The Stugna; I have heard that it's been very effective against Russian armoured vehicles. Don't know much about it, but hear that it's one mean weapon.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
An interesting article by a Kiwi academic on the war. The Three Wars in Ukraine | Newsroom He says that its in fact three wars:
Another Kiwi academic wrote an earlier piece on Putin's Russia now being a fascist state and he has hit the nail on the head Russia Fought Against Nazism But is Now Itself a Fascist State | Newsroom
- A war of aggression and self defence.
- A war of national liberation.
- A war of secession.
Another Kiwi academic wrote an earlier piece on Putin's Russia now being a fascist state and he has hit the nail on the head Russia Fought Against Nazism But is Now Itself a Fascist State | Newsroom
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
More or less a classic 2nd gen ATGM. They are cheap to produce and easier to develop than, say, a Javelin, Spike, or MMP.
It really doesn't take much in the way of warhead design or defeat mechanism design, to defeat a Soviet tank. So a simple ATGM like that can be effective.
Would it be of any worth to other European nations though? Not at all.
Exonian
Member
I have no military experience, but my take on this conflict is that experienced boots on the ground are as important as ever, and both sides will value units with experience.
I assume that many of the units now withdrawn from the northern front may end up redeployed to the eastern front after they have been brought back up to strength. I wonder whether the experience gained on the road to Kyiv by Russian troops in their first taste of action will make them more effective in future. Or might the realities of a war they were not expecting make them more cautious?
I assume that many of the units now withdrawn from the northern front may end up redeployed to the eastern front after they have been brought back up to strength. I wonder whether the experience gained on the road to Kyiv by Russian troops in their first taste of action will make them more effective in future. Or might the realities of a war they were not expecting make them more cautious?
GermanHerman
Active Member
This picture was allegedly taken near Izyum and you can see from the tactical markings that this are redeployed troops from the north:
Capt. Ironpants
Active Member
Sounds interesting, but I am unable to read, as I get this message: "Forbidden -- You do not have permission to access this resource". Is it just me? Or is it for paid subscribers only?
I was able to access it. Its not paywalled. Geolocked maybe?
Here is the text-
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The three wars in Ukraine
The war can be seen as one of aggression and self-defence, of national liberation, and as a war of secession. The likely outcomes of all three seem to point to a divided Ukraine
Comment: Identifying the nature of a war allows comparison with wars of a similar nature. These analogies help us to understand a complex new conflict. They provide scenarios as to how the conflict may unfold – and end. They indicate the costs likely to be incurred and the opportunities seized (or missed) by the antagonists.
The war in Ukraine can be seen through at least three lenses: as a war of aggression and self-defence; a war of national liberation; and as a war of secession.
Supplementing these three modes are associated clashes over disinformation, cyber-hacking, ethno-linguistic assertiveness, and outside intervention. And permeating all are flagrant violations of the international laws of war.
A war of aggression and self-defence
In obvious respects, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a conventional act of aggression by one sovereign state against another. It is conventional inasmuch as the bulk of the fighting is conducted by the uniformed armed forces of the two countries using modern weapons. The Russian attack violates Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, which proscribes aggression against a fellow member. Article 2 (4) asserts:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state …
The attack also triggers Article 51, the attacked member’s right of self-defence, which states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations …
Russia (as the successor to the USSR) and Ukraine (then as a republic of the USSR) acceded to the UN Charter in 1945. Thus both are legally bound to respect its prescriptions. While Ukraine has, Russia has not.
The international crime of aggression was mooted after World War I and included in indictments of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II. It was one of four crimes specified by the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998. In all three instances the crime of aggression was insufficiently defined and was not sustained by international enforcement or judicial action.
In 2019 member states ratified the Kampala Agreement by which the ICC delegated the decision to determine aggression to the UN Security Council. That body has not exercised this prerogative, not least because one or another of the five permanent members has used or threatened its veto – most recently Russia, with China’s abstention. The crime of aggression thus lacks legal weight. Western leaders’ characterisation of Putin as a ‘war criminal’ for ordering the attack of Ukraine, and authorising disproportionate and undiscriminating force against civilians, is a satisfying moral judgment and bold political act, but it is without judicial foundation or practical effect.
