Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Armchair

Active Member
One needs to remember that the ADF should have other options for the delivery of a land attack capability, depending on what the target is and where it is located. With the right RAAF aircraft and PGM's, an aerial strike package could potentially be launched at targets in the Sulu Sea from Darwin without needing in-flight refueling. Add in in-flight refueling and that strike distance can get extended quite a bit further. If a system like Rapid Dragon were adopted, particularly for the C-17, then Hainan could potentially be targeted by aircraft operating from Darwin.

The above is part of the reason why I mentioned in another post about the need to consider the what a warfighting system needs or can do, rather than focusing on what a specific or individual platform can do.
A Hobart is a platform with systems. It can protect itself and other ships from missiles and air (ESSM and SM-2], detect and engage submarines (with helicopter and torpedoes) it can detect and engage other ships (with Harpoon) and it can attack land now (with Harpoon). It is planned to operate in a task force possibly without the support of air cover. What’s not to like (if it needs to go to war now)? It only has 48 VLS cells, old Aegis (no BMD) no long range SAM, it only has 8 (old small short range) missiles for surface and land attack, but (on paper) it is still vastly more capable than the ships it replaced and equal to, or much better than, the ANZACs at nearly everything a warship can be expected to do. How can you improve the existing platform before planned refit? One way is to increase the very limited land attack capability.

The system ordered for the RAN is Tomahawk. That will increase the RAN land attack range by a factor of about 10 and the possible magazine size of land attack missiles by a factor of 6 (5 ish if you count the 8 harpoons or 4ish if you preserve 16 cells for air defence) The warheads of the ordered missiles is double that of Harpoon.

We don’t know the mission the capability is required for or how many Tomahawks would be carried. There are good political and domestic reasons for that (outside scope of thread) but we can take your two missions. 1. Attack well defended targets in mainland Asia and 2. attack targets within 2000 km of RAAF bases.

I assume in both cases the mission is in concert with allies (otherwise it would be suicidal and does not merit further consideration).

Take the mainland Asian target first. Your suggestion, if I understand correctly, is to use one of 8 c-17s with (not ordered Rapid Dragon) to attack it. I like Rapid Dragon (for other missions) but I don’t think any surviving C-17 would get to fly close enough to launch those missiles until many days after other weapons had attacked that target extensively. Until it does launch the RAAF has to preserve that asset and its escorts, bases and refuelling aircraft. if C-17s in continental Australia are a credible threat then they will be targeted (and the minimal planned Australian air defences will have plenty of other targets to protect).

Hobart does have a theoretical capability to defend itself against cruise missiles, aircraft and submarines and can stay at sea for weeks. It can theoretically be defended by allies against ballistic missiles (which may themselves have targeting difficulties - nobody knows who comes out better from the cyber and satellite war). Hobart might be expected to rotate into the Tomahawk firing line with lots of other Aegis equipped ships from various nations. The US is building more Burkes, buying and updating Tomahawks, but no more C-17s. Sounds like B2(1), other stuff, then lots of Tomahawk for that target from their end. I am not advocating that mission for Australia but I am saying Tomahawk equipped Hobart is the only choice if that is the mission (Australia has rejected pursuing B21).

For the mission within 2000km of airbases I agree with you that Australia should have options. If one of the options is to launch missiles from a ship (that can also protect itself and perhaps in some circs protect the airbase) under RAAF air cover without risking RAAF aircrew (including refuellers) then that option is appealing to me (I have an open mind about the arguments around observability and targeting).
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Yes there was the recent ANAO audit that questioned the selection process and the value for money, but what was it looking at, how was this determination made?

I've been through audits like this before and a lot of it is looking at the project, not the technical side. They don't have access to detailed performance data, and if they do they can't comment on it. It's does the project have the documentation the process says it should have, has the project followed the process it's contacted to follow.

