The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Except the two aren't the same. Ukraine doesn't want to fight.
UKR has a army, command system, and drafting mechanisms in place that are all functioning. They may not be running optimally, but they still all work. Together, they offer resistance to RU goals. That is literally the definition of wanting to fight. Even the US had AWOL and draft dodgers in WW2, and I think we can all agree that doesnt mean the US didnt "want" to fight at the time.

I suppose we could quibble on the use of "want" as no one "wants" to sit in a trench under artillery fire, while being hunted by FPV drones, but I think you see my point.

If UKR did not want to fight (again, collectively speaking), we would see something along the lines of the French or Russian army mutinies of 1917, or maybe widespread public discontent as expressed in the US during Vietnam.

Don't confuse the government for the country.
I cant poll every single Ukrainian citizen. All I can do is judge the apparent lack of evidence of a lack of will to fight, as per my point above.

He's very clearly referring to the fact that Ukraine is striking civilian shipping that belongs to neutral countries. Whether they're Chinese specifically or not is unimportant. Either you're allowed to strike countries not in the fight or you're not. Ukraine has opened a problematic and dangerous door with this behavior. Depending on how exactly one looks at it, it amounts to state-sanctioned piracy, or even terrorism. And of course Russia has already mirrored their response.
It is a dangerous response to strike shadow fleet vessels, escalatory in nature. Is it warranted ? Scchhhmmmmaybeee ? I suspect this isnt going to be used widely, and is more of an attempt to inflate insurance costs on the shadow fleet so much, that they can no longer commercially operate. Admittedly , Im on the fence on this one.
 

Aleks.ov

New Member
^ I think are way off, my man. The US does not give two shits about what Russia thinks about Venezuela. And you certainly overestimate the acceptable cost and the Geran UAV capabilities, to a laughable degree in the context you present it in.
I suppose the Houthis, with their primitive drones and the US flight from the Red Sea, have proven the opposite. But we're getting off topic.
 

personaldesas

Active Member
I suppose the Houthis, with their primitive drones and the US flight from the Red Sea, have proven the opposite. But we're getting off topic.
So you’re saying Russia might at any time pull a significant number of Shaheds out of Ukraine, somehow project them roughly 13,000 km across the Pacific, and meaningfully intervene in Venezuela, on the basis that the Houthis managed to harass a shipping lane located right next to their own territory. Is that the claim?
 
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swerve

Super Moderator
'A source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said Friday’s attack was a “new, unprecedented special operation”.'
Great! Let's all do "unprecedented special operations".
“The enemy must understand that Ukraine will not stop, and will strike them anywhere in the world, wherever they may be,”
Then, Russia mustn't stop and hit them "anywhere in the world".
"this is an absolutely legitimate target for the SBU."
UK is providing weapons to Ukraine, UK is an "absolutely legitimate target" for Russia; as every ship and every rail line providing aid to Ukraine is. (I live in UK.)
Different categories.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Different categories.
Speaking to the online outlet Ukrainska Pravda, a Ukrainian official justified the strike. “This tanker was used to circumvent sanctions and earn money that was used for the war against Ukraine. Therefore, from the point of view of international law and the laws and customs of war, this is an absolutely legitimate target for the SBU. The enemy must understand that Ukraine will not stop and will beat him anywhere in the world, wherever he is.”

According to whom?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
UKR has a army, command system, and drafting mechanisms in place that are all functioning. They may not be running optimally, but they still all work. Together, they offer resistance to RU goals. That is literally the definition of wanting to fight.
It literally is not. Wanting to fight, or being willing to fight, refers to the desires of individual citizens. The desire of the Ukrainian government to keep fighting isn't in question.

Even the US had AWOL and draft dodgers in WW2, and I think we can all agree that doesnt mean the US didnt "want" to fight at the time.
Best current estimates put Ukraine at somewhere between 400-500k troops, with ~300k deserters. There are examples of formations that lose over half of personnel in training before they get to the front lines. I think we can all agree the comparison to US AWOL and draft dodgers is at the very least inaccurate and misleading.

I suppose we could quibble on the use of "want" as no one "wants" to sit in a trench under artillery fire, while being hunted by FPV drones, but I think you see my point.

If UKR did not want to fight (again, collectively speaking), we would see something along the lines of the French or Russian army mutinies of 1917, or maybe widespread public discontent as expressed in the US during Vietnam.
We do see widespread public discontent, including people literally getting into fights or even trying to kill TCC personnel in the streets.

I cant poll every single Ukrainian citizen.
That's not how polling works... you do a representative sample utilizing a recognized methodology.

All I can do is judge the apparent lack of evidence of a lack of will to fight, as per my point above.
There is no lack of evidence. There is a lack of willingness to look at it.


