Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

In addition the multi mission bay on the Type 26 / Hunter has space for upto 10, 20' containers. It can serve as a mother ship for a variety of UUVs, USVs and UAVs yet to enter service. By default, anything these unmanned platforms can do, the Hunter can also do.

 

[Armchair]

Given a choice, I would rather the RAN adopt and start loading RUM-139 VL-ASROC fitted with Mk 54 LWT's, rather than a handful of RGM-109E Tomahawks.

Now if the Hunter-class VLS loadout could be increased significantly in size/number (like tripled) then allocating some cells to LACM would make a bit more sense. As it stands now, the NSM should provide some LACM capability in addition to serving as an AShM.

Long rant cut as addressed above.

Just adding land is where ships, including subs, have their bases. If a shorter range land attack capability requires the ship to sail 1000km closer to the target that is 1000km of extra transit where the land attacking ship is a sub (and missile) target.

 

[Redlands18]

In addition the multi mission bayvon the Type 26 / Hunter has space for upto 10, 20' containers. It can serve as a mother ship for a variety of UUVs, USVs and UAVs yet to enter service. By default, anything these unmanned platforms can do, the Hunter can also do.

What is better for ASW? A Drone armed with a couple of LWT, that can be deployed 100nm+ from the ship, re-deployed, re-called or re-charged without wasting the LWT, or a one shot and done missile/LWT combo with a range of about 16-18nm. VL-ASROC makes some sense as a defensive ASW system for the US, Japan and ROK because they have the VLS to spare, we don't.

 

[Wombat000]

The beauty of ASROC type system is it’s a ship borne capability.
it’s doesn’t rely on aviation assets, its not as effected by weather conditions or electronic countermeasures.

identify and fire to a meaningful range.
it might not be as ideal as a helicopter, but the ship itself can more efficiently prosecute a ranged target.

currently, lose the chopper = lose ASW.

Am I wrong?

 

[Todjaeger]

Long rant cut as addressed above.

Just adding land is where ships, including subs, have their bases. If a shorter range land attack capability requires the ship to sail 1000km closer to the target that is 1000km of extra transit where the land attacking ship is a sub (and missile) target.

One needs to remember that the ADF should have other options for the delivery of a land attack capability, depending on what the target is and where it is located. With the right RAAF aircraft and PGM's, an aerial strike package could potentially be launched at targets in the Sulu Sea from Darwin without needing in-flight refueling. Add in in-flight refueling and that strike distance can get extended quite a bit further. If a system like Rapid Dragon were adopted, particularly for the C-17, then Hainan could potentially be targeted by aircraft operating from Darwin.

The above is part of the reason why I mentioned in another post about the need to consider the what a warfighting system needs or can do, rather than focusing on what a specific or individual platform can do. If a target located at XYZ needs to hit by a strike, consider what type of ordnance would be needed to neutralize that target, and then look at what could delivery the appropriate types of ordnance. If the target location is within 2,000 km of an Australian airfield, then RAAF aircraft would likely be a better option. If the the target is further away than that, then a RAN platform might be a better option. I mention might, because if the target is so distant, then chances are RAN warships which might be launching such a strike would likely be operating without friendly air cover, and possibly even without RAAF AEW&C or MPA support. In a situation like this, then the RAN vessel might have an even greater need for air defence than would otherwise be the case.

With the currently rather limited number of VLS cells across the RAN, as well as the limited options in terms of missile loadout one always needs to consider the potential opportunity costs for different loadout configurations. A VLS cell loaded with a Tomahawk means that cell cannot contribute to air defence either with an SM-2 or up to four ESSM, but could potentially be used to target land or shipping targets within ~1,600 km. However, if the land or shipping target is within ~200 km, using a Tomahawk might be a bit of a waste since a NSM could potentially be used instead. One of the other things which need to be considered with the VLS cell loadouts is that they require a port call to either be reloaded or have the missile loadout changed, so due thought would be required, otherwise a deployed ship might find itself with a reduced capability to deal with threats due to being loaded with missiles inappropriate for the tasks required.

