Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Bob53]

NSM is not 'just' an AShM, but can also be used as a LACM. Moreover, even if a ship were to launch a full volley of eight missiles at another warship, particularly one with advanced radar, CMS and area air and point defence missiles. Consider for a moment how many Type 55 DDG's (or perhaps CG's) the PLAN has in service, or will be getting brought into service. These vessels are supposed to be China's equivalent to the USN's Aegis-kitted Ticonderoga-class CG. It is distinctly possible that Australia might need to engage in volumes of fire to achieve a single hit, and even then, these are comparatively small missiles with a 120 kg warhead (RGM-84 Harpoon warhead is ~221kg, and RBS-15 is ~200kg, whilst RGM-109E is ~450 kg) this could potentially achieve a mission-kill, but IMO it would be unlikely to actually sink a vessel unless it was either rather small, or poorly crewed.

There are also numbers to consider. Allegedly, the RAN MFU numbers should grow to about 20 majors by the mid-2040's, with the Hunter-class build and SEA 3000 GPF. Now it will be years before the RAN gets up to 20 major warships in service, and even then, it would be very unlikely to actually have all 20 available or deployed on ops at the same time what with maintenance, training and other service cycle needs. However, if say a dozen were actually on or fit for deployment, that would mean Australia might have up to 120 NSM's embarked on various vessels across the fleet. If the total warstock is 'only' 250 NSM, that means effectively a single full reload per deployed or deployable vessel in the event of conflict. That could potentially mean Australia might quickly exhaust the supplies of ordnance in the event of a modern, major conflict.

Or look at this from another perspective. The US has built examples of the Harpoon family of missiles for decades and sold them to other countries around the globe. A defence reporting article from almost a decade ago (20 April 2015, archival link here) stated that the US had produced approximately 7,500 Block II Harpoons, which means that the number should be higher and possibly by quite a bit once all the other Harpoon versions are factored in. Now yes, the US has a significantly larger defence industrial base than Australia, as well as a much larger economy and annual defence budget, but Australia's number is a thirtieth of the US number. However, these sorts of numbers does enable the US to be a resupply source for other nations in the event of a conflict. If Australia keeps maintaining a comparatively small warstock, then it could easily end up with Australia depending on the US for a munitions resupply.

I’m not advocating for 250 missiles to be the cap for all the reasons you memtiined. My point was the OP mentioned only 250 missiles in an order be delivered by 2027…. even if we could fit 250 NSMs on Australian ships and fired 10 at every target…are we really likely to be facing a fleet of 25 ships VS the entire Australian surface fleet ( which is what would be required to get 250 NSM missiles to sea In 2027. The stocks will build over time to be far greater than 250…. but 250 NSM is a country mile ahead of what the RAN can hit a surface fleet with Currently.

 

[Pusser01]

Just out of interest, does anyone think it may an idea for the RAN to fit their MH-60R's to carry NSM to provide a different firing platform? Cheers.

 

[FormerDirtDart]

Just out of interest, does anyone think it may an idea for the RAN to fit their MH-60R's to carry NSM to provide a different firing platform? Cheers.

NSM is a containerized surface launched missile, this is the only way the NSM has been configured to be launched. I don't think anyone is going to invest a dime in redesigning the missile, or the module, to be carried on a helicopter pylon.



Image clipped from Kongsberg brochure

 

[swerve]

Kongsberg's publicity speaks of the NSM-AL - for Air Launched. Brochure mentions helicopters & UAVs as launch platforms.

NSM-AL

The brochure is from 2023.

 

[Todjaeger]

These are two separate arguments with respect to volumes of fires and sustainability of warstock. The inventory of warstock of Tomahawk we are acquiring is not worse than any other long ranged strike weapon we are acquiring and is substantially better than some (than JASSM-ER by a factor of 3x for example). Tomahawk is and will always remain an exquisite strike weapon that is not maintained in huge numbers by anyone. It has been used (too many times IMHO) lavishly by (primarily) US politicians who have been more than happy to be seen to throw lots at “problems” with little concern to cost (or even militarily effective outcomes I’d argue) so as to appear “strong” on an issue, while seemingly achieving little in reality. I'm not sure anyone else who ever deploys them is ever going to use them that way.

