Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[hauritz]

My take was the article reflects both pillar one and two of AUKUS.

I guess time will tell if it’s more of an opinion piece or reality.

That said ,my limited enthusiasm for AUKUS has dropped dramatically in the last two months to the point of absolutely no confidence in it playing out to the script envisaged.

Sadly S

Well AUKUS was never really expected to run smoothly. It is such a long term project with so many moving pieces. Sometimes I think we should have just stuck with the French. There was always that option to swap to Nuclear boats down the track. At least we would possibly have had a production line up and running by now.

Trump's obsession with "Built in America" not only hamstrings Australian industries but also would seem to be hindering America's ability to boost the production rate of the Virginias. Add to that what sounds like another disaster on the horizon with the Collins LOTE and questions about whether the British will be able to hit the schedule with the AUKUS subs and your lack of confidence is understandable.

 

[Stampede]

Well AUKUS was never really expected to run smoothly. It is such a long term project with so many moving pieces. Sometimes I think we should have just stuck with the French. There was always that option to swap to Nuclear boats down the track. At least we would possibly have had a production line up and running by now.

Trump's obsession with "Built in America" not only hamstrings Australian industries but also would seem to be hindering America's ability to boost the production rate of the Virginias. Add to that what sounds like another disaster on the horizon with the Collins LOTE and questions about whether the British will be able to hit the schedule with the AUKUS subs and your lack of confidence is understandable.

All large projects have there complexity and challenges and no doubt building a SSN is as big as it gets.
The political dimension is my main concern in conjunction with what you mention.

Politics is contentious on DT but my take is the Virginias will be either unavailable or too costly or politically unpalatable.

Our main ally has changed dramatically and it’s not a short term thing.

We need to consider this.
Yes with the benefit of hindsight, we should’ve stuck with the French.

Oh well

Cheers S

 

[downunderblue]

Sometimes I think we should have just stuck with the French. There was always that option to swap to Nuclear boats down the track. At least we would possibly have had a production line up and running by now.

Below is a a recently published and informative video on the Suffren by a former US Sonarman who regularly posts on Naval matters.

We never learned publically why the CoA chose to pass on the original Suffren SSN design. Clearly it would have been initially convenient and politically easier, but something stopped them considering the design.

Clearly refueling was an issue. The Suffren uses Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) as a fuel for its K15 nuclear reactor. For the French this is fine as they maintain a domestic nuclear industry for fuel production and servicing but we clearly don't, incurring sovereign risk. The refueling period is said to be around 10 years, but I recently learned that the Suffren's main mission is to deploy with their SSBN's, requiring a low patrol distance and thus limited use of the reactor. For the AU perspective, we need to conduct long higher speed transits and will operate the reactor at greater capacity for longer periods. Does this 10 years now become 7, or 6 before you need to refuel? This just wont work for the RAN or CoA.

Additionally have a look at the lead times for the production of the class. They are at 12 years from laying the keel so maybe this was an issue as well.

Again we may never know but if accurate, it would be good to disclose in a general nature just to stop all the noise declaring that the Suffren class remains a viable Plan B. From what I am hearing there is no viable plan B (if you constrict it purely to obtaining a SSN).

 

[Reptilia]

Below is a a recently published and informative video on the Suffren by a former US Sonarman who regularly posts on Naval matters.

We never learned publically why the CoA chose to pass on the original Suffren SSN design. Clearly it would have been initially convenient and politically easier, but something stopped them considering the design.

Clearly refueling was an issue. The Suffren uses Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) as a fuel for its K15 nuclear reactor. For the French this is fine as they maintain a domestic nuclear industry for fuel production and servicing but we clearly don't, incurring sovereign risk. The refueling period is said to be around 10 years, but I recently learned that the Suffren's main mission is to deploy with their SSBN's, requiring a low patrol distance and thus limited use of the reactor. For the AU perspective, we need to conduct long higher speed transits and will operate the reactor at greater capacity for longer periods. Does this 10 years now become 7, or 6 before you need to refuel? This just wont work for the RAN or CoA.