A war of national liberation
If Russia fails to change the Ukrainian government’s policies in its favour, and if popular armed resistance to a Moscow-friendly government persists, the nature of the war would begin to resemble the post-colonial national liberation wars of Asia and Africa. Examples include Mao’s and Ho Chi Minh’s guerrilla wars against Japan, France, and the US, and Israel’s and Kenya’s insurgencies against imperial Britain.
In national liberation wars, the weaker party under occupation by a stronger party uses militia, irregular forces, and resistance volunteers in hit-and-run tactics to out-manoeuvre and sting the conventional forces, and to weaken the political resolve of the occupying power by raising the costs of occupation. They deploy propaganda abroad to win international sympathy and material support.
These tactics resemble those of ‘hybrid warfare’, of which, ironically, Russia has used against Ukraine for a decade. If Russian forces succeed in displacing the Zelenskyy government from Kyiv and occupy the bulk of the country, they will likely face significant harassment by mobilised and motivated civilians within Ukraine and from across the borders.
The liberation fighters will be supported, directly or indirectly, by Western governments, corporations, NGOs, and volunteer ‘foreign fighters’. Their actions in defiance of Russian claims will be legitimised by UN Charter Article 1 (2) and General Assembly Declaration 1514, among many others, establishing the right of self-determination of peoples. They may lose battles but if they survive and persist, they could ultimately win the liberation war by forcing a stalemate on, and eventually the departure of, the Russians, as did the Afghan Mujahideen when pitted against the Soviet Union in 1990, and the Taliban against the US and Nato in 2021.
A war of secession
This aspect of war began in 2014 when Russian ‘volunteers’ (special forces soldiers in unmarked uniforms popularly called ‘little green men’) fomented rebellion among Russian-speaking Ukrainians of Crimea and Donbas. Self-appointed local leaders then called for Russian support against the elected Ukrainian officials. Putin obliged by annexing Crimea and providing weapons and clandestine advisers to the Donbas separatists. Subsequent armed clashes with Ukrainian armed forces cost nearly 14,000 lives and saw the murder by a Russian missile of 298 passengers and crew aboard a passing Malaysian airliner. One of Putin’s aims is to secure the recognition of Crimea as Russian, and Donetsk and Luhansk provinces as independent, Russia-aligned republics, similar to those of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which Russian forces carved out of Georgia in 2005.
International law and the UN Charter are ambivalent regarding wars of secession, especially if akin to civil wars, sectarian wars, or irredentist conflicts. They prescribe only non-interference by outsiders and respect for the Geneva Conventions by the combatants. Legal opinion divides those insisting on territorial integrity, usually first world commentators, from those privileging self-determination of oppressed peoples and national liberation struggles, usually third world commentators. The UN Security Council permanent members and Western states tend to the former, and the majority of UN General Assembly members, recently freed from colonialism, tend to the latter.
China is a notable exception as a champion of territorial integrity – its own foremost. Putin’s Russia straddles the ideological spectrum opportunistically, insisting on the integrity and security of Russia itself from outside intervention (and from the alleged threat posed by Nato’s presence in neighbouring states) but at the same time asserting the right of ex-Soviet Russians settled in surrounding countries to demand privileges and autonomy if not outright independence from their host governments. If expressed with authenticity, the rights of the Russia-aligned minorities in Crimea and Donbas must be acknowledged.
Likely outcomes
The likely outcomes of all three war modes seem to point to a divided Ukraine oppressed by the might of the Russian military in the east and south, and maybe also in Kyiv, with the rest of the country fiercely loyal to the current elected Ukrainian government and hostile to Russia. Some commentators predict a North Korea/South Korea-type armistice to stop the fighting in the near term, but promising no lasting political settlement in the longer term, only prolonged division and armed strife. Just when Western leaders were beginning to meet the economic challenge of a rising China, they will be obliged to divert resources to stem a Russian security challenge.
Some see Ukraine as the fulcrum on which the balance between Western democracies on the one hand and Eastern autocracies on the other will be precariously balanced. Even if the balance does not tip into all out West-East war, ordinary consumers on both sides will suffer from rising inflation and energy and supply chain disruption. A new phase in global conflict and economic hardship may have been triggered by Putin’s criminal invasion. The world’s seven billion inhabitants may feel its effects economically just as tens of millions have already felt it physically.
