Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Armchair]

I think it's critical that the RAN has an MCM capability that doesn't occupy a major surface combatant to utilise. If the PLAN were to offensively mine Australian territorial waters like the Bass Strait for example, as the Germans did both in 1914 and in 1940, it would be especially inconvenient to have to redirect even one or two frigates to the area in order to clear them.

The only practical benefit of going to war with a major trading partner is you don’t need to use explosives to stop merchant shipping and create economic harm (for both sides). Just cancel some contracts and declare some exclusion zones. If the PLAN is sending subs and/or surface mine layers to interrupt coastal shipping and stop communication between Melbourne and Devonport in such a perilous location (in ASW terms) as the Bass Strait they will have taken their eyes off the ball (Taiwan). Yes it would have the inconvenient effect of drawing RAN surface combatants away that you point to, but at what cost? Is that threat so pressing that it establishes it as a critical capability (matched against the other critical missing capabilities)?

The problem is In the locations further north where the PLAN would (in my view) be laying mines the threats posed by submarines, MPAs and shore based missiles overmatch minor warfare vessels (it is a version of the same problems that saw the USN seek to replace LCS with frigates, and actually the same problem that PLAN minelayers would have in trying to survive after laying mines in southern Australia).

 

[SammyC]

I think it's critical that the RAN has an MCM capability that doesn't occupy a major surface combatant to utilise. If the PLAN were to offensively mine Australian territorial waters like the Bass Strait for example, as the Germans did both in 1914 and in 1940, it would be especially inconvenient to have to redirect even one or two frigates to the area in order to clear them.

I suspect China would more likely mine our sea lanes through S E Asia. This would be far harder hitting than say Bass Strait. There is a statement in the recent 2024 national defence strategy that says a direct attack on Australia is unlikely, primarily because we can be brought to our knees much easier by cutting our international sea supplies.

Mining the Lombok or Sunda Straits (or their feeder paths such as a the Palawan Passage and Makassar Strait) for instance would impact about $100 billion in sea trade, much of it ours. These are also the main alternatives to the Malacca Straight, if that is ever shut off. Closing all three basically stops everything and makes supplying Singapore, S Korea, or the Philippines very difficult from outside the region.

Given nearly all of our petrol comes from Singapore, it would also mean we would all be on bicycles within a month.

If conflict comes, we will by necessity need to move our military, including Navy significantly northward to defend these sea lanes. It will be in regions that are under attack and in China's home ground advantage. Hence the need for ships, including MCD that can operate in this region.

Now all of this does not negate the need to have protection of our own coast, and our small ships, including the patrol boats and OPVs would be doing some heavy lifting. They will be busy. Some frigates will be needed locally as well to keep raiding parties away.

 

[devo99]

Yes it would have the inconvenient effect of drawing RAN surface combatants away that you point to, but at what cost? Is that threat so pressing that it establishes it as a critical capability (matched against the other critical missing capabilities)?

I would say it's important enough to not be stuck with harbours blocked by mines and no ships around to clear them to warrant at least some level of investment in a solution. That could come in manned or unmanned form but should be deployable from the harbours themselves.

The problem is In the locations further north where the PLAN would (in my view) be laying mines the threats posed by submarines, MPAs and shore based missiles overmatch minor warfare vessels (it is a version of the same problems that saw the USN seek to replace LCS with frigates, and actually the same problem that PLAN minelayers would have in trying to survive after laying mines in southern Australia).

"replace LCS with frigates" is quite a mischaracterisation here since the Constellation-class frigates are only intended to fulfil some of the many roles which the USN continues to use the LCS for. Notably the LCS are appreciated for their MCM capabilities which are yet to be seen on the frigates.

 

[devo99]

I suspect China would more likely mine our sea lanes through S E Asia. This would be far harder hitting than say Bass Strait. There is a statement in the recent 2024 national defence strategy that says a direct attack on Australia is unlikely, primarily because we can be brought to our knees much easier by cutting our international sea supplies.