Additionally have a look at the lead times for the production of the class. They are at 12 years from laying the keel so maybe this was an issue as well.

Again we may never know but if accurate, it would be good to disclose in a general nature just to stop all the noise declaring that the Suffren class remains a viable Plan B. From what I am hearing there is no viable plan B (if you constrict it purely to obtaining a SSN).

also the small weapons load and no vls.

 

[Todjaeger]

also the small weapons load and no vls.

Also not addressed were the very real issues with trying to fit US combat systems and weapons to a French design. Yes, the RAN could have opted to adopt the French fitout but that would also mean changing over from what the RAN already has and knows how to maintain/support and are already known elements that work for the RAN. France likely has comparable capabilities but Australia would need to learn the new systems and their differences and possibly change or adapt how they operate.

 

[John Fedup]

Below is a a recently published and informative video on the Suffren by a former US Sonarman who regularly posts on Naval matters.

We never learned publically why the CoA chose to pass on the original Suffren SSN design. Clearly it would have been initially convenient and politically easier, but something stopped them considering the design.

Clearly refueling was an issue. The Suffren uses Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) as a fuel for its K15 nuclear reactor. For the French this is fine as they maintain a domestic nuclear industry for fuel production and servicing but we clearly don't, incurring sovereign risk. The refueling period is said to be around 10 years, but I recently learned that the Suffren's main mission is to deploy with their SSBN's, requiring a low patrol distance and thus limited use of the reactor. For the AU perspective, we need to conduct long higher speed transits and will operate the reactor at greater capacity for longer periods. Does this 10 years now become 7, or 6 before you need to refuel? This just wont work for the RAN or CoA.

Additionally have a look at the lead times for the production of the class. They are at 12 years from laying the keel so maybe this was an issue as well.

Again we may never know but if accurate, it would be good to disclose in a general nature just to stop all the noise declaring that the Suffren class remains a viable Plan B. From what I am hearing there is no viable plan B (if you constrict it purely to obtaining a SSN).

Interesting comment wrt reactor output versus refuelling interval. Certainly a 6-7 year interval would be problematic. As for the build time of 12 years, I would think Australian involvement in the construction process could have reduced the build time somewhat. All moot points now.

 

[Todjaeger]

Interesting comment wrt reactor output versus refuelling interval. Certainly a 6-7 year interval would be problematic. As for the build time of 12 years, I would think Australian involvement in the construction process could have reduced the build time somewhat. All moot points now.

One of the impressions I had formed during/following the Attack-class SSG debacle was that Naval Group really did not want any Australian involvement. IIRC there was a story going around that the cost of food purchased for a Naval Group delegation in Australia (pizza I think) was being added to the ledger to count for Australian 'content' in the build.

 

[John Fedup]

IIRC there was a story going around that the cost of food purchased for a Naval Group delegation in Australia (pizza I think) was being added to the ledger to count for Australian 'content' in the build.

That would be a show stopper for sure. Certainly France wasn't exactly a great team player wrt the Attack class program. I wonder if they would have been better motivated had the project been for SSNs. Another 12 boats in production could have reduced build costs for both France and Australia, but probably not the pizzas.

 

[Todjaeger]

That would be a show stopper for sure. Certainly France wasn't exactly a great team player wrt the Attack class program. I wonder if they would have been better motivated had the project been for SSNs. Another 12 boats in production could have reduced build costs for both France and Australia, but probably not the pizzas.

Again, my impression, but it struck me that despite Australian desires for 'local content' and involvement, France/Naval Group was not all that interested in a collaboration, but rather wished to be a vendor building and selling a solution. Had it been for Australian versions of the Suffren-class SSN, I suspect that France/Naval Group would have required that these be built in France.

