Middle East Defence & Security

[Feanor]

Seems the Syrian civil war refuses to die down.
Turkish forces have reportedly entered in larger numbers through northern Syria last night.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1897928110458229008

It's back to full on warfare in Latakia, with reports of mass murders by the new government forces, and apparently a resumption of "barrel-bombings". If Russia wasn't busy in Ukraine, this would be a great time for them to step in, and with some agreement with Turkey and Israel, create an Alawite state on the coast.

 

[PachkaSigaret]

The past few months have been rough on the coast. It's more of a fight of survival, lot's of persecution and reprisals upon the Alawites. They might as well fight back the best they can.

NSFW:

https://x.com/MyLordBebo/status/1897971624499913104

https://x.com/MyLordBebo/status/1897983473261900023

https://x.com/MyLordBebo/status/1897996977570210238

I'm seeing unconfirmed reports that Russia is taking refugees at the airbase. I wonder if that'll further aggravate the new governmental forces.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

It's back to full on warfare in Latakia, with reports of mass murders by the new government forces, and apparently a resumption of "barrel-bombings". If Russia wasn't busy in Ukraine, this would be a great time for them to step in, and with some agreement with Turkey and Israel, create an Alawite state on the coast.

I think this only validates Israeli policy in Syria, particularly its decision to destroy most of SAA's former arsenal, and also create a buffer zone overlooking Damascus and protect the Druze.

HTS started the massacres on day one, but it was very low key and none mentioned it much. Now that it picked up the pace we finally hear about it. 300 victims so far.

I hate the IRGC and Assadists as much as everyone else, but this brutality is meant to signal to us that they're just Assadists 2.0.

Like I said on the day it happened - I'm happy for the Syrians who feel like they've been liberated, and at the same time Jolani is still the ISIS longbeard he always was.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

The Alawites made a strategic mistake. By not rallying and forming armed groups in the coastal areas during the SAA's retreat, they've lost a tremendous geographic advantage.
Still, not all hope is lost. They can still regain control over these territories, and once it happens HTS will find it nearly impossible to penetrate these areas, especially if the Alawites receive some external support.

The subject of support is tricky. Here's why:

• Israel indirectly supported the Alawites and all endangered minorities in Syria, particularly Kurds and Druze, by eliminating HTS's potential new arsenal and their chemical weapons.
  • Although not CAS, the Alawites at least know in the short term the threat is much lower and consists of unga bungas on Toyota trucks, not tanks, artillery, and aviation. At least not nearly in the quantity SAA had.
  • Israel did not destroy the SAA's arsenal while they were in power though, nor imported weapons. So Alawites cannot bank on Israel to keep HTS's arsenal down on the same level as it is now.
    
• Iran could sponsor Alawites.
  • It's currently looking to regain foothold in Syria and restore its land corridor to Lebanon.
  • On-shore and easily defensible geography make Alawites a prime candidate.
  • Alawites had cooperated with Iran in the past.
    
• Russia could sponsor Alawites.
  • Its bases in Syria will likely regain importance once the war in Ukraine ends.
  • Same reasons as Iran.
    
• Russia and Iran were competitors.
  • Although allied in some aspects, they were also rivals. Iranian and Russian influence in Syria often came at each others' expense.
  • Russia is arguably better for Israel than Iran.
    
• Turkey could strike a deal.
  • Although it supports the HTS, it could also seek to negotiate a truce and sponsor both. Alawites with weaponry threatening Israel and its naval assets and east-med trade, and HTS with weaponry to keep themselves in power and threaten Israel more directly.
  • But that would also be a threat to the Alawites. They'll be subjugated, with their executioners armed by their own sponsors, and the threat of the order being given if they misbehave.

All in all, the Alawites have multiple parties they could build relations with and hope for sponsorship. They could also go it their own way, be an autonomous region. Difficult to predict what they'll choose.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Terrorists in Daraa governorate organizing and rallying against IDF forces in Syria.
Daraa is of strategic importance to Israel. It stands between the Quneitra and Sweida governorates, controlled by the IDF and Druze respectively.
Daraa population is predominantly Sunni, so they're an obstacle.

A more organized and coordinated front against Israel would give the IDF a more comfortable center of power to attack. It's the disorganized terrorism the IDF's struggling more with.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1898480460528857414

 

[Big_Zucchini]

When confused by incoherence, search for the coherence.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1898501875785498924

Spokesperson statement on latest developments in Syria

The European Union strongly condemns the recent attacks, reportedly by pro-Assad elements, on interim government forces in the coastal areas of Syria and all violence against civilians. Civilians have to be protected in all circumstances in full respect of international humanitarian law. The EU...

www.eeas.europa.eu

The EU condemns the Alawites, aka Assad-loyalists. Israel responds when HTS moves to attack Druze.