It is a dangerous response to strike shadow fleet vessels, escalatory in nature. Is it warranted ? Scchhhmmmmaybeee ? I suspect this isnt going to be used widely, and is more of an attempt to inflate insurance costs on the shadow fleet so much, that they can no longer commercially operate. Admittedly , Im on the fence on this one.
I think it's a desperate and thoroughly illegal move that indicates Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure are getting to a critical point. You'll note that energy ceasefire ideas are being floated at the same time as this happens. I think it's a carrot and stick attempt to get Russia to stop destroying Ukrainian infrastructure.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Sumy area.


Russian forces have opened a new direction in Sumy region, attacking from the east into southern Sumy region, capturing the villages of Grabovskoe and Visokoe. Some reports also have them penetrating into Ryasnoe. This seems to be an opportunistic move, with Ukrainian sources claiming a lacksadaisical attitude among the troops there. On the old Sumy front, Russian forces recaptured Konstantinovka, Varachino, and a number of positions around Andreevka and Alekseevka, reversing many of Ukraine's recent gains here.


Russian drone operations in the Sumy area.


Russia hits a CV90 IFV in Miropol'ye.


Some bizarre footage, allegedly from Grabovskoe, with people in civilian clothes making gestures towards a Russian drone, and then firing on it with an AK. They might Ukrainian service members in plain clothes, or civilians with weapons.


Allegedly Ukrainian POWs taken in Grabovskoe.


Russia hit the villages of Barilo and Balitsa, Sumy region, targeting allegedly Ukrainian staging areas.


Kharkov area.


Russian forces have moved southward out of Volchansk, taking chunks of fields, and gaining ground taking all of Volch'ya. Russian forces have also pushed eastward into Volchanskie Hutory. Russian forces have also taken the village of Liman and started the fight for Prilipka.


Russian drone drops on some sort of infantry, allegedly a Ukrainian element trying to enter Belgorod region.


Russian TOS strikes on Volchanskie Hutory. Allegedly Ukraine's 157th Mech Bde is active in the area.


Russia hits a Ukrainian crossing, allegedly Pechenegi area. Reportedly a Tornado-S was used.


Russian strike on Ukrainian vehicles, allegedly they include Grads used to hit Belgorod.


Ukrainian forces confirm the loss of an Su-27, allegedly in the Kharkov area, from the 39th Aviation Bde. Some sources claim it was downed by a Russian Su-35S.


Kupyansk area.


Ukrainian forces have recaptured almost all of western Kupyansk in a series of counter-attacks. While a substantial grey zone with some Russian control still exists, it's likely those forces are effectively cut off. In Eastern Kupyansk Russian forces have gained most of the country-side north-east of town, about half of Kucherovka, and briefly took northern Petropavlovka, but were pushed out again. Russian forces also continue to inch forward around Ambarnoe and Dvurechenskoe.


Ukrainian T-64BV gets hit near Kupyansk.


Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian infantry in the center of Kupyansk.


Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian UGV, allegedly Kupyansk area.


In Kupyansk-Uzlovoy it appears Ukraine set up a vehicle maintenance station in a large pipe of some sort. Russian drones found it and target the vehicles parked there. At least 4 are seen.


Russian strikes on Glushkovka, Kupyansk area.


A Russian strike on a crossing near Kuyansk misses the new improvised crossing, hitting the old bridge that was destroyed back in '22.


There was a recent video put out with Zelenski posing in front of the Kupyansk city sign but the video is clearly old, the sign doesn't look the way it does. And while the area of the sign is under Ukrainian control, Russian drones are all over the area, making it basically impossible to film that kind of video there.


Oskol front.

In the Boguslav area Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces back from the village. In response Russian forces have launched a new push on Novoplatonovka, cutting the road south. Russian forces have secured the last piece of the western shore of the Zherebets river, likely due to a Ukrainian withdrawal.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Krasniy Liman area.

Russian forces are pushing south-west in the woods, gaining ground in and around the villages of Dibrova and Ozernoe. West of Liman Russian forces push deeper towards the river. Russian forces have also gained ground towards Koroviy Yar.


Reportedly Kramatorsk is left without power after recent Russian strikes.


Russian Grad-1 operations, from the 83rd Arty Rgt, in the Krasniy Liman area.


A view of Krasniy Liman covered in fiber-optic cables from drones.


Ukrainian drone-netting on the Izyum-Slavyansk road.


Seversk area.


Russian forces have taken all of Seversk and are pushing west out of it. They've taken the hills west of it and are trying to advance further. Russian forces also continue to gain ground in Zakotnoe, and around Dronovka. Svyato-pokrovskoe has fallen, and Russia has also taken the hills north of it as well as the entire west shore of the Bakhmutka river including the Ukrainian strong points on the high ground there.