International law above all
Regardless of which of the Ukraine war’s three aspects prevails, the international laws of war and humanitarian conduct still govern all parties to the conflict. These include sovereign political leaders, regular troops, militia, guerrillas, and armed individuals, and outside intervention forces whether regular or irregular, overt or covert. Clear rules are set out in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in 1998, and in the domestic criminal codes of progressive states, many based on international human rights treaties.
While Russian leaders may employ indiscriminate violence, Western leaders must adhere to the standards of international law, and the guidelines of morality, if their democratic ideals are to prevail. Not only most Ukrainians but also many brave Russians are expressing their liberal sentiments by protesting, demonstrating, enlisting, resisting, or migrating. They share the vision of a more humane civic life that the West offers in contrast to the kleptocracy and thuggery of Putin’s self-serving and stultifying Russian oligarchy.
As truth can be one of the first victims of war I have included this article going into some of the history behind unit 54777 and how it shapes or influences history
newlinesmag.com
www.state.gov
This article by the Rand corporation goes into the psychology of propaganda with people more likely to believe the propaganda if repeated by multiple sources
www.rand.org
This is not some invention of Russia though William Randolph Hearst the American publisher and known as the father of yellow journalism did much to push for America's war with Spain (You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war" )
Inside Russia’s Secret Propaganda Unit
Exclusive: Newly discovered documents reveal the role of a secret Russian intelligence section called Unit 54777 in propaganda and espionage operations.
newlinesmag.com
Russia’s Top Five Persistent Disinformation Narratives - United States Department of State
Russia has long exploited the “Illusion of Truth” effect: When a lie is repeated so often that people begin to believe it. Understanding this effect can help you avoid falling for it.
www.state.gov
Russia's “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model
Russia's propaganda model is high-volume and multichannel, and it disseminates messages without regard for the truth. It is rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it does not commit to consistency.
www.rand.org
cdxbow
Well-Known Member
Ability to sustain a war is very much related to a nations industrial capacity, and in this the Russians are going to be in trouble. However it's not just overall capacity that is going to be a problem, it's the lack of a very specific ability, Russia does not have a significant modern semiconductor manufacturing base. This article discusses some these issues Why low-tech Russia is losing the war - Asia Times
As an aside, what a sweet prize Taiwan is, with more than 50% of the worlds high end industry.
As an aside, what a sweet prize Taiwan is, with more than 50% of the worlds high end industry.
I get sad when news like this is reported. It makes it real, when a 3rd party confirms the crime.
It might not be just a single well hidden tank, at a slight curve in the road, that destroyed a Russian BTR-82A — can’t tell what the Russian reaction to fire is, when I don’t know how many are really firing on the Russians. After a few seconds, you can see that the Russians begin to fire back in the correct general direction — while trying to move through the kill zone — correct immediate action to threat. A round hits the house, and the T-64BV tank was hidden by the house — the enemy gets a vote; and they will also react to fire.
Watch the video above — I would use more smoke grenades, to get out of trouble. They don’t seem deploy it as a counter measure, when they know they are in a kill zone. But it might be a tactical decision or the canisters have been fired in an earlier battle. Hard to tell.
As powerful as OSINT can be, this Ukrainian video of the destruction of a BTR-82A is a skewed and limited look at this conflict. This is just the nature of the beast. I can’t tell you more because we don’t really know the actual ambush layout — it’s edited to ensure we can’t see the full tactical picture. If I was in a Russian BTR-82A, I wouldn’t be able to see much either. As a human being, I pity the Russian troops, who are dismounting blind into unfamiliar terrain while under fire.
Due to the multiple edits, can’t see what the Russian infantry are doing in their drills, in response to what seems to be a single Ukrainian T-64BV tank shooting a Russian convoy on the move. The other shots fired by the T-64BV miss, but appears that this held up the convoy enough for artillery fire.