Essentially, the EU and Israel seem to be on opposing sides again, despite being natural allies vs the axis. Here, search for the coherence.
Israel and the EU will both benefit from each other's success.

Israel will benefit if the EU succeeds in deporting refugees.
The EU will benefit if Syria balkanizes and the overall capacity for tribal violence there reduces, along with international power plays. In turn reducing chances of a repeated immigrant wave.

The opposing sides are not really opposing.

 

[Feanor]

I think this only validates Israeli policy in Syria, particularly its decision to destroy most of SAA's former arsenal, and also create a buffer zone overlooking Damascus and protect the Druze.

HTS started the massacres on day one, but it was very low key and none mentioned it much. Now that it picked up the pace we finally hear about it. 300 victims so far.

I hate the IRGC and Assadists as much as everyone else, but this brutality is meant to signal to us that they're just Assadists 2.0.

Like I said on the day it happened - I'm happy for the Syrians who feel like they've been liberated, and at the same time Jolani is still the ISIS longbeard he always was.

I strongly disagree. I think Israel wanted Syria as a failed state and as such bears some of the responsibility for the state of affairs. It has plenty of others to share this responsibility with, and I don't for a second suggest Israel is the main one to blame. The main ones to blame are HTS. But in no particular order Assad, Russia, Turkey, the USA, Saudi Arabia, and a few others all share part of the blame here. And let's be clear here, HTS are not Assadists 2.0. Assad was a secular dictator, a Cold War relic really.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I strongly disagree. I think Israel wanted Syria as a failed state and as such bears some of the responsibility for the state of affairs

Israel wanting Syria as a failed state, comes in contradiction with its regional doctrine and events we've seen all throughout its history, including very recent ones.
It seems to me that it has always strived to maintain stability among its neighbors. Examples:

• Egypt
  • Peace treaty.
  • Waived peace treaty terms to defeat Sinai insurgency.
  • Intelligence sharing.
  • Energy trade.
    
• Jordan
  • Peace treaty.
  • Rumored and quite substantiated Israeli security guarantees.
  • Intelligence sharing.
  • Mutual trade.
  • Water supply (Israel -> Jordan) agreement.
    
• Lebanon
  • Recently eliminated Hezbollah.
  • Western-backed government.
  • Government recently formed after a long political crisis.
  • Iranian influence being pushed out.
    
• Syria (Assad family)
  • Ceasefire (Hafez).
  • Informal quiet (Bashar).
  • Quietest Israeli border despite IRGC presence.
  • No escalation during Israel's WBW campaign (war-between-wars).

It could definitely be argued that Hezbollah's downfall created the circumstances for Assad's own downfall. I assume that's what you mean when you say Israel has some responsibility here. But eliminating Hezbollah was a much greater interest for Israel, at least in the short term, than Assad's rule's preservation. Hezbollah was a present and arguably the most capable threat to Israel's security at the time.
Still, the claim of Israel's interest in destabilized Syria is incoherent to me because of above mentioned factors. It strove to stability among its neighbors, and I argue that even now the balkanization of Syria and destruction of SAA's former arsenal contribute to stability:

• Overall capacity for violence in Syria has drastically reduced.
  • General equation of HTS and other forces reduces risk to civilians, decreases size of conflict zones.
• No excessively dominant party means territorial expansion by any party is somewhat deterred.
• Protecting the Druze and Kurds should result in at least some parts of Syria being permanently secured and de-conflicted.
  • Israeli aerial support for Druze will either deter violence against them, or make any attack short-lived.
• Balkanization of Syria revolves around multiple strong centers of power (autonomous regions), not chaotic territorial conflicts, even if they may occur in the early stages of the process.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

In continuation of last post, Israel has an opportunity to cultivate ties and alliances across the region by offering protection.
It would be difficult to trust Alawites considering their past alliances with Iran and Russia, but the feasibility of restarting relations must be examined with them and any willing faction across the region.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899020807717703949

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Another great video by Pataramesh. To me this illustrates how hard at work Iran is to make their missiles more accurate and thus more relevant. Despite losses they don't relent.
If the Iranian threat is not dealt with, they will close more technological gaps. Iran's ability to improve missile navigation and guidance systems is greater than Israel's capability to improve kinematic capabilities of its missile defenses.

