The Arjun Tank

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niteshkjain

New Member
Look in to this also

Link: http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2008/04/only-for-hardcore-tank-buffs-arjun.html

THURSDAY, 17 APRIL 2008
ONLY FOR HARDCORE TANK BUFFS: The Arjun controversy

This post is a prelude to an article that I'm writing on the recent controversy over the Army’s statement to Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence, which was tabled in parliament as a part of the Committee’s 29th Report. The part relating to the Arjun, in Para 8.18 of the report, is quoted below:

8.18. During evidence before the Committee, a representative of the Army clarifying the position regarding performance of the Arjun tank submitted as under:-

“Sir, we have just carried out the trial in winter. The tanks have performed very poorly. There have been four engine failures so far. The tanks have done about 1000 km each. There has been a problem. The Defence Minister has been apprised by the Chief. I think two or three days back, he has written a DO letter giving the exact position. So a lot of improvements have to be done before the Army will be satisfied with the Arjun tank.”

The factual position

During the AUCRT in Pokhran, there was NO problem with either of the two engines. The problems were actually with four transmission systems: supplied by Renk AG, from Germany.

The problem: When the oil temperature went up, the oil viscosity was reduced… and the oil pressure was therefore insufficient. As a result, the bearing gave way, and the main shaft in the transmission also got damaged. Pieces were flying around and, when the transmission gearbox was opened, it looked pretty ugly.

The investigations are focusing on three aspects:

1. The possibility that the use of indigenous oil, rather than German oil, may have led to a failure of lubrication. The CQA (PP)… that is Controller of Quality Assurance (Petroleum Products)… has examined the oil and said that it is of the same grade as the foreign oil. However, the experts from Renk AG are still not convinced. They have taken samples of the oil to Germany to analyse, are will reach a conclusion by Monday, 21st April.

2. The possibility that recent changes made to the Arjun’s system of dual gear levers might have led to the problem. The driver has a Mode Selector Switch (with options: Forward-Neutral-Reverse)… and also a gear lever (with options: 1, 2, 3, Automatic). So totally, the tank has four forward and two reverse gears. Recently, when the production series tanks began being manufactured, the Gear Lever options were changed to (1, 2, Automatic). In the new system, gears 3 and 4 engage and disengage automatically. In fact, one school of thought amongst the designers is to have just the first gear manual… and then 2-4 automatic, i.e. (1, Automatic).

The CVRDE’s Transmission Group Team has recommended that another Manual Gear lever be introduced. That would be used while tow starting the tank. There are also problems with the logic of gear change in the Pokharan area where the tests are taking place. Unlike the Suratgarh desert, which had heavy sand, the Pokhran desert has hard, flat ground. Since the driving conditions are different, the logic for gear changing has to be different, and the micro-switches that signal the gear changes have to be calibrated differently.

3. There is also a possibility that a recent change in the supplier of the bearing that failed might have led to the problem. [Renk AG, which manufactures the gearbox, recently changed its bearing supplier.]

Experts from Renk AG are reaching the trial area and also CVRDE, Avadi, on 22nd April. Renk AG is one of the world’s most respected suppliers of transmission systems and it’s prestige is at stake here. A top Arjun designer says, “Renk’s prestige is at stake. I have no doubt they will fix the problem fast.”

Problems with four HSUs

The second problem that the Arjun faced was in some Hydro-pneumatic Suspension Units (HSUs). The Arjun has 7 road wheel stations on each side, which means that each tank has 14 HSUs. With two tanks participating in the trials, there were 28 HSUs that were effectively taking part. Of these, four HSUs failed.

One of them was a genuine failure, in which the HSU’s breather pipe got damaged and sand went in through that. The other three HSUs failed after 2000 km of running. HVF lays down a service life of 2000 km for each HSU, so that was predictable. This was not a problem at all.

It might also be noted that it takes just two hours to replace an HSU in the Arjun. This tank does not have a torsion bar suspension, in which replacing a road wheel station was a major undertaking.

