element. A two-week training program is mentioned, and I've heard references to this before in Russian social media. The video does claim they will be part of the Marine Bde.

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Misc.

We have unconfirmed reports of Russia using the TOS-2 in Ukraine.

Российская армия впервые применила на Украине новую систему ТОС-2 «Тосочка»

gurkhan.blogspot.com

A NLAW munition that allegedly malfunctioned. Location and context unclear.

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vk.com

Russian Kub loitering munition apparently failed to explode.

Военный Осведомитель

Украинские военные публикуют фото прилетевшего на их позиции барражирующего дрона-камикадзе «Куб-БЛА».

t.me

Azov is changing their insignia. Given that most of the old Azov either died or became POWs at Mariupol', the time is right for a rebranding. They can use the reputation boost they got from the defense of Mariupol'.

Украина.ру

Азов убирает неонацистскую символику — The Times

t.me

Russian Orlan-10 control setup somewhere in Ukraine.

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NATO/EU.

A US-UK loitering munition, the PHOLOS, spotted in Ukraine.

Милитарист

На Украине замечен БЛА вертикального взлета. Предположительно это британо-американский барражирующий боеприпас PHOLOS

t.me

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vk.com

An Australian citizen was killed in Ukraine. Russian sources claim he was part of Ukrainian combat formations in some capacity. Other sources claim he was there on a humanitarian mission.

Open Ukraine| Открытая Украина

На Украине убит 47-летний австралиец, который находился в составе украинской армии с «гуманитарной миссией».

t.me

Likely UK-supplied Wolfhound MRAP in Ukraine.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A US-supplied RQ-20 UAV in Ukraine.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

The US intends to purchase additional Stinger missiles. This might be related to the supplies provided to Ukraine.

https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2022-05-27/exclusive-u-s-army-replenishes-stinger-missiles-after-ukraine-shipments

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Updates. These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 31
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
May 31, 2022

Main Points.

• Russian forces are increasingly focused on advancing on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.
• Russian forces are making gains within and around Severodonetsk.
• Russian forces are likely hoping to advance on Lysychansk from Toshkivka in order to avoid having to fight across the Severskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.
• The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely feeling the pressure of the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast, especially as much of the Russian operational focus is currently on the capture of Severodonetsk.

Moscow’s concentration on seizing Severodonetsk and Donbas generally continues to create vulnerabilities for Russia in Ukraine’s vital Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian counter-offensives continue. Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River. If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack. This strategic calculus should in principle lead Russia to allocate sufficient combat power to hold Kherson. But Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen instead to concentrate all the forces and resources that can be scraped together in a desperate and bloody push to seize areas of eastern Ukraine that will give him largely symbolic gains. Continuing successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson indicate that Ukraine’s commanders recognize these realities and are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that Putin’s decisions have created.

The Ukrainian leadership has apparently wisely avoided matching Putin’s mistaken prioritization. Kyiv could have committed more reserves and resources to the defense of Severodonetsk, and its failure to do so has drawn criticism.[1] Ukrainian forces are now apparently withdrawing from Severodonetsk rather than fighting to the end—a factor that has allowed the Russians to move into the city relatively rapidly after beginning their full-scale assault.[2] Both the decision to avoid committing more resources to saving Severodonetsk and the decision to withdraw from it were strategically sound, however painful. Ukraine must husband its more limited resources and focus on regaining critical terrain rather than on defending ground whose control will not determine the outcome of the war or the conditions for the renewal of war.

Sound Ukrainian prioritization of counter-offensive and defensive operations pushed the Russians almost out of artillery range of Kharkiv City and have stopped the Russian advances from Izyum—both of which are more important accomplishments than the defense of Severodonetsk. Ukraine’s leadership has had to make incredibly difficult choices in this war and has generally made the right ones, at least at the level of strategic prioritization and in the pace, scale, and ambitiousness of its counter-offensives. That is why Ukraine still has a good chance to stop and then reverse the gains Russia is currently making.

Russian forces are likely attempting to exploit Belarusian equipment reserves to compensate for heavy material losses in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 31 that Belarusian forces are moving tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from storage facilities in Belarus to Russia to replenish combat losses.[3] This report corroborates previous reporting that Russian forces have largely exhausted their own reserves and indicates that the Kremlin is still leveraging its influence over Belarus in order to use Belarusian equipment.