If one looks at the Brazilian Navy, they started a submarine upgrade and replacement programme at least as far back as early 2008 which was to see the then existing Brazilian Type 209 subs upgraded by LockMart, which would then be replaced by four Scorpene-class subs from France. The delivery of the lead sub was planned for 2017 but I believe it as not delivered until 2018. However, part of the whole programme was also for Brazil to develop a SSN with assistance from France. As of 2013, the expectation was that the lead Brazilian SSN would commission in 2023, but AFAIK that has not happened. If this happened with Brazil, then I tend to think Australia would have run into similar if not worse issues, especially if there were the added issues involving US defence tech and IP.

 

[Stampede]

Again, my impression, but it struck me that despite Australian desires for 'local content' and involvement, France/Naval Group was not all that interested in a collaboration, but rather wished to be a vendor building and selling a solution. Had it been for Australian versions of the Suffren-class SSN, I suspect that France/Naval Group would have required that these be built in France

If one looks at the Brazilian Navy, they started a submarine upgrade and replacement programme at least as far back as early 2008 which was to see the then existing Brazilian Type 209 subs upgraded by LockMart, which would then be replaced by four Scorpene-class subs from France. The delivery of the lead sub was planned for 2017 but I believe it as not delivered until 2018. However, part of the whole programme was also for Brazil to develop a SSN with assistance from France. As of 2013, the expectation was that the lead Brazilian SSN would commission in 2023, but AFAIK that has not happened. If this happened with Brazil, then I tend to think Australia would have run into similar if not worse issues, especially if there were the added issues involving US defence tech and IP.

Not sure it’s such a bleak picture.

Four nations currently have a version of the French Scorpene Class with a fifth in Indonesia sorting out contracting and financing for at least another two vessels.
The builds for both India and Brazil seem respectable in time frame from the vessel being laid down to commission.
As to Brazils SSN aspiration time will tell. The first SSN vessel is yet to be laid down but with build experience and a domestic nuclear capacity they are certainly well placed.

Our own Attack class beat out two other contenders to select the offering from Naval Group for our future submarine.
While the project was in its infancy and had become controversial because of the AUKUS announcement and its political handling ,it was I understand still tracking along OK in ANAO reporting.

It was however “French” which apparently we are not meant to like!!!!

It must be remembered that the Attack Class was to be a conventional submarine with a entry date in the early 30s.

No talk or aspirations for nuclear propulsion,but yes it may of being on the wish list for late builds of a project consisting of 12 vessels.
With the Attack Class to be built in Australia and knowledge of our preferences for US weapons and combat management systems I’m sure all the international players involved knew the score.

Cheers S

 

[Todjaeger]

Not sure it’s such a bleak picture.

Four nations currently have a version of the French Scorpene Class with a fifth in Indonesia sorting out contracting and financing for at least another two vessels.
The builds for both India and Brazil seem respectable in time frame from the vessel being laid down to commission.
As to Brazils SSN aspiration time will tell. The first SSN vessel is yet to be laid down but with build experience and a domestic nuclear capacity they are certainly well placed.

Our own Attack class beat out two other contenders to select the offering from Naval Group for our future submarine.
While the project was in its infancy and had become controversial because of the AUKUS announcement and its political handling ,it was I understand still tracking along OK in ANAO reporting.

It was however “French” which apparently we are not meant to like!!!!

It must be remembered that the Attack Class was to be a conventional submarine with a entry date in the early 30s.

No talk or aspirations for nuclear propulsion,but yes it may of being on the wish list for late builds of a project consisting of 12 vessels.
With the Attack Class to be built in Australia and knowledge of our preferences for US weapons and combat management systems I’m sure all the international players involved knew the score.

