Royal New Zealand Air Force

[recce.k1]

Is anyone else sick of the he said she said coming from both sides of politics about the suitability of the NH90s. Someone needs to explicitly state why they were not said instead of trying to point the finger. I agrree with Goff: "Why they were not taken up to Vanuatu, I haven't had a clear explanation from the Minister of Defence - he should be more explicit about that. "

The MSM (and it seems, Phil Goff, of all people who should know better) seem to be focusing on the wrong issues (the NH90).

The NZDF already have, at this point in time, an appropriate helicopter type deployed to Vanawatu - the Seasprite, two of them, on board HMNZS Canterbury. Fully maranised, cleared for shipboard deployment and operations on Canterbury and successfully been doing so for some years now, support procedures in place etc.

So the RNZAF's shiny new NH90's are seen flying around the country (but yet to reach full operational capability and certainly not cleared for overseas operations) and I think Ron Mark, NZF defence spokesman, comes along first and demands to know why they aren't being deployed to Vanawatu. MSM repeat accusation.

Govt defmin responds ("not yet cleared for overseas deployments" and "not easily transportable (at this point in time)". MSM interpret that as meaning there is something wrong with the NH90 and then go and question Labour shadow defmin spokesman, Phil Goff, who ordered the NH90's nine years ago, as to whether the wrong helicopter type was chosen (and MSM then dig up old reports of NH90 developmental defects, such as not able to operate in snow, although that issue has since been resolved. Etc etc).

Instead of giving considered and measured responses to the MSM, Phil Goff (who more than any other NZ politician fully understands the NH90 acquisition back-story) appears to deflect and goes on to attack the Govt (possibly because there are real, unasked/unanswered questions as to why Labour didn't order eg the modifications to allow NH90 shipboard operations via Canterbury, rather than simply be transported and off-loaded at its destination) . Anyway MSM repeat Goff's lines. Public none the wiser except that thanks to MSM & pollies, may now regard the NH90's as very expensive duds.

In the meantime, the NH90's are yet to reach FOC and remember, like most other NH90 operators, they were behind schedule (again more legitimate questions the MSM could scrutinise Phil Goff about, why did he sign-off on a type that was pretty-much developmental)?

Until the NZG orders A400/C17's to transport the NH90, we will have to wait until they can be embarked upon Canterbury. According to this article (from two years ago) that may still take a while.

Up to four NH90s can be carried aboard HMNZS Canterbury, but much work remains to ready the NH90 for ship-borne operations. Reaching the capability of embarked operations in an amphibious tactical sealift scenario is still distant and it will involve a lot more development. The NH90 will be NZ’s primary deployment helicopter although there is some residual capacity for the A109. WGCDR Sexton: “Before they can take over from the Huey, we have to have the ability to deploy them overseas.”
NEW RNZAF HELICOPTERS SLOWLY SPOOL UP | Australian Defence News & Articles | Asia Pacific Defence Reporter

Until that happens, we will have continue to rely on the durable Seasprite, which is probably fine in most if not all situations.

Although perhaps the next type that could be looked at for NZG deployment options, could be the AW-109 rather than the NH90. Transportable now by C-130H and likely to be less affected by "wind wash" issues in the tropics, however they are yet to be trialed for deployment. Would they be suitable though, seeing there are only five of them and they were bought primarily for training? Possibly not until either more are bought or perhaps the NZDF/NZG assess whether there is a place for a type in-between the AW-109 and NH90, suitable for deployment in low-intensity/very-low-threat but none-the-less important operational environments eg NZ/South Pacific for military light-utility and HADR/Police/CT/SAR taskings etc. Ideally I'd rather see half-a-dozen of these new types purchased (rather than further AW-109's) to sustain a deployment of 2-3 machines, like the venerable Huey back in the day (and this has been suggested here before of course by various members). And keep the NH90 for high-intensity/high-threat military deployments and the Seasprites for naval operations. It will be interesting to see if the forthcoming Air Mobility review goes there with this.

 

[Gibbo]

The MSM (and it seems, Phil Goff, of all people who should know better) seem to be focusing on the wrong issues (the NH90).

