Royal Canadian Navy Discussions and updates

StingrayOZ

Super Moderator
Staff member
Canada has a lot more experience with nuclear power than Australia and that includes constructing nuclear reactors.
Canada certainly has a much better nuclear base to build from.

But Candu reactors were all designed and built basically over a generation of people ago who are now all buried. Also the design and operation Candu is pretty much the opposite of nuclear submarine reactor design, CANDU is all big and low enrichment, while SSN tend to be fed from weapons grade lines to make very small, dense and powerful reactors. A nuclear weapons program may be more beneficial to SSN reactor design than experience with power plant reactors.

I tend to think Argentina and Brazil obsession with building SSN is more about keeping their nuclear scientists busy than it is delivering useful needed capability.

But there is load of experience there in Canada, and attracting talent from its south would be fairly easy too.
If there was political unity and the will, nuclear subs could be developed in Canada. Neither exist and it is questionable if Canada will exist in its current form twenty years from now.
I don't think Canada has the clear need yet. The US is definitely in their region and the northern territories are sparsely habituated. TBH, I think SSN are too far for Canada politically, socially, alliance wise, etc. Conventional submarines aren't terrible, and depending on what you want to do (like sit in choke points), they make more economic sense than SSN.

For Australia, if we just wanted to protect bass strait, conventional submarines would be fine. Better than SSN. More bang for the buck. But Australia wants to control multiple choke points and chase things in different oceans and seas, that are all very far away. If Canada got 6 really good conventional with AIP, that would address a significant amount of their concerns. Some subs are better than no subs.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Some subs are indeed better than no subs. Twelve SSKs is probably a reasonable number given our coastal requirements along with possible Pacific deployments from allied bases. There are pollies here that think some is a number between zero and four which is close to none IMO.
 

kato

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I think they should have just ordered basically the same build as Germany, and spun the additional requirements into another platform.
"Bonn" is actually a pretty good comparison there, since from the German perspective that singular ship only shares the "basic design" (the steel dimensions, sorta) with the original class. The internals (accomodation, ship operations etc) are all specced differently, the propulsion layout was updated but designed to fit within the same spaces, the aviation facilities accomodate different helicopters, the deckspace forward was modified since Bonn doesn't carry a containerized hospital (but instead has more regular cargo container space) etc.

Building AOR ships similarly to the specs of another country, but within the same "general requirements set" would/should have resulted in a project cost and timeline likely identical to Bonn.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Building AOR ships similarly to the specs of another country, but within the same "general requirements set" would/should have resulted in a project cost and timeline likely identical to Bonn.
Likely true except in Canada, even with no modifications the build would still be over budget and late.
 

shadow99

Member
My greatest concern for the Canadian Navy is the age of the Halifax class frigates.

Commissioned from 92-96 will put HMCS Halifax at 40 years of service when the first of the River class arrive. Assuming they start to arrive in 2032.

Is it even realistic to keep the Halifax class running that long? With the amount of heavy maintenance required, along with equipment becoming obsolete at what point does the cost becomes so high for it make sense to replace them with a tier 2 light frigate? The savings on manpower alone from 240 ish down to 90 crew is significant.

Considering the length of time to build the River class... and a quickly deteriorating world a Korean or Japanese build of light frigates would see us 3 ships by 2030 bringing our fleet back to 15 ships in a time of need.

Being able to retire HMCS Halifax is a bonus, being used for parts for the remaining ships in class.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
My greatest concern for the Canadian Navy is the age of the Halifax class frigates.

Commissioned from 92-96 will put HMCS Halifax at 40 years of service when the first of the River class arrive. Assuming they start to arrive in 2032.

Is it even realistic to keep the Halifax class running that long? With the amount of heavy maintenance required, along with equipment becoming obsolete at what point does the cost becomes so high for it make sense to replace them with a tier 2 light frigate? The savings on manpower alone from 240 ish down to 90 crew is significant.

