Middle East Defence & Security

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
The "close defense layer" on Germany ships is several km distance, i.e. at the point where MLG27 takes over and hoses a target down with FAP shrapnel shots. Rumours-wise the ship was closer to the shore than that distance at the time of attack anyway, so basically anything that would make it past the shoreline would fall into the "close defense layer".
Staying that close to Lebanese shoreline is incredibly dangerous to the point of negligence. Hezbollah still likely has AShMs.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Hisb'allah is not the side in the conflict that's firing on UN forces.

And UNIFIL is there with approval of and in cooperation with the Lebanese government.
That's just complacency. It wouldn't be the first time they fired on NATO ships, including German ones.
And yes, they have fired on UN forces before.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Perhaps in their panic, they reveal their assessments and fears.
Much can be said about the viability and pros and cons of strikes on Iran's nuclear, oil, regime, and other targets. But the most interesting one perhaps would be the Basij.
It's one thing to kill the Ayatollah which ultimately will be replaced. Another thing entirely to destroy the main mechanism keeping a secular revolution at bay. Hitting the Basij will be as destructive to Iran as it is difficult for Israel.
While the main conventional targets in Iran are fairly centralized and easy to cripple with just a few hits - Basij is a paramilitary force dispersed across Iran to deal with unrest. Its manpower pool is huge, and making it temporarily ineffective would be incredibly complex.
Yet it shouldn't be ruled out that this is what Israel built capabilities for.



On the Hezbollah front, the IDF now publicly revealed that Hezbollah is keeping its finances as well as a former bunker of Nasrallah, under a hospital in Beirut's Dahiyah neighborhood (Hezbollah stronghold).
Instead of striking it, the IDF's spokesperson in Arabic Avichai Adraee provided extra details on how to enter the facility and reach the money. Approximately $500 million are located there.
Hezbollah pays its members in US dollars, raising the chances someone will take upon themselves the task to loot it.
Lebanon's population is far more sympathetic to Israel than the population of Gaza or J&S could ever be, so it's preferable that civilians get the area cleared so infrastructure remains intact. However in a general outlook on Dahiyeh, its status could be a dilemma for the IDF.
On one hand, its destruction could ensure Hezbollah's infrastructure is truly removed and Hezbollah has nowhere to return in Beirut.
On the other hand, the crisis in Lebanon may also manifest as a housing crisis and so maintaining Dahiyeh somewhat intact could further Israel in the aspect of hearts and minds, which is ultimately quite important for a "day after" strategy in Lebanon.

 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Recently we heard Iran threatening retaliation vs Israel immediately after Israel's response. There are many factors to this calculus. Here's the main one supporting it:

Any Israeli airstrike would necessitate a large number of aircraft be airborne at once. Aerial refueling tankers, SAR assets, combat aircraft for a variety of missions. All these need to land somewhere.
Israel's strike methods are incredibly precise and deadly, but they lack in per-sortie capacity, sortie output, and most importantly - timing.
Aerial power is king, but it's undeniable that an MRBM reaches its target so much faster than an aerial fleet. As soon as Israel strikes, Iran could initiate a massive strike targeting Israel's airbases.

Together with the highly likely possibility that Iran has more missiles than Israel and the has interceptors, Iran has a credible capability to, if not cause value damage, at least hit Israeli runways across the country in a way that hinders the ability of fuel-starved aircraft to land.

Israel would not launch an attack if it knew the response could lead to it losing large numbers of aircraft. Therefore I assume it has plans to set up additional improvized runways across the country just in case. There is a unit specializing in that.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Recently we heard Iran threatening retaliation vs Israel immediately after Israel's response. There are many factors to this calculus. Here's the main one supporting it:

Any Israeli airstrike would necessitate a large number of aircraft be airborne at once. Aerial refueling tankers, SAR assets, combat aircraft for a variety of missions. All these need to land somewhere.
Israel's strike methods are incredibly precise and deadly, but they lack in per-sortie capacity, sortie output, and most importantly - timing.
Aerial power is king, but it's undeniable that an MRBM reaches its target so much faster than an aerial fleet. As soon as Israel strikes, Iran could initiate a massive strike targeting Israel's airbases.

Together with the highly likely possibility that Iran has more missiles than Israel and the has interceptors, Iran has a credible capability to, if not cause value damage, at least hit Israeli runways across the country in a way that hinders the ability of fuel-starved aircraft to land.

Israel would not launch an attack if it knew the response could lead to it losing large numbers of aircraft. Therefore I assume it has plans to set up additional improvized runways across the country just in case. There is a unit specializing in that.
A F-35B with a much longer range could address runway concerns somewhat, perhaps even a few existing “B”s would be a good backup.
 
Top