Mining the Lombok or Sunda Straits (or their feeder paths such as a the Palawan Passage and Makassar Strait) for instance would impact about $100 billion in sea trade, much of it ours. These are also the main alternatives to the Malacca Straight, if that is ever shut off. Closing all three basically stops everything and makes supplying Singapore, S Korea, or the Philippines very difficult from outside the region.

Given nearly all of our petrol comes from Singapore, it would also mean we would all be on bicycles within a month.

If conflict comes, we will by necessity need to move our military, including Navy significantly northward to defend these sea lanes. It will be in regions that are under attack and in China's home ground advantage. Hence the need for ships, including MCD that can operate in this region.

Now all of this does not negate the need to have protection of our own coast, and our small ships, including the patrol boats and OPVs would be doing some heavy lifting. They will be busy, but are going to be operating in more safer waters (in general).

I agree with this but I don't think it's necessarily a matter of either-or and definitely not something that we can afford to leave to assumptions.

 

[devo99]

I should admit that I haven't fully thought through this topic myself yet but as I've recently bought and started reading through Jack Loney's The Sea War In Bass Strait it's been on my mind so I've brought it here to see where it goes under peer scrutiny. I'll be at the Goldrick Seminar in Canberra in a couple weeks and with the topic being "The importance of the maritime domain to Australia’s economic wellbeing and national security" I want to refine my thoughts on related topics beforehand.

 

[SammyC]

I should admit that I haven't fully thought through this topic myself yet but as I've recently bought and started reading through Jack Loney's The Sea War In Bass Strait it's been on my mind so I've brought it here to see where it goes under peer scrutiny.

You got me thinking devo. The below Wiki page lists the vessels sunk in Australian waters during WW2. There was more than I had thought.
List of ships sunk by Axis warships in Australian waters - Wikipedia

53 ships were sunk from 54 Axis raiders (surface ships and submarines). The two in Bass Strait you referred to devo are on the list, as is of course Sydney and Kuttabul. Over 1,700 sailors died as a result of these sinkings.

Sombre read.

 

[downunderblue]

I found an interesting 2023 article ADF will need fast minelayers for its new ‘smart’ mines | The Strategist from a former RAN Cmdr involved in MCM/Minelaying.

What I didnt consider (oddly) were the defensive opportunities of minelaying around key Australian ports. I'm not sure as to how effective this would be, but its clear there are many tactical opportunities/ threats in this space.

I noticed in my google searches that the ADF just recently (2024) ordered up to AUD $1B on an unspecified qty of RWM Italia Murena or Asteria multi-influence sea mines through the GWEO Enterprise. This is another Rheinmetal contract. The mines can be used in many scenarios, but its fair to say that any vessel hit under the waterline with 600kg of military grade explosives will likely regret it. Talk about having a bad day.

 

[devo99]

I noticed in my google searches that the ADF just recently (2024) ordered up to AUD $1B on an unspecified qty of RWM Italia Murena or Asteria multi-influence sea mines through the GWEO Enterprise. This is another Rheinmetal contract. The mines can be used in many scenarios, but it's fair to say that any vessel hit under the waterline with 600kg of military grade explosives will likely regret it. Talk about having a bad day.

Just over twice the explosive mass that was in the Mk48 they sank ex-HMAS Torrens with.

 

[swerve]

I think it's critical that the RAN has an MCM capability that doesn't occupy a major surface combatant to utilise. If the PLAN were to offensively mine Australian territorial waters like the Bass Strait for example, as the Germans did both in 1914 and in 1940, it would be especially inconvenient to have to redirect even one or two frigates to the area in order to clear them.

Japan may be interested in frigates with MCM kit because many of the places that might be mined could have shooting going on, e.g. the straits between the Ryukyu islands.

 

[Maranoa]

I think it is much smarter to use clandestine mine layers than commissioned warships which are easily tracked even from open source satellite imagery releases. Remember the captured Iraqi minelayers from Op Falconer? Old rusty garbage scows that were allowed to tool around the Coalition task force for weeks prior to an RAN VBSS which found a lot of mines already laid on their hidden mine rails.