An aerial shot of the ruins of Seversk. Reportedly 300-400 civilians were still in the town.


Russian forces in Seversk.


Druzhkovka area.

I'm adding this to cover all the meaningful movement happening north-west of Chasov Yar towards Druzhkovka. Russian forces have taken chunks of countryside around Pazeno and Vasyukovka, including the hills. Pazeno is fully under Russian control. Ukrainian positions by the ponds south of Vasykovka are threatened with encirclement. Russian forces have also gained some ground north of Mayskoe. Westward Russian forces have taken half of Bondarnoe, and some fields south of it. Closer to the canal Russian forces have taken the rest of Orekhovo-Vasilevka, and have approached Min'kovka. They've also taken fields north-east and south-west of there.


Russian drones target 3 Ukrainian tanks in Druzhkovka.


Russian Grad strikes near Druzhkovka.


Russia hit Druzhkovka, targets include two gas stations and some fuel trucks.


Konstantinovka.


Ukrainian forces have countered-attacked from the north into the dachas east of Konstantinovka, and have reached the outskirts of Predtechnoe. This is pattern, with Ukrainian sources frequently counter-attacking from this direction. It's likely this pattern will only break when Russian forces have secured the north-eastern approaches to town. South of the town, north of the reservoir, Russian forces continue to gain ground in the fields. Inside Konstantinovka, Russian forces continue to inch forward, grabbing a few more streets and buildings towards the center of town. From the north-east Russian forces have approached Verolyubovka along a wide front, capturing fields east of it and creating a large grey zone.


Russia hits a Ukrainian Grad west of Konstantinovka.


More Ukrainian footage out of Konstantinovka.


A Ukrainian soldier talks about stubborn civilians refusing to evacuate in Konstantinovka, a town currently contested.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovsk area.

North of Mirnograd Russian forces have inched forward near Sofievka and are slowly retaking pieces of the old salient. They've retaken Dorozhnoe and are contesting Ivanovka and Novoe Shakhovo. West of Pokrovsk Russian forces gained ground in Novopodgorodnoe, but lost the mine complex north of Udachnoe. Inside Mirnograd, the pocket has collapsed completely, Russian forces are sweeping the ruins with some resistance still occurring. It's not long now until the final flag raising in Mirnograd. North of Pokrovsk Russian forces have advanced in Grishino, but it's slow going. Ukraine has meanwhile has counter-attacked and recaptured one of the pig farms north of Pokrovsk.

One thing is how long it's taken to mop up the pocket. Despite being relatively small, and not that many troops being encircled, it's taken weeks to clear the Ukrainian forces encircled in Mirnograd. I think this is significant. It's likely Russia will attempt to encircle Ukrainian forces in the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk area and how long they can tie down Russian forces matters.


Russian strikes on Novopodgorodnoe.


Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian UGV loaded with supplies, allegedly near Mirnograd.


Russian bomb and Tornado-S strikes on Mirnograd.


Russian Rubicon drone operators down a Ukrainian E300 Skyranger near Pokrovsk. It's unclear if it was being used for some sort of front-line duty, or this is just where they were trying to cross the front line into Russian airspace.


A video dissecting a recent failed Russian attack towards Grishino with two combined elements. I'm generally not a fan of this channel's delivery, but the content is worth a watch. Note the reason cited for the failure is poor coordination. One element was ready long before the other. This is the exact same thing that led to the failure of Russia's push for Ugledar back in '23. It's interesting that this issue persists.


Russian drone strikes take apart a Ukrainian mech column attempting to counter-attack back into Pokrovsk. Some sources connect this to the 425th Skala Assault Rgt.


The first new "Australian" Abrams gets taken out near Pokrovsk. It was part of the column destroyed above.


Russian TOS-2 fires in the Pokrovsk area.


A destroyed Leo-1 near Pokrovsk.


A small pile of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles, Pokrovsk area.


Russian forces shot down an E300 UAV in the Selidovo area, and hauled it away. Apparently it was rigged up to drop 120mm mortar shells and FAB-250/100 bombs.


Russian Giatsint-B operations near Pokrovsk.


Russian forces setting up a net corridor towards Pokrovsk.


A look at Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk under Russian control.


Dnepropetrovsk axis.


Back and forth fighting continues around Novopavlovka. Ukrainian counter-attacks have regained quite a bit of ground, threatening Russian supply lines into the center of the village. Meanwhile Russia has launched a push along the north shore of the river. Russian forces have also regained some ground in Ivanovka.


Eastern Zaporozhye.