I will cover the ASROC portion shortly but in another post.

 

[Todjaeger]

The beauty of ASROC type system is it’s a ship borne capability.
it’s doesn’t rely on aviation assets, its not as effected by weather conditions or electronic countermeasures.

identify and fire to a meaningful range.
it might not be as ideal as a helicopter, but the ship itself can more efficiently prosecute a ranged target.

currently, lose the chopper = lose ASW.

Am I wrong?

Sort of yes, and sort of no. It has to do with how surface vessels and aircraft conduct ASW ops. Ideally, if friendly subs are unavailable to provide an anti-sub capability, then there would be several layers of ASW assets operating together to screen likely targets of hostile subs, often targets which would be considered 'high value'.

Where possible, fixed wing ASW aircraft would provide an outer screening layer that might be 100 miles ahead of/away from the high value targets, as well as attempting to sanitize chokepoints that potential subs might lurk in or near, ahead of the arrival of a TF. RAAF P-8A Poseidons should be able to provide this type capability in some areas to a degree. Much would depend on how much Poseidon coverage would be needed and at what distance would the aircraft be operating from friendly bases. There should next be a middle screening layer provided by embarked naval helicopters with ASW capabilities and IIRC these might operate as much as 40 - 60 miles away from a TF and/or their embarking vessel or high value targets. Lastly there should be an inner screening layer consisting of the surface escort(s), before a sub might get to whatever vessel or vessels are being protected.

Now each of the screening elements should have some organic ASW capability and be attempting to detect and persecute sub contacts to keep them as far from the sub's targets as possible. Typically for fixed wing ASW they can deploy air-dropped sonobuoys, LWT's and depth bombs. Naval helicopters typically can also drop sonobuoys and some are also fitted with dipping sonar and can usually carry a pair of LWT's. The surface ASW vessels might have several types of sonar available (hull-mounted, VDS, towed arrays, etc.) and there are a number of different potential ASW weapons, depending on the vessel and service though LWT's are among the most common.

One of the areas where things can get a bit... complicated is engaging a possible sub contact. Most of the LWT's have a fairly short range, 10 km to 20 km depending on torpedo speed. AFAIK this is not a significant issue for the aircraft, because they can get close to where a suspected sub contact is to drop a LWT quite quickly as well as relaying potential contact info via datalinks to other participants in the ASW screening efforts. However, aircraft and naval helicopters in particular, have a limited amount of ordnance available per sortie. It is possible that a naval helicopter could be tracking a suspected sub but no longer have any LWT's to engage with which sets up having to chose. Does the naval helicopter break off tracking a suspected sub and return to a supporting vessel to re-arm and refuel, before taking off on another sortie and attempting to locate the potential sub again? Or does the helicopter stay aloft to try and maintain contact with the sub to provide other ASW assets with targeting information that could be used to neutralize the sub?

This is part of the area where something like the RUM-139 VL-ASROC could play a role since it can significantly increase the 'reach' of ship-based ASW weapons. Realistically, if an ASW escort is close enough to target a hostile sub with ship-mounted LWT's, then the hostile sub is most likely already within range to launch torpedoes on high value targets given that many of the heavyweight torpedoes likely have a range of 30 - 50 km. Also, an embarked naval helicopter would likely not be operating that close to a surface vessel most of the time, so contacts that the helicopter might be tracking would likely be too far for a surface vessel to engage with.

To wrap this up, a properly kitted surface vessel is capable of conducting ASW operations without a helicopter, so the loss of a naval helicopter for some reason does not eliminate the surface vessel's ability to engage in ASW ops. However, having an ASW helicopter does provide a range of additional ASW capabilities which can lead to better success than a surface vessel operating on its own.