Considering the length of time to build the River class... and a quickly deteriorating world a Korean or Japanese build of light frigates would see us 3 ships by 2030 bringing our fleet back to 15 ships in a time of need.i

Being able to retire HMCS Halifax is a bonus, being used for parts for the remaining ships in class.
This is the same situation that Australia faces with Anzac frigates albeit their strategic environment is more pressing. Depending on which selection Australia makes, (Japanese option likely), Canada could consider 3 Korean options to ease the disappointment of losing the Australian requirement. Better still, buy three of their large destroyers and await the River class. Probably get an awesome deal on them if we buy submarines as well. Bottom line, there should be a minimum of 15 “war ships”.
 

Underway

Active Member
So the inflation adjusted cost for German build is half as much as what Canada is paying.
Germany doesn't include life cycle costs, or ammo, or initial trial costs or numerous other things. With whole project accounting over the life cycle of the ships, and accrual accounting, Canadian defence procurements are apples to celery comparisons with other countries.
Given the fact we don't have a shipbuilding industry and we're adding a bunch of costs to the contract (because our Gov't does accounting different then anyone else in the world) half as much isn't really that surprising. Not to mention defence inflation is about 5-10% higher then the base inflation rates.

We are building off the Bohn design. The Berlin and the Bohn are quite different ships that were built about 10 years apart. The Germans also provided a helpful list of improvements that they recommeded for the Bohn, like the ability to store ship from both sides (aka installing clamshell doors not just on the port side).

First indication that the upcoming River Class Destroyers will be equipped with the Mk.49 launcher for the RIM-116 RAMs.
Link? I would love to see where this came from.
 

shadow99

Member
Apparently Russia has taken notice of Canada's intention to buy 12 SSKs. Doubt our next government will make the decision in its first term and 12 is never going to happen albeit that is the number to aim for. Don't think Russia has much to fear....from Canada at least.

Russia takes notice of Canada's plan to buy 12 submarines that could lie silent under Arctic ice (msn.com)
Being deadbeat Canadians the chance of new subs is very low.

I think Junior is hoping to buy Australia's Collins class subs when they retire.
 

76mmGuns

Active Member
Apparently Russia has taken notice of Canada's intention to buy 12 SSKs. Doubt our next government will make the decision in its first term and 12 is never going to happen albeit that is the number to aim for. Don't think Russia has much to fear....from Canada at least.

Russia takes notice of Canada's plan to buy 12 submarines that could lie silent under Arctic ice (msn.com)
Russia has no urgency to take action. Canada will bend over backwards to delay and delay. Honestly my bet is not a single new sub before 2055. Any takers?
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Being deadbeat Canadians the chance of new subs is very low.

I think Junior is hoping to buy Australia's Collins class subs when they retire.
Junior will be long gone before Collins’ retirement. After the Upholder and used Hornet acquisitions, doubtful any future government will buy used kit. Politically easier to do SFA.
 

Sender

Active Member
Russia has no urgency to take action. Canada will bend over backwards to delay and delay. Honestly my bet is not a single new sub before 2055. Any takers?
Not from me. This is a program of record, and there is a project office. Canada is getting new subs. The only question is how many, but it appears that the goal is a minimum of 8 (Stealth, lethality, persistence: Commander RCN talks submarines in Halifax | Trident Newspaper.)

 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Not from me. This is a program of record, and there is a project office. Canada is getting new subs. The only question is how many, but it appears that the goal is a minimum of 8 (Stealth, lethality, persistence: Commander RCN talks submarines in Halifax | Trident Newspaper.)

I agree subs should be a priority acquisition. However for this to happen, other programs will likely be cut due to the financial mess junior has created. No future government will have the spine to keep all the promises for new defence kit, short of direct involvement in a pending war or the electorate waking up to the rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment and demanding action, something that seems remote to say the least.
 

Sender

Active Member
An RFI for new submarines was posted this morning. Not a lot of details, but a positive step forward for this project.