I agree with the assessment below. HTS is allied with Turkey and its proxy SNA. This of course follows PKK's surrender. The upside is that HTS MAY choose to stand up to Turkey and insist on territorial integrity and non aggression toward Kurds.
The downside is that in the little time HTS have been in power, they have only demonstrated the opposite - attacking the SDF, Druze, and most recently brutally abusing then murdering Alawite POWs and civilians.
There is very little room for optimism for the Kurds. In the absence of a land corridor, whatever Israel could provide is naturally limited, and the US, from a strategic POV, would be unwise to pick a fight with Turkey over pretty much inconsequential allies.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899270721219535330

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Rumors swirling about the Druze also coming into agreement with HTS, similar to SDF, about integrating into a whole Syria. Now also a Syrian flag being raised.
It's not yet confirmed. If true, this would pose a serious challenge to Israel. On one hand, Israel insists on a DMZ, especially to protect the Druze but also to create strategic depth vs Islamist terrorist groups, and to close off the main Syria-Jordan border crossing through the Sunni Dara'a.
On the other hand, its relationship with the Druze must be maintained, including for the sake of Israel's own Druze community that's well integrated into Israeli society and army.

It's possible that the objective to protect the Syrian Druze via a DMZ will be waived until HTS starts any violent action, but Dara'a being a Sunni area means the IDF can keep going as usual in regards to the border crossing.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899476612745146609

 

[T.C.P]

Rumors swirling about the Druze also coming into agreement with HTS, similar to SDF, about integrating into a whole Syria. Now also a Syrian flag being raised.
It's not yet confirmed. If true, this would pose a serious challenge to Israel. On one hand, Israel insists on a DMZ, especially to protect the Druze but also to create strategic depth vs Islamist terrorist groups, and to close off the main Syria-Jordan border crossing through the Sunni Dara'a.
On the other hand, its relationship with the Druze must be maintained, including for the sake of Israel's own Druze community that's well integrated into Israeli society and army.

It's possible that the objective to protect the Syrian Druze via a DMZ will be waived until HTS starts any violent action, but Dara'a being a Sunni area means the IDF can keep going as usual in regards to the border crossing.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899476612745146609

The Druze and SDF coming to terms with the HTS govt kind of lends credence tot he reports that were saying that Israel was lobying for Russia to stay. If Israeli intelligence knew that the Druze and SDF were about to fold and only the Alwaites, who are geogrpahically too far away, would hold out aginst the HTS govt, then their reason for lobbying for RUssia to stay makes sense.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

The Druze and SDF coming to terms with the HTS govt kind of lends credence tot he reports that were saying that Israel was lobying for Russia to stay. If Israeli intelligence knew that the Druze and SDF were about to fold and only the Alwaites, who are geogrpahically too far away, would hold out aginst the HTS govt, then their reason for lobbying for RUssia to stay makes sense.

I believe the reports of Israel lobbying to keep Russian bases were believable. But I fail to see the connection.

Israel sought multiple independent alliances with the Kurds, Druze, and at least separatism in Alawite regions.
But if anything, to me, the Russia angle is only part of that strategy, or a bonus, not a replacement to that.
Aim for the best, keep what you can. It's an X and Y, not X or Y. At least IMO.

 

[Feanor]

Israel wanting Syria as a failed state, comes in contradiction with its regional doctrine and events we've seen all throughout its history, including very recent ones.
It seems to me that it has always strived to maintain stability among its neighbors. Examples:

• Egypt
  • Peace treaty.
  • Waived peace treaty terms to defeat Sinai insurgency.
  • Intelligence sharing.
  • Energy trade.
• Jordan
  • Peace treaty.
  • Rumored and quite substantiated Israeli security guarantees.
  • Intelligence sharing.
  • Mutual trade.
  • Water supply (Israel -> Jordan) agreement.
• Lebanon
  • Recently eliminated Hezbollah.
  • Western-backed government.
  • Government recently formed after a long political crisis.
  • Iranian influence being pushed out.
• Syria (Assad family)
  • Ceasefire (Hafez).
  • Informal quiet (Bashar).
  • Quietest Israeli border despite IRGC presence.
  • No escalation during Israel's WBW campaign (war-between-wars).