Incidentally, the HSU has been an area where the Arjun’s designers have put in some really serious thinking. The terrain in Pokhran, which is flat and hard, generates in the HSU pistons a low amplitude, high frequency vibration. That is in contrast to heavy sand dune country like Suratgarh, where the HSU pistons undergo a high amplitude, low frequency vibration. In Suratgarh there were no problems, but the resurfacing of problems (albeit after the specified service life) in Pokhran brings to mind the earlier problems in which HSUs were leaking while the tank was being transported by train. The low-amplitude, high frequency vibrations generated by the vibrations of a train were enough to cause the HSUs to leak. That problem was resolved by changing the rings of the floating piston in the HSU. Also, the CVRDE tried out different types of piston rings, including imported ones from Hunger, Germany. Eventually, a life of 2000 km was achieved.

Problems with top rollers

Three or four top rollers also failed. That is being investigated.

Problems with tank Muzzle Reference Sight (MRS)

Of the two tanks undergoing AUCRT, one had a problem with the MRS, which was found to shift when the tank fired. This could have been easily overcome by firing through other means, disregarding the MRS. But suffice to say, the MRS had a problem.

These are very interesting dimensions to the trials in Pokhran, but far more interesting is the way the Army has reacted to them… taking the opportunity to slam the CVRDE for a “substandard” tank. An article on that will be appearing in the Business Standard on Saturday morning.
 
C

Chrom

New Member
Feanor said:
So (I'm asking those more knowledgeable then me) how serious are those problems?
Click to expand...
From my POV they are very serious in the sense what tank certainly couldnt be accepted with them in service, but not very serious in the sense what they are most likely easy to solve.

P.S. I still would very like to see T-90C vs Arjun trial. Might well be the case what T-90C have its own share of problems.

P.P.S. Who were the Arjun crew? Army or DRDO, or both? Bad crew can kill any engine or transmission...
 
A

aaaditya

New Member
hey guys,finally it seems that the governement is seeing through the army's ruse ,i hope they sanction a fair comparative trials between the arjun and the t-90's.

here check out this link and article:

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/apr/19tank.htm

The battle lines have been drawn. At stake is the future of one of India's most prestigious defence products: the Arjun Main Battle Tank.

In its 29th report, which was tabled in Parliament earlier this week, Parliament's Standing Committee on Defence writes that it is 'startled' to be told that the tank had performed poorly in winter trials, and that it was miles away from meeting the army's requirements.

Business Standard has come to know from three different members of the Standing Committee on Defence that it is more than 'startled' -- it is frankly disbelieving of the army's deposition.

In its last annual report for 2007-08, the committee was told by the ministry that the Arjun tank was 'a product unique in its class', an improved system over the T-72, Rs 6-8 crore cheaper than its contemporary system in the West, far superior (in firing accuracy) to the other two tanks (T-72 and T-90), driven for over 60,000 km and fired more than 8,000 rounds and 'there was no problem'.

After the army representative slammed the Arjun, the Standing Committee chairman, Balasaheb Vikhe Patil, as well as the defence secretary and several other members agreed that the committee would formulate a clear policy on India's tank of the future.

Underlying this decision is the belief amongst most members of the Standing Committee that the army is biased against the Arjun tank and is in favour of continuing to use the Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks. There were clear factual inaccuracies in the army's deposition before the Standing Committee. The most glaring of them is the army's suggestion that it is carrying out trials on the Arjun's performance.

In fact, the army has already accepted the Arjun for introduction into service, based upon its driving and firing performance over the years. After firing trials in summer 2006, the trial report (written by the army) said: "The accuracy and consistency of the Arjun has been proved beyond doubt."

The ongoing trials in Pokhran are being cited by the army as Accelerated Usage cum Reliability Trials. In these, two Arjun tanks were run almost non-stop for 3,000 kilometres, not to judge performance, but to evaluate the tank's requirement of spare parts, fuel and lubricants during its entire service life.

In fact, it is the Arjun's developer, the Central Vehicle R&D Laboratory, Avadi, that has long demanded comparative trials, where the performance of five Arjuns would be gauged against five Russian T-90s and T-72s. The army has consistently sidestepped that invitation.