I agree few nations are maintaining sufficiently deep inventories of weapons, that has been a long term problem but we are one of the few at least that manufacture our own Mk.80 series bomb bodies, which make up the bulk of our strike weapon inventories. As a consequence I’d like to see Paveway and / more likely JDAM kits added to the GWEO enterprise, fairly rapidly to continue to properly address these concerns…

The arguments on volume and warstock sustainability are IMO all interrelated, as is the nature of the launching platform(s). The end goal of a successful strike is of course to neutralize the target, whatever that may be. Depending on the nature of the target, it's location and what defences (if any) might be encountered either around it or en route, will all play a role in dictating what ordnance is needed, or felt necessary for neutralization, as well as what launching platform(s) could/should be used, where the actual strike package launch should occur as well as what ingress and egress options are available and used.

Theoretically, a force could still be using Sopwith Camels dropping Mk 1 Cooper HE-Frag bombs against hostiles today and have that be a viable solution, depending on the threats faced and where such strikes needed to take place. More realistically though, targets Australia might want or need to engage are more likely to belong to modern adversaries that are near-peer or even overmatch Australia. This then triggers the need to either delaminate hostile defences, particularly vs. aerial threats, or have the ability to conduct penetrating strikes through those defences.

The need to be able to keep launching platforms out of the reach of the defences a target or target nation might have is what lead to the development of much of the standoff ordnance now in use. This in turn triggered the smarter mouse/better mousetrap cycles of development where the defences vs. aerial threats (as well as structure hardening and development/usage of decoys) improved and changes, to better enable the engagement and elimination of inbound standoff ordnance, since the launching platforms were often no longer viable targets due to range. This then triggered rounds of development to improve the strike ordnance to make it more accurate, as well as improve it's sig management to make it harder for the air defences to be able to detect and engage the inbound ordnance.

Now as I have mentioned before, the Tomahawk missile itself is a fairly old missile design, with initial production in the 1970's and entering US service in the early 1980's. Yes there have been numerous improvements to the design since it first entered service, AFAIK none of these improvements have (or really even could) made it more difficult to detect and engage/intercept inbound Tomahawk strike packages and we had reports of some Tomahawks getting intercepted by Iraqi air defences back in 2003. This potential for hostile intercept, plus the CEP limits as well as need to actually inflict damage on targets all at least in part plays a role in why the US might launch so many Tomahawks at various targets, to make sure that enough get through to have an impact. As for other Tomahawk users, AFAIK only the UK has ever fired Tomahawks from RN Swiftsure-class and Trafalgar-class SSN's against targets during Kosovo, against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003 and then in the Libya intervention in 2011. All of which were conflicts or interventions where the US also had a massive presence and strike involvement.

In fact, of the conflicts and interventions that NATO members and allies were involved in over the last 30 years, the only one I recall that did not have the US sustaining a massive strike effort was over Libya in 2011. As I recall it, France ended up being the lead nation which carried out the most strikes, whilst US forces were actively involved but mostly in supporting roles providing logistics, tanking and ISR. There are a few lessons that I draw from that particular intervention which involve ordnance usage and warstocks. The first is the potential rate of strike missions, with over 800 targets getting hit in a roughly two week period from the end of March until mid-April (and some ~6,500 missions of all types between 31 March and 1 August, 2011). Relating to that is that whilst European PGM's were initially being used with significant frequency, it turned out that what was available in the warstocks was not enough to sustain the mission sortie rates. Given that this was an intervention over Libya and not a direct conflict with a near-peer (or more capable) nation, nor were the NATO member-states involved facing major or even potentially existential threats to their own security, that does suggest to me that a 'real' major direct conflict would see munitions depleted at an even greater rate.

In some respects it might be worth trying to extrapolate what Ukrainian and Russian munitions usage is, though given the circumstances it might be difficult or impossible to determine given what is known and also unknown about the adversaries.

