The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[KipPotapych]

Russian MoD confirms damage to Novocherkassk ship, via Google translate:

The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that while repelling an attack by the Ukrainian armed forces on the port of Feodosia today, December 26, the large landing ship Novocherkassk was damaged at night, RIA Novosti reports.

No specification of the damage, of course. They are also claiming that they shot down two Su-24 planes that fired the missiles.

According to the ministry, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacked the port of Feodosia with aircraft guided missiles. Air defense systems, the department reported, destroyed two Ukrainian Su-24 bombers that fired these missiles.

Customary warning, etc because it is a reliable RU source quoting RIA quoting the Russian MoD, lol.

Минобороны: в Феодосии при атаке ВСУ поврежден десантный корабль «Новочеркасск»

Подробнее на сайте

www.kommersant.ru

Edit: Apologies. It appears Feanor and I posted at the same time, more or less.

 

[wild_Willie2]

Here is a first image of the "damage" to the landing ship Novocherkassk.
Could she be classified as a submarine after this attack?



@wild_Willie2 Image source please. That is a requirement of the rules.

Ngatimozart

 

[Feanor]

Here is a first image of the "damage" to the landing ship Novocherkassk.
Could she be classified as a submarine after this attack?

View attachment 51052

A chunk of the ship hull was thrown over 500m away so I don't think we can classify it as a ship of any kind anymore. It's likely completely destroyed.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

 

[Fredled]

The issue isn't the capture of that specific town, really just a ruined suburb of Donetsk. The goal is to push the front line back from Donetsk and to advance to other areas. Russia is clearly pushing southward, intending to close on Ugledar from behind. Presumably they will eventually also push west from there into Georgievka.

I think they are puching just everywhere from Lugansk to Krinky. The goal being to push the frontline westward and northward.

Roughly a quarter of them, he said, would bribe his superior, who remains in charge of the center, offering around $1,000 dollars to avoid being drafted. That price has only gone up since.

Do they snatch people and bring them to the recruiting center to replenish the ranks of connon fodders, or just to have more people paying bribes?
Military dodging must be massive. And so is corruption.

Another question: Any change soince the Chief of the recruiting office has been sacked? Or the more it changes, the more it stays the same?

Anyway, it's not by forcing delinquents into joining the fight that they will win it.

Anyway, I firmly believe he is doing a disservice to the country currently. The boy who cried wolf sort of thing that is really taken to the quite extreme. At some point, people will question anything that is said because there will be no difference or a way to distinguish between, for example, the monstrosities that really took place and the ones he/they made up. Another example would be that there is a whole bunch of folks out there who are still in disbelief that the counteroffensive failed and think that there is still something “up the sleeve” and is yet to come. ....

I fully agree. I think he does so because he is quiet desperate. But also because he is immature. He had little or no political experience before becoming the head of state. He is surrounded by smart people thought. Podoliak is smart. Kuleba us smart. Budanov is smart. Danilov says many non sens, but it's on purpose (more on him later if you want). Military leaders are smart and they are at odd with Zelencky for a reason.

This is even more stupid because the West is dedicated to save Ukraine beyond all expectations. Western leaders, themselves, give the very good reasons why Ukraine should defend its sovereignty. He really doesn't need to hype it up.
He hopes to mobilise the West even more but the opposite could happen if he goes on that route.

Technically, in my opinion, we (NATO) have been fighting against Russia since we started coordinating strikes on the Russian positions, supply lines,

Yes. On top of that.

he reports from the area are really gruesome, if not worse. The recent article from Washington Post really outlined some of the realities that the Ukrainian soldiers are facing, but I cannot find it at the moment (maybe it was another outlet, WSJ?). But the New York Times had one as well.

I believe that any Ukrainian soldier who put a foot on the left bank of the Dniepr felt like that.
Nonetheless, that they are still there is already a remarkable achievement. Even if they have to retreat, trying it is already something IMO.