Some pro-Russian milbloggers began to capture the frustrating realities of limited warfare, which may further intensify societal tensions in Russia. Pro-Russian political figure and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev said that the limited mobilization of Russians for war has divided Russian society into two groups: a small proportion that is involved in the war and the “peacetime Russians” who distance themselves from the war effort and are inconvenienced by foreign sanctions.[4] Gubarev blamed the “peacetime Russians” for failing to start collecting donations for Russian equipment, while criticizing the Kremlin for increasing propaganda about Russian successes during the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Gubarev also blamed the “peacetime Russians” for slowing down rotation rates due to fear of conscription. Guberev noted that mass mobilization could resolve the divide in society but opined that Russian commanders will not order such a mobilization to avoid mass casualties of unprepared conscripts as occurred, he notes, in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).

Gubarev is accurately capturing a phenomenon that is normal in a limited war that nevertheless generates high casualties. Resentment by those fighting such a war and their families against those who are untouched by the horrors of combat can grow even in an all-volunteer professional military, as Western countries experienced during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It is likely to be even more pronounced in Russia, whose military relies so heavily on conscripts and involuntarily-recalled reservists. This resentment can erode morale and will to fight as well as the propensity to volunteer for military service.

Russian citizens continued to conduct a series of attacks on Russian military recruitment centers in late May, likely in protest of covert mobilization. Russian Telegram channel Baza reported that the Russian Federal Security Service arrested a former Moscow artist and opposition figure, Ilya Farber, for Molotov Cocktail attacks on military recruitment centers in Udmurtia in the Urals on May 21.[5] A Russian court had previously sentenced Farber to an eight-year prison sentence for a bribery case. The case gained Farber significant support from Russian opposition leaders.[6] Farber admitted to committing arson in court on May 30. Baza also reported two more attacks on recruitment centers in Simferopol and Tula Oblast on May 28 and May 31, respectively.[7]

Full report at link above or pdf can be downloaded here.

 

[swerve]

The US intends to purchase additional Stinger missiles. This might be related to the supplies provided to Ukraine.

https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2022-05-27/exclusive-u-s-army-replenishes-stinger-missiles-after-ukraine-shipments

Officially 100% related. It's been said publicly that it's to replenish stocks, replacing those given to Ukraine. And once production is restarted, other countries will be able to do the same.

Some redesign of electronics is currently underway because Stinger has parts which are no longer made. In the meantime, two other NATO countries (France & Poland) make MANPADS.

 

[Feanor]

Update.

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Russia allegedly hit a Ukrainian command center in Noviy Bug, Nikolaev area. This is alleged to be the center of Ukraine's South command.

БелВПО

Все, что осталось от командного пункта ОК "Юг" в Новом Буге. Бандеровцы в шоке.

t.me

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian SIM cards are being distributed in Kherson as the region transitions to Russian information and economic institutions.

Telegram: Contact @newsfrontnotes

t.me

Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk-Krivoy Rog.

Allegedly a Ukrainain 2S3 taken out near Krivoy Rog.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

The North.

Russia apparently hit a Ukrainian border guards checkpoint in Chernigov area, destroying 1 or 2 BRDM-2 and a number of cars (though some of those may not have been in working condition).

Повёрнутые на войне

Последствия удара ВКС РФ по Черниговскому пограничному отряду. Март этого года. @vorposte

t.me

Повёрнутые на войне

Последствия удара ВКС РФ по Черниговскому пограничному отряду. Март этого года. @vorposte

t.me

Kharkov-Sumy.

A Ukrainian BMP-1 near Kharkov was spotted with a new tactical marking, a white hollow triangle.

Милитарист

Необычный тактический знак на украинской БМП-1 под Харьковым - треугольник

t.me

Izyum Salient.

Captured weapons weapons near Liman where Russian forces allegedly took Yarovaya.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian SpN in Krasniy Liman.

Андрей Vышинский

Российские спецназовцы в Красном Лимане.

t.me

Russian 2S7 and TOS-1 in the Izyum Salient.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Captured Ukrainian weapons near Slavyansk.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

LDNR Front.

A rare Russian Tornado-G MLRS firing allegedly at Zolotoe.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian D-30s apparently acting in support of LNR forces, possibly somewhere around Severodonetsk. They appear to be VDV.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian forces in action near Bakhmut (Artemovsk). Note the T-72 at 4:30. I suspect it's a T-72M with K-1 added on.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

DNR forces have apparently taken Novoselovka-2. It controls a road from Artemovsk to Konstantinovka. The unit is the DNR 9th Regiment, an elite unit that was involved in the assault on Mariupol'. It appears to be back on the front line and quite possibly spent some time in the rear getting reinforced and resupplied. Warning footage of corpses. Rebels point out damaged and abandoned civilian cars, claiming they were being used by Ukrainian forces.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A destroyed T-72B near Popasnaya, allegedly Ukrainian though it could very well be Russian or rebel.