It could definitely be argued that Hezbollah's downfall created the circumstances for Assad's own downfall. I assume that's what you mean when you say Israel has some responsibility here. But eliminating Hezbollah was a much greater interest for Israel, at least in the short term, than Assad's rule's preservation. Hezbollah was a present and arguably the most capable threat to Israel's security at the time.
Still, the claim of Israel's interest in destabilized Syria is incoherent to me because of above mentioned factors. It strove to stability among its neighbors, and I argue that even now the balkanization of Syria and destruction of SAA's former arsenal contribute to stability:

• Overall capacity for violence in Syria has drastically reduced.
  • General equation of HTS and other forces reduces risk to civilians, decreases size of conflict zones.
• No excessively dominant party means territorial expansion by any party is somewhat deterred.
• Protecting the Druze and Kurds should result in at least some parts of Syria being permanently secured and de-conflicted.
  • Israeli aerial support for Druze will either deter violence against them, or make any attack short-lived.
• Balkanization of Syria revolves around multiple strong centers of power (autonomous regions), not chaotic territorial conflicts, even if they may occur in the early stages of the process.

I believe Israel prefers not to have firm neighbors with regards to whom Israel would be bound by international law and instead prefers to operate in a grey area that allows them to have the full range of options, military and political. Consider this; a firm Syria, at peace with Israel, with an internationally legitimate government. Could they host Iranian military bases? Of course they could, it's their territory. Would Israel have any legal rights to strike those bases? No. But they would certainly want to. It's the same reason they're happy to have Russia inside a jihadi Syria, but a weak jihadi Syria at war with itself, and probably hostile to Iran.

It would be difficult to trust Alawites considering their past alliances with Iran and Russia,

Of course. It would be difficult to trust anyone that has worked with Russia closely. Shared intelligence, transferred military technology, helped them evade US sanctions. Pot meet kettle?

On a side note, this sentiment is frankly ridiculous. Are you under the impression that the murdered villagers in Latakia had a say in Assad's alliances with Russia and Iran? You would have to be delusional to think anyone asked them. Or is it that you think the current ethnic cleansings are carefully targeted at former Assadist regime supporters and nobody else as the EU seems to think (with their utterly vile statement)? What do Alawites as a community, as an ethnic and religious group have to do with the political decisions made by a secular military dictatorship such that to you this means protecting them from ethnic cleansing would be problematic?

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I believe Israel prefers not to have firm neighbors with regards to whom Israel would be bound by international law and instead prefers to operate in a grey area that allows them to have the full range of options, military and political.

LOAC+IHL is actually very permissive of military operations. 99% of cases I heard references to it were misinterpretations believing LOAC+IHL prohibit combat when IRL they just set the framework for it.
Since Israel had absolutely no issue conducting warfare within the framework of LOAC+IHL, I find the idea that Israel would somehow prefer the opposite in 2025, to be very strange.
In fact, adherence has contributed to Israel's political flexibility.
For example, while regional nations and terrorist orgs typically kill and torture their victims, Israel prefers to arrest and capture whenever possible.
Contrary to what death penalty advocates may think, this actually provides Israel with a great deal of HUMINT, particularly in wartime, and these can also be later used as a bargaining chip. Most recent case would be the hostage deal, in which Israel traded 50-100 terrorists per hostage.

Of much higher strategic importance, operating within LOAC+IHL significantly increases Israel's breathing space in terms of warfare longevity. Necessary because Israel is under a media microscope during every war.
Non-adherence would likely lead to imposition of sanctions and isolation very quickly.

Consider this; a firm Syria, at peace with Israel, with an internationally legitimate government. Could they host Iranian military bases? Of course they could, it's their territory.

Being at peace with Israel and hosting Iranian bases are mutually exclusive concepts.
But let's not deal with hypotheticals when we have real world examples.
Since 1948, Israel ended hostility with a row of Arab countries in 2 main ways:
Peace with countries it fought with, and Normalization with countries that were hostile to it. Normalization is another word for Non-Aggression Agreement.
But in all cases, as mediator and sponsor, the US offered willing Arab nations some upgrade of security ties with the US.
Not all accepted the US as the sole sponsor, with Russia and China being common arms supplier, for example to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE.
But while rapprochement with Iran was sometimes on the table, there never was nor is there any Iranian base or overt presence in any such country.
Certainly not in those with whom peace was negotiated.

Further, your hypothetical scenario is not too limiting. If Syria was to formally make peace with Israel and then host Iranians, then if those Iranians were believed to take part in hostile actions vs Israel, the peace agreement would be either void, or Israel would receive permission to strike as it did in Egypt back when ISIS was still a thing.
The key here is that the massive Israeli military advantage is a deterrent against any violations and Arab-Iranian cooperation.

Would Israel have any legal rights to strike those bases? No.

That's not exactly true. Israel and Iran are nations at war. It depends on the circumstances.
If such bases would beyond doubt present an imminent military threat or are actively used to support a war effort against Israel, then the relationship status between Israel and Syria would be legally irrelevant.
But also, such strike would not void a peace treaty. Peace treaties are not a matter of pure technicalities. Israel and Egypt both routinely violate the original terms of the peace treaty and agree to ignore it because they understand these are well intended and not against one another, but against common threats.