It might not be just a single well hidden tank, at a slight curve in the road, that destroyed a Russian BTR-82A — can’t tell what the Russian reaction to fire is, when I don’t know how many are really firing on the Russians. After a few seconds, you can see that the Russians begin to fire back in the correct general direction — while trying to move through the kill zone — correct immediate action to threat. A round hits the house, and the T-64BV tank was hidden by the house — the enemy gets a vote; and they will also react to fire.
As powerful as OSINT can be, this Ukrainian video of the destruction of a BTR-82A is a skewed and limited look at this conflict. This is just the nature of the beast. I can’t tell you more because we don’t really know the actual ambush layout — it’s edited to ensure we can’t see the full tactical picture. If I was in a Russian BTR-82A, I wouldn’t be able to see much either. As a human being, I pity the Russian troops, who are dismounting blind into unfamiliar terrain while under fire.
Last edited:
If the troops are already dismounted, the Russian tank crew might have some valid concerns about using smoke. Unless the formation is well trained and rehearsed, it can cause more problems.
We also do not know the wind direction, which would be the other primary consideration when using smoke. They are on a road, moving in a single file towards a direction, hence the smoke itself might have little benefit unless the wind is moving in the direction of their movement.
Agreed.
If you don’t mind, let me add some minor points to what I said, earlier:
One, these are tactical decisions, including use or non-use of smoke and the decision to dismount infantry. The immediate actions drills were implemented, which means a command decision was made.
- How well implemented were the drills?
- As I also said earlier — can’t tell due to edits.
Two, wind is not a factor in this case, as smoke from the burning BTR-82A confirms. Thanks for giving me a chance to clarify.
Three, the Ukrainians expected the dismount drill and fired artillery to target dismounts. There is an action—reaction dynamic that causes friction.
Last edited:
I think it would depend. If it was a non top attack round and the tank had effective ERA it might stand a chance. The bulk of Russian tank losses appear to have been by missiles impacting the turret roof; we have no idea as to.how many were actually killed by 2nd gen non top attack systems. We know there were various instances in Syria where tanks survived non top.attack.shots from 2nd gen ATGWs.
Sandhi Yudha
Well-Known Member
Czechia seems to start the delivery of some T-72 MBTs and BVP-1 IFVs by rail. Isn't this easy for Russia to spot this transport at the moment it cross the border with Ukraina and destroy it with air strikes?
Could they do it sure, would it be easy? Well that I think is debatable. They would need to know the exact time, location, the exact train etc which will require a few resources. It's not like they are striking at a fixed target (radar installation, bases, dumps etc) but rather a moving target so they need to get in close because trying to do it at range will be impossible. That then means they need to also get past the local air defence and the Ukranian fighters that for the most part have more aerial dominance in that region of Ukraine.
Quite simply it is a resource intensive operation with no guarantee of success for little reward.
Big_Zucchini
Well-Known Member
The key here is a tandem warhead. A tandem warhead doesn't care about your ERA, nor feelings. It smashes through. To defeat a tandem charge, a tank must either have multilayered ERA on top of a good amount of armor (ERA doesn't defeat a whole shaped charge, just a part of it, always leaving residual penetration), or just a solid chunk of composite armor like the front of a turret of an Abrams, Merkava, or Leopard.
Syria saw the use of many ATGM types, many of whom without a tandem warhead.
Russian ultra predictable movement routes enable Ukrainians to very easily ambush them, therefore all the reasons not to target the armored front of a tank, and instead go for its side armor.
Even with proper kit, all tanks would be vulnerable to even decades old ATGMs on their sides.
Interesting thread on Russian losses and it makes a credible case that Ukraine gov't estimates my be pretty close to correct.
"Only for the pesky Pacific Fleet to keep being amazingly rebuilt in a few months and appearing closer to Japan each time. As such, Ive never used official Ukrainian claims on Russian losses during this war. Here is the most recent claims. "
"These claims might seem very high--though for the first time we actually have a tool for comparison. Open source intelligence based on photographic evidence. We can thus have a baseline comparison between minimum Russian losses and Ukrainian claims. "
"For tanks, which the open source intelligence has excellent evidence about, the difference between Ukrainian claims (676) and proven losses (425) is actually not that large considering that the OSINT figure is a base line. "
"So I am being relatively cautious in estimating that there is another 25% of Russian tanks that would have been hit compared to those documented as destroyed. As of yesterday, that would have been an additional 111."