⚡️Z Правда Шурави.

Разбитый танк укрорейха в Попасной.

t.me

There are reports that Ukrainian Aydar btln still holds the Uglegorsk powerplant near Svetlodarsk.

МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ФАН

Углегорская ТЭС возле города Светлодарска. В ней засели боевики предположительно батальона "Айдар", обстреливающие окрестные населенные пункты. Сам Светлодарск был освобожден на прошлой неделе, следующий репортаж — о том, как живет город сегодня. #Попасная, #Бахмут @riafan_everywhere

t.me

A Ukrainian Buk-M1 was spotted near Kramatorsk.

Милитарист

В районе Краматорска замечена переброска ЗРК «Бук-М1»

t.me

Chechen fighters in the SBU building, Severodonetsk. I think they're sweeping the building from the way they're checking rooms and going around corners. Note they're short-stocking their AKs to go around corners. These look a lot more competent then the Tik-tok morons we've seen before.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Rebel fighter with a DP-27, unclear if it's his or a captured one. Ukrainian Territorial Defense have been spotted using them many times. On the other hand rebel reservists are generally pretty poorly equipped too.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Rebel reservists with captured weapons near Svetlodarsk.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Mariupol'.

Russian boats patrolling the port of Mariupol'.

Заметки с передовой

Атмосфера в порту Мариуполя

t.me

The West.

Long gas lines in Odessa. Fuel shortages apparently continue.

Рыбарь

Еще одна иллюстрация топливного кризиса на Украине: на большей части заправок в Одессе нет газа, а на других стоят большие очереди. На АЗС также периодически возникают драки за драгоценное по местным меркам горючее. #Одесса #Украина @rybar *Поддержать нас: 4377 7278 0407 7977

t.me

Misc.

Russian night time Grad strikes, location and context unclear.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

A rare Ukrainina Triton armored car destroyed. Location and context unclear.

ПТСР TEAM Community

При участии нашего товарища из @ptsr_team была демилитаризирована редкая бандероповозка «Тритон». Данная бронемашина построена на шасси советского бронетранспортёра БТР-70 заводом «Ленинская кузница» (в 2017 году название завода декоммунизировано). Из открытых источников известно, что подобных...

t.me

A Ukrainian soldier posing with a destroyed Tunguska, allegedly also Ukrainian. It's hard to be certain on attribution, as the camo is non-distinctive, and there don't appear to be any tactical markings. The lack of Zs, Vs, etc. suggests that this might be Ukrainian.

Милитарист

Украинский военнослужащий позирует рядом с уничтоженным ЗРПК «Тунгуска» ВСУ

t.me

Ukrainian soldiers training with M-14s. We've had info of them being supplied before but I don't think we've seen them in combat yet.

Военный Осведомитель

Американские винтовки разработки 1950-х годов М14 на вооружении ВСУ.

t.me

A short video of Russian Cossack volunteer from Don unit. This video shows them riding around in Kamaz trucks, including one up-armored guntruck. In one shot they're with a T-80BVM, which may or may not be theirs. In some shots they don't have any body armor. It's unclear whether this is a lack of body armor, or they're far from the front and not wearing it.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian Marines T-80BV. Possibly from the 155th Marines.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Captured Ukrainian automatic grenade launcher UAG-40. A few of these have been captured by Russian forces.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Captured Ukrainian weapons. Location and context unclear.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukrainian troops practicing with a water-cooled Soviet Maxim gun. Note the steam.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Russian TOS-1 unit in action. Note the antiquated artillery sight, and the iphone being used to calculate.

Старше Эдды

Одно из самых захватывающий действий, это наблюдение реальной работы ТОСа. Сила и мощь тяжёлой огнемётной системы воистину захватывает дух, слава РХБЗ, ВСУ соболезнуем ( нет). Изюмский фронт.

t.me

A rebel BMP-2 uparmored with K-1 and with a basket behind the turret. This upgrade was seen before the war. Assuming the uparmored under the ERA, this is in principle a viable idea. It obviously loses amphibious capabilities, and reduces mobility, but poor protection is one of the biggest weaknesses for the type.

Прокачанная БМП-2

Видимо машина ЛДНР, они любители увешивать Контактом всю свою технику Ну и корзина за башней

shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com

Russian trucks, uparmored with scrap.

Блиндинируемся дальше

Еще пара ZVO Уралов

shusharmor.livejournal.com

Old footage of the air bridge into Mariupol'. It was allegedly active for weeks prior to Russian air defense shutting down the route.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

There are reports that Ukraine has withdrawn it's helos from the UN mission in Mali.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

NATO/EU.

