Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
The Mogami has the same gas turbine (RR MT-30) as the Hunter class so that gives commonality in the supply & maintenance process. The diesel generators are different though.
Might depend on who/where the alternate naval construction were to take place. If the people in place in WA are either very solidly for, or very solidly against a particular side, and there is an alternative seat which might be swayed, particularly if a gov't or potential future gov't were to 'promise' to send billions first developing the appropriate infrastructure and then for the actual build, it might make more sense, at least from a political perspective.I don’t see how either major party would gain political advantage from promising to cancel ship building projects in WA (without replacement). Anything could happen with a change of government or minister but the changes would be after the election rather than as a vote winning tactic.
The current plans do seem to ignore the fact that the major population centres are around Sydney and Melbourne.Might depend on who/where the alternate naval construction were to take place. If the people in place in WA are either very solidly for, or very solidly against a particular side, and there is an alternative seat which might be swayed, particularly if a gov't or potential future gov't were to 'promise' to send billions first developing the appropriate infrastructure and then for the actual build, it might make more sense, at least from a political perspective.
From an economic sense, it might depend on just how much more it will cost (in time as well as funding) to get the infrastructure and work forces in WA up to where they need to be to actually engage in naval construction. Depending on the numbers, it might still end up being less expensive and/or faster to expand ASC's footprint and/or workforce.
As I have mentioned previously (and repeatedly) I do have significant reservations about Australia attempting to establish a second yard for warship production. I could easily foresee a scenario occurring where one of the ongoing projects gets cancelled and/or the yard gets closed due to either political or budgetary pressure (if not both), and then the resulting loss and wastage of all the time and resources which went into building the facility and establishing the skilled workforce.
The politics make the economics of the move from WA to SA irrelevant though. If there is not enough money, or the program fails, then any program may be cancelled but there is zero chance that a promised ship building program will be moved from a state with about 8 seats in play (including that of Hastie who will be hoping to either be the next Defence Minister or Opposition Leader) to one with about 2 seats in play (and where both states have ALP governments that have viable chances of winning another term). All of the politicians involved would be very familiar with the political ramifications for Tony Abbott of mooting off-shore builds of the promised Collins replacement.From an economic sense, it might depend on just how much more it will cost (in time as well as funding) to get the infrastructure and work forces in WA up to where they need to be to actually engage in naval construction. Depending on the numbers, it might still end up being less expensive and/or faster to expand ASC's footprint and/or workforce.
Depends.SA has its hands full with major surface combatants and submarines. WA has plenty of work building minor warships. Whether either state has the additional capacity to take on construction of 8 GPF and 6 LOCVs is questionable.
No. We need two major sites for construction. Our countries are big enough to support that. Single site has historically for everyone has been problematic, because its not generally sustainable (no matter how much work is given - the work force tends to implode due to age, lack of opportunity, a short period of bad management etc) and is itself a single point of failure.Can or should Canada or Australia depend on a single shipyard?
Two major yards are needed for refit work at least. Its a long slow trip to take a broken ship from Perth to Sydney.Can or should Canada or Australia depend on a single shipyard? Realistically Canada can’t support the RCN without facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and that includes actual ship construction IMO. I will leave it to our OZ colleagues to give their opinions. Two production shipyards for warships will require government support and it won’t be cheap. Losing all production for whatever reason will be hugely expensive and perhaps fatal.
Mogami is replacing the 2500 ton Abukuma, yes - but there are only six Abukuma. Six Mogami have already been commissioned, three are building, & three more are on order, & they're going to be followed by 10 or more enlarged & more heavily armed ones. Between them, those 22+ ships will also replace eight Asagiri class (5000 tons, 220 crew) & probably at least some of the nine Murasame (6000 tons, 165 crew).
- The Mogami isn't replacing the Kongo or/and Atago class. They really serve different functions, have different capabilities, have different weapons, have different load outs, different crew models, different systems, different everything.
- The Mogami is replacing a 2,500t frigate. A early 80s ship with a crew of ~120. (so this isn't a lean ship cut down of a bigger ship, its a small ship concept scaled up)
What about major hull construction in one yard, then fitting out in another one.Two major yards are needed for refit work at least. Its a long slow trip to take a broken ship from Perth to Sydney.
I think for shipbuilding WA is limited by population much more then a Victorian (Melbourne) or NSW (Newcastle, Sydney, Wollongong) yard, or even Adelaide.
A lot of the discussion seems to anticipate combat between PLAN and RAN (or in this case JMSDF) surface ships. While that is possible (and must be prepared for), it seems to miss the point that the primary adversaries for GP frigates in a peer level conflict will be submarines (because of the strenuous efforts of both sides to build the capability to create areas where they can deny access to surface ships). Broadly speaking, if a Mogami (or a future RAN GPF) needs to be competitive with a Type 054a then one, or the other, of them is in the wrong place. The peer threat for a Mogami is a PLAN submarine and it needs to be able to operate, (if needs be) on its own, against that threat. The same is true for whatever GPF is selected for the RAN. Sure it needs to contribute to strike and force protection too, but sinking ships in a major conflict will be a job for RAN submarines (not least because the targets will be in places within the first island chain that will be unacceptably dangerous for RAN surface ships).They aren't designed to confront a peer threat by themselves. Cancelling hunter/hobart replacements would make no sense. You might as well cancel both classes in that case.
