Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[downunderblue]

The French designs are very innovative and capable, their engineers and designers are first rate. Their management however, are ignorant, arrogant and petty, pretty much like a few Australian companies and organisations I can think of.

There is a lot of innovation incorporated on the Suffren. Yes it took 12 years and a lot of toil, but on paper it looks really impressive. Not for the RAN, but impressive given their mission. Dassault, Thales, MBDA and NG continue to put out/ have put out some impressive kit that matches or supersedes a lot of their competition, so 'berets' off to them IMO. No one should be saying they are mugs.

Australia's inability to build long term relationships is perhaps our greatest failing. Just sticking with and building a respectful, long term arrangement with a supplier through multiple generations and capabilities, allowing incremental improvements and tailoring would have saved us so much effort and energy.

How much of that goes down to the constant 2.5 year political election cycle. We have no real long-term thinking or stability when the politicians (and chasing bureaucracy) are constantly on a 24hr news cycle worried/insecure about getting reelected. There is often no real time to actually govern or let the informed cabinet government process actually work. IMHO we would see better more stable long-term decision making if we had four year fixed terms.

 

[Lofty_DBF]

AUKUS news from Facebook page Naval Reactors.

The first eight enlisted sailors and five additional officers from the Royal Australian Navy graduated from the U.S. Navy’s Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) Charleston as part of the Australia, United Kingdom, United States (#AUKUS) trilateral security partnership.

Read more here: First Royal Australian Navy Enlisted Students Graduate Nuclear Power Training

 

[John Fedup]

In this new world a CANZUK approach to defence procurement appears a no brainer to me. The three major nations there are all buying variants of the same frigate, looks like JORN is getting exported etc etc.

From my perspective if the Canadians wanted to join Pillar 1 of AUKUS that would be a great outcome for everyone once the Canadians and Yanks start getting along again (which they will).

The Brazilians are unreliable - they appear more closely aligned to China than us.

Yes, AUKUS 1 would have been beneficial to all considering Canada's existing nuclear infrastructure and R&D capabilities but it is a dead-end now. As for getting along with the $hitshow south of the border, not happening anytime soon and shouldn't. The trust level is on par with the PRC.

 

[downunderblue]

This refueling issue is overblown IMHO. The French SSNs have double crews which means lots of sea time - so the RAN might run longer patrols, but with single crews and fewer sea days things would offset each other and reactor use would end up being about the same.

Here's some rough math to illustrate what I mean:

1) The Rubis class SSNs are retiring having logged ~1,200,000 nautical miles and 120,000 dived hours over 36 years. This translates to an average speed of advance of 10 knots. They used 5 cores over this time (i.e. 4 refuelings) so sailed ~240,000nm between refuelings.​

​

2) For the RAN a 10 knot speed of advance is about right for a 60-70 day patrol from Perth to the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, even taking a roundabout route with a stopover in Guam or Okinawa... 3-4 weeks transit at ~15 knots and 6 weeks tooling around on patrol at ~8 knots. Typical distance travelled would be 15,000 - 20,000 nautical miles per patrol.​

​

3) On a Rubis you could do 2 long patrols like this every year for 7 full years before having to refuel the reactor in year 8. The French usage with double crews is actually somewhat more intensive than this, with 170-180 days/year @ 10 knots which translates to 40,000nm+ each year.​

​

4) With the Suffrens, reactor life is improved - somewhere around 25-50% better than a Rubis (very roughly) - allowing for 8-10 operational years between refuelings depending on how intensively the reactor is used.​

​

4) For the RAN, with a single crew I would assume 100-120 days of sub duty per year is the max achievable, as any more would run into retention issues. Even bumping up the average speed of advance to 12.5 knots (16 knots transit and 10 knots patrol, with a 40-60 mix), that would add up to 30,000 - 35,000 nm/yr, which those Suffren cores with 300,000nm+ lives could easily handle for ~9 years before refueling.​

​

At that point when you hit year 10 you're docking your sub anyway for deep maintenance, so refueling becomes just a list of task items to perform - many of which will run concurrently without extending the docking by much. (Worse case, the refueling duration on a Rubis is 5 months from initiating reactor shut-down to being able to sail off again with a fresh core)​

Once you inserted math into the equation 'you had me at hello'. Todjaeger however makes a reasonable point about the high speed transits. What you wouldn't want is that 9 or 10 year maintenance cycle being forced much earlier because you've run the reactor too hard. Yes they could manage it, but why should they?

