Long-time lurker here but I have not been posting here for years. Anyway, as I Finnish Navy reservist I have been quite puzzled about the current status and composition of the Russian Baltic Fleet for a long time.
Basically what I don't really get is the current overall mission of the Baltic Fleet and it's overall capabilities in relation that. So I'm hoping that
@Feanor and other members have more experience and knowledge about the Russian Navy could shed some light into this.
The way I see it is that current structure of the Baltic Fleet is mostly a Soviet-time relic and it's current capabilities don't reflect the security situation around the Baltic Sea in any proper way.
Your analysis here is fundamentally correct. The Baltic Fleet is actually in decent shape (compared to say the Pacific Fleet) but it's structure is poorly optimized.
To start with there are one Project 956 Sovremenny class destroyer and two Project 11540 Neustrashimyy class ASW frigates (I may have some details wrong here, but the overall picture is key here). The Sovremenny is a fairly old antiship focused destroyer whose capabilities in a modern ASuW scenario are somewhat questionable. Then the Neustrashimyy class frigates are probably quite capable in ASW there are only two of them and I don't really get what their mission in any kind of a more serous conflict with eg. NATO would be...?
There are four quite modern Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvettes but even they are no match for NATO capabilities in the area. Finally there is a huge variety of different smaller ships and missile boats of questionable combat utility.
Based on the information I have there is only one Improved Kilo class submarine in service with the Baltic Fleet. So Submarine availability is at best very limited for the Baltic Fleet.
Of course there is the naval aviation side with Su-27 Flankers and Su-24 Fencers in addition to the land-based Kh-35 and 3M55 anti-ship missiles.
To clarify the Kilo isn't really improved. It's a Soviet era project 877 and nearing the end of its service life. I recall an announcement about new subs for the Baltic fleet, if it follows the pattern they could get 2, 3, 4, or 6 improved Kilos like the Black Sea and Pacific fleets. The 956 destroyer had less than stellar ASW even back in the 80s (the ASW role was left to the 1155 BPKs). And it's not really in good working order. Navy-korabel tracks VMF assets monthly, and as best as I can tell from his shorthand, the Nastoychiviy hasn't been active since 2015 with 2020 as a tentative return to service date (
Корабельный состав ВМФ РФ (боевые корабли основных классов) на 01.11.2019). It's not in reserve or completely non-functional but it's unlikely that it's ready for major action. The project 11540s are decent multirole frigates but they are dated, though not yet obsolete. The 20380s really are the best the Baltic Fleet has to offer and I think the 4 of them combined, with the two 11540s to support, wouldn't be able to keep shipping lines to Kaliningrad open against a combined NATO effort, much less do anything else.
As for the airwing, it now has Su-30SM, making it a tad more formidable, and the Kh-35U (X-35U) is being deployed, though I'm unsure if the Baltic Fleet has gotten them yet, offering allegedly double the range.
You also missed 4 significant new additions, two 21631 and two 22800 small missile ships. While their value as a warship is limited, their combined volley of 32 long range cruise missiles or AShMs does help.
There are certainly some things I have missed in the overview here but the overall picture should be pretty clear by now. The main issue I have with the current composition of the Baltic Fleet is that I don't see them as anything more than a some kind of a speed bump in even a rather limited military conflict with NATO. Their air, surface or undersea capabilities are no match for NATO capabilities in respective areas. In any kind of military conflict NATO would first use their superior airpower to destroy any Russian surface assets in the Baltic Sea and after that there is very little that lone Kilo class submarine could do on her own.