The NZDF already have, at this point in time, an appropriate helicopter type deployed to Vanawatu - the Seasprite, two of them, on board HMNZS Canterbury. Fully maranised, cleared for shipboard deployment and operations on Canterbury and successfully been doing so for some years now, support procedures in place etc.

So the RNZAF's shiny new NH90's are seen flying around the country (but yet to reach full operational capability and certainly not cleared for overseas operations) and I think Ron Mark, NZF defence spokesman, comes along first and demands to know why they aren't being deployed to Vanawatu. MSM repeat accusation.

Govt defmin responds ("not yet cleared for overseas deployments" and "not easily transportable (at this point in time)". MSM interpret that as meaning there is something wrong with the NH90 and then go and question Labour shadow defmin spokesman, Phil Goff, who ordered the NH90's nine years ago, as to whether the wrong helicopter type was chosen (and MSM then dig up old reports of NH90 developmental defects, such as not able to operate in snow, although that issue has since been resolved. Etc etc).

Instead of giving considered and measured responses to the MSM, Phil Goff (who more than any other NZ politician fully understands the NH90 acquisition back-story) appears to deflect and goes on to attack the Govt (possibly because there are real, unasked/unanswered questions as to why Labour didn't order eg the modifications to allow NH90 shipboard operations via Canterbury, rather than simply be transported and off-loaded at its destination) . Anyway MSM repeat Goff's lines. Public none the wiser except that thanks to MSM & pollies, may now regard the NH90's as very expensive duds.

In the meantime, the NH90's are yet to reach FOC and remember, like most other NH90 operators, they were behind schedule (again more legitimate questions the MSM could scrutinise Phil Goff about, why did he sign-off on a type that was pretty-much developmental)?

Until the NZG orders A400/C17's to transport the NH90, we will have to wait until they can be embarked upon Canterbury. According to this article (from two years ago) that may still take a while.



Until that happens, we will have continue to rely on the durable Seasprite, which is probably fine in most if not all situations.

Although perhaps the next type that could be looked at for NZG deployment options, could be the AW-109 rather than the NH90. Transportable now by C-130H and likely to be less affected by "wind wash" issues in the tropics, however they are yet to be trialed for deployment. Would they be suitable though, seeing there are only five of them and they were bought primarily for training? Possibly not until either more are bought or perhaps the NZDF/NZG assess whether there is a place for a type in-between the AW-109 and NH90, suitable for deployment in low-intensity/very-low-threat but none-the-less important operational environments eg NZ/South Pacific for military light-utility and HADR/Police/CT/SAR taskings etc. Ideally I'd rather see half-a-dozen of these new types purchased (rather than further AW-109's) to sustain a deployment of 2-3 machines, like the venerable Huey back in the day (and this has been suggested here before of course by various members). And keep the NH90 for high-intensity/high-threat military deployments and the Seasprites for naval operations. It will be interesting to see if the forthcoming Air Mobility review goes there with this.

Yes the $million$ question I have is why are the Hueys being got rid off if the NH90 isn't 100% ready to take over what to me seem to be fairly predictable taskings for the type? As the link you posted recce says...a WGCDR Sexton states: “Before they can take over from the Huey, we have to have the ability to deploy them overseas.”

Clearly a call has been made to not go with this plan & it has unfortunately almost immediately thrown egg in the RNZAF's face. I get it that the extra cost & crew currency & resourcing issues for the Huey means they have to go at some point, but why couldn't 1 more year be squeezed out of them, even if just 5 or so were left to cover the gap for that year.

However as stated the NZDF are running a text-book operation utilising a thoroughly suitable chopper up there so it's a pity the typically apathetic NZ media aren't focusing on what is being done right.:mad

 

[t68]

I don't know for 100% what the diffrence are between the NZDZF NH90 and the ADF MRH90 are, and i know wiki is not the most reliable source but it stated the when NZ ordered the 90 they chosen their airframes to be nearly identical to the ADF machines.

As we know the time taken to implement these machines into service has not been a smooth Success story for both nations with the ADF running behind by an estimated 39 mths for initial operating capabilty and was finally reached in July 2014 and this gave Army an operating capabilty as

The initial stage of Army’s MRH90 Operational Capability (OC) has been referred to as Operational Capability Amphibious 1 (OCA1). It is defined as:
... an MRH90 troop transport helicopter capable of operating in a low-threat environment by day or night, from land or while embarked in HMAS Choules, up to and including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (Permissive).
Army advised the ANAO that an important purpose of declaring this quite limited capability subset as Army’s OC, is to ensure that 5th Aviation Regiment can commence development of proficiencies and qualifications for embarked operations as soon as possible, so as to be ready to support OC for the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) in 2015.