 

[ASSAIL]

[QUOTE="StingrayOZ, post: 433315, member: 13043
I don't know what ASROC hit rates are, but I would be surprised if it was any where near 50%.
[/QUOTE]
Just me being a pedant but…ASROC doesn’t have a hit rate, it’s simply the torpedo delivery system, the success depends on the torpedo capability and the bathymetric conditions.
Latest ASROC is guided, as was IKARA, so provided the sonar contact is maintained (most commonly by rotary winged ASW) there’s a fair chance of success.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Australia may be able to get away with upsetting Naval Group and the French, but we are far too reliant on BAE to be able to get away with cancelling the Hunters, the same way we did the Attacks.

I appreciate most here know more about the details of warships than I do, but from an engineering viewpoint I don’t agree with this idea of selecting designs based on our perception of the power of one nation over another. We should be assessing each design on its merits, not who produced it, preferably while reviewing an in-service example.

[From a diplomatic and economic viewpoint, I don’t think we “got away with” our treatment of France at all. It has almost certainly cost Australia a free trade deal with the EU that was being negotiated. That harms other industries. I think the reputational damage was high.]

It seems to me that every nation, including the USA, has a range of firms of varying design skill, and at one time or another, they can all produce a good or bad design. Examples abound. USA has produced the LCS, UK had all the engine problems on Type 45 destroyers (and lots of trouble with Astutes till EB helped them out), Spain took decades to build their S80 sub, and Germany recently produced an absurdly large frigate (F125) that makes OPVs look well armed. Yet other times the same nations have produced great designs.

I think it is dangerous for Australia to get too wedded to any single supplier. Their performance might drop and price rise if they believe ahead of time they will win a tender. Other suppliers might give up bidding and limit our options. If we have become over reliant on one, the solution is to give that supplier less work not more.

Sorry for the lecture. This is not a criticism of those who build and supply warships either. It is a criticism of the process by which decisions are made.

 

[H_K]

I may be missing something but with Hunter hull #7 not due to be delivered until ~2040, why is so much ink being wasted on the topic of Hunter hulls 7-9?

Any “decision” made by the current government still has scope to be changed 2-3 times.

Surely the focus should be on ways to accelerate delivery and/or enhance capability of the first Hunter hulls? And ways to procure a complementary hull in parallel (whether high end AAW destroyer or low end GP combattant)?

 

[Todjaeger]

I appreciate most here know more about the details of warships than I do, but from an engineering viewpoint I don’t agree with this idea of selecting designs based on our perception of the power of one nation over another. We should be assessing each design on its merits, not who produced it, preferably while reviewing an in-service example.

[From a diplomatic and economic viewpoint, I don’t think we “got away with” our treatment of France at all. It has almost certainly cost Australia a free trade deal with the EU that was being negotiated. That harms other industries. I think the reputational damage was high.]

It seems to me that every nation, including the USA, has a range of firms of varying design skill, and at one time or another, they can all produce a good or bad design. Examples abound. USA has produced the LCS, UK had all the engine problems on Type 45 destroyers (and lots of trouble with Astutes till EB helped them out), Spain took decades to build their S80 sub, and Germany recently produced an absurdly large frigate (F125) that makes OPVs look well armed. Yet other times the same nations have produced great designs.

I think it is dangerous for Australia to get too wedded to any single supplier. Their performance might drop and price rise if they believe ahead of time they will win a tender. Other suppliers might give up bidding and limit our options. If we have become over reliant on one, the solution is to give that supplier less work not more.

Sorry for the lecture. This is not a criticism of those who build and supply warships either. It is a criticism of the process by which decisions are made.

An unfortunate reality when talking defence kit, is that who produced it does matter, as that can impact access to other systems. The US for instance has security concerns about defence industry from some Euro nations gaining access to US defence tech. As I understand it, certain Euro nations have a reputation for conducting espionage (including industrial) activities even against NATO allies.

Now I would agree that the LCS designs were/are problematic, but I do not really lay those faults at the feet of the designers. Rather I would lay the problems with the designs back on a set of rather flawed assumptions and premise dictating what capabilities the designs needed to feature. Had certain defence & gov't leadership not been apparently enamored with making transformational changes to US military capabilities (not just naval) by adopting rapidly deployable, highly mobile platforms, with an apparent belief that such mobility could replace at least some of the need for protective armour (land systems) or self-defence capabilities (naval systems). For the LCS designs specifically, the programme requirements really seemed to be trying too hard to push technology too far to meet competing design requirements.