In the end, I suspect that if Australia were to get into a direct conflict (either alone or as part of a coalition) with another power, whilst it might initially resemble the 'Phoney War' for a little while, once actual combat ops commenced warstocks would rapidly start getting drawn upon faster than production could replace them. I would also anticipate that there would be a rather limited ability to continue production and assembly of modern PGM's if the conflict was a large scale and/or widespread one, as the global supply chain of rawmats, finished goods and components would likewise be disrupted. Hence my interest in Australia not only being able to contribute to it's own warstocks with domestic production, but also to have a large enough warstock in place so that Australia has some staying power in a fight. Like it or not, resupply from an overseas source particularly if during a global conflict, just might not be available.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I don't think anyone is going to invest a dime in redesigning the missile, or the module, to be carried on a helicopter pylon.

India was talking about this.

Which means it definately won't go anywhere. No one else will spend money when India might, and India defence procurement particularly for integration is entirely ponderous.

Indian Navy's First MH-60R Maritime Helicopter Takes Flight - Naval News

The U.S. Navy's Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) announced on Twitter that the Indian Navy's first MH-60R Maritime Helicopter conducted its initial flight.

www.navalnews.com

The Indian Navy MH-60R weapons package is expected to include Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile in its helicopter launched variant (known as NSM-HL).

So unless Australia does a parallel program, absolutely nothing will happen. India and Australia are probably the only navies interested in such capability.

 

[StingrayOZ]

A lot of the discussion seems to anticipate combat between PLAN and RAN (or in this case JMSDF) surface ships. While that is possible (and must be prepared for), it seems to miss the point that the primary adversaries for GP frigates in a peer level conflict will be submarines (because of the strenuous efforts of both sides to build the capability to create areas where they can deny access to surface ships). Broadly speaking, if a Mogami (or a future RAN GPF) needs to be competitive with a Type 054a then one, or the other, of them is in the wrong place. The peer threat for a Mogami is a PLAN submarine and it needs to be able to operate, (if needs be) on its own, against that threat. The same is true for whatever GPF is selected for the RAN. Sure it needs to contribute to strike and force protection too, but sinking ships in a major conflict will be a job for RAN submarines (not least because the targets will be in places within the first island chain that will be unacceptably dangerous for RAN surface ships).

The mogami have significant ASuW and ASW capability, bow sonar, torpedos, rear ramp, communication array to handle many UAV and UUVs.

A mogami isn't going to face off 1 on 1 with a Type 054a. That is never going to happen. Ever. In any sort of conflict this ships would be operating under air cover and or protection of more capable ships and in and against other threats including UAV's, UUV's, subs and ships.

But if we are talking about comparing fleet and systems capabilities between forces at some point you make approximations. 8 or 12 Mogamis would be something as a capability.

An up armed Arafura with a 40mm and 2 NSM, or 2 NSM on a cape class isn't approximate to anything. They would also have no ASW capability and extremely flawed unusable ASuW. Like nothing. They would also have no UAV or UUV capability. None. 500 of them would mean nothing.

 

[Pusser01]

India was talking about this.

Which means it definately won't go anywhere. No one else will spend money when India might, and India defence procurement particularly for integration is entirely ponderous.

Indian Navy's First MH-60R Maritime Helicopter Takes Flight - Naval News

The U.S. Navy's Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) announced on Twitter that the Indian Navy's first MH-60R Maritime Helicopter conducted its initial flight.

www.navalnews.com

So unless Australia does a parallel program, absolutely nothing will happen. India and Australia are probably the only navies interested in such capability.

I thought I had read somewhere that Japan were looking aswell, stuffed if I can find the site now though. Noting the USN used to have the Penguin fitted to their Seahawks, they may replace this with the NSM-AL to give a bit more punch above the Hellfire.

 

[StingrayOZ]

I thought I had read somewhere that Japan were looking aswell, stuffed if I can find the site now though. Noting the USN used to have the Penguin fitted to their Seahawks, they may replace this with the NSM-AL to give a bit more punch above the Hellfire.

The question is really is the Mh60R the ideal platform for that kind of integration?
Given its a single shot, from a manned, short range, low altitude platform, made even shorter ranged by hanging a giant missile off it. Can you target and fire it effectively from that platform. Maybe. Perhaps if there was a UAV to provide a better closer firing data to the launch.

In a big ocean, where you have a single combatant unexpectedly having to deal with something, maybe. But its pretty niche. You can fire the NSM from the ship, you can fire TLAM from the ship, fire LRASM from the ship, you can fire SM-6 in surface mode, from the ship. A smaller UAV/surface drone could help provide targeting data, as could sats. Where does a lone air shot of NSM really fit in?