My point was CoA ignored the Suffren SSN option pretty quickly. The above may have been in the minds of someone like VADM Mead, but the main issues were likely both the lack of a domestic nuclear industry and the NPT/ reputation risk. Utilising the HEU solution not needing to refuel the US/UK reactors clearly avoids the refueling issue Additionally, they can address NPT risk by not needing to refuel. In a report written by the Director General of the IAEA titled 'IAEA safeguards in relation to AUKUS', it is noted that the on 21JUL22 the CoA wrote to the DG advising:

“that Australia would be provided with complete, welded power units. These power units are designed so that removal of any nuclear material would be extremely difficult and would render the power unit, and the submarine, inoperable. Further, the nuclear material inside of these reactors would not be in a form that can be directly used in nuclear weapons without further chemical processing, requiring facilities that Australia does not have and will not seek”.

I assume they looked at the French SSN and simply said 'too hard'. We don't have much more to go on but if accurate (and it's reasonable) I would love for it to be announced or corroborated publically to some degree because it would stop people like Peter Briggs, Malcolm Turnbull, Rowan Moffit and even Saul Eslake rabbiting on like it is an option B, if only we sucked up to the French President enough.

 

[downunderblue]

Too noisy, and obsolete before they even got wet

Some of you may or may not have seen the Sky News Australia documentary titled Into 'The Deep: Australia’s Submarine Gamble' which aired on 25FEB25. I have posted it below if anyone hasn't seen it. Of interest is the exchange approx 7.23 mins in where they interview former PM's Boris Johnson and Scott Morrison.

NARATOR:"But for the top brass of the Australian Navy, Boris Johnson says it wasn't only about delays, it was also about the French technology".

JOHNSON: "Australian Admirals came to our Admirals and said look, I mean these things are going to be too noisy, they're diesel powered gizmos and uh we think they're going to be obsolete and plus they're not being delivered on time. Can you help us with some nuclear propulsion units because you've got them".

MORRISON: "I was quickly forming the view that we were going to have very expensive boats that would be obsolete before they even got wet and in an environment which was rapidly changing and really the the only serious option in that situation was to was frankly to go the moonshot [AUKUS]"

It alludes that the discussion were at a senior RAN and RN level until Morrison was briefed and got involved.

MORRISON: "I spoke to Boris after I'd taken it through the NSC, our national security committee [of Cabinet] and had fulsome unanimous support. and put it to to to Boris on a call, but you know he was in at hello with this".

JOHNSON: "AUKUS till I die, that was my catchphrase".

 

[StingrayOZ]

My point was CoA ignored the Suffren SSN option pretty quickly.

There were issues with the whole redesign a nuclear submarine, to become a conventional submarine, but do it by variation. Akin to building a house, but instead of a house, you went to Toyota, and bought a Hilux, and then got Toyota to vary the design until it was a house. Perhaps it was both sides that did not want to build a submarine that way. While the politicians thought it could happen, many from the engineering side seemed to think this was a terrible idea. AFAIK no lawyer or politician has ever actually built anything themselves, they sometimes can create the environment for others to create things, but sometimes, not. They turn up hard hat in hand, but are as useful as Mussolini was.

That isn't just an Australia thing either, or a sub thing. Look at the US constellation class. With so many variations, even a "simple" cheap and "proven design" has blown out before the hull is even finished being designed. The FREMM design isn't bad, not are the italians bad, but the project is setup to fail.

Ultimately, if we are getting top level US and UK access, why not go the whole hog and acquire the platform Rather than reinventing the wheel. The annoying part in particular is we could have moved into this much earlier (10 years?) and that would have put us into the Uk or US program.

 

[Todjaeger]

There were issues with the whole redesign a nuclear submarine, to become a conventional submarine, but do it by variation. Akin to building a house, but instead of a house, you went to Toyota, and bought a Hilux, and then got Toyota to vary the design until it was a house. Perhaps it was both sides that did not want to build a submarine that way. While the politicians thought it could happen, many from the engineering side seemed to think this was a terrible idea. AFAIK no lawyer or politician has ever actually built anything themselves, they sometimes can create the environment for others to create things, but sometimes, not. They turn up hard hat in hand, but are as useful as Mussolini was.

That isn't just an Australia thing either, or a sub thing. Look at the US constellation class. With so many variations, even a "simple" cheap and "proven design" has blown out before the hull is even finished being designed. The FREMM design isn't bad, not are the italians bad, but the project is setup to fail.