 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
The RFI has a 160 day response deadline so it might not be junior’s government that examines the results, not that junior would care. Funding will only be possible with significant program cuts elsewhere. Will be interesting to see how the Conservatives react once they form the next government.
 

Underway

Active Member
From the RFI. Has a lot of information in here.
Draft High Level Mandatory Requirements

HLMR #1 - Urgency, Availability, and Sustainment

Ability to deliver submarine, maintenance facilities and training systems to achieve Initial Operating Capability no later than 2037.

Explanation: The anticipated reduced availability of the VCS will directly impact force generation and the production of key qualifications within the submarine force. To avoid a capability gap and to ensure that crews can be generated as the CPS fleet is delivered the requirement is to have the first of class CPS delivered no later than 2035. IOC is defined as the first CPS being fully operational with requisite infrastructure and In-Service-Support in place.

HLMR #2 – Fleet Size

Ability to perform lines of tasking as follows: 3 submarines for continental defence/global deployment, 3 submarines for national and international exercises and force generation simultaneously.

Explanation: In accordance with ONSAF, CPSP is exploring the renewal and expansion of the CAF’s submarine fleet to enable the RCN to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines. The CPS fleet size must be sufficient to complete assigned missions and roles throughout its service life. In order to achieve 6 simultaneously operational submarines as described above, it is acknowledged that the total fleet size must be larger to accommodate submarines in various levels of maintenance.

HLMR #3 – Endurance and Persistence

Ability to operate discretely without external support for minimum transits of 7000nm (2x 3500nm) at 8kts, and a minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations while on station. Capable of no less than 60 days self-sustained operation.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of conducting continental defence missions including Arctic patrols from home ports in Halifax and Esquimalt. The absence of support facilities in the Arctic mean that the submarine must be able to conduct such patrols unsupported.

HLMR #4 – Lethality

Ability to perform precision attacks to include the use of the following weapons systems: heavy weight torpedoes, anti-ship missiles and long-range precision land attack missiles.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of detecting, targeting, engaging, and destroying threats, both at sea (surface and subsurface) and ashore. To achieve this, the CPS must be capable of carrying and employing an appropriate combination of sensors and weapons to detect and deter maritime threats, control Canada’s maritime approaches, and hold distant adversaries at risk with the capability to project power ashore.

HLMR #5 – Operating Environment

Ability to operate worldwide throughout the year, both by day and by night, in temperatures ranging from tropical to Arctic. Ability to operate near, in and if necessary, under ice (for limited periods of time).

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of global deployment. Arctic operations will predominantly take place within navigable waters, which are expected to expand in the coming decades. CPS will operate near and in ice, and on occasion, will be required to operate under ice for short periods of time to transit from one ice free area to another.

HLMR #6 – Environmental Compliance

Ability to operate in compliance with the environmental regulations in all areas of operation, including the Arctic.

HLMR #7 – Crew Size

Ability to minimize crew size using automation and remote monitoring.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to be operated with a core crew of no more than 40 personnel. In addition, the submarine must be able to accommodate 8 additional personnel (riders) in permanent bunks.

HLMR #8 – Survivability (Stealth)

Ability to operate in contested environments while maintaining tactical advantage with low acoustic (passive and active), magnetic, and Infrared (IR) signatures to prevent counter-detection.

Explanation: The CPS must be able to maintain tactical advantage over new and developing detection systems including airborne magnetic anomaly detection, electric field detection and acoustic detection through reduced signature and low target echo strength. Stealth should also be enabled by operational signature management that allows the submarine to manage its signature to meet operational conditions.

HLMR #9 – Interoperability

Ability to communicate and share information and data within mission frameworks utilizing high-assurance cryptographic capabilities (algorithms and protocols) compliant with the US Crypto Modernization Program to ensure a high degree of security for information confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of data and information flow with organizations, submarines, systems and applications necessary to complete its missions. This includes all aspects of being able to work with others in a robust, secure and sustainable manner, both integrated and networked. More specifically, it includes regulatory compliance and standardization to ensure operational and tactical interoperability.