Russian forces have broken through across the Gaychur in several spots. Near where the Yanchur meets the Gaychur they've taken the villages Peschanoe, Gearsimovka, and the southern half of Andreevka. They've also taken a bigger bridgehead by Novoe Zaporozhye, and lastly they're across the river in the north-western part of Gulyaypole. All of Varvarovka, in face the entire right shore of the Gaychur river, is in Russian hands. A Ukrainian counter-attack temporarily created a grey zone in Dobropol'ye, but ultimately Russia recaptured it and even took additional ground on the right shore of the Gaychur. Inside Gulyaypole itself Russian forces have taken everything north of the river, and half of everything south of the river. Ukraine holds the mid-rises in the city center. South of Gulyaypole Russian forces have advanced north and east of Dorozhnyanka. The intent is likely to link up with Russian forces in southern Zaporozhye, and eliminate the salient. Near where the Yanchur meet the Gaychur, Russian forces have taken Ostapovskoe.


Ukrainian M1117 getting hit near Gulyaypole. It seems to have gotten stuck.


A series of drone strikes on pickups and cars in the Gulyaypole area. Most appear to be Ukrainian military logistics, but a couple are hard to tell.


Russian drones hunt Ukrainian infantry west of the Gaychur.


Russian forces near Gulyaypole used a stripped down Ural truck as an assault vehicle. Note, the attempt failed, despite the EW systems it's equipped with.


Russian strikes in Gulyaypole.


Russian strikes on a Ukrainian dugout near Gulyaypole.


Russian TOS-2 operations around Gulyaypole.


Zaporozhye.


Russian forces have advanced eastward out of Stepnogorsk taking a number of positions around the solar farms there and linking up with Russian troops near Stepovoe. The fate of the mid-rise apartments in Stepnogorsk is still unclear.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Dnepr front.

Russian forces from the 126th Coastal Bde using improvised unmanned boats for logistics in the delta of the Dnepr.


Black Sea/Crimea.

Ukraine hit a Russian Naval pier in Novorossiysk. The target was clearly a sub, but the sub had moved since the strike was planned, causing the drone to miss it. It's unclear if the sub took any damage as a result. Official Russian sources claim the sub is undamaged, but we won't really know until we see it go out to sea.


Russia hit a Turkish ship carrying sunflower seed oil, heading from Odessa to Egypt. Mirroring what Ukraine did in one of their strikes, a Russian Shahed hit the ship causing some damage.


Ukraine hit the Dashan tanker heading into Novorossiysk.


Ukraine hit the Taman' bay, damaging two Russian vessels and a pier.


A Ukrainian drone attempts to hit an S-400 radar in Crimea, but apparently falls before it reaches the target. It is possible the drone had a payload that fired from that distance, causing the drone to fall. Also note the fencing around it.


Ukraine hit an An-26 and two radars in Crimea.


A Russian MiG-31BM being towed, in the sights of a Ukrainian drone, Bel'bek airfield, Crimea. It's unclear what the fate of the jet is.


Ukraine allegedly hit a Russian Coast Guard ship.


Strikes.


With recent strikes a pattern has emerged where Russia is apparently trying to break Ukraine's energy system into separate islands, to make it more difficult to re-allocate energy from one part of the country to another. In particular it appears they're trying to isolate eastern Ukraine. It remains to be seen if it succeeds.

Russian strikes on Kiev.


Russia has been hitting the town of Fastov, focusing on rail infrastructure, for at least 3 days.


Battle damage to the Fastov rail depot after multiple Russian strikes.


Russia hit Priluki, Chernigov region. Targets include a substation.


Russian strikes on Sumy.


Russia hit Shostka, Sumy region. Targets include a gym where allegedly Ukraine was storing munitions.


Battle damage in Akhtyrka after Russian strikes.


Russia hits Lozovaya area again. The likely target is rail infrastructure, but confirmation is lacking.


Russia hit Pavlograd, Dnepropetrovsk region.


Russia hit Pyatihatka, Dnepropetrovsk region, not to be confused with the village of the same name that much fighting took place over in Zaporozhye in '23.


Russian strikes on Kremenchug. Targets include the oil refinery.


Russia hit the Kremenchug hydro-electric dam.


Russian strikes on Krivoy Rog. The targets are reportedly energy infrastructure.


Russia hit a substation in Cherkasy.


Russia hit Zaporozhye city, with gliding bombs and Lancets. The Lancet strike in particular found two Ukrainian armored vehicles parked among many civilian ones and took them out. An apartment building got hit but the damage is relatively light, leading to speculation that it may have been a SAM that hit it, others that it may have been an interecepted glide bomb. The Motor-Sich factory was also damaged. Links represent at least 3 separate waves of strikes.


Battle damage from Russian strikes on a substation in Malaya Belozerka. It provides an iron ore facility in the area with power.