Cheers S

From my POV, the number of countries which have Scorpene-class subs in service is completely irrelevant since Australia was not trying to purchase or build a version of the Scorpene-class, rather Australia wanted the Attack-class to be a conventional/diesel-electric sub which met Australian and RAN needs and service requirements, and would be built in Australia. The selection process for SEA 1000 ultimately chose Naval Group's offer as being the best or most suitable for Australian requirements over offerings from Japan as well as the paper Type 216 sub from Germany.

Now, this has been my impression based off reading a number of articles over the years from a variety of sources, but what Australia seemed to want is a vendor offering a sub design which Australia would then build domestically, whilst Naval Group really wanted to be a vendor that sold Australia some French-built subs.

Now for a reality check. If two subs, even subs with the same external dimensions, are respectively diesel-electric and nuclear-powered, the respective sub's internals are going to be completely different even with the overall systems are comparable in capability. One cannot just take out the machinery and fuel storage of a conventional sub and replace it with a nuclear reactor, as that would change the overall distribution of mass inside a sub which would almost certainly impact the vessel's trim and possibly buoyancy.

The reason I mentioned Brazilian efforts to develop an SSN and get it into service is because ~12 years ago, they were expecting to have an SSN commissioned in Brazilian service by 2023. Here it is in 2025 and whilst construction on the lead SSN did have first steel cut in 2024 (or a year after the plan had expected the lead ship to already be in service) the vessel is now not expected to be launched until ~2029 followed by sea trials for several years with commissioning coming sometime between 2032-2034. All this for a Brazilian sub designed with French assistance which as a project seems to have gotten started around 2008 but might be even earlier.

Had SEA 1000 (which started in 2007) been for an SSN class from the beginning, I still do not foresee a way in which Australia could have domestically built an SSN, since Australia lacks the ability to build PWR's, especially the kind which an SSN would require. Brazil, which does have a domestic nuclear industry, developed their own PWR. As part of AUKUS under the current plan, the first Australian SSN's are to be built/sourced overseas from the US with following subs likely largely built in Australia, but with PWR's sourced from either the US or UK. Even so, we are talking about events which are not expected to take plan until the 2040's most likely.

Had the French Suffren-class SSN been selected as part of SEA 1000, I just cannot envision France being willing to 'sell' Australia the LEU and nuclear reactors so that Australia could build the sub hulls domestically and install them. Not when it already seemed like Naval Group was trying to get conventional production which Australia certainly could, shifted back to France.

 

[John Fedup]

Had SEA 1000 (which started in 2007) been for an SSN class from the beginning, I still do not foresee a way in which Australia could have domestically built an SSN, since Australia lacks the ability to build PWR's, especially the kind which an SSN would require. Brazil, which does have a domestic nuclear industry, developed their own PWR.

If Canada had a defence orientated government in 2007, an Australian/Canadian/Brazilian collaboration for SSN would have been a thought with economic advantages albeit difficult.

Had the French Suffren-class SSN been selected as part of SEA 1000, I just cannot envision France being willing to 'sell' Australia the LEU and nuclear reactors so that Australia could build the sub hulls domestically and install them. Not when it already seemed like Naval Group was trying to get conventional production which Australia certainly could, shifted back to France.

Yep, pretty much why the program went down the $hitter.

 

[H_K]

Clearly refueling was an issue. The Suffren uses Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) as a fuel for its K15 nuclear reactor. For the French this is fine as they maintain a domestic nuclear industry for fuel production and servicing but we clearly don't, incurring sovereign risk. The refueling period is said to be around 10 years, but I recently learned that the Suffren's main mission is to deploy with their SSBN's, requiring a low patrol distance and thus limited use of the reactor. For the AU perspective, we need to conduct long higher speed transits and will operate the reactor at greater capacity for longer periods. Does this 10 years now become 7, or 6 before you need to refuel? This just wont work for the RAN or CoA.

This refueling issue is overblown IMHO. The French SSNs have double crews which means lots of sea time - so the RAN might run longer patrols, but with single crews and fewer sea days things would offset each other and reactor use would end up being about the same.