Ultimately, if we are getting top level US and UK access, why not go the whole hog and acquire the platform Rather than reinventing the wheel. The annoying part in particular is we could have moved into this much earlier (10 years?) and that would have put us into the Uk or US program.

One of the other elephants in the room was the systems fitout. Australia had already decided upon the using the BYG-1 system like the Collins-class was converted to and is fitted to USN Virginia-class SSN's and an Australian entity was created to handle the fitout in such a way to keep the French from having any direct access to information on or about the BYG-1. I can readily believe various Australian interests getting irritated with Naval Group's actions and approach to designing a sub to be built in Australia since IIRC one of the objectives of the programme was to not only deliver a new sub class for the RAN, but also establish both facilities and a skilled workforce that could maintain, modify and if need be, build additional subs in the future.

The idea of then going with a French SSN design, adding the likely problems associated with getting ToT on French nuclear capabilities aboard subs would likely have drawn a rapid response of, "nope, not gonna happen..." which would likely have left advisors to gov't with unpalatable options. A French SSN design, built in France and using the fitout France uses, or go elsewhere. I just do not see both France and the US being willing to share information enough so that an Australian SSN could be designed and built with a LEU reactor from France, whilst fitted with the US BYG-1.

Had Australia decided in 2007 to actually pursue the SSN route, I do think this would have been better and things would certainly have gotten farther along than they are. Unfortunately though, circumstances at the time were not what was needed to push Australia to decided to go the SSN route and this would continue to be the case for another 14 years or so.

 

[OldTex]

From memory when the Attack class was being selected the option of getting an SSN was politically off the table. Hence the idea of taking an SSN design and modifying it to become a long-range SSK became the Attack class. Exisiting SSKs did not (reasonably) meet the range required by CoA and RAN.

 

[Todjaeger]

Once you inserted math into the equation 'you had me at hello'. Todjaeger however makes a reasonable point about the high speed transits. What you wouldn't want is that 9 or 10 year maintenance cycle being forced much earlier because you've run the reactor too hard. Yes they could manage it, but why should they?

My point was CoA ignored the Suffren SSN option pretty quickly. The above may have been in the minds of someone like VADM Mead, but the main issues were likely both the lack of a domestic nuclear industry and the NPT/ reputation risk. Utilising the HEU solution not needing to refuel the US/UK reactors clearly avoids the refueling issue Additionally, they can address NPT risk by not needing to refuel. In a report written by the Director General of the IAEA titled 'IAEA safeguards in relation to AUKUS', it is noted that the on 21JUL22 the CoA wrote to the DG advising:

I assume they looked at the French SSN and simply said 'too hard'. We don't have much more to go on but if accurate (and it's reasonable) I would love for it to be announced or corroborated publically to some degree because it would stop people like Peter Briggs, Malcolm Turnbull, Rowan Moffit and even Saul Eslake rabbiting on like it is an option B, if only we sucked up to the French President enough.

It was actually the maths which ended up losing me. Of course, I have been on the receiving end of estimates which 'proved' I was wrong, despite having real world data which was different from the calculated estimate by 35%. When one has variable after variable involved in making an estimate, such an estimate can begin to have a range of potential answers. Similarly, if there are variables which are not factored into an estimate, that too can significantly the results.

 

[Going Boeing]

Another reason for not going the LEU Reactor from France route is the time that the vessels are out of service for refuelling. A good example is the Ohio class SSBN’s, after the SALT II talks, it was determined that 14 were required to fulfil the role but they are being replaced by 12 Columbia class. This is because the Columbia‘s reactor will have sufficient fuel for the life of the boat and thus not have each boat out of service for the 2-3 years refuelling period halfway through their life as required for the Ohio’s.

The French LEU reactors would require probably 4 additional submarines to be constructed to have the same availability as the planned 8 AUKUS SSN fleet due to the refuelling requirement every 7-10 years.

 

[hauritz]

Too noisy, and obsolete before they even got wet

Some of you may or may not have seen the Sky News Australia documentary titled Into 'The Deep: Australia’s Submarine Gamble' which aired on 25FEB25. I have posted it below if anyone hasn't seen it. Of interest is the exchange approx 7.23 mins in where they interview former PM's Boris Johnson and Scott Morrison.

It alludes that the discussion were at a senior RAN and RN level until Morrison was briefed and got involved.