The army has also testified incorrectly to the Standing Committee about four engine failures during the recent AUCRT. In fact, sources closely associated with the trials say, the problems were with four gearboxes manufactured by German company Renk AG. A world leader in transmission systems, Renk representatives are already in Pokhran and Avadi, analysing and resolving the problem.

The army does not mention, but problems were also experienced with four hydro-pneumatic suspension units (HSUs), which leaked after the Arjuns had run 2,000 kilometres.

But Arjun's makers say 2,000 kilometres is the service life of the suspension; normally they would have been replaced before the point at which they leaked.

Officers closely associated with the Arjun, as well as several members of the Standing Committee on Defence, contrast the army's approach to the Arjun with the navy's acceptance of indigenous projects.

They say the navy has achieved striking success in building its own warships by associating itself with the project right from the design stage; warships are accepted into service and many hiccups overcome during their service lives. In contrast, the army is resisting accepting the Arjun until every last hiccup is resolved by the DRDO.

An application to interview the army's Director General of Mechanised Forces was approved by the MoD eight months ago. However, the DGMF has not granted an interview so far because of 'scheduling problems'.
 
K

kams

New Member
Chrom said:
From my POV they are very serious in the sense what tank certainly couldnt be accepted with them in service, but not very serious in the sense what they are most likely easy to solve.

P.S. I still would very like to see T-90C vs Arjun trial. Might well be the case what T-90C have its own share of problems.

P.P.S. Who were the Arjun crew? Army or DRDO, or both? Bad crew can kill any engine or transmission...
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Army, 43 armd regiment, to be specific.

eckherl,

Regarding your question wrt to external fuel tanks and APU/NBC,

1. Correct on Fuel tank
2. APU/NBC- not sure, as per GSQR, APU is supposed to be inside the armour. However, why should NBC have that kind of exhaust?
p.s- sorry for the delay, was trying to get some accurate info. from contacts.
 
E

eckherl

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
kams said:
Army, 43 armd regiment, to be specific.

eckherl,

Regarding your question wrt to external fuel tanks and APU/NBC,

1. Correct on Fuel tank
2. APU/NBC- not sure, as per GSQR, APU is supposed to be inside the armour. However, why should NBC have that kind of exhaust?
p.s- sorry for the delay, was trying to get some accurate info. from contacts.
Click to expand...
Thanks kams:

It would make more sense to have it inside of the hull as far as the NBC overpressure system, but the photo does indeed look like a APU, is this something that they may of setup for display purposes only.
 
A

aaaditya

New Member
here is another interesting article on the arjun development programme and highlights the mistakes of the indian army.

here is the link and the article:

http://www.business-standard.com/common/news_article.php?autono=320813

The Arjun tank is in pitched battle even before fully entering service with the Indian Army. Ironically, the most hostile fire is coming from the men who will eventually ride the tank into war: the army’s mechanised forces. These experts, it now emerges, have rubbished the tank before Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence; they say they will not accept the Arjun unless it improves considerably. What benchmarks it must meet remain undefined.
The Arjun saga encapsulates the pitfalls in any attempt to build a complex weapons system. It all began in 1974, when the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) undertook to build India’s own Main Battle Tank (MBT). The euphoria gradually waned as the DRDO missed deadline after deadline, eventually losing the army’s trust with unfulfilled promises that the tank was just around the corner. The army undermined the project in equal measure, periodically “updating” the design as technology moved on. DRDO scientists joke that whenever they approached a technology solution, the next issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly would give the army new ideas for upgrading their demands.
Exaggeration notwithstanding, the DRDO has a point in complaining about changes in the Arjun design goalposts. There is logic too in the army’s plea that it could not accept a 1970s, or a 1980s design in the 1990s and 2000. But there was neither logic nor reason in the recriminations that followed. Instead of design and R&D partners with equal stakes in the Arjun, the DRDO and the army locked themselves into mutual finger-pointing: no matter how much the Arjun was improved, there were always some flaws that remained to be sorted out.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD), meanwhile, watched mutely. With the Arjun ploughing through endless trials — 15 Arjuns have already run 75,000 km, and fired 10,000 rounds in the most extensive trials ever — the army insisted on another tank. In the late 1970s, the army bought the T-72; in the 1990s, the T-90s came along. But despite thousands of crores of rupees paid to Moscow, the Russian tanks have been raddled with problems; now hundreds of crores more are being spent in upgrading their night fighting capabilities, navigation equipment, radio sets, and their armour. Tens of Indian soldiers have died as the barrels of Russian tanks burst while firing.
In contrast, just Rs 300 crore was used in building and developing the Arjun. This is not to say that the Russian tanks are worthless. Operating military equipment is fraught with danger and upgrading is a continuous process. But the army’s tolerance for Russian defects contrasts starkly with its impatience for the Arjun.
Some army exasperation was, perhaps, understandable when the DRDO was plugging a tank that was not yet fit for the battlefield. But it is no longer justified when the Arjun is performing well. Soldiers from the 43 Armoured Regiment, which operates 15 trial Arjuns, praise the tank whole-heartedly. Problem solving will remain a part of operating the Arjun, just like with India’s Russian fleet. But while the soldiers and junior officers accept that the Arjun has come good, the generals remain fixed in the past.
As a result the army, incongruously, finds itself defending its Russian tanks from the Indian challenge of the Arjun. The tank’s developers, the Central Vehicle R&D Establishment at Chennai, has been clamouring for face-to-face comparative trials, where the Arjun, the T-72 and the T-90 are put through the same paces. After first agreeing — and even issuing a detailed trail directive in 2005 — the army has backed away from comparative trials. Instead, it told the MoD that it was buying 124 Arjuns, and trials were needed only to ascertain its requirements for spares. While doing these trials — which have nothing to do with the Arjun’s performance — the army has testified before the Standing Committee on Defence that the tank’s performance was suspect.
Contrast the Indian Army’s approach with how other countries approach complex defence R&D projects with long gestation periods, where technology gets outdated during the development cycle. The four-nation Eurofighter consortium bypassed the “technology trap” by agreeing to first develop a simpler fighter, which all participants would buy as Tranche 1 of the project. During Tranche-1 manufacture, newly developed technologies would be harnessed into a newer, more capable Eurofighter. The last Tranche-1 aircraft was delivered last month; the new multi-role Tranche-2 aircraft has been developed, meanwhile; deliveries will start now. Clear development milestones and a more accepting approach by the users have made Eurofighter a success.
The army placed an order for 124 Arjuns eight years ago, when the tank was not even a viable fighting platform. Now that the Arjun is pulling its weight (almost 60 tons!) and those 124 tanks are rolling off the production line in Avadi, this order should be seen as Tranche-1. The CVRDE is refining many of the Arjun’s systems with technologies that have been developed more recently, particularly through harnessing India’s growing IT proficiency. Assuring a Tranche-2 order for improved Mark 2 Arjuns, and allocating R&D funding would set the project on a path where India might never need to buy a foreign tank again.
One reason for the army’s judgemental approach to the Arjun is its lack of involvement in the tank’s development. Unlike the navy, which has its own directorate of naval design, and which produces itself the conceptual blueprints of any new warship, the army has no technical expertise — nor any department — that designs its tanks. The Directorate General of Mechanised Warfare (DGMF) is staffed by combat officers from the mechanised forces, most of whom see the Arjun not as a national defence project, but as a tank that they must drive into battle. A whole new approach is needed.
 
D

drandul

Member
Excuse me- all that story sounds quite strange- I mean why would any army prefer to use any "Problem equipment" supplied by some other country instead of use home made but more robust and easely adopted equipment?- Even if I know that t90 don't have mach problems- it's clear that for any country much safe to have it's own production of weapons..after reading article I would assume that
1 -Arjune realy have serios problems in design preventing it to be used in normal army day by day service and some seriose improvements needed or-
2- Army desision-making persons corrapted and have some personal interest in Russian cotracts- that is realy frightens if you cannot
So if transmission made by German company a'm not wonder if most of components made by some other foreign companies. - In case of real conflict spare parts and production could be a problem?
 
W

Waylander

Defense Professional
Verified Defense Pro
One important point is that T-90 is available right now in high numbers while even if Arjun would be read to go without any flaws India would not be able to upgrade it's tank forces in a sufficient time with the Arjun alone.
 