Here's some rough math to illustrate what I mean:

1) The Rubis class SSNs are retiring having logged ~1,200,000 nautical miles and 120,000 dived hours over 36 years. This translates to an average speed of advance of 10 knots. They used 5 cores over this time (i.e. 4 refuelings) so sailed ~240,000nm between refuelings.​

​

2) For the RAN a 10 knot speed of advance is about right for a 60-70 day patrol from Perth to the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, even taking a roundabout route with a stopover in Guam or Okinawa... 3-4 weeks transit at ~15 knots and 6 weeks tooling around on patrol at ~8 knots. Typical distance travelled would be 15,000 - 20,000 nautical miles per patrol.​

​

3) On a Rubis you could do 2 long patrols like this every year for 7 full years before having to refuel the reactor in year 8. The French usage with double crews is actually somewhat more intensive than this, with 170-180 days/year @ 10 knots which translates to 40,000nm+ each year.​

​

4) With the Suffrens, reactor life is improved - somewhere around 25-50% better than a Rubis (very roughly) - allowing for 8-10 operational years between refuelings depending on how intensively the reactor is used.​

​

4) For the RAN, with a single crew I would assume 100-120 days of sub duty per year is the max achievable, as any more would run into retention issues. Even bumping up the average speed of advance to 12.5 knots (16 knots transit and 10 knots patrol, with a 40-60 mix), that would add up to 30,000 - 35,000 nm/yr, which those Suffren cores with 300,000nm+ lives could easily handle for ~9 years before refueling.​

​

At that point when you hit year 10 you're docking your sub anyway for deep maintenance, so refueling becomes just a list of task items to perform - many of which will run concurrently without extending the docking by much. (Worse case, the refueling duration on a Rubis is 5 months from initiating reactor shut-down to being able to sail off again with a fresh core)​

 

[spoz]

However, refuelling in effect requires the country to have an effective nuclear industry to be able to support the process. Australia does not have that, and despite the present election campaign, there is little prospect that it will have it.

In any case, the French bird has well and truly flown. And I would suggest that there is absolutely no desire on the part of the RAN to be have to deal with Naval Group ever again.

 

[Morgo]

If Canada had a defence orientated government in 2007, an Australian/Canadian/Brazilian collaboration for SSN would have been a thought with economic advantages albeit difficult.

In this new world a CANZUK approach to defence procurement appears a no brainer to me. The three major nations there are all buying variants of the same frigate, looks like JORN is getting exported etc etc.

From my perspective if the Canadians wanted to join Pillar 1 of AUKUS that would be a great outcome for everyone once the Canadians and Yanks start getting along again (which they will).

The Brazilians are unreliable - they appear more closely aligned to China than us.

 

[Todjaeger]

This refueling issue is overblown IMHO. The French SSNs have double crews which means lots of sea time - so the RAN might run longer patrols, but with single crews and fewer sea days things would offset each other and reactor use would end up being about the same.

Here's some rough math to illustrate what I mean:

1) The Rubis class SSNs are retiring having logged ~1,200,000 nautical miles and 120,000 dived hours over 36 years. This translates to an average speed of advance of 10 knots. They used 5 cores over this time (i.e. 4 refuelings) so sailed ~240,000nm between refuelings.​

​

2) For the RAN a 10 knot speed of advance is about right for a 60-70 day patrol from Perth to the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, even taking a roundabout route with a stopover in Guam or Okinawa... 3-4 weeks transit at ~15 knots and 6 weeks tooling around on patrol at ~8 knots. Typical distance travelled would be 15,000 - 20,000 nautical miles per patrol.​

​

3) On a Rubis you could do 2 long patrols like this every year for 7 full years before having to refuel the reactor in year 8. The French usage with double crews is actually somewhat more intensive than this, with 170-180 days/year @ 10 knots which translates to 40,000nm+ each year.​