 

[Todjaeger]

I may be missing something but with Hunter hull #7 not due to be delivered until ~2040, why is so much ink being wasted on the topic of Hunter hulls 7-9?

Any “decision” made by the current government still has scope to be changed 2-3 times.

Surely the focus should be on ways to accelerate delivery and/or enhance capability of the first Hunter hulls? And ways to procure a complementary hull in parallel (whether high end AAW destroyer or low end GP combattant)?

The original (pre-DSR and subsequent naval review) SEA 5000/Hunter-class build portion of the was slowed in 2018 IIRC to sustain continuous shipbuilding between 2022 and 2044 when the final/ninth Hunter-class frigate was planned for delivery. There remains potential for the build to be accelerated which would push that 2044 date for delivery of #9 earlier. There have also been leaks that the number currently planned will be cut back to six frigates instead of nine. Between the potential for these changes to happen, plus the actual shipbuilding to be a pair of hulls under construction at any one time once production begins to ramp up, it is quite possible that come the mid-2030's, a reduced frigate build could be complete.

If that were to happen, prior planning would also need to have taken place so that a future/follow-on build programme is ready if Australia is to try and maintain a domestic shipbuilding capability. Otherwise, Australia would likely find itself in yet another shipbuilding "valley of death" where a trained and experienced workforce is made redundant due to a lack of further work and orders.

 

[Volkodav]

There seems to be a perception the the Hunter is a bad design, that it does not meet requirements, and that other, similar, but unsuccessful designs would somehow have been superior.

The question is, how could anyone, outside of the project or the governance for the project, have any real way of knowing this?

Yes there was the recent ANAO audit that questioned the selection process and the value for money, but what was it looking at, how was this determination made?

I've been through audits like this before and a lot of it is looking at the project, not the technical side. They don't have access to detailed performance data, and if they do they can't comment on it. It's does the project have the documentation the process says it should have, has the project followed the process it's contacted to follow.

Then there's the question of did the government of the day decide on an appropriate strategic direction, were the needs correctly derived from strategic direction, were requirements drived from these needs, does the selected capability meet these requirements? All of this happens and is separate from the quality of the actual design.

However the realisation that successive governments were wrong on numbers and capabilities of MFUs translates into, Hunter sucks headlines and public sentiment.

The fact we should have built destroyers to replace destroyers, but didn't, doesn't mean Hunter isn't a good design and it doesn't mean it won't be a highly capable necessary addition to the fleet.

 

[swerve]

g
Slight point of correction here, and perhaps a somewhat pedantic one. Mk 41 VLS comes in three different lengths which are self-defense, tactical, and strike. The self-defense launcher is 5.3 m whilst the tactical is 6.8 m and the strike is 7.7 m.

I thought SDL was withdrawn several years ago, & it's just tactical & strike now. Lockheed Martin's VLS pages & brochure only mention tactical & strike - & are dated 2019. Got to go back a few years before that to find any mention of SDL.

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/cont...LS_Vertical_Launching_System_Product_Card.pdf

 

[Todjaeger]

There seems to be a perception the the Hunter is a bad design, that it does not meet requirements, and that other, similar, but unsuccessful designs would somehow have been superior.

The question is, how could anyone, outside of the project or the governance for the project, have any real way of knowing this?

Yes there was the recent ANAO audit that questioned the selection process and the value for money, but what was it looking at, how was this determination made?

I've been through audits like this before and a lot of it is looking at the project, not the technical side. They don't have access to detailed performance data, and if they do they can't comment on it. It's does the project have the documentation the process says it should have, has the project followed the process it's contacted to follow.