Volk, as I'm sure you know, most of the time they don't even understand the technical and performance specs of a project. While the senior auditors have some grasp, at least, of such things the junior people who do most of the grunt work are normally pretty well straight out of university and have no more idea of how a warship functions and what its specs mean than would a kitten; and that's despite Defence going to some lengths to try to educate them. All they can do is examine process and compare achievement against schedule and budget, and (sometimes) make judgements on how and why procurement and other programmatic decisions were made. And sometimes, regrettably, they seem to take advice from alleged pundits who in reality know little more than they do.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Type 45's WR-21 engine was a US-UK joint project, IIRC with US design leadership until the USA dropped it. By then the UK was committed to it & carried on. The gas turbine was from Rolls-Royce, & the fancy bits to boost efficiency were US-designed & made. They're the bits which have been problematic, AFAIK. The British mistake was in not recognising their failings & adapting WR-21. By all accounts it's extremely good most of the time, but IIRC can fail in a narrow set of conditions where the American efficiency boosters cut out & take everything else down. Solution being implemented.

I watched the hearings about the T45 engine issues several years ago. The NG efficiency boosters were the problem. IIRC this was identified and a redesign was implemented and tested. For some reason the test duration for the new design wasn't tested long enough so the failures didn't occur
 

swerve

Super Moderator
If the module designers did actually start with StanFlex modules as a base, and not just the concepts behind StanFlex, then they probably should be taken out back behind a shed and slapped about the head and neck with a blivet.
I think they started with the idea. Then threw it away & did something totally different & unworkable.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
I think they started with the idea. Then threw it away & did something totally different & unworkable.
If this was the case, then it sounds like a cultural stew of arrogance and ego, with perhaps just a little stupidity added into the pot.

Why take something that is in service and works and modify or build off that, when one can come up with something which attempts to replicate the successes of others, yet proves essentially unworkable as originally intended, whilst being IIRC both over weight/displacement and over budget, as well as much less flexible?

Come to think of it, the reasoning was probably the same as why two classes of ocean-going speedboats were developed and purchased with the belief that they would be used in littoral areas against hostile patrol boats, many of which could likely outfight the LCS.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Volk, as I'm sure you know, most of the time they don't even understand the technical and performance specs of a project. While the senior auditors have some grasp, at least, of such things the junior people who do most of the grunt work are normally pretty well straight out of university and have no more idea of how a warship functions and what its specs mean than would a kitten; and that's despite Defence going to some lengths to try to educate them. All they can do is examine process and compare achievement against schedule and budget, and (sometimes) make judgements on how and why procurement and other programmatic decisions were made. And sometimes, regrettably, they seem to take advice from alleged pundits who in reality know little more than they do.
Yes I know exactly what you a referring to.

Sadly when you look at the resumes or LinkedIn profiles of some of the senior autitors and governance people, it is clear that have a disturbing lack of technical acumen. Same applies to many PMs and Contracts people (I would take an experienced Warfare Officer, or even a pilot over the many non technical people in those fields, who have no idea what the gear does, let alone how it works).

Over the years, due to my experience in auditing and governance I have been drawn into preparing for and or responding to audits. The amount of selfevident material that is completely missinterpreted or ignored is mind boggling. I often think my school aged kids would ask better questions and develop a higher level of understanding than many of these so called professionals.

What is truely terrifying is the internal , governance, risk and quality managers (among others) who really have no idea what we are doing or why we are doing it.

The worst part is they actively resist knowledgeable and experienced people joining their teams and disrupting their chosen, illinformed, narratives.
 
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StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Just me being a pedant but…ASROC doesn’t have a hit rate, it’s simply the torpedo delivery system, the success depends on the torpedo capability and the bathymetric conditions.
Latest ASROC is guided, as was IKARA, so provided the sonar contact is maintained (most commonly by rotary winged ASW) there’s a fair chance of success.
TLAM is also just a warhead delivery system. But a ship can probably obtain successful land strike capability with just a few TLAM hitting prepared coordinates, which would be sufficient for our region. Particularly as a deterrent.

I'm not sure ASROC provides true ASW capability just by itself. It is just a pay load delivery system, the sensors are on the ship and the torpedo. Which typically you would be firing at contacts, not absolutely identified stationary undefended targets.

I am not sure where Landstrike should be completely ditched to just add a portion of niche ASW capability. I am not sure increasing the load of VLS filled with ASROC improves that mission success either. Does going from 2 ASROC to 16 ASROC launched mk56 torpedos now mean the combatant can take out 8 times the number of submarines? Or is 8 times better at taking out submarines? Surely the law of

I'm not sure ASROC is the ideal way to prosecute hostile nuclear subs. AFAIK the concept is more about conventional subs in a choke point. I'm not sure.