The overall point being that Oryx and other credible sources are the baseline you should start from. There are and will be many losses that are never documented or can't be counted accurately. for example:
It's going to take more than a Ukrainian tractor to clear out that mess.
"Only for the pesky Pacific Fleet to keep being amazingly rebuilt in a few months and appearing closer to Japan each time. As such, Ive never used official Ukrainian claims on Russian losses during this war. Here is the most recent claims. "
"These claims might seem very high--though for the first time we actually have a tool for comparison. Open source intelligence based on photographic evidence. We can thus have a baseline comparison between minimum Russian losses and Ukrainian claims. "
"For tanks, which the open source intelligence has excellent evidence about, the difference between Ukrainian claims (676) and proven losses (425) is actually not that large considering that the OSINT figure is a base line. "
"So I am being relatively cautious in estimating that there is another 25% of Russian tanks that would have been hit compared to those documented as destroyed. As of yesterday, that would have been an additional 111."
The overall point being that Oryx and other credible sources are the baseline you should start from. There are and will be many losses that are never documented or can't be counted accurately. for example:
It's going to take more than a Ukrainian tractor to clear out that mess.
Last edited:
You talk about "western media claiming war crimes on Bucha". What about Al Jazeera? Is that also "western media" now? Bucha killings: ‘The world cannot be tricked anymore’ | Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera. I suspect there are plenty of other "non-western media" that claim the same, you can search that for yourself. Apart from Chinese media, I have not found "non-Russian media" supporting the "Russian claims" (or what I would call Russian lies) on Bucha.
Most media are disputing Russian claims regarding Russian war crimes, this is nothing unique to "Western media".
Regarding Azov: "Western media" are reporting on Azov, this is not "suppressed", see e.g. Who are Ukraine’s neo-Nazi Azov Battalion? | The Independent The Azov Battalion: Extremists defending Mariupol | Europe | News and current affairs from around the continent | DW | 16.03.2022 Azov movement analysis: A far-right battalion has a key role in Ukraine's resistance. Its neo-Nazi history has been exploited by Putin - CNN
In my opinion there is a huge and significant difference between reporting in "Western media" and "Russian media". There is a bias in a lot of the "Western media", but bias is quite different from the outright lies that "Russian media" are spreading, and the consistent suppression of any news that are not reflecting the "alternate reality" that Russia is presenting. It's sad to see that you seem to disagree.
An interesting article by a Kiwi academic from the University of Otago in Dunedin. Russia fought against Nazism but is now itself a fascist state
"Like Stalin, Putin thinks nations can be defined objectively, and he has declared there is no Ukrainian nation separate from the Russian one. History matters for national identity, but sometimes serves as a tool for aggressive nationalism."
During the Great Patriotic War, what Stalin, the CCCP, USSR, and modern Russia call WW2, the Russians fought Nazism liberating Eastern Europe and helping liberate the rest of Europe from what was a terrible evil. They paid a horrific price in blood for that victory and no-one can take that away from them. Unfortunately Stalin was just as evil as Hitler and Eastern Europe swapped one jackbooted master for another, who was more cunning, ruthless, and far smarter than Hitler. Stalin like some of the Tsars before him believed that Ukraine was not a separate nation to Russia and that it was nothing but a vassal state and it's people of lesser quality than Russians. Stalin wasn't even a Russian himself, but a Georgian and he was the most avid and active of Russian nationalists of the 20th Century.
However as any Ukrainian will tell you Ukraine existed before the State of Rus was founded by Princes from Kyiv no less. However over the centuries Ukraine has changed hands, been partitioned, declared independence, invaded, incorporated by Russia against its will more than once. Russia has forbidden it it's culture and language more than once under the Tsars and the CCCP. Stalin forced the Holodomor - the Great Starvation on it and throughout the rest of Russia as punishment for resistance to forced collectivisation. After WW2 nothing changed until the USSR collapsed and Ukraine gained its freedom. So as far as most Ukrainians are concerned the Russians are oppressors and have been for approximately three centuries. On the Russian side they have some spurious claims that Ukraine is a Russian province. Ukraine as a 'borderland': a brief history of Ukraine's place between Europe and Russia (theconversation.com) They may be right but the jury is well and truly out on that and current Russian actions definitely do nothing to help their case.