Then there's the question of did the government of the day decide on an appropriate strategic direction, were the needs correctly derived from strategic direction, were requirements drived from these needs, does the selected capability meet these requirements? All of this happens and is separate from the quality of the actual design.

However the realisation that successive governments were wrong on numbers and capabilities of MFUs translates into, Hunter sucks headlines and public sentiment.

The fact we should have built destroyers to replace destroyers, but didn't, doesn't mean Hunter isn't a good design and it doesn't mean it won't be a highly capable necessary addition to the fleet.

TBH the definition differences between corvettes, frigates, destroyers and cruisers still rather kills me. Corvettes do tend to be somewhat easier to differentiate from the others simply due to size. Cruisers, in current usage, might be easier to distinguish if one adopts the USN practice where a cruiser includes or has space for an embarked staff and can provide a command function for a TF. When one gets down to it though, what is the difference between a modern destroyer and a modern frigate? Frankly the distinction appears to be mostly a service by service one, and often reflective of how a specific navy expects to use a given class of vessel or what role said vessels would fulfill.

Having said all that, I would be perfectly happy if the Hunter-class FFG were to adopt the apparent ASW specialty designation (no need to remove or eliminate the noise reduction efforts), possibly add in some more VLS cells to bring the total to 48 or more, and then get adopted as the RAN's new/upcoming GP frigate.

The principle issues I have with the Hunter-class are not some issues with the design, though having a better idea of what the actual VLS fitout will be would be nice, but much more about issues with the programme. IIRC first steel was cut for the lead ship last year, and the year before that prototype or test blocks started being built in an effort to ensure that once actual construction started, there were fewer design & build issues. IIRC an issue encountered with the Hobart-class build is that some of the blocks did not fit together as planned, with different entities being blamed for the errors. So having work done early on in an effort to reduce potential problems in the future seems a wise move, but one is still looking at a RAN that is not expected to have the lead ship in service until 2031/2032 or thereabouts.

Hence my interest in getting further warship construction programmes underway as soon as possible, to prevent future production gaps and/or work stops. Looking at SEA 5000, the project was brought forward to 2015, with an expectation that the lead ship will be commissioned in 2031 or about 16 years after the project was brought forward. If similar timing is applied to whatever programme will be the replacement for the Hobart-class DDG, then work needs to get done so that once the 2nd to last Hunter-class frigate finishes construction, the first of the replacement destroyers can be laid down. Something I suspect many forget, is that whilst the SEA 5000 project was brought forward in 2015, there had been a Future Frigate Programme existing in one form or another at least since the 2009 DWP and did the work needed to get SEA 5000 established as a project. That appears to be where things stand with whatever will become the programme which will be run to replace the Hobart-class. It is also an area of potential concern, because then one is looking at a timeline of ~two decades between the start of ideas on what will be a replacement and the first vessel actually commissioning. If these ideas are only now starting to get looked at and considered, and if it takes a similar length of time for the replacement destroyer, we would be looking at the lead ship commissioning ~2044.

 

[swerve]

...
It seems to me that every nation, including the USA, has a range of firms of varying design skill, and at one time or another, they can all produce a good or bad design. Examples abound. USA has produced the LCS, UK had all the engine problems on Type 45 destroyers (and lots of trouble with Astutes till EB helped them out), Spain took decades to build their S80 sub, and Germany recently produced an absurdly large frigate (F125) that makes OPVs look well armed. ...

Type 45's WR-21 engine was a US-UK joint project, IIRC with US design leadership until the USA dropped it. By then the UK was committed to it & carried on. The gas turbine was from Rolls-Royce, & the fancy bits to boost efficiency were US-designed & made. They're the bits which have been problematic, AFAIK. The British mistake was in not recognising their failings & adapting WR-21. By all accounts it's extremely good most of the time, but IIRC can fail in a narrow set of conditions where the American efficiency boosters cut out & take everything else down. Solution being implemented.