E

eckherl

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
One should remember that India`s logistical support for their MBT`s is set up for the T-72 models primarily, bringing Arjun into the fold would cause some headaches and additional monetary measures for support not including a different training program for tank crews with different armor tactics to get the full capabilities that Arjun has to offer. T-90S is not a perfect tank and it has had some issues when operating in extreme ambient temperatures, especially with the FCS, Russia has tried to resolve some of these issues and have had some success, but it was the Israelis that have really helped with assistance to resolve some of these issues especially with turret component overheating problems. I am quite sure that the Indian Army is set up like most branches of a countries armed forces meaning that they have fixed budgets and have to fight for every increase that they can possibly get with other branches competing also for money. It very well may be that the Indian Army doesn`t want to support two different MBT models at the current time and the T-90S is fully capable of handling any MBT threat in that regoin.
 
N

niteshkjain

New Member
Link: http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=438671

Govt looking into `sabotage possibility` of Arjun tank


New Delhi, April 24: Government on Thursday spoke of the "possibility of sabotage" in winter trials of country`s indigenous Arjun tank prompting army chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor, and other top officials to rush to the Avadi tank factory to carry out fresh inspections.

Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh told reporters that the possibility of sabotage of the recent winter trials of the Arjun tanks should be examined.

He said though the German engines in the tanks had been used for over 15 years, "it should be examined how they broke down during the winter trials.

"How can this happen all of a sudden?" he wondered as he responded to questions whether the tanks had failed in winter trials conducted by the army.

Eight years after the force placed an order for 124 tanks with the ordinance factory board, the army, in a scathing indictment of the tank`s performance, has told the parliamentary standing committee on defence that the tanks had "faired very badly".

Army officers have informed the committee that the tanks were miles away from meeting the army`s requirement and several improvements needed to be carried out before they could be declared battle worthy.

Soon after the minister`s comments, a high-level defence ministry team, comprising the army chief and secretary, defence production Pradeep Kumar left for Avadi tank factory near Chennai to carry out on-the-spot inspection of the tank.

Bureau Report
 
C

Chrom

New Member
niteshkjain said:
Link: http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=438671

Govt looking into `sabotage possibility` of Arjun tank


Bureau Report
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Ah, so witch hunt began... Not completely disregarding "sabotage" possibility, i still should note what any modern engine depends from a lot of outside factors - transmission, heat management, load balance, cleaning, etc. Any however small engineering failure in these areas can make perfectly capable engine unreliable.
 
N

niteshkjain

New Member
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...ith_Arjun_tank_trials/articleshow/2986941.cms

Despite row, army & DRDO to go ahead with Arjun tank trials
27 Apr 2008, 0505 hrs IST,TNN


NEW DELHI: Amid escalating controversy about whether there was "internal sabotage" during the last round of trials of the indigenous Arjun main battle tank, the army and DRDO are gearing up for the next phase of trials.

The fourth round of AUCRT (accelerated usage-cum-reliability trials) of the Arjuns will be held in the first week of May, even as the army and DRDO remain at loggerheads over the tank’s performance.

The latest round of controversy has erupted with minister of state for defence production Rao Inderjit Singh holding that the "possibility of sabotage" in the recent winter trials of the tanks "should be examined".

DRDO, on its part, says the army is extremely reluctant to induct the Arjuns despite extensive trials, which have seen the tanks being driven for 75,000 km, with firing of over 10,000 rounds.

"The Arjuns have proven themselves. But the army seems more keen on inducting foreign tanks at great cost rather than indigenous ones," said an official.

The army, however, pooh-poohs such claims. "This talk of internal sabotage, seeking to blame the army, is totally wrong. We just want the problems identified in the Arjuns to be rectified. We are not against induction of indigenous equipment but cannot accept faulty tanks," said a senior official.

The problems, listed out by army chief General Deepak Kapoor in a letter to defence minister A K Antony, includes failure in the German-origin engines of the tank, especially in the transmission systems.

The army told the parliamentary standing committee on defence that the tanks had "performed very poorly" during the winter trials, with "four engine failures".