As they have been sent to Vanuatu on HMAS Tobruk it's safe to safe that it also refers to her, and

Scheduled 41-month delay.
Army’s first Airmobile capability is defined as: a troop transport helicopter capable of land-based Airmobile operations by day, night or Night Vision Device (NVD). It represents a high-threat combat capability, and is referred to as Operational Capability Land 1/2 (OCLl/2).

If NZ machines have been built to the same standard as the ADF machines it does not really explain the lack of capabilty from operating fron HMNZS Canterbury.

Also this comment from Janes seems to back Wiki I the assumption's the machines are near identical,

New Zealand receives final NH90 helo - IHS Jane's 360

Like all NH90 customers, New Zealand has suffered from programme delays caused in large part by the many different configurations of the helicopter that are being developed (there are actually more versions of the NH90 than there are customers).

New Zealand has tried to avoid this pitfall by opting for a configuration that is very similar to its chief operating partner, Australia. The RNZAF's platforms come with an additional fifth multifunction display unit, RT-1851 ARC-210 radios, wet deck for the cabin, and RNZAF manufactured floor load spreaders to help prevent damage from boots and cargo (or similar).

So I don't really know what to think of the claims that the landing gear on the NZ machines differ from the ADF.

 

[ngatimozart]

I don't know for 100% what the diffrence are between the NZDZF NH90 and the ADF MRH90 are, and i know wiki is not the most reliable source but it stated the when NZ ordered the 90 they chosen their airframes to be nearly identical to the ADF machines.

As we know the time taken to implement these machines into service has not been a smooth Success story for both nations with the ADF running behind by an estimated 39 mths for initial operating capabilty and was finally reached in July 2014 and this gave Army an operating capabilty as


As they have been sent to Vanuatu on HMAS Tobruk it's safe to safe that it also refers to her, and



If NZ machines have been built to the same standard as the ADF machines it does not really explain the lack of capabilty from operating fron HMNZS Canterbury.

Also this comment from Janes seems to back Wiki I the assumption's the machines are near identical,

New Zealand receives final NH90 helo - IHS Jane's 360




So I don't really know what to think of the claims that the landing gear on the NZ machines differ from the ADF.

The variant that the NZDF have is the TTH which has the bog standard undercarriage. The variant the ADF have is the MRH which has the undercarriage from the NFH and therefore able to operate off ships like the LHD or Canterbury at sea in conditions other than SS1. What the then NZG should have done was ordered the MRH variant but didn't because of the perceived cost and their political and philosophical dislike of defence.

Referring back to Ron Marks remarks in the Stuff story discussed yesterday about the inability of the NH90 to deploy to Vanuatu, I noticed he mentioned something about Big Gerry stating that the feasibility of retrofitting something to the NH90s was being looked at. I wonder if they are looking at retrofitting NFH undercarriages to our NH90s.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Each time Ron Mark opens his mouth about the NH90s I get more convinced he's all hat and no cattle....

Looking back over the unsuccessful tenderers, only one of the options stands out as guaranteeing a robust marine capability - the EH101. The list of tenderers and the reason they weren't successful is below:

• Bell 412-EP | Failed to meet payload requirements
• Augusta-Bell AB139 | Failed to meet payload requirements
• Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk | Required 15 aircraft to deliver payload requirements, high operating cost
• Augusta-Westland EH101 | Failed to meet external payload requirement, high operating cost
• Sikorsky S-92 | Military variant likely to be more expensive, cabin design caused tactical concerns

For those who think the Blackhawk would have been a non-developmental option:

Six companies responded to the Invitation to Register. The respondents are tabled in section 2.1b. The NH90 helicopter from NHIndustries and the S-70M helicopter from Sikorsky were considered to meet the capability and operational requirements. At the time, however, the S-70M helicopter was not in production and the prototype was still under development. Therefore, it was decided that the bid from NHIndustries for the NH90 helicopter was the preferred option. As a result, the Request for Proposals was not required and a 'sole source' Best and Final Offer was issued to NHIndustries in order to determine program deliverables and costs. 2011 Major Projects Report - Part 3A: NH90 MUH [Ministry of Defence NZ]

 

[John Fedup]

Each time Ron Mark opens his mouth about the NH90s I get more convinced he's all hat and no cattle....