I think S80 (the submarine dived OK, but had difficulty surfacing again) has been fixed. F125 can be seen as a flawed concept: a big & elaborate ship for low-intensity operations, though "makes OPVs look well armed" is a bit exaggerated. But to me, the big problem was in construction, where it turned out to be overweight & lopsided, needing a lot of work to stop it listing.

I struggle to say anything good about LCS. The concept was flawed, & the module system was ridiculous. They started with StanFlex, then threw away it's good points & added to its weaknesses. I have no idea why.

These were all designed & built by companies with good records, I think. But they still got it wrong.

 

[Todjaeger]

I thought SDL was withdrawn several years ago, & it's just tactical & strike now. Lockheed Martin's VLS pages & brochure only mention tactical & strike - & are dated 2019. Got to go back a few years before that to find any mention of SDL.

https://www.lockheedmartin.com/cont...LS_Vertical_Launching_System_Product_Card.pdf

It might not really be offered, given other smaller VLS available now with smaller footprints like the Mk 48 or Mk 56. Since I have not really been able to determine which classes of vessels were fitted with the self-defense length, not sure whether they are now all out of service or not.

 

[swerve]

Mk 56 can launch ESSM, & is about 2 metres shorter than Mk 41 tactical

 

[Todjaeger]

F125 can be seen as a flawed concept: a big & elaborate ship for low-intensity operations, though "makes OPVs look well armed" is a bit exaggerated. But to me, the big problem was in construction, where it turned out to be overweight & lopsided, needing a lot of work to stop it listing.

I struggle to say anything good about LCS. The concept was flawed, & the module system was ridiculous. They started with StanFlex, then threw away it's good points & added to its weaknesses. I have no idea why.

These were all designed & built by companies with good records, I think. But they still got it wrong.

If the module designers did actually start with StanFlex modules as a base, and not just the concepts behind StanFlex, then they probably should be taken out back behind a shed and slapped about the head and neck with a blivet.

I tend to agree that the Baden-Württemberg class concept appears... flawed, given its armament and apparent capability set.

The LCS concept I think is an example of a little flaw in concept, but much more a WTF were they thinking. Particularly with the numbers which ended up getting ordered and built, even after a range of issues became known. As it stands, 30 vessels between the two LCS classes have been built since ~2005 with seven already having been retired and an average cost of ~USD$360 mil. per vessel. IMO a shining (or perhaps glaring) example of what happens when policymakers appear so wedded to ideas, despite practical limitations on what is possible.

 

[Stampede]

I may be missing something but with Hunter hull #7 not due to be delivered until ~2040, why is so much ink being wasted on the topic of Hunter hulls 7-9?

Any “decision” made by the current government still has scope to be changed 2-3 times.

Surely the focus should be on ways to accelerate delivery and/or enhance capability of the first Hunter hulls? And ways to procure a complementary hull in parallel (whether high end AAW destroyer or low end GP combattant)?

Government and defence need to have long term plans for platfirm procurement.
I think we all understand that necessity
That said, I agree that when your talking about programs in the fifteen year plus timeframe , it all becomes a but academic with regards to what may or may not eventuate.

The ten ships of the ANZAC class was a long term project.
Today we know the outcome.
Talk of twelve with NZ getting 4.
It didn't happen.
But the RAN did get their eight and NZ did get two.
Back in the 90's government may have had a change of mind and reduced the orders to say six. There could of been a reflection that the fleets mix needed a different balance. Alternatively the program may of been a mega success with additional foreign and domestic orders continuing work till today,.
no SA or WA ship building
Sound familiar to today's conversation!
We know the past,we know what did and didn't happen and we know what we plan for long term may very well change.

ANZACs became ten,. Hunters????

I don't engage too much with the Hunter conversation because it fits into the long term category of aspiration, but also unknown.

It's up there with AUKUS subs, future amphib/supply ships, tier two things and dare I say it Virginia Class subs.

Aspirations, but also unknown outcomes.

How is today's fleet and NUSHIPS looking?


Cheers S

 

[Morgo]

(the submarine dived OK, but had difficulty surfacing again)

That’s a pretty fundamental issue!