I don't think that they are under supported. After all, that's where the three Su34 have been downed.

The men who have to be there may see it as suicidal or pointless. But when you look at the map (which, I agree is a much more confortable position) and see the whole picture, given the conditions, it's great stuff.

Not prepared psychologically? Who could be?

Is there any word where these are being constructed? (the Ukrainian defence line) Very doubtfully this is being done all over the front line.

From what I have read, they build it in the north. Their goal is to secure the official border of Ukraine.
Unlike the Russians, they see little sens in building defence line where the fighting are because the front line is dynamic. Ukrainian forces may not be tomorrow where they are dug in today. If they build something and retreat, then the Russian could use it for their own defence. And if they move forward, it's not very useful anymore.
But they know that official borders won't move.

Another reason is that the north is relatively quiet and they have the possibility to do it there. While in the DonBas, they are constantly under bombardment and shelling. And it's difficult to spend time building anything there.

Ukrainian pilots are also training in France. This got my attention because France doesn't have F16's. They say they are training on simulators or something but I don't believe it. IMO they are being trained on Rafale or Mirage 2000.

Training doesn’t necessarily mean actual training on an aircraft, as it was already proven several times in this case. In the beginning, when the training supposedly began, it was just language learning, then the manuals, then the “strategy”, etc. Could be any of those and other things. Especially without a source, speculations can go wild, haha.

I agree but France is de facto not the best place both to learn how to fly a plane they don't have and the English language (LOL).
But, please, let me speculate on this one...

 

[Fredled]

Here is a first image of the "damage" to the landing ship Novocherkassk.
Could she be classified as a submarine after this attack?

While the boat has undoubtly been reclassified as under water scrap metal, I don't think the Ukes have hit anything of value there. Certainly not a large landing ship.
It looks like a relatively small boat.

But I'm no specialist.

 

[Fredled]

Zaluzhny on the loss of Mariinka

and how the Russians can repeat this every two to three months as the war goes on.

 

[Feanor]

While the boat has undoubtly been reclassified as under water scrap metal, I don't think the Ukes have hit anything of value there. Certainly not a large landing ship.
It looks like a relatively small boat.

But I'm no specialist.

Russian sources confirm the Novocherkassk was hit. It's a large landing ship. It can't exactly hide. If the ship sank it won't be seen again. But if it's really not sunk and just somewhat damaged then footage should emerge shortly. I'll wait on navy-korabel to confirm (he abandoned his lj but still has a telegram) but I suspect this is exactly what it looks like.

Zaluzhny on the loss of Mariinka

and how the Russians can repeat this every two to three months as the war goes on.

I wonder if he really said any city. Because it's definitely not any city. Only the relatively small ones like Artemovsk/Bakhmut, or Avdeevka. Kupyansk and Seversk could be next. Ugledar too. Possibly Chasov Yar if things continue to go well on the Artemovsk/Bakhmut axis. Certainly not Kharkov or Zaporozhye, at least not as things currently are.

 

[seaspear]

How sustainable are these sort of victories and are there accurate estimations of losses in manpower and materials for these ruins to show its worth?

 

[Feanor]

How sustainable are these sort of victories and are there accurate estimations of losses in manpower and materials for these ruins to show its worth?

Good question. This is one of the biggest mysteries of this war. These attacks are currently far smaller then what Ukraine did in the south, and the failure there was spectacular. So if Ukraine continues to fail that badly in their own efforts, Russia will likely outlast Ukraine. If every town of 10k people and bigger needs this kind of effort, then of course Russia can't possibly hope to take all of Ukraine, though clearing the first ring of towns around Donetsk might be doable. Even pushing on Slavyansk-Kramatorsk might be. Personally I don't think the war will remain the same. We've seen this war go through a number of stages. I think it's possible another year goes by where Russia takes a few more towns while Ukraine fights mostly defense. But if Ukraine starts massing for another offensive, Russia will slow their own offensive operations and prepare to defend. Things will change with new weapons and changes in supply levels for the sides. So trying to project infinitely forward based on current trends is a fool's errand. I don't believe Russia will run out of equipment or men in the next year even if Ukraine does defense and Russia does offense. And I think this war will shift again before the end of next year.

