1. In the interests of a better informed discussion, I provide a TDI link on the Russian concept of a Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) in this invasion of Ukraine. They provide a thread on the problems with the Russian army at a fundamentally organizational level.
2. In effect, the structure of a BTG isolates it from combined arms assistance — it turns out the a BTG from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) cannot even communicate (via secure means), resulting in it being killed. It looks like the BTG CANNOT target and strike quickly and effectively at long range. The net result is that the BTGs lack the mass (i.e. sufficient infantry) necessary to take defended urban terrain by assault. At least, not at a reasonable cost in combat losses.
3. In any war, the signal to noise ratio is often high and there is a need to filter out unnecessary noise to fully understand both tactical and geopolitical developments. This Defencetalk thread exists to serve the larger community and to separate useless noise, and help readers of news with bias to understand real consequences of decisions at tactical, operational or strategic levels, when appropriately discussed.
4. I have seen many bad takes on the war in Ukraine and I expect more to come. As I see it, letting Russia decapitate Ukraine’s government cannot be the right call because “oil/gas must flow” and this is one of the worst takes thus far from certain types of Western pundits — who don’t appreciate deterrence. You don’t deter without capability. If you have NATO’s military capabilities, you can decide to escalate arms shipments, knowing that Russia will not be able to open another front to attack. Supporting American, British and Central European arms shipments (and the American DoD training Ukrainians to operate the Switchblade 600), is not the same as supporting a no fly zone. That stupid no fly zone idea was so hot in the media, for a while, until it was debunked.
5. To understand where the war in Ukraine is going, and military operations in the coming weeks, we need all your help to post quality information. The progress of war may set conditions for a negotiated settlement. A logical course of action, by the Kremlin, is of course necessary.
2. In effect, the structure of a BTG isolates it from combined arms assistance — it turns out the a BTG from the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) cannot even communicate (via secure means), resulting in it being killed. It looks like the BTG CANNOT target and strike quickly and effectively at long range. The net result is that the BTGs lack the mass (i.e. sufficient infantry) necessary to take defended urban terrain by assault. At least, not at a reasonable cost in combat losses.
3. In any war, the signal to noise ratio is often high and there is a need to filter out unnecessary noise to fully understand both tactical and geopolitical developments. This Defencetalk thread exists to serve the larger community and to separate useless noise, and help readers of news with bias to understand real consequences of decisions at tactical, operational or strategic levels, when appropriately discussed.
4. I have seen many bad takes on the war in Ukraine and I expect more to come. As I see it, letting Russia decapitate Ukraine’s government cannot be the right call because “oil/gas must flow” and this is one of the worst takes thus far from certain types of Western pundits — who don’t appreciate deterrence. You don’t deter without capability. If you have NATO’s military capabilities, you can decide to escalate arms shipments, knowing that Russia will not be able to open another front to attack. Supporting American, British and Central European arms shipments (and the American DoD training Ukrainians to operate the Switchblade 600), is not the same as supporting a no fly zone. That stupid no fly zone idea was so hot in the media, for a while, until it was debunked.
5. To understand where the war in Ukraine is going, and military operations in the coming weeks, we need all your help to post quality information. The progress of war may set conditions for a negotiated settlement. A logical course of action, by the Kremlin, is of course necessary.
(a) The Ukrainian concession of seeking a legally binding international security guarantee backed by the U.S. & major European powers to prevent future Russian aggression in lieu of NATO membership is one of the Kremlin’s many goals to meet.
(b) I do not see the Kremlin altering their war goals in Ukraine — specifically, the goal of “demilitarization” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (25 March General Staff press conference). If anything, the defeat of the various Russian BTGs in Kyiv have caused Putin & his top advisors to see the fulfillment of their war aims as vital to the survival of their regime.
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