Of course. It would be difficult to trust anyone that has worked with Russia closely. Shared intelligence, transferred military technology, helped them evade US sanctions. Pot meet kettle?

Either I don't understand the meaning of a pot meeting a kettle, or I don't understand what you're trying to say.
But on the surface level, yes I agree. Aside from a temporary thaw, Israel and Russia were and still are firmly hostile to each other, only really bound by the fact that neither has the energy or will to actually make it kinetic, instead just supporting each other's enemies.

On a side note, this sentiment is frankly ridiculous. Are you under the impression that the murdered villagers in Latakia had a say in Assad's alliances with Russia and Iran? You would have to be delusional to think anyone asked them.

Assad's main supporter base, as an Alawite... are Alawites. That means their survival also depended a lot on Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Else they'd be butchered as well. It'd be foolish to think they'd forget the help they got from them and choose Israel instead. Some loyalty must remain, and it's evident the Alawite insurgency we've seen this past week was of Assad-loyalists.

Or is it that you think the current ethnic cleansings are carefully targeted at former Assadist regime supporters and nobody else as the EU seems to think (with their utterly vile statement)?

In fact I've said multiple times here that the victims are also Kurds, Druze, Alawite civilians, Christians, and there are reports of Alawite insurgents targeting civilians as well.

What do Alawites as a community, as an ethnic and religious group have to do with the political decisions made by a secular military dictatorship such that to you this means protecting them from ethnic cleansing would be problematic?

Not protecting them would be problematic. But prospects of them choosing to partner with Israel are very low due to history with Iran-Russia-Hezbollah, and also pro-Israeli sentiment in the Arab world is as rare as water in the desert. I certainly wouldn't count the Alawites in the top 10 candidates for that title.

 

[Feanor]

LOAC+IHL is actually very permissive of military operations. 99% of cases I heard references to it were misinterpretations believing LOAC+IHL prohibit combat when IRL they just set the framework for it.
Since Israel had absolutely no issue conducting warfare within the framework of LOAC+IHL, I find the idea that Israel would somehow prefer the opposite in 2025, to be very strange.
In fact, adherence has contributed to Israel's political flexibility.
For example, while regional nations and terrorist orgs typically kill and torture their victims, Israel prefers to arrest and capture whenever possible.
Contrary to what death penalty advocates may think, this actually provides Israel with a great deal of HUMINT, particularly in wartime, and these can also be later used as a bargaining chip. Most recent case would be the hostage deal, in which Israel traded 50-100 terrorists per hostage.

Of much higher strategic importance, operating within LOAC+IHL significantly increases Israel's breathing space in terms of warfare longevity. Necessary because Israel is under a media microscope during every war.
Non-adherence would likely lead to imposition of sanctions and isolation very quickly.

You're carefully dodging the substantive point. You can't go into another sovereign nation's territory period. It's not about the LOAC, it's about the UN Charter which flat out prohibits it outside of a very few special circumstances.

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence ...

I'm sure you can locate the full text at your leisure.

Being at peace with Israel and hosting Iranian bases are mutually exclusive concepts.

No they aren't. Israel and Mexico aren't at war. Mexico could host Iranian military bases tomorrow, do it in secret, and it would be some time before Israel found out. According to your statement a state of war would exist between Mexico and Israel from the moment they host those bases?

But let's not deal with hypotheticals when we have real world examples.
Since 1948, Israel ended hostility with a row of Arab countries in 2 main ways:
Peace with countries it fought with, and Normalization with countries that were hostile to it. Normalization is another word for Non-Aggression Agreement.
But in all cases, as mediator and sponsor, the US offered willing Arab nations some upgrade of security ties with the US.
Not all accepted the US as the sole sponsor, with Russia and China being common arms supplier, for example to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE.
But while rapprochement with Iran was sometimes on the table, there never was nor is there any Iranian base or overt presence in any such country.
Certainly not in those with whom peace was negotiated.

You're conflating what did happen with the general argument. If the UAE hosted Iranian bases would Israel declare war on them?

Further, your hypothetical scenario is not too limiting. If Syria was to formally make peace with Israel and then host Iranians, then if those Iranians were believed to take part in hostile actions vs Israel, the peace agreement would be either void, or Israel would receive permission to strike as it did in Egypt back when ISIS was still a thing.
The key here is that the massive Israeli military advantage is a deterrent against any violations and Arab-Iranian cooperation.