 

[vonnoobie]

As the saying goes, "Its not over till the fat lady sings". Russia is relying more and more on new build equipment and munitions which arent nearly on a month to month basis any where near what they had available or where expending at the start of the invasion while Ukraine is relying more and more on aid which has the US tilting on the edge on the EU a mix between tilting and trying best to ramp up supply. On the other hand also hearing more and more support coming from Japan and South Korea.

I will say this what has helped Russia has being the west responding to changing situations rather then acting proactively. It IMO is the biggest issue with the west our politicians all too often only change track at the last minute often far too late and for Ukraine it has meant an extra year or so waiting for certain systems that they either have now or are still to be delivered.

 

[Fredled]

Russian sources confirm the Novocherkassk was hit.

On their side, Ukrainian give more details (for the sources, please follow the links).

IMO, the picture is not that of the strike site. Because I don;t see any remnant of a large ship. Or it's completely under water, which is unlikely there. Or it didn;t sink and moved somewhere else.

 

[Fredled]

How sustainable are these sort of victories and are there accurate estimations of losses in manpower and materials for these ruins to show its worth?

As we said many times, there is no reliable estimate of loss from any side.
It's hard to call them victories when there is nothing left. The Russians destroy what they intended to take. So basically, they didn;t take anything usable or valuable. They only moved the front line a few km forward.
It's a progress for the Russian. Not a victory.

 

[Fredled]

As the saying goes, "Its not over till the fat lady sings". Russia is relying more and more on new build equipment and munitions which arent nearly on a month to month basis any where near what they had available or where expending at the start of the invasion while Ukraine is relying more and more on aid which has the US tilting on the edge on the EU a mix between tilting and trying best to ramp up supply. On the other hand also hearing more and more support coming from Japan and South Korea.

I will say this what has helped Russia has being the west responding to changing situations rather then acting proactively. It IMO is the biggest issue with the west our politicians all too often only change track at the last minute often far too late and for Ukraine it has meant an extra year or so waiting for certain systems that they either have now or are still to be delivered.

The West reacted too slowly. Even after it was clear that Russians were losing. The lack of vision, and sometimes of competences, from our politicians is only one of the reasons.
The main reason was that Nato wanted to secure their member in Eastern Europe. So the first Patriots, Leopards and Abrams went to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia first. And to Ukraine one year later. Now they are sending F35's to the Baltic region while Ukraine is still waiting for the F16's.
It's not stupid because an open war between NATO and Russia is an increasingly closer possibility. but the real weapons are not sent where they are needed the most.
It takes time to send these weapons both to Ukraine and to Eastern Europe. They have to decide of their priority. And your own backyard is always your priority.

The other reason is the anorexic military spending in Europe. It's less than 2% of GDP. And when Trump asked Europeans to spend more, he did a disservice to Putin. Now that's what the Europeans are precisely doing. Europeans just understood that they have to fund their own defence and that they can't rely that much, if not exclusively in some cases, on the US. No matter how much the US is helping. I can say we are lucky that the US administration is willing to help that much with Ukraine.
Europeans are increasing military production, but it's not as fast as the US in doing so. And not as fast as Russia for another reason. The US has already a larger, not fully exploited capacity, and a larger military export industry. The US is also less crippled with red tape and extreme caution than Europe.
And as defence is concerned the US acts as a single country while Europeans are still a mosaic of indépendant states, even with all the effort to offer a concerted response in the NATO and the EU frameworks. It should be noted that it's the first time the EU take a role in a major military issue. Yet not every European country are in the EU or NATO.