It all badly depends on the scenario. The Baltic Fleet benefits from ground-based IADS both over Kaliningrad and around St. Petersburg. It also would be reinforced by VVS units virtually immediately. And that brings multiple regiments of modern fighter jets, AEW, ELINT, advanced jamming, etc. NATO is certainly more powerful as a whole but the effort required to overcome this would necessitate at least some sort of buildup, providing plenty of advanced warning (in theory anyway). There's also a missile brigade in Kaliningrad, which means that NATO airfields could and would be targeted by both cruise and ballistic missiles. Final, and worst case scenario, would be the use of tactical nuclear weapons against NATO. While there's no guarantee it would go this way, between missile brigades in Leningrad Region and Kaliningrad, as well as near Pskov, and those small missile ships we mentioned, and long range aviation with their shiny new X-101s, there's little doubt that Russia has the ability to carry out a limited nuclear strike against NATO targets in Europe successfully, and certainly has the ability to credibly threaten NATO with one. Which raises the question; in what context would Russia and NATO even go to war here? If your argument is that the Baltic Fleet is no match for combined NATO fleets in and immediately near the Baltic, then you're not wrong. But what kind of war do you even have in mind? Is the entire goal of this hypothetical war to take control of the Baltic Sea from Russia at any cost?
Heck, if the political will would be there even combined Finnish and Swedish navies could probably dispatch the Baltic Fleet to the bottom of the seas in short order. So I'm really wondering what the Russians are actually trying to achieve with their whole Baltic Fleet at the moment?
This seems highly unlikely. While the Swedes and Finns have some impressive ships and are very well trained, and Russia will certainly trip over its own feet in ASW and mine-clearing matters, it's one thing to pick off a couple of Russian ships lost due to poor planning and above-mentioned deficiencies. It's another to actively take out the
entire Baltic Fleet, again considering the VVS involvement, as well as the extensive GBAD network. And of course Finnish sailors would come back to Russian tanks parked on their piers. So there's that minor matter... but once again, what's the context? Finland and Sweden randomly deciding that this is the day they're finally going to get Russia back for the Northern War?
The way I see the current situation is that the Baltic Fleet has way too many separate classes of small combat vessels of questionable combat value. If I structured the Baltic Fleet from scratch I would probably have let's say eight Project 20380 Steregushchiy class corvettes, four Project 21631 Buyan M class corvettes and four Improved Kilo class submarines. In essence just 2-3 different classes of modern air-defense capable warships and considerably larger amount of submarines. The current composition of the Baltic Fleet includes way too many different classes of old and too small vessels that just strain maintenance and manpower resources for very little actual gain in combat capability.
These are of course just my two cents, any thoughts or comments? Something I have missed completely?
You're actually not too far from the mark. The end picture for the Baltic fleet will probably include 6 20380/20385 corvettes, 6-8 small missile ships (only two will be Buyan, and even they're better off somewhere else, the 22800s are a better fit), and likely at least 3 new Kilos, possibly more, possibly even some of the new project 677 boats, though for now they seem destined for the Northern fleet. The 11540s will of course remain in service for the forseeable future, possibly with some sort of upgrade program. Except, I'm not sure what this would change? Combined NATO forces in and around the Baltic would still massively outclass your proposed fleet structure. ASW would still be weak, minesweeping near non-existent, and Kilos are nowhere as impressive today as they once were.
The gaggle of older Soviet vessels will likely slowly fade away, with some of the small anti-submarine ships and small missile ships being replaced by modern equivalents (a dubious move in my opinion but that seems to be where things are headed) the Soviet destroyers will go out of service, and the rest won't change much. There's even a new minesweeper in production, but the anti-mine complex it carries has some serious issues.
Also the combat utility of an individual Soviet era small missile boat is limited, but it's better to have then not to have. Worst case scenario they will make for extra targets that need to be hit, best case scenario they can contribute to a missile volley against a hostile surface asset.
Final point, in my opinion, in the medium term, the Baltic Fleet will build much in the direction you envision, though with some changes. Their goal would be to be able to prevent Kaliningrad from ending up completely cut off in the event of a war. With a large ground forces grouping there, considerable air defense, and an entire missile brigade, keeping it from being completely blockaded would make it a thorn in the side of anyone trying to attack Russia, and would likely stall NATO forces considerably, giving Russia time to move additional assets to front, overrun the Baltics, and ensure compliance from Belarus, putting Russia in a decent shape to fight a large battle or two in the corridor between the Baltic Sea and the Ukrainian border.