​

4) With the Suffrens, reactor life is improved - somewhere around 25-50% better than a Rubis (very roughly) - allowing for 8-10 operational years between refuelings depending on how intensively the reactor is used.​

​

4) For the RAN, with a single crew I would assume 100-120 days of sub duty per year is the max achievable, as any more would run into retention issues. Even bumping up the average speed of advance to 12.5 knots (16 knots transit and 10 knots patrol, with a 40-60 mix), that would add up to 30,000 - 35,000 nm/yr, which those Suffren cores with 300,000nm+ lives could easily handle for ~9 years before refueling.​

​

At that point when you hit year 10 you're docking your sub anyway for deep maintenance, so refueling becomes just a list of task items to perform - many of which will run concurrently without extending the docking by much. (Worse case, the refueling duration on a Rubis is 5 months from initiating reactor shut-down to being able to sail off again with a fresh core)​

All of the above manages to overlook a few things which might be inconsequential, but could also make a significant difference and TBH, we just do not know.

The first being what CONOPS the French SSN's operate with? What about a CONOPS that the RAN will use SSN's? What about the normal, hotel load and peak power demands for the subs, given how they are used? Trying to estimate how often LEU reactors might need to be refueled, based solely upon the estimated distance a sub will have traveled (which itself might be completely off or not reflect the power demanded for a variety or reasons) can provide an estimated number. Unfortunately, that estimate is itself based upon multiple other estimates which increases the likelihood of error and/or deviation.

Consider for instance the following question;

Which requires more power consumption, a 5000t sub to transiting 15,000 n miles at 8 kts, or that same sub transiting that same distance but at a speed of 16 kts? The distance is the same, with one sub moving at twice the speed so the transit duration should be roughly half (or enable a longer period of time on station or in a patrol area). I could be mistaken, but I tend to suspect that to double the speed requires more than double the amount of power for propulsion.

Then there is the question of what the minimum operational level of power is demanded to support a sub's systems, as well as what the peak demand will be and how much/often/long these demand periods will be.

Depending on the actual answers, the estimates previously made might be spot on, but could also end up being wildly off. This is especially true considering the very real possibility that how the RAN would operate an SSN might be quite different from how the Marine Nationale does.

Further, in order to refuel such a reactor Australia would either need to setup a domestic capability to do so or might need to send the subs to France to have it done. If France were willing to provide the tech for Australia to establish a domestic capability (which France might not be willing to do) Australia would then likely need to spend significant coin to establish and maintain such a capability. The lack of a domestic nuclear industry would likely not help with either the time or costs involved. OTOH it is quite possible that France would only permit the reactors to be refueled in France, since they could then charge Australia to do so as well as possibly protect some of their sensitive nuclear and submarine tech.

Me personally, I tend to suspect that any RAN SSN's are going to be run at fairly high transit speeds, perhaps 18 kts or whatever provides significant distance coverage without too great an acoustic signature, so that any RAN subs can spend significant time on station.

 

[Volkodav]

Not sure it’s such a bleak picture.

Four nations currently have a version of the French Scorpene Class with a fifth in Indonesia sorting out contracting and financing for at least another two vessels.
The builds for both India and Brazil seem respectable in time frame from the vessel being laid down to commission.
As to Brazils SSN aspiration time will tell. The first SSN vessel is yet to be laid down but with build experience and a domestic nuclear capacity they are certainly well placed.

Our own Attack class beat out two other contenders to select the offering from Naval Group for our future submarine.
While the project was in its infancy and had become controversial because of the AUKUS announcement and its political handling ,it was I understand still tracking along OK in ANAO reporting.

It was however “French” which apparently we are not meant to like!!!!

It must be remembered that the Attack Class was to be a conventional submarine with a entry date in the early 30s.

No talk or aspirations for nuclear propulsion,but yes it may of being on the wish list for late builds of a project consisting of 12 vessels.
With the Attack Class to be built in Australia and knowledge of our preferences for US weapons and combat management systems I’m sure all the international players involved knew the score.