Looking back over the unsuccessful tenderers, only one of the options stands out as guaranteeing a robust marine capability - the EH101. The list of tenderers and the reason they weren't successful is below:

• Bell 412-EP | Failed to meet payload requirements
• Augusta-Bell AB139 | Failed to meet payload requirements
• Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk | Required 15 aircraft to deliver payload requirements, high operating cost
• Augusta-Westland EH101 | Failed to meet external payload requirement, high operating cost
• Sikorsky S-92 | Military variant likely to be more expensive, cabin design caused tactical concerns

For those who think the Blackhawk would have been a non-developmental option:

The EH101 is the most capable and proven maritime medium lift helicopter. Canada is still waiting for its military version of the S-92 (CH-148 Cyclone) after 8 years!

 

[40 deg south]

The EH101 is the most capable and proven maritime medium lift helicopter. Canada is still waiting for its military version of the S-92 (CH-148 Cyclone) after 8 years!

Indeed.

Every time I hear someone complaining about the NH90, I think 'It could be worse. At least NZ didn't pick the Sikorsky option'.

On the other hand, Canada's oft-delayed maritime helicopter and fixed-wing SAR acquisitions have been comedy gold for Defence Industry Daily's headline-writers. In a world often lacking in light relief, that must be worth something!

 

[40 deg south]

Airbus doubles A400M production rate to claw back delivery delays - IHS Jane's 360

Another quarter-page ad for the A400M in today's DomPost reminded me of this story from Janes. The production rate has been pushed up to 2.5 aircraft per month effective immediately.

It's notable this has happened after a clean-out of management by the new Airbus CEO, and an influx of people from the commercial jetliner side of the business.

By way of comparison, the production rate for A320s is running at around 40 per month, and is scheduled to hit 50/month in early 2017.

 

[John Fedup]

Indeed.

Every time I hear someone complaining about the NH90, I think 'It could be worse. At least NZ didn't pick the Sikorsky option'.

On the other hand, Canada's oft-delayed maritime helicopter and fixed-wing SAR acquisitions have been comedy gold for Defence Industry Daily's headline-writers. In a world often lacking in light relief, that must be worth something!

We can't let India grab all the comedy gold and given our procurement record of late, we are giving them a good run for the gold!

 

[Zero Alpha]

I think one of the most interesting aspects of the NH90 project was the huge variety of vendors and aircraft bidding for the work. Tactically you don't use a Merlin anything near how you would use a Blackhawk. That suggests to me that there was a willingness to abandon exciting doctrine and focus on the aircraft.

It might be too much of a long bow to draw, but if they were prepared to walk away from existing doctrine, it might suggest why the introduction in to service has been relatively long (even accounting for technical challenges from the manufacturer).

I know a couple of Huey maintainers and they were both scathing of how much support the Blackhawk required to keep running in Australian service. Jury is out on whether or not that was because the Army was running it (therefore air force assumed they were less capable), or because of the design.

Ultimately the NH90 was probably the best decision in terms of technology and where it is in the product development cycle. We've just got to expect a lot of criticism from people who take cheap shots at the decision.

Worth remembering that if the Huey replacement ran to schedule it could very well have been a twin Huey in an analogue flavour (1980s aborted project) or digital (2001).

 

[ASSAIL]

There will always be naysayers when a new capability is introduced which has not yet reached full operational status. The NH 90 is no different but rarely do you hear about its advantages; composite construction, glass cockpit and super carrying capacity. The RNZAF will reach FOC all in good time just as the RAN has done with the MRH 90 Taipan which only received full ops status just before the Vanuatu cyclone after a long frustrating delay.
Certainly those who use it seem pleased with its utility

Capabilities put to immediate use | Navy Daily

 

[Todjaeger]

There will always be naysayers when a new capability is introduced which has not yet reached full operational status. The NH 90 is no different but rarely do you hear about its advantages; composite construction, glass cockpit and super carrying capacity. The RNZAF will reach FOC all in good time just as the RAN has done with the MRH 90 Taipan which only received full ops status just before the Vanuatu cyclone after a long frustrating delay.
Certainly those who use it seem pleased with its utility

Capabilities put to immediate use | Navy Daily

I still have reservations about the NH90 to be perfectly honest.