If China has a extra long range stick, then yeh, maybe its required. I imagine its one of those its possible, but is a priority thing.

If you ask the USN, they would much rather JSM carried internally into the F35C, or something for the F-35B, or literally any other option. You might be better off integrating SPEAR3/stormbreaker with multiple launchers into the MH60R.

How much money do we want to spend to enable that capability? $200m? How often was firing Penguin from seahawks used? That was also a time when, smaller navies weren't networked, had much more limited situational awareness, helicopters were useful scouting platforms, and made sense to have the scout be able to fire something. I am not sure that model is quite the same these days.

Maybe everyone is focusing on getting NSM onto ships at this stage. Perhaps later, it becomes a cheaper and existing way to tap into existing stocks. I don't know if NSM fits into torpedo bunkers. If you have to start modifying ships, helicopters, missiles, this gets expensive.

 

[Salinger]

Regarding the Progress of the Projects of Stand-off Defense Capability

Japan Ministry of Defense

www.mod.go.jp

防衛省・自衛隊：備える

www.mod.go.jp

In addition, JMOD has been contracting for JSM (Joint Strike Missile; manufactured by Norwegian Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace Ltd.) since JFY 2018 and included the cost of procuring the missile (35,2B) in the JFY 2024 draft budget as well.

We are pleased to announce that the contract for JFY 2023 was concluded on Wednesday, October 18, 2023. The acquisition of missiles under this contract is scheduled for JFY 2026.

It's for the F-35A, and any anti-ship missiles we can buy, the JSDF.

 

[Armchair]

Now as I have mentioned before, the Tomahawk missile itself is a fairly old missile design, with initial production in the 1970's and entering US service in the early 1980's. Yes there have been numerous improvements to the design since it first entered service, AFAIK none of these improvements have (or really even could) made it more difficult to detect and engage/intercept inbound Tomahawk strike packages and we had reports of some Tomahawks getting intercepted by Iraqi air defences back in 2003.

Tomahawk is a component in a network of systems, to be used in battle against another system of systems. The ability of the defender to detect and intercept Tomahawks (or anything else) depends on the integrity of the defending network at the time the Tomahawk is launched.

One part of Tomahawk’s upgrade path has related to its retargeting ability (presumably others have related to protecting it from electronic warfare). In a major conflict it would be launched in concert with massive electronic warfare activity and after attacks by stealthy platforms on electronic emission sources. If the radars that can guide interceptors have been destroyed or neutralised then the Tomahawks would continue to their (now undefended) targets. If not, they would be redirected to lower value (less well defended) targets (perhaps drawing defending fighters further from their bases).

Neither the RAN nor the JMSDF (who decided to acquire the system at the same time) have all of the other components to make Tomahawk fully effective but their major ally does.

 

[Armchair]

A mogami isn't going to face off 1 on 1 with a Type 054a. That is never going to happen. Ever. In any sort of conflict this ships would be operating under air cover and or protection of more capable ships and in and against other threats including UAV's, UUV's, subs and ships.

I agree with the rest of your argument but this again seems to reflects the sentiment that I am trying to question. In a major Pacific conflict ships such as the Mogami (or ANZAC from RAN and RNZN but also vessels from South Korea, Canada and Chile) will, at times, be operating without air cover as they hunt subs and escort other ships to maintain SLOCs. So far as I can see from the surface fleet analysis that is the principal purpose of the GPF being rapidly acquired by the RAN.

Just as the areas inside the first island chain will be prohibitively dangerous for RAN surface vessels the same will be true for PLAN surface vessels (until Taiwan is secured). If ships are fighting ships it will be at very long range (USN DDGs flinging Tomahawks at staging or landing areas that PLAN ships seek to intercept).

If I could draw an analogy. One could describe a PLAN maritime patrol aircraft or ASW helicopter as competitive with a P-8 or MH-60R. Neither pair is going to face off against the other, however, because the actual targets for all of them (as with the Mogami and GPF) are submarines.

 

[ADMk2]

Tomahawk is a component in a network of systems, to be used in battle against another system of systems. The ability of the defender to detect and intercept Tomahawks (or anything else) depends on the integrity of the defending network at the time the Tomahawk is launched.

