Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Not everybody in DIO or ONA is involved in military strategic, tactical or technical type work; there’s a lot, probably the majority who spend their lives working on political, economic and social issues. And even if they are, in DIO at least they are about gathering information, not using it. That’s what the strategic and capability planners in Defence do, using the information supplied to them by intelligence agencies.
 
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SammyC

Well-Known Member
Interesting post. Forgot about AI.

There was a bit of a frustrating debate recently conducted by the Lowy Institute on basically whether Australian should reinforce a more forward and maritime focus or become an 'echidna' and focus on more a continental security focus. I messaged Jennifer Parker after the debate amazed how she kept her cool listening to the Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen (former DIO and ONA) sprout so much rubbish. Politely she didn't comment but for me, to spend less on the RAN and diminish the threat of trade or supply interdiction just seemed complete madness (and reckless) to me.

As a maritime nation we have to secure or be in a position to secure our trade routes. Sam Roggeveen dismissed the capability of the PLA-N to mess with our trade, as well as the impact that would have in a time of conflict.

Thinking out allowed, I can't see a PLA-N surface vessel in the time conflict making it pass the first island chain given both their focus within that area and their vulnerability to a range of air and seaborne threats.

What is evident for me is the subsurface threat of the PLA-N to interdict our trade/supply is significant, hard to stop and during a conflict quite ever present. We can't be everywhere and their SS/SSG and SSN assets are considerable and expanding. It wouldn't take much for a few bulk carriers or tankers to be sank or severely damaged either in port (smart mine or HWT) or 2,000+km from the mainland for foreign insured vessels to run very very shy of taking any AU job, moreso the limitations we have substituting domestically flagged ships to compensate. Imagine how the political dynamic would be internally if we're all rationing petroleum resources. Those beautiful F-35's are useless without fuel and it wouldn't take much for us to feel really really insecure.

With that said and I would ask for a sense check but question why we aren't (maybe we are- we won't know I guess) investing more some SOSUS like network. Jindalee gives us an aspect of operational awareness in theatre but without a networked and triangulated subservice equivalent, which could also complement Jindalee at times, aren't we a bit exposed to a subsurface threat?

Naturally Aukus Tier 1 will help when those boats are in service but that's some time away. The rotation force will be important but initially quite limited.

I do note there seems to some ASW focus within Aukus Tier 2 so I hope they are thinking about that and other ways to efficiently limit our exposure.

Below is the Lowy debate if anyone is interested. Maybe Sam and Andrew Wilkie's were joint partners in crime but I'd expect more from a career with DIO and ONA. Whilst I welcome debate and different viewpoints, some of these views imo are unapologeticly misinformed, semi defeatest and ignore the political and military reality of how exposed we are without a maritime, forward and US aligned defence strategy.

Thanks downunder for the Lowy Institute debate link. It was interesting to watch.

While I didn't align fully with Sam's view (not all sams think alike), I know a good portion of the Australian population does. So it is useful for it to be discussed and debated. For the record I though Jen articulated her perspective well.

One of Sam's views is that AUKUS is high risk and that the US cannot be trusted in the same way it could a decade or two ago. I think he is correct. We need to go into this with eyes wide open.

A second position he has is that if we have a capability then we will be expected to use it. Any SSNs that we own will inevitably be drawn into a regional conflict. I agree with him on this, but so will everything else we have in our military.

He would have a view that we are relying on America too heavily for our military systems, and this makes us vulnerable to coersion from them. I would agree, hence investments in other equipment like ceafar, and NSM. Likewise the Mogami provides a useful alternate technology partner, as do European and Korean armoured vehicles.

Sam supports the echidna mentality, which is the logic behind HIMARS, Tomahawks, JSM/NSM, sea mining and the like.

He also states that the balance generally favours the side trying to sink ships. Yes he is also correct, however Jen stated that well defended platforms (hence the higher end investments in them) are inherently survivable if employed well.
 
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