They are valid questions and points. And threats are changing. Before we only worried about manned subs. large unmanned underwater drones may bring systems like ASROC to the forefront.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
TLAM is also just a warhead delivery system. But a ship can probably obtain successful land strike capability with just a few TLAM hitting prepared coordinates, which would be sufficient for our region. Particularly as a deterrent.
Agreed that TLAM and for that matter, any standoff PGM is really just a way to deliver a warhead to a target. The part I suspect Australia would be likely to struggle with is target detection and identification at range. Fixed infrastructure could likely be targeted using OSINT, but targeting systems a hostile force might bring into a theatre of conflict I suspect would grow increasing difficult as the range increases. That or Australia would need assets (SF, ASIS, or something else) in place with eyes on targets and access to comms to relay targeting data. I am less sanguine about the likelihood of a few PGM's being successful in neutralizing a target for any length of time, or outright destroying it. In terms of conventional explosive effect, a RGM-109E is roughly equivalent to a Mk 83 1,000 lb. bomb so it can certainly do damage but might be hard pressed to disable or destroy a facility unless employed in numbers and as has been observed, even then facilities can potentially be brought back online within a day or less.

I'm not sure ASROC provides true ASW capability just by itself. It is just a pay load delivery system, the sensors are on the ship and the torpedo. Which typically you would be firing at contacts, not absolutely identified stationary undefended targets.

I am not sure where Landstrike should be completely ditched to just add a portion of niche ASW capability. I am not sure increasing the load of VLS filled with ASROC improves that mission success either. Does going from 2 ASROC to 16 ASROC launched mk56 torpedos now mean the combatant can take out 8 times the number of submarines? Or is 8 times better at taking out submarines? Surely the law of

I'm not sure ASROC is the ideal way to prosecute hostile nuclear subs. AFAIK the concept is more about conventional subs in a choke point. I'm not sure.

They are valid questions and points. And threats are changing. Before we only worried about manned subs. large unmanned underwater drones may bring systems like ASROC to the forefront.
Whenever possible, ASW ops are going to involve a number of different assets trying to locate a possible sub. In a best case scenario, the sensors in use would be across multiple ships, naval helicopters, and potentially several deployed sonobuoy networks all working together. Where VL-ASROC might have a place is that it can enable a surface ship to launch LWT's at targets up to ~3x as far from the ship as the LWT's launched from the Mk 32 launchers can reach. This could provide a surface vessel with a potential sub engagement range of ~30 km vs. the current ~10 km and the targeting data might not even come from the launching ship, but could be provided by an orbiting MPA or naval helicopter, or even another surface vessel.

Questions on missile load outs would of course need to be asked and answers considered, particularly given the limited number of VLS cells in service across the RAN. At first glance, my personal suspicion is that until the Hunter-class FFG begins to enter RAN service, the RAN would be better off filling the Hobart-class DDG VLS cells with SM-2 and quad-packed ESSM, and the ANZAC-class VLS cells with quad-packed ESSM. Not quite sure what the 'best' ratio for the DDG should be, perhaps 32 SM-2 and 16 VLS cells fitted with a total of 64 ESSM, or maybe 40 SM-2 and 32 ESSM. From memory, the practice for air defense missile interceptions would be to launch two missiles at inbounds to bolster the likelihood of a successful intercept. If accurate, then a Hobart-class loadout would be enough for 16 inbounds to be targeted at SM-2 ranges (somewhere between ~70km and 370 km depending on which version of SM-2) and up to 32 intercepts by ESSM from 1 km to ~50 km away. Should more inbounds come in before the DDG can make a port call and get reloaded, it would be distinctly possible that the VLS might be empty.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Now to really put the fox in the hen house.


And yes, it lacks a medium calibre gun.

I do wonder how hard it would be to fit a 57 or 76mm if required.
Interesting
HMS Broadsword was the first in a class of vessel adopting the predominantly missile fit out in the late 70's.
A little conflict somewhere in the southern Atlantic was the reminder that a main gun of whatever size is a handy thing to have.
Batch 3 of the Broadsword class had grown to over 5000t and had gained a main gun.

Something to consider.