The quote that diesel/electric submarines were, or would soon be, obsolete. Now of course other nations may well disagree but that simple realisation means that going back to conventional subs is simply not an option. This means if AUKUS falls over there quite simply isn't a Plan B.

 

[SammyC]

One quote that got me was that diesel/electric submarines were, or would soon be, obsolete. Now of course other nations may well disagree but that simple realisation means that going back to conventional subs is simply not an option. This means if AUKUS falls over there quite simply isn't a Plan B.

I don't fully buy this diesel submarines will be obsolete argument.

If we want the capability to strike way up around Tiawan then yes, that is difficult for an SSK. We will need an SSN to achieve it.

If however we only want to protect our near waters (EEZ, offshore gas, port entries and say up to the Indonesian passageways down into the local seas around the north), then I think a fleet of SSKs, supported with drones like the ghost shark would be fine for a long time. We could perfectly easily keep hostile Chinese ships out of our waters, and outside land firing range with a simple and cheap SSK/drone fleet and some refuelling ports in Darwin, Townsville and Exmouth in addition to Perth and Sydney.

Japan does this perfectly fine with a very long island archipelago and the sixth largest EEZ in the world.

A submarine snorkelling in our own protected waters to recharge, and then dissapearing again to lurk around has limited risk of exposure. This is totally different to snorkelling in the Taiwan straight.

We are buying SSNs because we want the long distance strike option, not because diesel SSKs are obsolete.

 

[downunderblue]

years)

It was actually the maths which ended up losing me. Of course, I have been on the receiving end of estimates which 'proved' I was wrong, despite having real world data which was different from the calculated estimate by 35%. When one has variable after variable involved in making an estimate, such an estimate can begin to have a range of potential answers. Similarly, if there are variables which are not factored into an estimate, that too can significantly the results.

"Lies, damned lies, and statistics"

I think for me the issue is he could be right, so could you, but if you have a choice you don't chose a sub with such a variance (say 6 to 9 years between refueling periods, nor do you operate it 'sparingly' to make it 9 etc). The machine needs the fuel in the tank to do the job, properly., so to speak.

 

[Going Boeing]

One quote that got me was that diesel/electric submarines were, or would soon be, obsolete. Now of course other nations may well disagree but that simple realisation means that going back to conventional subs is simply not an option. This means if AUKUS falls over there quite simply isn't a Plan B.

I see the submarine roadmap as having multiple sections and the acquisition of Virginia submarines looks like the most vulnerable section - hopefully the world will recover from the Trump madness after he leaves office.

I believe that the acquisition of AUKUS SSN’s is much less vulnerable as the Royal Navy needs Astute replacements and will develop the new submarine despite what happens in the US. The worst case is that it may not have the BYG1 but it will proceed. The major companies (such as RR) are planning on the full build of RN & RAN submarines

The issue for the RAN if the Virginia’s are not available is how to fill the gap between the Collins and AUKUS SSN’s.

 

[downunderblue]

One quote that got me was that diesel/electric submarines were, or would soon be, obsolete. Now of course other nations may well disagree but that simple realisation means that going back to conventional subs is simply not an option. This means if AUKUS falls over there quite simply isn't a Plan B.

I don't think the quotes reference that directly, as they are said in the Australian context (use) within our strategic environment. Noise is referenced earlier which is interesting.

Another matter I was watching closely at the time was the use of a pump jet on a diesel boat. That hadn't been done before (an experimental Kilo had tried it) but apparently it requires a fair amount of constant power. The pump jet was on all the drawings of the Attack but I kept researching it at the time (thinking massive program risk/ overun). As it progressed I remember reading something saying CoA may or may not get the pump jet and wondered whether Naval Group had promised us a apple instead we were preparing for a lemon instead.

The pump jet primarily shields noise in high speed transits, allowing you to go faster for long periods whilst isolating noise to some degree. Maybe the lack of a pump jet had the RAN worried about those high speed transits considering increased detection capacity of the PLA-N?

And no one is saying diesels are obsolete. Just ask the JMSDF esp with the change in batteries. If the use case permits, they are clearly lethal at sea denial and much cheaper, but the for the CoA/ RAN use case clearly is different.

 

[iambuzzard]

I don't fully buy this diesel submarines will be obsolete argument.

If we want the capability to strike way up around Tiawan then yes, that is difficult for an SSK. We will need an SSN to achieve it.