Russia has the advantage to be a post-soviet quasi dictatorial regime. If they decide that all the private factories should dedicate half of their production capacity to the war effort (while Russia itself is not even under attack), everybody shuts up and comply. And that's what happens now.
Russia has so far deployed nearly one million men in Ukraine, with casualties which would be unacceptable in the West. And they are able to do far more than what we have seen so far. I'm afraid.

 

[Feanor]

As we said many times, there is no reliable estimate of loss from any side.
It's hard to call them victories when there is nothing left. The Russians destroy what they intended to take. So basically, they didn;t take anything usable or valuable. They only moved the front line a few km forward.
It's a progress for the Russian. Not a victory.

Victory is defined by the objectives. If you declare a goal to take the ruins of Mar'inka and you accomplish it that's a victory.

There have been questions here about the large landing ship. Here is satellite imagery to show the scale.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

 

[ngatimozart]

I'm not sure if this explanation is accurate. Men in military fatigues are grabbing someone and taking him in an ambulance. We don;t know why they did that and what the arrested man did wrong. Maybe a deserter, a turncoat or spy suspect... but grabbed to be sent to the front line is very unlikely because that would be counter productive.
Maybe they used an ambulance because they lacked other type of vehicle or because they wanted to hide.


Zelensky is always exaggerating in his speeches, talking of children, of genocide... It's indeed shocking because he does that all the time and everybody knows he lies or at least, embellish the situation.
I personally don't like the way he speaks.

TBS, Zelensky speeches or interviews are not official statement, in the sens that everybody knows that he is not reporting accurately.


There are between 20 and 50 thousands foreign military professionals in Ukraine. A very large part being Polish and a few ones from UK. (if being "from the UK' means anything at all).

It seems to me obvious that, among them, there are trained special forces, observers, officiers of some levels, high tech military specialists, trainers, consulting agents and so on.
One should be naive to think that MATO partners will send equipment worth billions of $ without having some personnel there to at least supervise. Between this and having special units on the front line, the limit is blurry.
Technically NATO may be already fighting against the Russian military.

Most of those foreigners will be there in unofficial capacities as private individuals fighting in the UKR foreign legion or other units. IF any NATO forces are operating in UKR I would suspect that it would be well back from the frontlines and in an advisory role only. NATO doesn't want a full on hot war against Russia, end I suspect even Putin realises that he cannot take NTO on in a conventional war; he cannot subdue UKR so how would he possibly succeed against NATO.

Between "committed" or "scheduled" and actually delivered, there is a large margin.
Everybody was talking about Spring 2024. I very surprised that they are ahead of schedule, but it's possible.
In fact, the informations remain secret and things are revealed to the public only when they are sure that the Russians knows it already. They won;t tell the Russians what Ukrainians got.

Ukrainian pilots are also training in France. This got my attention because France doesn't have F16's. They say they are training on simulators or something but I don't believe it. IMO they are being trained on Rafale or Mirage 2000.

The main NATO fighter training program is held in Romania, and UKR pilots are being trained there. There is no reason why UKR pilots cannot be trained on simulators in France because such training will bring them up to speed with western systems. Don't forget that modern western are basically a system of systems, that UKR airmen trained on Russian aircraft and systems will not be familiar with. If the French decide to supply Mirages and Rafales to UKR then fair enough. It is France's choice whether or not to do so. The training of UKR on the F-16 is a NATO program, not individual nations. I believe that the RAF are training some UKR pilots, and the UK doesn't operate F-16s or any US fighter aircraft.

She has been barred from running by the electoral commission.
It means that Putin is afraid of her. Not because she could be president instead of the president. But because she will campaign against war, friendship with the West, war compensation for Ukraine and for the liberation of Navalny.
Obviously Putin can't let such person being vocal in the media.

But the mere fact that this person exists, and dare speaks against war, is a good sign.