HLMR #10 – GBA+

Ability to create an inclusive environment in which all crew members have equitable opportunity for employment.

Explanation: DND and the CAF are dedicated to creating an inclusive and safe environment for a diverse defence team, including aboard vessels. As people will be central to submarine operations for the foreseeable future, intersectional considerations will be included in the overall requirements for the project. Specifically, these considerations will be integrated in the submarine selection process through the inclusion of a High-Level Mandatory Requirement requiring a “safe and inclusive environment for all crew members”. For reference, this requirement would evaluate how each submarine meets the “5-95th percentile” criteria. Specifically, this means ensuring that submarines are adapted to bodies which are found between the anthropometric measurements of the 5th percentile female and the 95th percentile male. This will ensure that the submarine and its amenities are adapted to the vast majority of men, women, and gender-diverse individuals, therefore increasing the meaningful participation and operational effectiveness of all submariners.

HLMR #11 – Extended Operational Effectiveness

Ability to deploy and recover off-board crewed and uncrewed systems to extend the sensor reach and deliver effect to the underwater battlespace.

Explanation: As a “system of systems,” modern submarines are equipped to employ and support crewed and uncrewed vehicles, in addition to other armaments and intelligence gathering capabilities – making submarines a true force multiplier. The CPS must be capable of contributing to seabed warfare.

HLMR #12 – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Ability to conduct multi-domain, multi-spectral sensing and to process, analyze and store data from onboard systems and external sources for real or near real-time exploitation and dissemination.

Explanation: The CPS must be capable of sensing across maritime surface and sub-surface domains and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, locate, classify, identify, track and collect intelligence on targets of interest in all conditions, day and night. It also includes the use of automation, data fusion, decision support tools and advanced algorithms and methods (e.g. machine learning and artificial intelligence) to lower operator workload and increase effectiveness in processing sensor data.

HLMR #13 - Infrastructure

Provide infrastructure and equipment on both East and West Coasts to meet operational support requirements, including all levels of maintenance, and training requirement.

Explanation: Recapitalization of existing and construction of new submarine support infrastructure will be required to enable and support the operations of the future submarine fleet. The physical characteristics of the future submarines and their designed operation, maintenance and training philosophy will be assessed against the existing infrastructure portfolio to determine a comprehensive set of submarine support infrastructure requirements.

HLMR #14- Training

Conduct shore-based operational and technical training on the East Coast and West Coast.

Explanation: Individual and collective training must be available to submariners on both the East and West Coasts. This can be a combination of real, virtual and augmented reality training with an aim to end the requirement for submariners to be away from home for extended periods of time for shore-based training.

HLMR #15 – Upgradeability and Growth Potential

Ability to upgrade submarine capability to maintain an operational advantage for the CPS service life.

Explanation: The CPS must maintain an operational advantage by keeping pace with technological change to counter and/or leverage disruptive technologies, as well as being prepared for rapid technical insertion through Continuous Capability Sustainment (CCS). To help achieve this, the CPS must possess the ability to upgrade existing systems and payloads. It must also have the growth potential to integrate new systems and payloads. This drives the requirement for sufficient excess margin for size (volume), weight, workstations, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), power, data busses, computational nodes, etc. The ability to integrate new systems and payload is also required to support special operations, by integrating mission tailored capabilities within an acceptable level of effort and in short timescales. This justifies the consideration for a modular open architecture approach that facilitates individual sensor updates and additions of new sub-systems and sensors on shorter timescales.
 

StevoJH

The Bunker Group
From the RFI. Has a lot of information in here.
I wonder how close the capability requirements from this RFI are to the ones that resulted in the RAN selecting the shortfin Barracuda.

Is the torpedo tube launched Tomahawk still in production for the RN submarines? Or will these boats require VLS?

They are asking a lot from a very lean crew size, not to mention the endurance requirements to basically transit to the SCS, operate for 21 days and return.
 
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