Russian sources report that US military pesonnel from the 4th Security Forces Assistance Brigade are in Ukraine. Evidence is absent.

Офицеры Пентагона на украинском сафари

Офицеры Пентагона на украинском сафари Поток иностранцев на Украину ленд-лиз по поставке живой силы в эти дни делится на две категории, почти по словам полковника Кольта, на тех, кто стреляет, и тех, кто копает. Первая категория разношёрстная и включает в…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

An M-109 apparently in the hands of Ukraine's 72nd Mech Bde.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Ukraine has allegedly received M-109s.

Украина получила 155мм американские САУ М109

gurkhan.blogspot.com

There are reports that Ukraine has received Krab howitzers from Poland. This is a variant of the RoK K-9, a very modern weapon system.

Украина получила 155мм польские САУ Krab

gurkhan.blogspot.com

Ukraine has allegedly received Zuzana-2 howitzers from the Czech Republic.

Словакия передала Украине САУ Zuzana-2

gurkhan.blogspot.com

There are reports that Germany has supplied very few weapons to Ukraine over the past 9 weeks.

Германия за последние девять недель практически не поставляла оружие Украине

Как сообщила немецкая газета Welt am Sonntag в материале Klaus Geiger, Gregor Schwung Trotz Versprechungen liefert Deutschland seit neun Wochen kaum Waffen (Несмотря на обещания, Германия за девять недель практически не поставила оружия), по всей видимости, за…

bmpd.livejournal.com

 

[KiwiRob]

There are reports that Ukraine has received Krab howitzers from Poland. This is a variant of the RoK K-9, a very modern weapon system.

Krab uses a K-9 chassis, a license built British AS-90 turret with a main gun from Rheinmatall.

 

[GermanHerman]

There are reports that Germany has supplied very few weapons to Ukraine over the past 9 weeks.

Германия за последние девять недель практически не поставляла оружие Украине

Как сообщила немецкая газета Welt am Sonntag в материале Klaus Geiger, Gregor Schwung Trotz Versprechungen liefert Deutschland seit neun Wochen kaum Waffen (Несмотря на обещания, Германия за девять недель практически не поставила оружия), по всей видимости, за…

bmpd.livejournal.com

German newspaper Zeit has released a piece about the sentiment concerning Ukraine inside the german government recently.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1532095290165043201

It's behind a paywall and in german but undoubtly parts of this will soon find its way in russian telegram channels.

Key points are:

- General mistrust towards the "fragile democracy" of Ukraine and the wide spread corruption (never minding germanys own murky deals)
- Concerns about Zelensky concentrating power and possible turning into an autocrat (this is a bit provocative from Zeit and not a direct quote, but will undoubtly be eaten up by russian propaganda)
- Fear that the ukrainian government could act "irrational" and use german weapons on russian soil.
- Germany needs to defend it's interests against pressure from the public /Zelensky who exploits sympathy

There also seems to still be bad blood about Steinmeier and the general behaviour of Ukraine.

All in all I dont think Ukraine can hope for much more (meaningfull and timely) weapon deliveries from Germany.

 

[Feanor]

Krab uses a K-9 chassis, a license built British AS-90 turret with a main gun from Rheinmatall.

Thank you for the correction. I recalled it was some hybrid with the Koreans but I honestly forgot the details.

- General mistrust towards the "fragile democracy" of Ukraine and the wide spread corruption (never minding germanys own murky deals)

This is a reasonable concern, but really doesn't have anything to do with weapon deliveries, especially not in the middle of what is for Ukraine a total war.

- Concerns about Zelensky concentrating power and possible turning into an autocrat (this is a bit provocative from Zeit and not a direct quote, but will undoubtly be eaten up by russian propaganda)

Honestly I would be surprised if Zelensky did. I would be less surprised if someone toppled him. But you don't prevent that by giving him less security and lower chances of military success.

- Fear that the ukrainian government could act "irrational" and use german weapons on russian soil.

I guess it depends on their definition of rationality. Russia and Ukraine are at war.

- Germany needs to defend it's interests against pressure from the public /Zelensky who exploits sympathy

Their interests being what? Access to Russian oil and gas? I thought they were working on ditching that...

There also seems to still be bad blood about Steinmeier and the general behaviour of Ukraine.

Well... yeah. There's that. It wasn't exactly the smartest move on Ukraine's part, at least in my opinion.

All in all I dont think Ukraine can hope for much more (meaningfull and timely) weapon deliveries from Germany.