- The Mogami is competitive against the Type054a frigate. (or the Russian Gorshkov)
There could be a few issues with an approach where you are building hulls in one place and finishing fitout in another (that was of course the approach we took with the LHD's). The major one I think of first is there is any sort of delay in processes for each yard be it supply chain for each aspect to the project. Some sort of industrial action for whatever reason. Some sort of act of God that stops work etc etc. If there is an issue at either yard the risk is the whole thing falling in a heap. At least for a period of time until the situation is rectified. That puts timelines for specific projects at a bigger risk adding a point of failure. I am not sure the efficiencies would be there either with an approach like that. Either way in an increasingly competitive world (and not in a cuddly Olympics kind of competitive way) efficiency and completing at scale is becoming more important.What about major hull construction in one yard, then fitting out in another one.
On this topic, there's an article mentioned way back in this forum on the Arab spring and I think in the first week the UK ran out of missiles used on it's ships and had to borrow from it's allies. That's an easy exampleI would have a view that we would use ammunition in a conflict way faster than people think.
My assessment of conflicts like Ukraine, indicates that peacetime ammunition production (where we are today) is about one- two orders of magnitude less than it needs to be. So when we think we need 10 missiles, we actually need 100-1,000.
So, in my view, an in country war stock of NSMs is more like 2,500 units, and a production rate that can be accelerated to around 1,000 per annum to keep up with consumption.
The UK has a grand total of 6 platforms capable of employing Tomahawk. They seem to find their capability effective…I myself tend to look at PGM usage data from the US as a guide, both in terms of rate of utilization/consumption in conflict, as well as relative effectiveness.
This is part of the reason why I question Australia getting Tomahawk, because apart from a fairly small warstock of strike missiles, Australia just does not have the platforms for the needed volumes of fire to be effective.
Now me being me, whilst more/greater warstock of NSM would be nice, I would rather Australia have more ESSM or SM-2/6, or equivalent. Better still would be domestic assembly and/or fabrication with enough orders getting placed regularly to maintain production as well as establish an effective warstock.
As an alternate to, or perhaps it might be thought of as an adjunct, would be for Australia to approach the US about establishing a joint munitions storage depot in Australia, where the US can safely and securely store some of their warstocks closer to potential conflict areas. The idea being it might be advantageous to the US if a CSG, MEU or naval TF needing munitions resupply does not have to head all the way back to a US base in Guam, Hawaii or US coast, or depend on a resupply vessel which is coming from one of those areas. Instead, they might be able to head to Australia for resupply, or there could be US munitions ships which can resupply in Australia.
UGM-109 and RGM-109, whilst both Tomahawks are still quite different in terms of strike applications, since the launching RN platform for UGM-109 is really not going to be 'seen' prior to launch.The UK has a grand total of 6 platforms capable of employing Tomahawk. They seem to find their capability effective…
We will have substantially more than that in time.
I think it is a common mistake that many make that the only militarily effective use of cruise missiles, is to employ them the same fashion US forces have done…
France, Russia, UK and arguably even Israel have done so with vastly lower volume of fires and seem to find such means, effective to achieve their missions.
These are two separate arguments with respect to volumes of fires and sustainability of warstock. The inventory of warstock of Tomahawk we are acquiring is not worse than any other long ranged strike weapon we are acquiring and is substantially better than some (than JASSM-ER by a factor of 3x for example). Tomahawk is and will always remain an exquisite strike weapon that is not maintained in huge numbers by anyone. It has been used (too many times IMHO) lavishly by (primarily) US politicians who have been more than happy to be seen to throw lots at “problems” with little concern to cost (or even militarily effective outcomes I’d argue) so as to appear “strong” on an issue, while seemingly achieving little in reality. I'm not sure anyone else who ever deploys them is ever going to use them that way.UGM-109 and RGM-109, whilst both Tomahawks are still quite different in terms of strike applications, since the launching RN platform for UGM-109 is really not going to be 'seen' prior to launch.
IMO Israel's strike situation is in some respects a bit different, in that I their area of interest (and concentration of intel resources) is going to be much shorter/closer and concentrated. Having said that though, Israel keeps a sizable warstock of ordnance and receives further ordnance deliveries from the US. I forget how many Israel has received since the 7 October 2023 attacks, but there have been several that I recall.
Lastly, I tend to disagree about assertions made regarding ordnance usage by various nations, particularly if/when those nations are engaged in large scale conflict. Israel during various conflicts, as well as NATO members involved in the 2011 intervention in/over Libya all used significant volumes of ordnance in relatively short periods of time, and again depended upon the US to replenish their respective warstocks so that they could continue strike missions over Libya. Here is a WaPo article published back in 2011 about the issue.
IMO people need to consider the number of strike and other combat sorties which they believe forces will be sent on, and what the sortie rate might be, and then figure from that how much ordnance would be needed to meet those mission needs. Again referring back to Libya in 2011, in less than a month of the NATO air campaign over Libya there were over 800 strike missions with only three flown by the US. Given that targets were hit on those missions, that would suggest over 800 pieces of ordnance (and possibly significantly more than that) were used. This all points to the potential reality that in actual sustained combat ops, ordnance expenditure could be significantly higher than believed/planned for.