One part of Tomahawk’s upgrade path has related to its retargeting ability (presumably others have related to protecting it from electronic warfare). In a major conflict it would be launched in concert with massive electronic warfare activity and after attacks by stealthy platforms on electronic emission sources. If the radars that can guide interceptors have been destroyed or neutralised then the Tomahawks would continue to their (now undefended) targets. If not, they would be redirected to lower value (less well defended) targets (perhaps drawing defending fighters further from their bases).

Neither the RAN nor the JMSDF (who decided to acquire the system at the same time) have all of the other components to make Tomahawk fully effective but their major ally does.

The Tomahawk has benefitted from substantial EW capability enhancements in it’s various blocks as well as substantially improved navigation aids. Operational warshots have changed “colour” too.

That is about the extent of the public commentary we are ever going to get on the enhancements made to Tomahawk to improve it’s capability to penetrate air defence systems…

Despite it‘s age, USN is not slowing down purchases of it’s primary (conventional) long ranged strike weapon. I’d also caution people about drawing a line between design heritage and the allegedly capability of modern variants. The AIM-120D3 is a perfect example why.

x.com

x.com

 

[Todjaeger]

The Tomahawk has benefitted from substantial EW capability enhancements in it’s various blocks as well as substantially improved navigation aids. Operational warshots have changed “colour” too.

That is about the extent of the public commentary we are ever going to get on the enhancements made to Tomahawk to improve it’s capability to penetrate air defence systems…

Despite it‘s age, USN is not slowing down purchases of it’s primary (conventional) long ranged strike weapon. I’d also caution people about drawing a line between design heritage and the allegedly capability of modern variants. The AIM-120D3 is a perfect example why.

x.com

x.com

Except that the US, whilst the US has kept placing orders for new production (and some refurbishment of older models IIRC) Tomahawk missiles, it has not done so at a rate which keeps pace with usage over the last few years. Given the size of the US warstock, yes it will likely be around for some years yet, but since at least 2017 the warstock has been getting drawn down. AEI had an op-ed on the subject back in Feb, it can be found here. Right now it looks like the US has been purchasing replacement Tomahawks at a ratio of purchased vs. expended of 2:3.

Between the R&D being done to develop hypersonics, as well as the testing to develop ship-launched versions of JASSM and LRASM, as well as changes to both strategic threats and force posture, I do expect that the US is approaching if not already reached a decision to wind down Tomahawk. Such a decision would of course take years (or even a decade or two) to complete the execution of but IMO the writing is on the wall.

 

[Going Boeing]

Anduril keeps coming up with simpler, cost effective but capable solutions in comparison with the established companies, eg the Ghost Shark is simpler and cheaper to build than Boeing’s Orca but appears to be effective in the roles that the RAN envisages.

Now they have announced a range of Barracuda cruise missiles that don’t require specialised and expensive tools during construction (& maintenance) and they are modular which allows them to be configured for the intended use - this could be a game changer if the testing shows them to be effective.

At this stage, they haven’t installed the seeker avionics and there’s no information about how stealthy the missiles are but I’m sure that they will achieve their aim at the lowest possible cost.

Anduril

 

[SammyC]

https://www.baesystems.com/en-aus/article/270m-contract-to-boost-guided-weapon-component-production

Of note, this looks like the first indication of ramping up ESSM production. BAE received a $270m contract from the NATO consortium responsible for ESSM.

The last major ESSM components contract BAE had was back in 2022 and was for $40-80m over three years, so this looks like at least a trippling of their supply and a doubling of their workforce. One assumes the other global providers are also doing the same.

I should also call out that BAE coordinates about half a dozen Australian manufacturers under this contract, so it has a substantial local footprint.

Eventually this will roll out to an assembly factory expansion, and it will be interesting to see what Raytheon does with this.

 

[hauritz]

Anduril keeps coming up with simpler, cost effective but capable solutions in comparison with the established companies, eg the Ghost Shark is simpler and cheaper to build than Boeing’s Orca but appears to be effective in the roles that the RAN envisages.