 

[downunderblue]

When thinking strategically there seems to be very different parameters when assessing threats/opportunities when it comes from mine counter measure operations vs minelaying.

When I initially think of minelaying I think of it in an offensive capacity where defensive is also a really important to counter.

I wonder if laying defensive minefields is less relevant though with the proliferation of sub launched stand of weapons? To interdict trade or a port you don't need to get as close now, thus the defensive minefield may be less relevant??

Smart accoustic mines make a lot of sense to me. Imagine being able to program a mine to the accoustic signature of a Song or Ming class SS, and then quietly lay them across maritime checkpoints surrounding the PRC. We all know the threat of those subs, but in doing so you contain/ limit the ability of the PLA-N to breach the SCS/ East China Sea?

I've heard of the first island chain, but maybe the PLA-N can be limited to operating in the first mine chain instead?

The same though goes for the SCS and Straight of Taiwan. The ability of Indopacom to operate in these theatres can also be restricted with such mines, thus meaning the interdiction of a PLA-N amphib invasion fleet may be more reliant on air or land based missile strikes? Will Indopacom be able to sortie enough airpower to meet this threat, considering they may be restricted in their deployment of the Virginia's as well as likely having Kadena and Anderson cratered when that invasion fleet starts to leave port?

I assume much of the planning to interdict this fleet goes to the use of the silent service. Do accoustic mines negate or limit this plan's effectiveness? Maybe we need to advance the use of the mothership concept of a large SSN operating a range of USV's at distance?

I'm sure all sides have well prepared plans and counter plans etc, and in conflict those plans are likely quickly thrown out the window when developments in war fighting and technology supercede them, but the effectiveness and lethality of relatively cheap and mass produced mines (and those with tech improvements) don't seem to be going away at all. Now is a good time to ensure we are properly prepared to protect ourselves as well as exploit opportunities in this field should a potential peer to peer conflict occur.

 

[Todjaeger]

I wonder if laying defensive minefields is less relevant though with the proliferation of sub launched stand of weapons? To interdict trade or a port you don't need to get as close now, thus the defensive minefield may be less relevant??

I would argue that the potential value of defensive minefields is still quite relevant, since it would not done to prevent the interdiction of trade. Rather it would be to control or deny the access hostile forces have to a waterway or SLOC. Now sure, using AShM a hostile force could threaten or close access to a port or SLOC, but imagine if the hostiles instead wanted or needed to land and take/hold the port, so that they have an area to conduct further ops from. In order for the hostiles to do so, they would likely need to land not only the forces necessary to take and then hold the location, but there would likely be a significant logistical train which would then need to be brought in to sustain the holding force as well as to enable the support and further ops elsewhere. Having not only the assault ships and escorts need to transit a minefield, but then have mines lurking which could damage or destroy logistics vessels carrying needed war material and/or fuels would add another layer of complexity to any A2/AD ops.

 

[Armchair]

When thinking strategically there seems to be very different parameters when assessing threats/opportunities when it comes from mine counter measure operations vs minelaying.

When I initially think of minelaying I think of it in an offensive capacity where defensive is also a really important to counter.

I wonder if laying defensive minefields is less relevant though with the proliferation of sub launched stand of weapons? To interdict trade or a port you don't need to get as close now, thus the defensive minefield may be less relevant??

Smart accoustic mines make a lot of sense to me. Imagine being able to program a mine to the accoustic signature of a Song or Ming class SS, and then quietly lay them across maritime checkpoints surrounding the PRC. We all know the threat of those subs, but in doing so you contain/ limit the ability of the PLA-N to breach the SCS/ East China Sea?

I've heard of the first island chain, but maybe the PLA-N can be limited to operating in the first mine chain instead?

The same though goes for the SCS and Straight of Taiwan. The ability of Indopacom to operate in these theatres can also be restricted with such mines, thus meaning the interdiction of a PLA-N amphib invasion fleet may be more reliant on air or land based missile strikes? Will Indopacom be able to sortie enough airpower to meet this threat, considering they may be restricted in their deployment of the Virginia's as well as likely having Kadena and Anderson cratered when that invasion fleet starts to leave port?