Of course not. Putin would never endorse a free and fair election. He's not so special in that regard. I can think of many other nations where fre and fair elections are forbidden or actively fought against.

Not sure how likely it is they will receive these jets sometime this week. Highly unlikely, in my opinion.

It's quite possible, but the level of probability is debatable. However I wouldn't be surprised f F-16s appear in UKR markings inside UKR borders by this Monday.

Training doesn’t necessarily mean actual training on an aircraft, as it was already proven several times in this case. In the beginning, when the training supposedly began, it was just language learning, then the manuals, then the “strategy”, etc. Could be any of those and other things. Especially without a source, speculations can go wild, haha.

I don't think that NATO will be teaching UKR pilots strategy and tactics. WRT fighting Russians UKR would be the teachers of that to NATO. However, reading of manuals simulator etc., are SOP for any air force.

Technically, in my opinion, we (NATO) have been fighting against Russia since we started coordinating strikes on the Russian positions, supply lines, etc (and that would be at the latest). That was reported a looong time ago and cited here by me as well.

Has NATO been fighting Russia? It's in a cold war with Russia and so any help that it gives UKR short of firing on Russian forces is not "fight against Russia" in the terms of an all out hot war. Yes, it's semantics but words are important and definitions even more so. A hot war between NATO and Russia or the US and PRC isn't at all desirable because both will lead to nuclear war and nuclear war is a planet killer, whichever way you look at it. The Americans, Russians and Chinese are not good losers.

 

[ngatimozart]

Ukraine appears to just have hit another Russian ship in port, the large landing ship Novocherkassk, using presumably Storm Shadows. Russian claims two downed Su-24s that were involved in the strike, but while Russia does appear to have fired on Ukrainian jets, there's no clarity on the outcome. Russian MOD confirms damage to the landing ship.

The two UKR Su-24 apparently survived with reports of them refuelling on the ground after the strike. UKR claim another two SU-34 the day after they shot down the first three. The SU-34 is a twin seater and losing 5 crew over friendly terrain isn't good. However modern SAM systems are pretty lethal and UKR claim using the Patriot system for the SAM ambush.

UKR forces appear to be forcing Russian aviation further back from the front lines and they do actively target any Russian air defence and aviation capabilities on the ground that they find. The Russians have to a degree also limited UKR crewed aviation very and near the front line.

This air war is definitely illustrative of what modern air war between two near peer states is and those who claim that US and western airpower will achieve air superiority over Russian of Chinese forces need to seriously think again. Even the much vaunted 5 gen aviation may struggle, because people confuse LO (low observability / stealth) as magic and invincible; it isn't and LO aircraft can be detected by radar and if the detection is strong enough, a firing solution will be obtained.

 

[KipPotapych]

This is one of the better discussions I have heard on this war as of late. I made a summary for a different purpose and I thought I’d post it here (didn’t edit though) in case some cannot listen to it for whatever reason. Definitely a recommended listen though. I also added a few comments of my own for discussion (summary is in bullets, my comments otherwise). The entire discussion that is just over an hour long can be listened to here:

Aid to Ukraine and the Future of the War with Michael Kofman | CSIS Events

CSIS experts discuss the future of the war in Ukraine with Russian military analyst Michael Kofman.

www.csis.org

Post 1 of 2:

• Russia has taken initiative to some extent.
• Russia has materiel advantage, including ammunition, equipment, and, to a lesser degree, manpower.

I am not sure I agree that manpower advantage is actually to a lesser extent. This point is discussed in more detail further down though.