Part of it stems from materials, part from design, and part from the sales/selection process.

IMO it remains to be seen whether or not the use of composites to the degree that the NH90 has, is a net benefit or hindrance. The composites can of course lead to a lower overall empty aircraft weight (which can also be a negative in high winds...) for a given volume, it is not yet known how the use of a composite airframe will age or fatigue over time. Given that some composite materials really do not age or fatigue well when exposed to UV radiation, this means that through-life operating and support costs might well be quite different than expected or planned for. Similarly, the process for handling stress cracks (those that can be handled/treated) is different than for aircraft with more traditional construction materials, with the potential for some issues being 'untreatable' when they could be rectified in other helicopters.

A design issue I have is the apparent problem with having a door gunner positioned while troops are embarking or debarking from the helicopter. I really do not understand why the design did not accommodate sufficient space for a helicopter crewmen to provide covering/suppressing fire when troops enter or exit the side doors. With some of the images of the side doors I have come across, it appears that a crew chief in the middle of the doorway nearly fills the entire space, which would mean any door gunner would have to get out of the way if/when troops are trying to rapidly board or exit.

Lastly, I have gotten the impression (and this is true for a number of European-sourced military systems) that it was offered as a complete or 'finished' product, with the design development completed, a reasonably accurate idea of costs (initial, operating, and through-life), and commonality with other NH90 users. Unfortunately, it seems that development was still ongoing which triggered delays in service entry and training, changes had to be made (where they could be) to the design to allow utilization, and the accuracy of some cost predictions will only be known in time. It is also worth noting that it seems that while a number of nations have opted for the TTH version of the NH90, the actual configuration of TTH helicopters vary depending on the country placing the order, making each national version a bespoke design effectively. For instance, the NZ NH90 TTH and the Australian MRH90 Taipan are both versions of the NH90 TTH, yet the onboard systems are not the same in a number of areas. This is of concern because Aussie and Kiwi NH90's could be serving alongside each other on an exercise or op and one could go down (due to damage, accident, maintenance, etc.) and then be rendered out of service because a needed part could not be drawn from the other's stock of parts, instead either a forward supply of parts would be needed, or the ability to have needed parts rapidly brought in either from a national stockpile or from an overseas source.

I do hope that NZ (and OZ for that matter) get many years of good service from the NH90

 

[40 deg south]

We can't let India grab all the comedy gold and given our procurement record of late, we are giving them a good run for the gold!

Canada has a long history of providing quality entertainment to the rest of the world, so why should your defence force not make a contribution!

That said, I'd hate to give the impression that other procurement records are flawless.Any Canadian seeking solace needs only to look at Britain's Nimrod Nightmare, Australia's Seasprite Saga, or the unfortunate history of HMNZS Charles Upham (aka the 'Up Chuck'em' or Chuck Up'em', depending on preference).

 

[Zero Alpha]

Maritime helicopters

Before the Tobruk evaluation, the Union Rotorua flirtation and the eventual Charles Upham purchase, there was a project called the Logistics Support Ship. It was intended to be a new-build vessel of around 12,000 tonnes, but otherwise similar to the current Canterbury.

Associated with that project was a project to buy a naval transport helicopter. Time was 1988-89. The Wasp replacement project was kicking around, but it didn't closely align. The core requirement was to embark two helicopters at a time aboard the LSS.

Key requirements included:

• 3000kg underslung load
• 10 passengers
• HIFR
• Deck-lock system (Harpoon)
• Marinisation
• Folding Tailboom
• Powered main rotor folding system
• Single pilot capable
• 'Suitable' undercarrage
• Floation system

Candidates included the advanced Sea King (presumably what became the HC4 Commando variant), the Super Puma and a cargo variant of Seahawk. Black Hawk was also considered. Sea Hawk had most of the features, but couldn't do the sling load could only take 9 pax, Blackhawk had strengths in other areas. Presumably it was hoped Sikorsky could do a hybrid.