Cheers S
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
Now to really put the fox in the hen house.


And yes, it lacks a medium calibre gun.

I do wonder how hard it would be to fit a 57 or 76mm if required.
WP

Be interesting to see what info comes out in the few days, under 120m and 5,000 ton is a good sign.
 

Reptilia

Well-Known Member
Phillipines?

I have no idea actually but it would make sense.

Imagine if it was Taiwan?
Maybe they are referring to the Constellation class, the president did say they were an indo pacific nation and 2 constellation are expected to be in service in 2026. Not Anzac sized though…

The Taiwanese Light Frigate program does not seem to compare unless those all end up as the ASW variant.


A 2/3 size Constellation with half the crew, 24 NSM, 32 VLS cells, 30knt max speed and electric drive. Sounds good…. Range though even with electric drive must be sub 4,500nm
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
If this was the case, then it sounds like a cultural stew of arrogance and ego, with perhaps just a little stupidity added into the pot.
I think it was exactly that.

The point of StanFlex is in the name: Standard Flexible. Standard: one fitting, one physical & electronic interface. Flexible: quick & easy swap in & out. It's limited, & that was accepted as a reasonable trade-off against the benefits of being to unplug one box & plug in another in a few hours, alongside anywhere with a big enough crane. Every ship fitted for StanFlex modules could have the necessary software.

From what I've read about the LCS mission modules, they were neither standard nor flexible. They require significant work to fit, physically fitting, wiring in, installing & testing software, etc. IIRC it could take weeks.

Why take something that is in service and works and modify or build off that, when one can come up with something which attempts to replicate the successes of others, yet proves essentially unworkable as originally intended, whilst being IIRC both over weight/displacement and over budget, as well as much less flexible?
It seems a major case of mission creep & bloat. The limitations of StanFlex weren't accepted, so a module had to make the ship it was fitted to all-singing all-dancing in a specific role. The USN knew better than anyone else, & could & would do anything better, & any change the USN wanted was obviously an improvement since it was a USN idea.
 

iambuzzard

Active Member
Maybe they are referring to the Constellation class, the president did say they were an indo pacific nation and 2 constellation are expected to be in service in 2026. Not Anzac sized though…

The Taiwanese Light Frigate program does not seem to compare unless those all end up as the ASW variant.


A 2/3 size Constellation with half the crew, 24 NSM, 32 VLS cells, 30knt max speed and electric drive. Sounds good…. Range though even with electric drive must be sub 4,500nm
Still needs a 127mm gun, though.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Now to really put the fox in the hen house.


And yes, it lacks a medium calibre gun.

I do wonder how hard it would be to fit a 57 or 76mm if required.
LDO_Comm_Datasheet_4C_R2 (leonardo.com)
SeaRAM Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Anti-Ship Missile Defense System > United States Navy > Displayy-FactFiles
The Leonardo 76/62 Super Rapid is quoted at 7.9t, and the Sovraponte model 30-40% lighter and non-deck penetrating, the Sea RAM at 8t, so you could probably replace the Sea RAM with a 76/62mm.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
I
There is likely to be American pressure for this. Americans understand this concept and what Australia would get out of it. It also makes a clear and manifest tie in between Australia and the US. Training, logistics, design, CONOPs, etc.

Part of the the problem with a type 26 based ship is you start moving away from things the Americans are familiar with, and they stop supporting the idea.

Same issue with the AUKUS submarine. The Americans understand the Virginia. Once you start moving away from it, they start to go quiet.

Arguably the UK should be leaning in and supporting and also rounding up the Americans to support it as well. But UK doesn't see this as their battle, and UK government and uniforms have their own problems and issues, and the AUGOV isn't asking the RN or the UKGOV. Probably because they have no meaningful presence in the indopacific.
One thing of note re AUKUS and Virginia subs. 1 country was all on board 18 months ago with Aus setting up and building their design here. 18 months later The other country still has many political and legal hurdles to cross before we can even lease subs. If the suggestion is we build Virginias or lease Virginias only and not AUKUS, it realistically it looks like we are at least another 2-3 years away from any sort of lock in contract Even for the up to 5 Virginias, let alone what would follow. OTOH if we didn’t build subs that would free up capacity for ship building would it not?
 
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Reptilia

Well-Known Member
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