Cheers S

The French designs are very innovative and capable, their engineers and designers are first rate. Their management however, are ignorant, arrogant and petty, pretty much like a few Australian companies and organisations I can think of.

Australia's inability to build long term relationships is perhaps our greatest failing. Just sticking with and building a respectful, long term arrangement with a supplier through multiple generations and capabilities, allowing incremental improvements and tailoring would have saved us so much effort and energy.

 

[Stampede]

From my POV, the number of countries which have Scorpene-class subs in service is completely irrelevant since Australia was not trying to purchase or build a version of the Scorpene-class, rather Australia wanted the Attack-class to be a conventional/diesel-electric sub which met Australian and RAN needs and service requirements, and would be built in Australia. The selection process for SEA 1000 ultimately chose Naval Group's offer as being the best or most suitable for Australian requirements over offerings from Japan as well as the paper Type 216 sub from Germany.

Now, this has been my impression based off reading a number of articles over the years from a variety of sources, but what Australia seemed to want is a vendor offering a sub design which Australia would then build domestically, whilst Naval Group really wanted to be a vendor that sold Australia some French-built subs.

Now for a reality check. If two subs, even subs with the same external dimensions, are respectively diesel-electric and nuclear-powered, the respective sub's internals are going to be completely different even with the overall systems are comparable in capability. One cannot just take out the machinery and fuel storage of a conventional sub and replace it with a nuclear reactor, as that would change the overall distribution of mass inside a sub which would almost certainly impact the vessel's trim and possibly buoyancy.

The reason I mentioned Brazilian efforts to develop an SSN and get it into service is because ~12 years ago, they were expecting to have an SSN commissioned in Brazilian service by 2023. Here it is in 2025 and whilst construction on the lead SSN did have first steel cut in 2024 (or a year after the plan had expected the lead ship to already be in service) the vessel is now not expected to be launched until ~2029 followed by sea trials for several years with commissioning coming sometime between 2032-2034. All this for a Brazilian sub designed with French assistance which as a project seems to have gotten started around 2008 but might be even earlier.

Had SEA 1000 (which started in 2007) been for an SSN class from the beginning, I still do not foresee a way in which Australia could have domestically built an SSN, since Australia lacks the ability to build PWR's, especially the kind which an SSN would require. Brazil, which does have a domestic nuclear industry, developed their own PWR. As part of AUKUS under the current plan, the first Australian SSN's are to be built/sourced overseas from the US with following subs likely largely built in Australia, but with PWR's sourced from either the US or UK. Even so, we are talking about events which are not expected to take plan until the 2040's most likely.

Had the French Suffren-class SSN been selected as part of SEA 1000, I just cannot envision France being willing to 'sell' Australia the LEU and nuclear reactors so that Australia could build the sub hulls domestically and install them. Not when it already seemed like Naval Group was trying to get conventional production which Australia certainly could, shifted back to France.

Some clarity which I have poorly articulated

The RAN were looking at a conventional submarine in the Attack Class

Remember this is the pre AUKUS world

12 vessels were always going to be a long build

The conventional version of the Suffren Class which the RAN selected may of presented an opportunity down the track for a nuclear option but this to my knowledge was probably more wishful speculation.
More realistic options were probably battery types and AIP development for later tranche’s of the Class.

Yes no doubt some complexity in converting propulsion types but the RAN seemed confident that the nuclear Suffern could be the base for a conventional and the Brazilian Navy seemed confident there enlarged Scorpene could evolve to a nuclear SSN
I mention the Scorpene Class as a reference to France’s ability to sussessfully build , sell and support submarines
We like to dislike them but they have runs on the board that cannot be dismissed.