Rough budget prices were included of $115M for Seahawks, $80M for Blackhawk, 60M for Super Puma and 60-80M for Advanced Sea King. Seahawks were singled out for not meeting the cargo requirements and Blackhawk being risky. Puma couldn't do HIFR or powered main rotor folding. Advanced Sea King was noted as being closest to indicative requirements. The paper did not that the roles and missions of the LSS were still relatively immature and it was difficult to assess the trade offs without knowing the relative importance of the features.

 

[chis73]

Much interesting information there ZA, thank you. I'd like to learn more. Can you provide a source - I doubt there is much online given the vintage. I can imagine the LSS project went down like a lead balloon in the Roger Douglas & Ruth Richardson era, not to mention that was also the time the ANZAC frigates, Endeavour & Manawanui were purchased.

Sounds like the MH-60S would have been perfect if it had been around (I think the MH-60S didn't evenuate until 2002 from memory).

I see Gerry Brownlee has still yet to answer the question for written answer in parliament regarding marinisation options for the NH90 (raised on 23 March). It is now 10 days overdue for an answer. Frankly, nothing he has said in the media inspires much confidence in me that he is a man expecting the problems to disappear soon. So far we've had "unsuitable" (twice), "challenging", and blaming the government 2 terms ago for purchasing them. Absolutely nothing about them undergoing introduction to service or that they will hopefully be deployable on Canterbury by the end of the year.

If we take the worst case scenario (that the NH90s are unlikely to embark on Canterbury for some years, perhaps never), what are the best options? Personally, I would like to see 6 Sqn expanded and maybe half a dozen maritime support helicopters purchased (seeing that we will have the Endeavour replacement to support as well). Front of the queue would be the MH-60S (via FMS, may just need decklock - which I think is being done on the MH60R for Denmark) or maybe the Merlin HC4. Both are currently in production, although the MH-60s line is scheduled to end by 2018. Merlin might be too big to hangar on Canterbury (which was designed for NH90) - and it only just fits in a C-17.

One remote option could be to hire a flight of RN Sea King HC4 and staff for a couple of years. The Sea King is due to retire 2016, with only 7 interim Merlin HC4s, Wildcats, and the non-marinised HC3s (such as those yet to go through the conversion) available to the Commando Helicopter Force. Not many aircraft there to keep deck landing skills alive with. Maybe the RN might jump at a similar opportunity to that provided by the Seedcorn initiative for the RAF MPA crews. Project Frogspawn perhaps? I'm sure a chance to poodle about the South Pacific would be welcome. It's not like we haven't done similar in the past to help ourselves out of a jam eg. leasing HMS Blackpool, the -Ton class minesweepers, and Venom jets.

 

[Zero Alpha]

Much interesting information there ZA, thank you. I'd like to learn more. Can you provide a source - I doubt there is much online given the vintage. I can imagine the LSS project went down like a lead balloon in the Roger Douglas & Ruth Richardson era, not to mention that was also the time the ANZAC frigates, Endeavour & Resolution & Manawanui were purchased.

No, nothing is online. I pulled some files from National Archives. I'm waiting on a few more and I'll put the citations up when I've got the set.

I've found a few gems so far. Like the 1984 offer from Boeing for 3 second hand 727s, converted to tankers, for $30.9M 1984 US Dollars. The 1991 Sioux replacement proposal to buy either Hughes 500MD, BK105 or A109s for training and light utility roles was certainly interesting too!

If NH90 can't be converted, I suspect they'll soldier on the the Seasprites until the issues with the fully marinised version of the NH90 is considered low risk and go from there. The tooling and spares saving would be considerable, and saving a few tens of millions on the flight simulator would be hard to ignore.

 

[RegR]

Much interesting information there ZA, thank you. I'd like to learn more. Can you provide a source - I doubt there is much online given the vintage. I can imagine the LSS project went down like a lead balloon in the Roger Douglas & Ruth Richardson era, not to mention that was also the time the ANZAC frigates, Endeavour & Manawanui were purchased.

Sounds like the MH-60S would have been perfect if it had been around (I think the MH-60S didn't evenuate until 2002 from memory).