Russia hit Nikolaev. Power outages are reported.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia hit Odessa, targets reportedly include energy infrastructure such as the Centrolit substation, and port infrastructure. A ferry carrying agricultural produce was damaged and a Turkish cargo ship was hit. Reportedly the cargo ship was carrying generators for Ukraine. These links represent at least 4 separate waves of strikes.


Russia has been striking bridges in Odessa region, including the Mayak bridge and the Zatoka bridge. A train was hit as part of these strikes. Iskanders and Shaheds are being used. Note the links below are multiple strikes. The intent seems to be to disrupt transport from Romania. Note that despite many strikes, the Mayak bridge remains active.


Allegedly footage Ukraine towing a pontoon bridge to the Mayak area to replace the main bridge.


Russia hit Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy, Odessa region.


Russia hit Yuzhnoe, Odessa region. The target was the Alseeds agro-industrial facility.


Russian strikes in Artsiz, Odessa region.


Some of the strikes in Odessa were done with UMPB-5 gliding bombs.


Ukrainian Yak-52 engaging Russian drones over Odessa.


Russian strikes on Rovno.


A Russian Shahed strike apparently derailed a cargo train near Zhitomyr, which then led to the derailment of the locomotive of a passenger train. Note we have seen cases of OLS-equipped Shaheds targeting trains before.


There are unconfirmed reports that Russia used an Iskander missile with 1000km range in Ukraine. There have been reports that Russia is working on a "long" Iskander for quite some time.


Another look at a pretty significant miss of a Russian Kinzhal that hit Starokonstantinov airbase area. Questions remain about the accuracy of the munition.


Ukraine hit a Russian oil platform in the Caspian Sea.


Ukraine hit a substation near Kursk, causing blackouts.


Ukraine hit Rostov-na-Donu lighting a Russian river tanker on fire.


A Ukrainian missile hit Gorlovka, target unclear, and we have a reported HIMARS strike on an industrial facility. It's unclear if the two are the same.


A Ukrainian drone fell in Buddenovsk damaging some buildings. Reportedly a local petro-chemical plant was the target.


Ukrainian HIMARS strikes hit the Belgorod powerplant.


Russian air defenses intercepting some GMLRS in the Belgorod area.


Ukraine hit the Saratov oil refinery again. Note that despite many repeated strikes, these refineries generally remain active.


Ukraine hit the Slavneft-YANOS refinery in Yaroslavl'.


Ukraine hit two S-400 TELs in Belgorod region while they were on the move. The strike was ~50kms behind the front lines.


A Ukrainian drone hit a residential building in Tver', with 7 civilians reported wounded.


Russian battlegroup North drone defense teams engaging a Ukrainian An-196.


Russian forces in Chechnya engaging a Ukrainian E300 Skyranger drone.


Russian drone defense team with twin maxim guns.


Russian helos engage Ukrainian drones.


A Russian interceptor drone downs a Ukrainian An-196.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Interesting bits.

Ukraine attacked a tanker reportedly involved in the transport of Russian oil, out in the Mediterranean.


Ukraine lost an Mi-24 recently, possibly to a Russian drone. The helo is from the 12 Tactical Aviation Bde.


Ukrainian infiltrators or likelier hired locals snuck into the Lipetsk-2 airbase in Russia and tried to burn down a decommissioned Su-27 and an active Su-30SM. Allegedly the attempts failed, but it's not clear. Note the Su-30SM was in a hangar, with weapons mounted.


A Russian truck with an armored cabin after getting hit. I think this is a perfect illustration of the value of this approach.


A Russian BTR-82A in the sights of a Ukrainian drone. But the Russian vehicle has a Starlink terminal on top of it. In general it seems Russia is using more and more of them for various reasons.


There is confirmation that some Russian gliding bombs have air-burst capacility.


Ukraine received 16 upgraded ZSU-23-4s with new radars and a new FCS.


Ukraine has apparently started operating an AW109 helo, confiscated from a Ukrainian politician.


A look at Ukraine's 56th Mech Bde T-64BVs during training.


Ukraine's 1st Assault Rgt with their very own tank sheds. These are T-72EA.


Ukraine's 5th Assault Rgt with a T-90K tank. They call it an AK but based on the Essa thermals, I think it's an original T-90K.


Reportedly Ukraine is working on adding guidance systems to S-8 rockets, presumably to produce something like the APKWS.


Ukraine's BMW-MLRS. A stark reminder that despite all the aid delivered to one side and increases in production from the other, there's still a shortage of equipment of every kind on both sides.


We have another first, a Ukrainian drone carried a radar, attempting to blind a Russian drone.


Australia reportedly completed delivery of 49 M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine.


We have some new Russian UGVs, one called the Omich, the other the Nerekhta, both have shown up in the war zone. We also have an EW version of the Courier and an unknown platform, but wire-guided.