Now they have announced a range of Barracuda cruise missiles that don’t require specialised and expensive tools during construction (& maintenance) and they are modular which allows them to be configured for the intended use - this could be a game changer if the testing shows them to be effective.

At this stage, they haven’t installed the seeker avionics and there’s no information about how stealthy the missiles are but I’m sure that they will achieve their aim at the lowest possible cost.

Anduril

Anduril are also building a manufacturing facility in Australia to handle its UUV production line. Hopefully it will be built along the lines of its proposed Arsenal-1 facility. In fact this article raises the possibilty of building an Arsenal-2 either in the US of in the territory of a US ally.

Anduril Unveils Arsenal-1 Factory And Bold Ambitions | Aviation Week Network

The company has a billion-dollar industrialization plan to “hyperscale” manufacturing of its diverse defense product portfolio.

aviationweek.com

 

[ADMk2]

The question is really is the Mh60R the ideal platform for that kind of integration?
Given its a single shot, from a manned, short range, low altitude platform, made even shorter ranged by hanging a giant missile off it. Can you target and fire it effectively from that platform. Maybe. Perhaps if there was a UAV to provide a better closer firing data to the launch.

In a big ocean, where you have a single combatant unexpectedly having to deal with something, maybe. But its pretty niche. You can fire the NSM from the ship, you can fire TLAM from the ship, fire LRASM from the ship, you can fire SM-6 in surface mode, from the ship. A smaller UAV/surface drone could help provide targeting data, as could sats. Where does a lone air shot of NSM really fit in?

If China has a extra long range stick, then yeh, maybe its required. I imagine its one of those its possible, but is a priority thing.

If you ask the USN, they would much rather JSM carried internally into the F35C, or something for the F-35B, or literally any other option. You might be better off integrating SPEAR3/stormbreaker with multiple launchers into the MH60R.

How much money do we want to spend to enable that capability? $200m? How often was firing Penguin from seahawks used? That was also a time when, smaller navies weren't networked, had much more limited situational awareness, helicopters were useful scouting platforms, and made sense to have the scout be able to fire something. I am not sure that model is quite the same these days.

Maybe everyone is focusing on getting NSM onto ships at this stage. Perhaps later, it becomes a cheaper and existing way to tap into existing stocks. I don't know if NSM fits into torpedo bunkers. If you have to start modifying ships, helicopters, missiles, this gets expensive.

One of the reasons Penguin wasn't continued in RAN service post the SH-2G debacle, was that ship-launched Harpoon Block II had a longer strike range than ship-carried helicopter-launched Penguin did... The juice therefore wasn't worth the squeeze.

Obviously NSM has a much better range than Penguin could ever manage, but it's also a much heavier missile and an MH-60R likely could only ever carry one of them per mission. Ship-launched NSM comes with a substantial booster motor, which the air-launched variant wouldn't have. Would this offset the additional range and altitude capability of the MH-60R as it did with Harpoon Block II? Quite possibly given NSM's reported "substantial" range improvement over Harpoon Block II...

Obviously with naval strike capability also coming in the form of surface strike mode in SM-6 and quite possible from Tomahawk as well, I'm not sure either RAN's best investment is in MH-60R / NSM, even if others were looking at it.

Adding JAGM would provide a nice and relatively straight forward range boost compared to MH-60R's current Hellfire missile capability and something like SPIKE NLOS would give greater range capability if it were absolutely required, something we might see soon in ADF service with AH-64E coming, so there may be some "joint" opportunities to leverage increased missile capability, without too much expenditure as it is?

 

[Pusser01]

Adding JAGM would provide a nice and relatively straight forward range boost compared to MH-60R's current Hellfire missile capability and something like SPIKE NLOS would give greater range capability if it were absolutely required, something we might see soon in ADF service with AH-64E coming, so there may be some "joint" opportunities to leverage increased missile capability, without too much expenditure as it is?

Just on a slight tangent, has there been any indication yet that the Army may get JAGM with their Apache purchase? Cheers.

 

[ADMk2]

Just on a slight tangent, has there been any indication yet that the Army make get JAGM with their Apache purchase? Cheers.

Not so far to my knowledge, but the UK has and the US Army (and USMC for AH-1Z) have as well so I expect we will be eying off a Hellfire supplement / replacement in the not too distant future.