Exactly. Israel wants a space where anyone who would be willing to host Iranian assets is a failed state or in a position where Israel can strike targets there. You're making my argument for me.

That's not exactly true. Israel and Iran are nations at war. It depends on the circumstances.

They are? Who declared war on whom and when?

If such bases would beyond doubt present an imminent military threat or are actively used to support a war effort against Israel, then the relationship status between Israel and Syria would be legally irrelevant.

Who decides for legal purposes whether they present an imminent threat? What if they're not being used to support a war effort against Israel? What if all they're doing is helping the Syrian military build up a massive arsenal of drones and missiles? A Syria that in this example is at peace with Israel? And why exactly would something that's an imminent threat make the state of peace irrelevant? Are you arguing the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive strike?

But also, such strike would not void a peace treaty. Peace treaties are not a matter of pure technicalities. Israel and Egypt both routinely violate the original terms of the peace treaty and agree to ignore it because they understand these are well intended and not against one another, but against common threats.

Striking a target inside a country you are at peace with, without their permission, to you is not a violation of peace with that country? In your mind that would be acceptable and not an act of war, i.e. an illegal act of aggression against another sovereign state?

Either I don't understand the meaning of a pot meeting a kettle, or I don't understand what you're trying to say.
But on the surface level, yes I agree. Aside from a temporary thaw, Israel and Russia were and still are firmly hostile to each other, only really bound by the fact that neither has the energy or will to actually make it kinetic, instead just supporting each other's enemies.

Hogwash. This has been your assertion but the facts don't bear it out. Israel continued to work with Russia despite US sanctions, including transferring technology in violation of those sanctions. Right now Israel is in favor of a continued Russian presence in Syria. USSR and USA were firmly hostile. Can you ever imagine this sort of thing taking place between them? Israel has a complex relationship with Russia and they aren't exactly friends. But they also aren't exactly hostile. In point of fact I can't think of a single overtly hostile act between the two off the top of my head.

Assad's main supporter base, as an Alawite... are Alawites. That means their survival also depended a lot on Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Else they'd be butchered as well. It'd be foolish to think they'd forget the help they got from them and choose Israel instead. Some loyalty must remain, and it's evident the Alawite insurgency we've seen this past week was of Assad-loyalists.

All of them? The majority? The ones that were killed? There is a distinct disconnect between the decision makers and the victims here.

In fact I've said multiple times here that the victims are also Kurds, Druze, Alawite civilians, Christians, and there are reports of Alawite insurgents targeting civilians as well.

We have a wholesale slaughter of civilians and your response is that trusting those civilians, you know the ones that got murdered and the ones in the process of being murdered, is problematic because... "Assad's main supporter base, as an Alawite... are Alawites. That means their survival also depended a lot on Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Else they'd be butchered as well."

Take moment, consider your statement.

Not protecting them would be problematic. But prospects of them choosing to partner with Israel are very low due to history with Iran-Russia-Hezbollah, and also pro-Israeli sentiment in the Arab world is as rare as water in the desert. I certainly wouldn't count the Alawites in the top 10 candidates for that title.

You don't stop ethnic cleansing to form a political partnership. One may follow the other, but it's not why this needs to stop. It needs to stop because it's wrong on its own. Even if Alawites are completely hostile to Israel, this needs to be stopped.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

You're carefully dodging the substantive point. You can't go into another sovereign nation's territory period. It's not about the LOAC, it's about the UN Charter which flat out prohibits it outside of a very few special circumstances.

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence ...

Seems you read the text and avoided all the following caveats.
There are 2 things to remember in this context:

1. UN in itself is a rigid organization increasingly ignored by the west due to its increasing irrelevance.
   1. Its charter, as any legal system, must adapt with time, and these too are rigid.
2. Even within the charter, there is reference to circumstances that you briefly mentioned, such as being in a state of war.
   1. Violation of one's sovereignty is certainly permitted in times of war.
   2. International law systems clearly define a framework for warfare, which necessarily involves breaching one's sovereignty.
3. Israel and Syria are in a de facto state of war.
   1. Transition of power is not generally considered to grant a clean slate to any country.
      1. A clean slate, if provided, is more practical than legal. Meaning it's up to every nation to decide on that.
   2. While a formal state of war is not always sufficient, it's de facto been over a decade since mutual hostilities between Syria-Israel resumed, making such exchanges completely legal.
   3. Syria can negotiate a peace treaty with Israel if it wishes to avoid hostilities.
      1. Barring potential accidents, Israel has never violated the sovereignty of neighbors with whom it came to a peace agreement, nor has it violated agreed ceasefires.
      2. It had many chances in the past, and the door is still open for a future agreement.
4. The idea that sovereignty violations are done just for the sake of violation, is illogical. That is not a strategic goal or advantage in any way.
   1. Freedom of operation is another thing.
   2. Arguably, Israel never required freedom of operation over territories of countries with whom it negotiated peace.
   3. And Israel was always willing to relinquish said freedom in exchange for peace.