It is apparent that the Ukrainians do have a national identity, culture, history, language, and national aspirations, that are separate to those of Russia and they have the freedom, will and wont to do these. On the other hand, Russia is trying to enforce three centuries of oppression and dominance based upon a fallacy and a sense of mistaken racial and social superiority. Whilst in WW2 millions of Russians fought against Nazism with untold bravery and died and / or were wounded doing it, with their sacrifice and valour being given rightful honour; Modern day Russia under Putin is now a fascist kleptocracy that spits and craps on the honour and memory of all those brave men and women who sacrificed so much. Assoc Prof Headly is quite correct in his assertions.
Anna Rankin, a Kiwi journo recently talked with some NZ resident Ukrainian and Russian expats about how the war impacts upon them. It is a very interesting read and quite educational. I have seen instances here in Christchurch of Russian expats standing beside Ukrainian expats at demonstrations against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article the same has happened. The interviewee's also talk about their worries about family, relatives and friends back home. The Ukrainians because they are in a war zone, and the Russians because of the oppression back home. One has a relative who was arrested for protesting against the war. Tis is a quote from the article:
"Like Stalin, Putin thinks nations can be defined objectively, and he has declared there is no Ukrainian nation separate from the Russian one. History matters for national identity, but sometimes serves as a tool for aggressive nationalism."
During the Great Patriotic War, what Stalin, the CCCP, USSR, and modern Russia call WW2, the Russians fought Nazism liberating Eastern Europe and helping liberate the rest of Europe from what was a terrible evil. They paid a horrific price in blood for that victory and no-one can take that away from them. Unfortunately Stalin was just as evil as Hitler and Eastern Europe swapped one jackbooted master for another, who was more cunning, ruthless, and far smarter than Hitler. Stalin like some of the Tsars before him believed that Ukraine was not a separate nation to Russia and that it was nothing but a vassal state and it's people of lesser quality than Russians. Stalin wasn't even a Russian himself, but a Georgian and he was the most avid and active of Russian nationalists of the 20th Century.
However as any Ukrainian will tell you Ukraine existed before the State of Rus was founded by Princes from Kyiv no less. However over the centuries Ukraine has changed hands, been partitioned, declared independence, invaded, incorporated by Russia against its will more than once. Russia has forbidden it it's culture and language more than once under the Tsars and the CCCP. Stalin forced the Holodomor - the Great Starvation on it and throughout the rest of Russia as punishment for resistance to forced collectivisation. After WW2 nothing changed until the USSR collapsed and Ukraine gained its freedom. So as far as most Ukrainians are concerned the Russians are oppressors and have been for approximately three centuries. On the Russian side they have some spurious claims that Ukraine is a Russian province. Ukraine as a 'borderland': a brief history of Ukraine's place between Europe and Russia (theconversation.com) They may be right but the jury is well and truly out on that and current Russian actions definitely do nothing to help their case.
It is apparent that the Ukrainians do have a national identity, culture, history, language, and national aspirations, that are separate to those of Russia and they have the freedom, will and wont to do these. On the other hand, Russia is trying to enforce three centuries of oppression and dominance based upon a fallacy and a sense of mistaken racial and social superiority. Whilst in WW2 millions of Russians fought against Nazism with untold bravery and died and / or were wounded doing it, with their sacrifice and valour being given rightful honour; Modern day Russia under Putin is now a fascist kleptocracy that spits and craps on the honour and memory of all those brave men and women who sacrificed so much. Assoc Prof Headly is quite correct in his assertions.
Anna Rankin, a Kiwi journo recently talked with some NZ resident Ukrainian and Russian expats about how the war impacts upon them. It is a very interesting read and quite educational. I have seen instances here in Christchurch of Russian expats standing beside Ukrainian expats at demonstrations against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article the same has happened. The interviewee's also talk about their worries about family, relatives and friends back home. The Ukrainians because they are in a war zone, and the Russians because of the oppression back home. One has a relative who was arrested for protesting against the war. Tis is a quote from the article:
These are just expats from both nations telling it as they see it. Against the war (newsroom.co.nz)