Hope the dispute gets sorted out and we see Arjun getting inducted in numbers. hope by 1000-2000
 
T

Titanium

New Member

Arjun under fire, Army wants another MBT

Manu Pubby

Posted online: Saturday, April 26, 2008 at 2354 hrs IST

NEW DELHI, APRIL 25
The latest round of user trials has made it clear that even after 30 years of development, Arjun Tank comes nowhere near meeting minimum operational requirements of the Army.

However, what is worrying the top brass is that DRDO’s insistence on inducting larger numbers of the indigenous tank will come in the way of a newer, better “Main Battle Tank (MBT) of the future” that is now required by the Army.

While Army HQ is not even thinking about extending its original order of 124 Arjun Tanks for two regiments, given that it is unacceptable for induction in the present form, the top brass is concerned that continued DRDO efforts on the Arjun will delay its requirement of a futuristic MBT.

The Army has now told DRDO that there is no point bickering about the past and the Arjun Tank should be treated as a technology demonstrator and a platform to work on a totally new tank design for the future.

There is a certain degree of urgency in the Army’s demand as it is aware of an increasing void in the tank armoury and its requirement of 3,500 tanks to replace the ageing T 72 MBT.

“After 30 years, the Arjun has not fructified, and now we need to start with a new design and a new tank. We have always said that a next (generation) tank has to come out in due course of time. We now have a base and expertise to start on the futuristic tank,” Lt Gen KDS Shekhawat, who till February was Director General of Mechanised Forces at Army HQ, said.

The current round of winter trials, where the German-origin power pack of the tank failed four times within a run of 1,000 kms, is the latest in the series of setbacks that have dogged the project since its inception in 1974.

The Army is disappointed that the tank has failed to deliver on every single count that was citied for the prolonged indigenous research project. The engine, tracks, transmissions and gunners sight — that together account for 60 per cent of its cost — are all imported.

“When we placed the order, 60 per cent of the components were imported. It was going to cost us Rs 25 crore at a time when the T 90 was available for below Rs 10 crore. But it was an indigenous effort, so we agreed for 124 tanks. But not much has changed. We still remain dependant on foreign firms, and there is a lot of unhappiness as it has not met operational requirements of the Army,” feels General VP Malik, who was the Army chief during the Kargil conflict.

The Army is not just questioning the technology of the tank but is also worried about Arjun’s reliability factor given that various components of the tank have not been tested in harsh climatic conditions and terrain unique to India.

As demonstrated during the ongoing Accelerated Usage-cum-Reliability Trials (AUCRT) of the Arjun tank (crucial to clear it for bulk production), the German engine failed four times as it had never been extensively tested by the Army in desert conditions in the past.

Besides, the Army also found “unacceptable” the chipping of the gun barrel during firing trials. The old problem in the hydro pneumatic suspension system also resurfaced.

The next litmus test for the Arjun comes on May 5 when DRDO will make a presentation at Army HQ to explain the defects and the steps taken to rectify the engine faults. Ironically, the DRDO, which was supposed to clarify on the trials this month itself, delayed the presentation by close to two weeks, saying it needs more time to prepare a report. After the DRDO presentation, the Army will take a call to either repeat the third round of AUCRT trials or proceed to the fourth “summer round” of the trials.

EXPERTSPEAK

• General VP Malik, former Army Chief “I can see a lot of unhappiness with the quality of the tank. It is primarily because of very long delay. Even at the end of it all, the tank has not come up to the operational satisfaction of the Army. I am all for self-reliance but we have to make the Arjun more indigenous than it is today.

• Lt Gen KDS Shekhawat, former DG, Mechanised Forces No point bickering over past. It is gone. Tanks have a certain shelf life, and now we need a new design looking into the future. Ultimately, it is the men who have to use the tank. If they have confidence, they will love the equipment.

• Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies I don’t really see a major future of the Arjun as the MBT of India. Over all, the Arjun tank has not met certain major parameters. However, the Army had expected that the two regiments to be inducted would meet requirements so that extensive trials could be carried out.

• AV Singh, former defence secretary Regardless of the shortcomings, we must encourage it as an indigenous effort. As far as opening development to the Indian private sector is concerned, it will add to the competition, improve quality and will shorten the development time.
 
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