No they aren't. Israel and Mexico aren't at war. Mexico could host Iranian military bases tomorrow, do it in secret, and it would be some time before Israel found out. According to your statement a state of war would exist between Mexico and Israel from the moment they host those bases?

Taking it too literally. Israel is not in a state of war with countries hosting Iranian military assets and personnel. But as I explained before, in practical terms and relating to the middle east, countries at peace with Israel do not host Iranian troops and are well deterred against that. Middle eastern countries hosting Iranian bases/troops/assets of substance, are not at peace with Israel.
Lebanon is an exception as it is in a transition period. It's not at peace with Israel, though there are prospects for that, and Israeli-Lebanese peace was only deemed realistic when Hezbollah was smacked hard.

You're conflating what did happen with the general argument. If the UAE hosted Iranian bases would Israel declare war on them?

No. But it would certainly end much of the processes that commenced after the normalization agreement, such as civilian travel to and above UAE, arms exports, defense cooperation, etc.

Exactly. Israel wants a space where anyone who would be willing to host Iranian assets is a failed state or in a position where Israel can strike targets there. You're making my argument for me.

If Iran has presence anywhere, Israel would rather hit it. Yes. But also, Israel would much rather said host state would be at peace with Israel and thus not host said presence.
That's why Israel was always proactive about negotiating peace with its neighbors, and normalization with its more distant neighbors.
Egypt for example was sponsored by the USSR, until a peace treaty in which Egypt also switched suppliers. These things go hand in hand.
So if a chance presents itself for actual peace with the new Syrian government, I'm sure Israel would pursue it. But it seems as of right now that Israel does not trust HTS one bit.

They are? Who declared war on whom and when?

Formal declarations of war aren't a thing anymore. The first large scale Israeli-Iranian clash that I can think of is the 2006 Lebanon War. Iranian troops invaded northern Israel, killed and kidnapped several soldiers, and commenced artillery fire into northern Israeli cities. In the absence of a formal state of war, this pretty much does it.
The most recent one is the BM exchange.

Who decides for legal purposes whether they present an imminent threat?

The army itself. In Israel's case, the IDF. Depending on intelligence assessment and posture at the time, it could either be independent action by the IDF, or involve the security cabinet. It's usually the latter.
There is no legal authority above a state. But Israel is in friendly relations with the western world and in alliance with some of them. It also means defense cooperation and intelligence sharing. If it was assessed by western nations that Israel's security decisions, including and primarily a pre-emptive strike, were unjustified, we'd see a certain response to it.
Since the west has never really pressured Israel beyond the very minimal level required to maintain incumbent leadership popularity, I assess that such situation hasn't happened at least in recent history.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

What if they're not being used to support a war effort against Israel? What if all they're doing is helping the Syrian military build up a massive arsenal of drones and missiles? A Syria that in this example is at peace with Israel? And why exactly would something that's an imminent threat make the state of peace irrelevant? Are you arguing the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive strike?

Being a hypothetical, there is much unknown here. It's unprecedented. But I think it also misses an important context - when Israel negotiated peace with Syria back in the 2000's for example, one of the demands was no Iranian presence on Syrian soil. Likewise, Israel is highly likely to demand something similar of Lebanon in the current and following negotiations if they extend to peace talks.
So in any realistic case, such presence would in itself be in violation of the peace agreement.
I'll use Syria as an example once again. If Iran's military presence in Syria is used, for example, to rearm Hezbollah in Lebanon, then that could certainly be constructed as a military threat and violation of an agreement.
In that case, Israel could, as in the Assad precedent, request Syria to remove Iran's presence on its own (with a deadline), or in the less likely case inform Syria that it will remove Iran's presence and de-conflict so that Israeli and Syrian military assets do not shoot at each other.

During ISIS's peak of popularity, its Sinai branch fired missiles at the Israeli city Eilat. Although a breach of the peace agreement, it did not break down, and Israel and Egypt coordinated to remove the threat, including with Israeli airstrikes on Egyptian soil and deconfliction with Egyptian forces.

Hogwash. This has been your assertion but the facts don't bear it out. Israel continued to work with Russia despite US sanctions, including transferring technology in violation of those sanctions.