As for the laters SSN S timeframe, I guess it’s how you look at it.
With there subs now in a production phase the program seems to be moving along quite well

Our own HMAS AUKUS is envisaged to enter service some twenty years after the quest to build a SSN so maybe that’s what it takes.
A couple of decades

Anyway we still have the conundrum of an aging Collin’s Class and questions as to a upgrade, balanced against the real world expectation as to weather we will actually get a Virginia Sub on time , in numbers suggested and if we actually have true sovereignty of ownership.
They will not throw us the keys without some political expectation

A replacement conventional to Collin’s may of being prudent leading into a later option of a SSN

Cheers S

 

[Todjaeger]

The conventional version of the Suffren Class which the RAN selected may of presented an opportunity down the track for a nuclear option but this to my knowledge was probably more wishful speculation.
More realistic options were probably battery types and AIP development for later tranche’s of the Class.

Yes no doubt some complexity in converting propulsion types but the RAN seemed confident that the nuclear Suffern could be the base for a conventional and the Brazilian Navy seemed confident there enlarged Scorpene could evolve to a nuclear SSN
I mention the Scorpene Class as a reference to France’s ability to sussessfully build , sell and support submarines
We like to dislike them but they have runs on the board that cannot be dismissed.

I think what I posted was not understood all that well. I tend to suspect, but readily admit I do not know this for a fact, that the relationship between the designs for the Shortfin Barracuda Attack-class conventional sub and the Suffren-class SSN is less similar than between a conventional ICE-powered automobile and an EV version of the same vehicle, US examples of this would be a standard Ford F-150 and an F-150 Lightning EV.

Yes, many of the submarine's systems like sonars, radar, torpedoe tubes, etc. will be the same, but much of the layout for things like wiring, piping, coolant and air distribution will need to be different. This is because one design has the diesel-electric engines, batteries, electric motors and fuel pumps, as well as all that diesel fuel. The other design has the weight of the reactor with the fuel and all the necessary shielding, plus all the needed cooling and circulation systems to avoid... problems, as well as also being able to use the reactor to generate power. No idea what the physical size or mass of a Suffren-class SSN reactor is, but I am inclined to believe that the mass is sufficiently high that the designers could not just swamp on a 1:1 basis in terms of mass or volume between a conventional diesel-electric configuration and a nuclear-powered configuration.

To put it another way, entire sections of internals for the two designs are almost certainly quite different, so that they are in reality two different classes rather than different variants of one overall class.

Side note: It appears that the RNLN has selected a version of the Shortfin Barracuda currently to be called the Orka-class which will replace the Walrus-class currently in service. Current specs of the Orka-class suggest it will be some 17 m shorter than the Suffren-class, as well as having a surfaced displacement which is some 1,400 tonnes less. To provide a little more context, that sort of displacement difference is nearly equal to the surfaced displacement of a Swedish Gotland-class sub.

What I am trying to get at is that it would not really be possible to 'transition' from conventional subs to a nuclear subs and expect there to be an advantage because the two designs might have had a common origin. The nuclear power reactor and all the needs it would have, as well as potential capabilities it would provide, would trigger a requirement for personnel to undergo training specifically to serve aboard SSN's, much like some RAN personnel are currently undergoing in USN and RN facilities and as part of their respective services.

 

[downunderblue]

If Canada had a defence orientated government in 2007, an Australian/Canadian/Brazilian collaboration for SSN would have been a thought with economic advantages albeit difficult.

So to mirror your logic/ point: "if SUPERMAN had a FLUFFY WHITE PUSSICAT in 2007, a SUPERCOALITION OF SUPERHEROS with CHEAP FLUFFY WHITE PUSSICATS could (albeit with difficulty) be had by ALL"

I say that in the knowledge that even Cher can't 'turn back time', and maybe we shouldn't worry as such. It is what it is. All we need to worry about is the now, and how we get us to a secure future.

Mind you, it does get thinking ... It's 2025. Does Cher herself possess a fluffy white pussy-cat, or is that dyed like everything else ...

;-)