I'm still hearing rumors about German air defenses planned for delivery to Ukraine. I guess we will see if it happens.

 

[Vivendi]

Some articles that may be of interest:

Kofman and Rob Lee provide their analysis on the Russian military's force design: Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force Design - War on the Rocks

In general no big surprises perhaps. One interesting thing is they seem to disagree somewhat with those that claim that lack of NCOs was one of the main issues for Russia.

Another recently published article by Dalsjø et al: Full article: A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War (tandfonline.com)

This article tries to cover "all that went wrong" for Russia including poor logistics, poor equipment, low morale, poor communication, etc. Spoiler alert: they conclude that the main threat from Russia is not its conventional capabilities per se, but its brutality, appetite for risk and nuclear weapons. At the very end they have a short paragraph on Western forces:

Finally, how well Western forces would perform if similarly challenged remains to be seen. Some of the flaws exposed within the Russian Armed Forces may well lie dormant within Western military forces too. Several reports indicate that European forces are hollow in several respects, such as personnel strength, equipment, supplies and training.

This last paragraph transitions well into the last article: Would We Do Better? Hubris and Validation in Ukraine - War on the Rocks

What do the experts on this forum think? Do you agree or disagree with these analyses?

 

[STURM]

There are a whole list of problems but the main one as I see it is that for the past few years Russian military modernisation was based on the premise that it would fight small wars of a limited scope/scale; such as was encountered in the Donbas, Syria and Georgia. Planners did not foresee the possibility that the military would be called to conduct a major strategic offensive; 3 main fronts comprising several axis; in a country as large as the Ukraine.

I would argue that even if the military was prepared; faulty assumptions by the political leadership would have doomed it to failure anyway; at least initially.

From what little I know I feel we need to do away with the notion that NATO or certain NATO armies would perform better of faced if faced with the same situation.

 

[Vivendi]

The analyses presented so far are of course preliminary and in particular (as some of the authors also indicate) are in no way predictions of what will happen next. It's now a war of attrition, and Ukraine is almost 100% dependent on Western support to be able to train and supply forces to keep going. Even if Russia has suffered tremendous losses both in terms of soldiers killed/wounded, as well as equipment destroyed, it has a much larger population, larger economy, and importantly has the capacity to produce more equipment and ammunition (if they can get access to components and raw materials). Also, Ukraine has also suffered massive losses, and will probably continue to do so.

I am guessing that if the West stop supporting Ukraine, Russia most likely could occupy the whole of Ukraine. However even in such a scenario I think Russia would struggle enormously, long term -- I am guessing the Ukrainians would then shift tactics and organize an armed Resistance against the occupying force. Due to the large size of the country and the quite large population of Ukraine it's difficult to see how Russia would be able to handle such an occupation long term. Russia is bigger than Ukraine, but I am guessing the difference is not big enough to make them able to occupy Ukraine long term, unless they actually complete the genocide that many already claim they have started implementing.
Russia has incited genocide in Ukraine, independent experts conclude - The Washington Post
Ireland recognizes Russia’s crimes as genocide against Ukrainian people (ukrinform.net)

 

[kato]

- General mistrust towards the "fragile democracy" of Ukraine
- Concerns about Zelensky concentrating power and possible turning into an autocrat (this is a bit provocative from Zeit and not a direct quote, but will undoubtly be eaten up by russian propaganda)

The actual sentence at least in the bit on Twitter is "concerns about missing or at best fragile democratic structures" in Ukraine.

No need to go to this article on that for russian propaganda. Ukrainian opposition politicians call Zelenskyy's style of ruling as president "populist authoritarian", restricting pluralism and installing a "vertical column of power" focused on his role as president - and that opinion on his style is published as such by official information agencies on international politics in Germany (i just translated that sentence from my state's agency for political education).

and the wide spread corruption (never minding germanys own murky deals)

The Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International for 2021 places Germany at #10 (score 80/100) - and Ukraine at #122, as the second-most-corrupt European country (score 32/100). The only European country considered more corrupt is Russia (score 29/100). This is not a new thing either, but this distribution has been broadly like that for decades.

Fear that the ukrainian government could act "irrational" and use german weapons on russian soil.

"a government 'in a tunnel' or under the pressure of a population in nationalistic exuberance could be carried away into irrational acts - such as using German weapons in an attack on Russian territory".

- Germany needs to defend it's interests against pressure from the public /Zelensky who exploits sympathy

"Others describe the impression that Berlin has to defend German interests against the superiority in discourse and sympathy that Zelenskyy skillfully uses for his aims. And some of those aims are questionable."