Russia's 123rd MRBde in training. Note we don't see any armored vehicles, just UAZ Patriot pickups and Ulan light buggies. The infantry is carrying a mix AKs from various makes, though all appear to be 5.45mm variants.


We have a Russian Molniya drone with a Starlink terminal and one with mine-laying capability.


A video of Russian FAB-500 drones getting their UMPK kits.


Some materials on Russia's 123rd MRBde, specifically it's drone elements. We have some footage from their drone lab, and the subsequent delivery of those drones to front-line units.


Antiques continue to show up in the war, we have Russian forces with the SG-43 MMG. It's here with an anti-air tripod.


Another exchange of bodies, 26 dead Russian soldiers for 1003 Ukrainian ones.


Ukrainian POWs being driven through the center of Donetsk. Recent Russian advances have led to an uptick in POWs but there's still no mass surrender on any appreciable scale.


There are reports Russian security forces, either private or government, are being deployed to tankers transporting Russian oil.


Ukrainian forces training in Jomsburg, Poland.


Ukraine will reportedly eliminate their foreign legion formations and send their service members into assault units. It's unclear whether the service members can simply opt-out or if Ukraine intends to do this involuntarily. This will certainly limit recruitment, and it might be an indicator that Ukraine isn't seen much recruitment into these units anyway.


Russia continues to build up Donetsk airport for Shahed storage and launches.

 

rsemmes

Active Member
No joining NATO and no reparations.
Now Russia will demand land and Merry Christmas.

No foreign troops in Ukraine and EU more like in 2047.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Some (so-far) December stats from the guy who watches too many videos (Andrew Perpetua), the tweet can be found here:

Here are losses we could identify so far in December, not including today (because I did this instead of finishing today):

This list only includes losses I have gone through and verified as accurate, there are like 800 more I have not verified yet.

Civilian Vehicles (pickups, lada, loafs, etc):
- Russia: 511 (6 Abandoned, 339 Damaged, 166 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 991 (5 abandoned, 751 Damaged, 235 Destroyed)

ATVs:
- Russian 416 (1 Abandoned, 53 Damaged, 362 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 132 ( 2 Abandoned, 25 Damaged, 105 Destroyed)

Trucks:
- Russian: 113 (12 Abandoned, 86 Damaged, 15 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 69 (10 Abandoned, 44 Damaged, 15 Destroyed)

IMV:
- Ukrainian: 141 (34 Abandoned, 84 Damaged, 22 Destroyed, 1 old loss Recovered)

MRAP:
- Russian: 2 (2 Damaged)
- Ukrainian: 67 (47 Damaged, 20 Destroyed)

APC:
- Russian: 29 (9 Abandoned, 7 Damaged, 13 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 92 (35 Abandoned, 37 Damaged, 19 Destroyed, 1 Captured)

IFV:
- Russian: 56 (24 Abandoned, 16 Damaged, 16 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 20 (8 Dmaged, 12 Destroyed)

Tank:
- Russian: 81 (25 Abandoned, 35 Damaged, 21 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 51 (12 Abandoned, 26 Damaged, 13 Destroyed)

Other Armored Vehicles:
- Russian: 28 (17 Abandoned, 3 Damaged, 8 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 23 ( 11 Abandoned, 8 Damaged, 4 Destroyed)

Artillery:
- Russian: 153 (2 Abandoned, 143 Damaged, 8 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 157 ( 1 Abandoned, 140 Damaged, 16 Destroyed)

Air Defense:
- Russian: 10 (6 Damaged, 4 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian 1 ( 1 Damaged)

Radar:
- Russian: 18 (14 Damaged, 4 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian 11 (2 Damaged, 7 Destroyed) (these raw numbers are misleading, these Ukrainian radars are mostly irrelevant)

EW:
- Russian: 29 (1 Damaged, 28 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 32 (2 Damaged, 30 Destroyed)

Surveillance/Comms:
- Russian: 373 (2 Damaged, 371 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 735 (3 Damaged, 732 Destroyed)

Engineering Vehicles:
- Russian: 11 (1 Abandoned, 7 Damaged, 3 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 21 (19 Damaged, 13 Destroyed)

Recovery Vehicles:
- Russian: 4 (1 Abandoned, 1 Damaged, 2 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 1 (1 Abandoned)

Boats:
- Russian: 13 (10 Damaged, 3 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 4 (3 Damaged, 1 Destroyed)

Ships:
- Russian: 2 (1 Damaged, 1 Destroyed)

Planes:
- Russian: 9 (3 Damaged, 6 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: without visual confirmation