What time period are you referring to? I can only assume you mean the IAI Searcher (Forpost) sale to Russia, which at the time was dwarfed by other western arms sales to Russia, including an entire French Mistral LHD whose sale was only cancelled at the last moment. Israel was not the exception back then. West-Russia relations were much less hostile back then.

Right now Israel is in favor of a continued Russian presence in Syria. USSR and USA were firmly hostile. Can you ever imagine this sort of thing taking place between them?

Yes, actually.
Israel and Iran were also mutually hostile post-revolution, yet they cooperated against the Iraqi nuclear program.
But the comparison with the USSR-USA is a bad one. USA-USSR were each other's main adversaries. For Israel, that would be Iran. Russia ceased to be a major adversary after the USSR collapsed, and even before that when peace with Egypt and Jordan was negotiated and Soviet/Russian presence at Israel's borders was reduced to just a fraction of the past.

A closer comparison would be the US preferring Iran take over a certain area from the USSR, as Iran was not nearly as important an adversary.
But another difference here is that the US is a superpower with global reach. Israel is not. Its resources are limited, and just defending its borders takes up significant treasure and manpower, far beyond what western nations would typically accept.

Israel has a complex relationship with Russia and they aren't exactly friends. But they also aren't exactly hostile. In point of fact I can't think of a single overtly hostile act between the two off the top of my head.

Because, as I explained, there is no reason to get kinetic over things. Hostile actions are kept at a low. Israel sells arms to Europe. Russia sells arms to Israel's adversaries, including Hezbollah, and invests in political influence campaigns across the west, including in Israel.
It's not like Israel and Russia are neutral to one another. It's more hostile than friendly.

All of them? The majority? The ones that were killed? There is a distinct disconnect between the decision makers and the victims here.

Tell me, do you honestly believe the Alawites generally see Israel favorably and would accept an alliance?

We have a wholesale slaughter of civilians and your response is that trusting those civilians, you know the ones that got murdered and the ones in the process of being murdered, is problematic because... "Assad's main supporter base, as an Alawite... are Alawites. That means their survival also depended a lot on Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah. Else they'd be butchered as well."

Take moment, consider your statement.

What do you find wrong about this statement?
There are also clashes in Jenin between PA security forces, local terrorist orgs, and Hamas. All of them consider Israel an enemy, and all are terrorist organizations. So when they kill each other, just because there are civilians being murdered by them, it somehow makes the local civilian populations view Israel favorably? No. It won't.

My first response in the forum (I wrote much more on Twitter) on the subject was:
"I hate the IRGC and Assadists as much as everyone else, but this brutality is meant to signal to us that they're (HTS) just Assadists 2.0.
Like I said on the day it happened (HTS revolution) - I'm happy for the Syrians who feel like they've been liberated, and at the same time Jolani is still the ISIS longbeard he always was. "

In a wider look at the region, Alawites have multiple options to choose from as protectors, and given sentiment toward Israel in the region - Israel is an unlikely option. Is that a wrong assessment?

If so, why do you believe Alawites would prefer Israeli support over Russian, Iranian, or Turkish?

You don't stop ethnic cleansing to form a political partnership. One may follow the other, but it's not why this needs to stop. It needs to stop because it's wrong on its own. Even if Alawites are completely hostile to Israel, this needs to be stopped.

Israel is not the middle east's police. Nor is it anyone's cultural parent.
It doesn't have the resources to intervene on everyone's behalf. One tribe massacring another is called "ethnic cleansing" in the west, and "Monday" in the middle east.
It intervened in Druze and Kurds' favor because they've proven valuable allies in the past.
If the EU and US decided they want Israel to take up that role and finance the relevant expenses - I'm all for it. Really. But when our own security challenges take budgetary precedent, I don't see that happening. I certainly don't see the EU supporting Israel in such an endeavor, especially with their unique interests in Syria.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Sorry for the Hebrew, but he's an excellent source and this is good stuff.

US reportedly notified Egypt of a reduction of military aid starting 2026.

My 2 cents: Military grip over Egypt means an elected leader must not pick conflicts with the military else he'll be ousted. Military aid reduction therefore seems to me as a veiled threat to Sisi's rule.
Possibly related to Gaza, but I wouldn't rule out the possibility of the US simply reducing aid foreign across the board.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899776507502805347

Report of US-Iran communication via UAE intermediate.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899780400756432964

Israel and Lebanon opened negotiations. Yesterday it was reportedly about land disputes and the terms of Israel's withdrawal from five remaining strategic outposts.
Today it's reported in Israeli media that the negotiations will also be about an Israeli-Lebanese normalization.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899472747056583109