I assume much of the planning to interdict this fleet goes to the use of the silent service. Do accoustic mines negate or limit this plan's effectiveness? Maybe we need to advance the use of the mothership concept of a large SSN operating a range of USV's at distance?

I'm sure all sides have well prepared plans and counter plans etc, and in conflict those plans are likely quickly thrown out the window when developments in war fighting and technology supercede them, but the effectiveness and lethality of relatively cheap and mass produced mines (and those with tech improvements) don't seem to be going away at all. Now is a good time to ensure we are properly prepared to protect ourselves as well as exploit opportunities in this field should a potential peer to peer conflict occur.

The corner stone of the Australian national defence project Is acquiring Virginia SSNs ( at breakneck speed). In order to deter conflict in the 2030s Australia has to hope that Virginias will continue to be capable of evading mines and holding targets at risk within the first island chain (almost certainly assisted by USVs as you say) for a very long time (the third RAN Virginia is scheduled to be a new build in the 2030s). I suspect that the pace of Virginia procurement, sea mines and Tomahawk for DDGs (and hypersonics for RAAF) all partly emanate from increasing doubts about the survivability of Collins class subs in high threat environments, and looking for new ways to be militarily relevant in a great power conflict. In my view that (along with sub hunting and joint deployments outside the first island chain) is the main game for the RAN.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Mining the Lombok or Sunda Straits (or their feeder paths such as a the Palawan Passage and Makassar Strait) for instance would impact about $100 billion in sea trade, much of it ours. These are also the main alternatives to the Malacca Straight, if that is ever shut off. Closing all three basically stops everything and makes supplying Singapore, S Korea, or the Philippines very difficult from outside the region.

Yes. I have done some work on logistics in this region and if anything, you are understating the value of sea trade through the Indonesian straits. Total world sea trade is worth far more - over $14 trillion US in 2019. Of that, 30% (i.e of the whole world’s maritime activity) travelled through the Straits of Malacca, including 2/3 of the world’s LNG and 1/3 of the oil. Add in the other large volumes through the Sunda, Lombok, and Torres straits, and you see that 1/3 of all maritime trade by value goes through Indonesian straits. see

https://ijpsat.org/index.php/ijpsat/article/download/5171/3224

Australia’s share of this is actually small in world terms, less than 10% (we are only 2% of world GDP). Yet that trade is critical to our economy, generating most of our export income.

All that being said, an effective mine blockade and/or submarine/torpedo campaign in the Indonesian archipelago could cripple the Chinese economy. So IMO it is absolutely a defence capability that could be one of Australia’s greatest strengths in a conflict.

If you look closely at the geography, this is why the US and Japan have pursued the “island chain” strategy to contain the Chinese navy. In the whole First Island Chain from Korea, via Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo to the Malay peninsula, there is not s single sea channel wider than 200km. The only true deepwater channel is in the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and that is about 170km wide plus there are islands in it. So the potential to bottle up the PLAN using mines and subs is very real.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-builds-an-island-wall-to-counter-chinas-intensifying-military-territorial-incursions/2019/08/20/802bc282-ae11-11e9-9411-a608f9d0c2d3_story.html

See also

Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the Pacific “Island Chains” | Andrew S. Erickson

By comparison, the GIUK gap defended by NATO navies against the Soviet navy in the cold war is far wider - about 500km.

 

[Bob53]

Could this be an LOSV option for the RAN?

New Dutch Navy Support Vessels Will Be Missile-Toting Wingmen To Frigates

Small and with a tiny crew, the new support vessels will add important magazine capacity to frigates, and launch loitering munitions. Small and with a tiny crew, the new support vessels will add important magazine capacity to frigates, and launch loitering munitions.

www.twz.com

 

[Going Boeing]

The US is in the process of restoring WW2 era airfields on some Pacific islands so that, in event of a conflict, they can disperse their assets. It would be interesting to see if port facilities adjacent to these airfields are also being upgraded as the need to quickly reload warships will be vital.