Drones (UGVs and USVs):
- Russian: 60 (19 Damaged, 41 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 415 (191 Damaged, 223 Destroyed, 1 Sunk)

Decoys:
- Russian: 1 (1 Damaged)
- Ukrainian: 12 (11 Damaged, 1 Destroyed)

Other Losses That Cannot be Identified:
- Russian: 29 (3 Abandoned, 13 Damaged, 13 Destroyed)
- Ukrainian: 33 (1 Abandoned, 19 Damaged, 13 Destroyed)



Sure seems like sustainable ratios for Ukraine and realistic 1:3 to 1:20 kill ratio (in UA favour, of course), depending on who you are listening to. Andrew himself is convinced that Russia is losing and compares it to the house of cards, be it on the battlefield, economic situation in Russia, you name it. Just a little more pressure…

To me, those numbers suggest that either a) Ukraine has no issues with neither recruitment nor equipment supplies or b) they are throwing all they have gotten to, apparently, keep the situation exactly as it appears to be now while working on their (currently completely unrealistic) peace plan.

Speaking of the peace plan:


Point 3 is straight up weird provided there is point 5. Point 5 also says that Russia cannot violate the ceasefire, but Ukraine can fire at Russian positions in the occupied territories and the US, NATO, and Europe will have to take action against Russia if the latter responds to the Ukrainian fire.

Russia has to formalize its non-aggression stance towards Ukraine and Europe while neither Ukraine nor Europe are obligated to do the same.

Points 8 and 9 are again redundant. The goal is to raise $800B to offset “the damage from the Russian war”. Interestingly though, based on the World Bank estimates, about half (of roughly $530B) the damage is due in the Russian occupied territories.

IMG_3317.jpeg

Source for the graphic presentaion:


Free-trade agreement with the US is a laughable concept until at least the next administration and not a given then either (unlikely, in my opinion).

Point 12 suggests that Russians should give up control of the nuclear plant, as well as some territory in Zaporozhie. That is a pipe dream. They are more likely to take a lot more before things wrap up.

Point 13 is not acceptable to Russia either. The “courses” aside, they have issues of language treatment in the Baltics, that are actually in the EU.

Point 14 is complete nonsense: the current frontline in the formally annexed regions is to be recognized as the de facto frontline. Is it not now? At the same time, Russia must withdraw from the Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv regions. The logical solution for Russia is to formally recognize the four regions in question as part of Russia, I guess? This point, by the way, goes well with my comments on the “security guarantees” above (point 5). Zelesnky himself is quoted in the article under this point that the war will continue and he is right (credit should be given where it is due).

Point 16 says that Russia actually does not have to withdraw from the occupied Mykolaiv region after all, but demilitarize it. And again some imposed obligations on Russia without the equal obligations imposed on Ukraine.

Way more to comment on this “plan”, but I believe this is more than sufficient to illustrate how unrealistic (and, frankly, completely nuts) this is. In my opinion, this is the worst proposal from Ukraine yet. Notably, zero talk about NATO membership at all as well. Overall, I am rather amazed how even poorly composed this thing is for presumably serious talks. I am sure Trump has subpar reading and comprehension skills, but many others do not, one would think.

I guess, this thread is yet to continue its active existence for a while yet, unfortunately.


Merry Christmas, to whom it may concern.
 

Redshift

Active Member
Evidence.
Omg ..... You constantly excuse Russia by saying other opinions (or even stated intentions ) don't matter, if they see Ukraine or NATO as a threat then Ukraine or NATO is a threat and you don't require them to provide evidence and we must all just accept their "feelings" because Russian feelings and opinions are all that matters.

Feel free to reply with your usual whataboutism or obfuscation of the point but I stopped reading your responses to my comments long ago as I don't really make them for you but for others to read.
 

Redshift

Active Member
...to Russia. Did I need to say that?
If I consider my neighbour's dog a threat, it is a threat to me. I doesn't matter what he thinks or what my/his second cousin thinks.
I will take counsel on my judgement of my fears.
Not on yours.

Edit.
NATO shouldn't and cannot take any action against an invasion because Russia considers those fears irrational.
So if you decide to shoot your neighbours poodle because you personally think that it is a threat that's just fine and dandy eh?

What if your neighbour decides that your goldfish is a threat should your neighbour break into your house and kill your goldfish?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The situation in Kupyansk continues to deteriorate for Russia. Ukraine is now gaining ground in eastern Kupyansk and it's looking like they will be able to push Russia out completely.