If however we only want to protect our near waters (EEZ, offshore gas, port entries and say up to the Indonesian passageways down into the local seas around the north), then I think a fleet of SSKs, supported with drones like the ghost shark would be fine for a long time. We could perfectly easily keep hostile Chinese ships out of our waters, and outside land firing range with a simple and cheap SSK/drone fleet and some refuelling ports in Darwin, Townsville and Exmouth in addition to Perth and Sydney.

Japan does this perfectly fine with a very long island archipelago.

A submarine snorkelling in our own protected waters to recharge, and then dissapearing again to lurk around has limited risk of exposure. This is totally different to snorkelling in the Taiwan straight.

We are buying SSNs because we want the long distance strike option, not because diesel SSKs are obsolete.

What was the saying the CoA came up with? Impactful Projection?

 

[iambuzzard]

I don't think the quotes reference that directly, as they are said in the Australian context (use) within our strategic environment. Noise is referenced earlier which is interesting.

Another matter I was watching closely at the time was the use of a pump jet on a diesel boat. That hadn't been done before (an experimental Kilo had tried it) but apparently it requires a fair amount of constant power. The pump jet was on all the drawings of the Attack but I kept researching it at the time (thinking massive program risk/ overun). As it progressed I remember reading something saying CoA may or may not get the pump jet and wondered whether Naval Group had promised us a apple instead we were preparing for a lemon instead.

The pump jet primarily shields noise in high speed transits, allowing you to go faster for long periods whilst isolating noise to some degree. Maybe the lack of a pump jet had the RAN worried about those high speed transits considering increased detection capacity of the PLA-N?

And no one is saying diesels are obsolete. Just ask the JMSDF esp with the change in batteries. If the use case permits, they are clearly lethal at sea denial and much cheaper, but the for the CoA/ RAN use case clearly is different.

If the Virginias go pear shaped the Japanese boats are definitely a good stop gap until we get the AUKUS boats.

 

[SammyC]

What was the saying the CoA came up with? Impactful Projection?

I'm not saying that SSNs are the wrong way to go, or that, as said, impactful projection is not important. I think they are the right option for Australia and that we should pull out all stops to ensure it happens.

I'm just saying that SSKs would be perfectly adequate to protect our own waters in a defensive mode. We would not need an SSN fleet for that purpose.

If we lost all options for SSN's then I think that is what we would drop our submarine requirement down to, and do it with what ever conventional submarine we could gain access to

I kind of see a mixed fleet being somewhat useful. Given that is what we will have for at least a decade, with Virginias operating in conjunction Collins, one can see the Virginias providing the longer distance patrols and the offensive presence in hostile waters, whilst the Collins continue to provide local coast defence.

 

[Volkodav]

Another reason for not going the LEU Reactor from France route is the time that the vessels are out of service for refuelling. A good example is the Ohio class SSBN’s, after the SALT II talks, it was determined that 14 were required to fulfil the role but they are being replaced by 12 Columbia class. This is because the Columbia‘s reactor will have sufficient fuel for the life of the boat and thus not have each boat out of service for the 2-3 years refuelling period halfway through their life as required for the Ohio’s.

The French LEU reactors would require probably 4 additional submarines to be constructed to have the same availability as the planned 8 AUKUS SSN fleet due to the refuelling requirement every 7-10 years.

The issue with this though is when the platforms life has to be extended, as has occured with the later Los Angles boats and will likely occur with the early Virginia's. It was never planned to refuel them which has complicated and extended planned maintenance.

Right now the USN is struggling with a backlog of maintenance, partly because of this, partly because of the draw down on capability of the US Navy Yards, because it was assumed the boat would not require refueling, and partly because of the additional maintenance each boat requires because their planned maintenance was deferred.

Then you throw in that one of the reasons the Virginia was anticipated to be so much less expensive to own and operate than the Seawolf, is because they ignored later through life costs and simply didn't plan for adequately supporting the type through life.

This pretty much happens everytime any organisation assumes plug and play, use and replace. The end up not getting the planned replacements and have to do highly complex, unplanned "brownfield" upgrade programs on platforms well past their useby dates.

 

[76mmGuns]

AUKUS news from Facebook page Naval Reactors.

The first eight enlisted sailors and five additional officers from the Royal Australian Navy graduated from the U.S. Navy’s Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) Charleston as part of the Australia, United Kingdom, United States (#AUKUS) trilateral security partnership.

Read more here: First Royal Australian Navy Enlisted Students Graduate Nuclear Power Training

This sort of news is why I'm positive about AUKUS subs. The groundwork is being done and continues to produce results. This news doesn't reach the general public.