Tinian

Tinian 2

Peleliu

 

[76mmGuns]

Could this be an LOSV option for the RAN?

New Dutch Navy Support Vessels Will Be Missile-Toting Wingmen To Frigates

Small and with a tiny crew, the new support vessels will add important magazine capacity to frigates, and launch loitering munitions. Small and with a tiny crew, the new support vessels will add important magazine capacity to frigates, and launch loitering munitions.

www.twz.com

Mostly seems like an Arafura but the helo deck covered in containerised missiles. Given it'll have no real OPV functions, if the Arafura's were used similarly, you wouldn't need 40-60 crew either, since no boarding actions or patrolling is warranted, so I can see how they said only 8 sailors will be on board. Wonder if the Arafura helo deck could handle that much weight as it stands .

But without any Aussie announcements on this, I'll stop my ruminations here

 

[Armchair]

Mostly seems like an Arafura but the helo deck covered in containerised missiles. Given it'll have no real OPV functions, if the Arafura's were used similarly, you wouldn't need 40-60 crew either, since no boarding actions or patrolling is warranted, so I can see how they said only 8 sailors will be on board. Wonder if the Arafura helo deck could handle that much weight as it stands .

But without any Aussie announcements on this, I'll stop my ruminations here

The thin Australian announcements (for vessels in the 2030s) are for a program with the USN and that is focused on providing a long range strike magazine (likely to be Tomahawk) with an indication of 32 VLS cells Put simply, the surface fleet analysis would have considered changing the design of Hunter (or cancelling it) to increase magazine capacity. They instead decided on adding LOCSVs to supplement the small magazines of the ( reduced in number) Hunter and Hobart class and set a date for the Hobart replacement.
From the article the Dutch vessel is to address air defence magazine problems rather than long range strike. I imagine if you were building a vessel to launch 32 Tomahawks you would want those launchers in the hull of a larger vessel than the Dutch plan (rather than in containers on the deck).

Again from the article it looks like the Dutch vessel is intended to address a very specific problem (limitations of the Dutch frigates fire control systems) that (hopefully) is not relevant to the RAN.

 

[hauritz]

The thin Australian announcements (for vessels in the 2030s) are for a program with the USN and that is focused on providing a long range strike magazine (likely to be Tomahawk) with an indication of 32 VLS cells Put simply, the surface fleet analysis would have considered changing the design of Hunter (or cancelling it) to increase magazine capacity. They instead decided on adding LOCSVs to supplement the small magazines of the ( reduced in number) Hunter and Hobart class and set a date for the Hobart replacement.
From the article the Dutch vessel is to address air defence magazine problems rather than long range strike. I imagine if you were building a vessel to launch 32 Tomahawks you would want those launchers in the hull of a larger vessel than the Dutch plan (rather than in containers on the deck).

Again from the article it looks like the Dutch vessel is intended to address a very specific problem (limitations of the Dutch frigates fire control systems) that (hopefully) is not relevant to the RAN.

It should also be noted that Austal is conducting trials with a modified Armidale.

Austal Australia completes sea trials for Royal Australian Navy's Patrol Boat Autonomy Trial

MEDIA RELEASE 23 APRIL 2024 Austal Australia completes sea trials for Royal Australian Navy's Patrol Boat Autonomy Trial In a noteworthy development within the Australian maritime sector, the collaborative Patrol Boat Autonomy Trial (PBAT) project has successfully completed Sea Acceptance Trials...

www.austal.com

In fact Austal is promoting a whole range of Autonomous options.

https://www.austal.com/sites/default/files/data-sheet/Autonomous-AUSTAL%20brochure-4.25.19.pdf

Like them or loath them Austal are probably in the box seat as far as building these sorts of vessels for the navy.

 

[Going Boeing]

This article from Naval News shows that Hanwha is putting a lot of effort into winning the GPF contract. Fitting CEA radars makes them more attractive for RAN use. The radars are quite elevated thus having good detection range of sea skimming missiles and small attack craft.