Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, is being fingered as ignoring the massing of Georgian tanks, artillery and troops near Tskhinvali on Aug. 7
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Lack of preparation also plagued the Russian air force ... for not immediately launching an air attack to blind Georgia's radar and reconnaissance capability and then shatter command and control.
The resulting confusion in Russia's command and control was pointed to as the reason that Russia's air force took so many losses, including a number of Su-25 Frogfoot close-attack aircraft, possibly an Su-24 and a front-line, high-performance Tu-22M aircraft that may have been either a bombing or reconnaissance variant operated by the Black Sea Fleet.
More precisely, Russian intelligence failed to analyze the numbers, locations and capabilities of the Georgian air defenses
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As a result, Russian pilots went into combat expecting no resistance. Secondly, there was no campaign to eliminate the Georgian air defense or air force. Finally, there was no reason to use a strategic bomber like the Tu-22
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Radar-killing missiles were not used on the Georgian air defenses, despite their availability, which meant that Russian aircrews could not use their precision stand-off weapons without being in range of Georgia's SA-11 air defenses.
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The Russians made little or no use of its space-based surveillance ... the initial use of older T-62 tanks and lightly armored personnel carriers caused unnecessary casualties ... the rough terrain and heavy vegetation of Georgia foiled the long-range use of laser-guided weapons.