I see Gerry Brownlee has still yet to answer the question for written answer in parliament regarding marinisation options for the NH90 (raised on 23 March). It is now 10 days overdue for an answer. Frankly, nothing he has said in the media inspires much confidence in me that he is a man expecting the problems to disappear soon. So far we've had "unsuitable" (twice), "challenging", and blaming the government 2 terms ago for purchasing them. Absolutely nothing about them undergoing introduction to service or that they will hopefully be deployable on Canterbury by the end of the year.

If we take the worst case scenario (that the NH90s are unlikely to embark on Canterbury for some years, perhaps never), what are the best options? Personally, I would like to see 6 Sqn expanded and maybe half a dozen maritime support helicopters purchased (seeing that we will have the Endeavour replacement to support as well). Front of the queue would be the MH-60S (via FMS, may just need decklock - which I think is being done on the MH60R for Denmark) or maybe the Merlin HC4. Both are currently in production, although the MH-60s line is scheduled to end by 2018. Merlin might be too big to hangar on Canterbury (which was designed for NH90) - and it only just fits in a C-17.

One remote option could be to hire a flight of RN Sea King HC4 and staff for a couple of years. The Sea King is due to retire 2016, with only 7 interim Merlin HC4s, Wildcats, and the non-marinised HC3s (such as those yet to go through the conversion) available to the Commando Helicopter Force. Not many aircraft there to keep deck landing skills alive with. Maybe the RN might jump at a similar opportunity to that provided by the Seedcorn initiative for the RAF MPA crews. Project Frogspawn perhaps? I'm sure a chance to poodle about the South Pacific would be welcome. It's not like we haven't done similar in the past to help ourselves out of a jam eg. leasing HMS Blackpool, the -Ton class minesweepers, and Venom jets.

The latest air force news makes mention of NH90 deploying to Talisman Sabre in Australia onboard CY therefore 90s must be cleared at least for transport aboard naval ships. Seems to contradict one of the main issues in regards to sending the 90s to assist in Vanuatu.

 

[RLP32a]

The EH101 is the most capable and proven maritime medium lift helicopter. Canada is still waiting for its military version of the S-92 (CH-148 Cyclone) after 8 years!

Canada is also still waiting for the EH101 or Cormorant to make FOC. The aircraft serviceability rate has been too low to provide an adequate replacement for the H-46 Labrador. We had 14 Labrador helicopters serving Canada from 4 sites for many years without significant problems, but the availability rate is so low for our 14 Cormorants that we can only handle 3 sites with the 14 aircraft - we have had to use Bell 412s at the fourth site as an "interim" measure. The main problem is a lack of spare parts from AWIL supply chain - this was temporarily improved by buying the Presidential EH 101s from the US, but they are burning through those spares at a great rate. So far, that "interim "status has been in place for ten years.

It is an Italian sports car, fast, fun to fly, spends a lot of time in the garage and you can't get parts for it.

 

[John Fedup]

Canada is also still waiting for the EH101 or Cormorant to make FOC. The aircraft serviceability rate has been too low to provide an adequate replacement for the H-46 Labrador. We had 14 Labrador helicopters serving Canada from 4 sites for many years without significant problems, but the availability rate is so low for our 14 Cormorants that we can only handle 3 sites with the 14 aircraft - we have had to use Bell 412s at the fourth site as an "interim" measure. The main problem is a lack of spare parts from AWIL supply chain - this was temporarily improved by buying the Presidential EH 101s from the US, but they are burning through those spares at a great rate. So far, that "interim "status has been in place for ten years.

It is an Italian sports car, fast, fun to fly, spends a lot of time in the garage and you can't get parts for it.

The parts issue was another Chrétien helicopter screw-up. They never bought enough spares when the CH-149s were ordered. The Presidential AH-101s eased this problem but I am not sure how things are at the moment. As there have been no recent horror stories (that I am aware of) things must be better. You have to order parts to have them! Other users seem to have figured this out.

 

[Zero Alpha]

The parts issue was another Chrétien helicopter screw-up. They never bought enough spares when the CH-149s were ordered.

It was a screw-up, but whose screw up was it? It would be very unusual for politicians to get involved in spares and support arrangements.