Sure seems like sustainable ratios for Ukraine and realistic 1:3 to 1:20 kill ratio (in UA favour, of course), depending on who you are listening to. Andrew himself is convinced that Russia is losing and compares it to the house of cards, be it on the battlefield, economic situation in Russia, you name it. Just a little more pressure…

To me, those numbers suggest that either a) Ukraine has no issues with neither recruitment nor equipment supplies or b) they are throwing all they have gotten to, apparently, keep the situation exactly as it appears to be now while working on their (currently completely unrealistic) peace plan.
I think some of this has to do with Ukraine's counter-offensive in Kupyansk. It's been costly. There have also been some counter-attacks in the Konstantinovka area where Ukraine has lost vehicles, and of course the costly attempt to push back into Pokrovsk spearheaded by the newly delivered Australian M1s.

EDIT: Ukraine's defenses in Gulyaypole seem to have collapsed. Russia is still mopping up but the town should be theirs within a day or two. This comes as Russia's push across the Gaychur expands in two bridgeheads, that are nonetheless so close together they will soon form one large one.
 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
What if we substitute “forced” with “encouraged with false expectations”? Whether the false expectations are known to be false by the encouraging parties or just a delusion I am not sure, but it does make a big difference.

Your overall point, however, is totally valid.

Im not sure after almost 4 years anyone has any false expectations any more. Even early on, it should of been fundamentally obvious that aid to UKR would by drop by drop.

To be fair, Russia hasn’t even come close to the level of mobilization that would be required to end the war quickly.
True, but RU is likely logistically maxed out, and with AFV stocks largely tapped out, the ensuing internal political dissatisfaction from general mobilization or using conscripts would likely be dangerous.

Also, as per the RUSI report on the RU air defense I cited recently, Russia has not used their newest GBAD missiles at all in this war (probbaly for a reason) and used their “second best” only on a few occasions. I right away thought of Armata tanks and the like, but those are RUSI’s claims.
They have used some of their very fews S-500 batteries in Crimea from old reports, but they dont have enough S-500 to make a difference. See any T-14 in use at the front ? How about Su-57 ? Both are absent - but for good reason - there arent enough of them to make a difference, and the risk of getting them blown up outweighs the benefits of their use. RU is all in at this point.

What about Kazakhstan? You definitely can say that Tokaev is in power solely due to the Russian direct open action during the coup attempt in the early 2022 (an action they never had to take in Belarus). Yet self-governed and not a puppet.
My take on Kazak politics isnt nearly as good as what I know about Belarus (which isnt a great deal in any case), but the point still stands with regards to Belarus vs Poland, Puppet vs Ally.

On this subject. I think I may have talked about it before, but Biletsky (of the Azov), I think it was, who said the other day that soon the number of deserters/AWOL will be higher than the number of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or at least those fighting. There is also this great (but idiotic, in my opinion) narrative spread by the Ukrainians that the absolute majority of those deserters and AWOL are simply soldiers trying to switch from one unit to another. Well… (via Google translate from Ukrainian on both accounts)
Again- clearly there is an issue. However, the apparatus as a whole functions for now.


What Poroshenko said there, in short, without literal word for word translation, is that the Flamingo missiles do exist, by they do not work. They can fly and all but never hit targets. They do work in tandem with Neptune, as distractors. Neptune missiles manage to hit targets when they fly next to Flamingos (which is absurd because they fly at different speeds and trajectories -> hence my translation above as “in tandem”). He concludes that they are only useful when a Neptune needs to hit a target, otherwise not so much. But, he lastly says, psychological effect - he makes a gesture - is quite great.
The only clear attributed use of the Flamingo (Crimea) points to issues that need to be resolved. Like the Neptune, I will assume it will get better over time.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
It literally is not. Wanting to fight, or being willing to fight, refers to the desires of individual citizens. The desire of the Ukrainian government to keep fighting isn't in question.
Do you see widespread political agitation to stop fighting ? Do you see defense contractors deliberately leaving orders unfilled ? Is there sabotage of vehicles and munitions ?

We are probably quibbling over definitions, but without the above, there is clear evidence of the desire to not be Russian.

Now, no one can doubt this is changing over time:


With an increase in "Ukraine should seek to negotiate an ending to the war as soon as possible" this points to war weariness- but this is not the same as surrender. I take (collective) desire to not fight = surrender.

Best current estimates put Ukraine at somewhere between 400-500k troops, with ~300k deserters. There are examples of formations that lose over half of personnel in training before they get to the front lines. I think we can all agree the comparison to US AWOL and draft dodgers is at the very least inaccurate and misleading.
Quantitatively, sure, but the presence of draft dodgers alone doesnt imply anything other than the human nature to not get killed. We are agreeing in principle and disagreeing to the extent of "wanting to fight".

Once we see several of the following, you can be sure the wheels have fallen off the UKR war effort:

- polling indicating the desire to end the war no matter what
- mass protests
- domestic war production suffering from strikes or other logistic disruptions
- widespread, continued RU advances with lower casualty rates
 
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