There seems to be a perception the the Hunter is a bad design, that it does not meet requirements, and that other, similar, but unsuccessful designs would somehow have been superior.
The question is, how could anyone, outside of the project or the governance for the project, have any real way of knowing this?
Yes there was the recent ANAO audit that questioned the selection process and the value for money, but what was it looking at, how was this determination made?
I've been through audits like this before and a lot of it is looking at the project, not the technical side. They don't have access to detailed performance data, and if they do they can't comment on it. It's does the project have the documentation the process says it should have, has the project followed the process it's contacted to follow.
Then there's the question of did the government of the day decide on an appropriate strategic direction, were the needs correctly derived from strategic direction, were requirements drived from these needs, does the selected capability meet these requirements? All of this happens and is separate from the quality of the actual design.
However the realisation that successive governments were wrong on numbers and capabilities of MFUs translates into, Hunter sucks headlines and public sentiment.
The fact we should have built destroyers to replace destroyers, but didn't, doesn't mean Hunter isn't a good design and it doesn't mean it won't be a highly capable necessary addition to the fleet.
TBH the definition differences between corvettes, frigates, destroyers and cruisers still rather kills me. Corvettes do tend to be somewhat easier to differentiate from the others simply due to size. Cruisers, in current usage, might be easier to distinguish if one adopts the USN practice where a cruiser includes or has space for an embarked staff and can provide a command function for a TF. When one gets down to it though, what is the difference between a modern destroyer and a modern frigate? Frankly the distinction appears to be mostly a service by service one, and often reflective of how a specific navy expects to use a given class of vessel or what role said vessels would fulfill.
Having said all that, I would be perfectly happy if the
Hunter-class FFG were to adopt the apparent ASW specialty designation (no need to remove or eliminate the noise reduction efforts), possibly add in some more VLS cells to bring the total to 48 or more, and then get adopted as the RAN's new/upcoming GP frigate.
The principle issues I have with the
Hunter-class are not some issues with the design, though having a better idea of what the actual VLS fitout will be would be nice, but much more about issues with the programme. IIRC first steel was cut for the lead ship last year, and the year before that prototype or test blocks started being built in an effort to ensure that once actual construction started, there were fewer design & build issues. IIRC an issue encountered with the
Hobart-class build is that some of the blocks did not fit together as planned, with different entities being blamed for the errors. So having work done early on in an effort to reduce potential problems in the future seems a wise move, but one is still looking at a RAN that is not expected to have the lead ship in service until 2031/2032 or thereabouts.
Hence my interest in getting further warship construction programmes underway as soon as possible, to prevent future production gaps and/or work stops. Looking at SEA 5000, the project was brought forward to 2015, with an expectation that the lead ship will be commissioned in 2031 or about 16 years after the project was brought forward. If similar timing is applied to whatever programme will be the replacement for the
Hobart-class DDG, then work needs to get done so that once the 2nd to last
Hunter-class frigate finishes construction, the first of the replacement destroyers can be laid down. Something I suspect many forget, is that whilst the SEA 5000 project was brought forward in 2015, there had been a Future Frigate Programme existing in one form or another at least since the 2009 DWP and did the work needed to get SEA 5000 established as a project. That appears to be where things stand with whatever will become the programme which will be run to replace the
Hobart-class. It is also an area of potential concern, because then one is looking at a timeline of ~two decades between the start of ideas on what will be a replacement and the first vessel actually commissioning. If these ideas are only now starting to get looked at and considered, and if it takes a similar length of time for the replacement destroyer, we would be looking at the lead ship commissioning ~2044.