• Those advantages are not decisive.
• This is a transitional period of the war and what happens next depends on the choices the parties make.
• Kofman expects this winter to look more like the last one.
• Artillery ammunition is crucial for Ukraine to sustain both defensive and offensive efforts.
• Ukraine’s dilemma with air defense is either to defend cities and critical infrastructure of have air defences present at the frontline.
• Very remarkable flexibility to the adjustment to the situation and we underestimated how successful Russia would be in adjusting to sanctions.
• Russia is receiving more sanctioned electronics than they did before the war started (via third countries).
• Military spending in Russia as a percentage of GDP is going to double next year.
• Russia has been preparing for the long war since last fall and is doubling down and has the resources to do so; when compared to Ukraine, considering the western assistance, the dynamic looks a little gloomy for Ukraine.
• Fortunately, Russia chooses to attack prematurely, before their forces are ready, because they feel like they have manpower and equipment, but the quality of the force is no longer there and it takes time to restore it. So these advantages that they have are not decisive.
• Russia greatly transitioned to the war footing economy and is actually driving the growth with it.
• The production numbers Russia provides (re military equipment) are inflated because they include (and perhaps mostly) equipment they are pulling out of storage and “restoring” or retrofitting it.
• Production is, however, growing because you can see the expansion on the sat imagery, including construction of new manufacturing facilities, expansion of the existing ones, etc.
• Whether the above will be transitioned to battlefield gains next year remains to be seen.
• On the western side, it looks like only now it is sinking in that it is going to be a long war.
• The US started the war making 14,000 main calibre artillery shells per month; they are now making 28,000 and going for 36,000. Europe is basically a joke.

Comparatively speaking, since we are talking about the war where artillery is the main means, those US numbers look a bit like a joke as well, especially when compared to the Russian reported annual production of… was it 2M?

• We will need to invest into that manufacturing capacity next year.

Basically, we are behind Russia by over a year in regard to the expansion plans (if there are any to begin with).

• Putin has been going on the victory laps, mostly due to the election next March, but due to the situation in the Middle East and political division in the US, as well issues in the EU, it is half projected and half theatrical.
• Now is likely the worst time in the war for any serious negations.
• Putin is quite comfortable with public opinion in Russia and has many legs to stand on.
• The Russian families of the soldiers who died in the war are being generously compensated and elites who lost their privileges in the west are being compensated domestically via redistribution of property (via the assets of the western companies that left, as well expansion of the MIC).
• Last year the number of dollar millionaires in Russia increased by 10% and the trend is likely to continue. This isn’t a new thing in this war, however, since the wars usually create new stakeholders.
• The number of Russians who are “tired” of the war slightly increased, according to the polls, but “with a Russian spin to it”: they are not prepared to make any concessions and basically want to keep all territories that Russia gained in this war. Even these people are a minority and the majority is quite ok with the war continuing.
• In Kofman’s opinion, Russia can recruit enough men to compensate for the battlefield losses, but they cannot recruit enough for rotation (those men who have been at the frontline since last - 2022 - fall).
• To solve this issue, Russia will either have to double their recruitment or run another partial mobilization after the March election.
• While Russia has more people than Ukraine, when it comes to the turning mobilized folks into the combat ready units is where Russia has a lot of issues and why they cannot transform this advantage into the success on the battlefield.

This point goes to the both sides, however. Yes, Ukraine has advantage of western assistance with the training, but the issue obviously remains.

• Russia’s tight labour market makes recruitment and mobilization more difficult.

This one is a great point! Having a tight labour market and playing it the long way, war of attrition, your troops are not the only people (or lack thereof) you have to worry about. When you already run a shortage of skilled (and other) workers in your economy, you really don’t want to draw from that pool of people any more than you must in order to keep things running at home. Otherwise, you run into a risk of all kinds of trouble at home, including properly running your MIC. In other words, this would not be sustainable for Russia in the medium-ish to long run. That was a really great point by Mike. Of course, this is on top of his argument that more people would flee if there is another round of mobilization (which I don’t necessarily agree with). Anyway…

 

[KipPotapych]

Post 2 of 2:

• There are things that EU cannot physically provide to Ukraine if American funding is cut or reduced.
• Ukraine needs somewhere between 75 and 90 thousand main calibre artillery shells per month. They won’t necessarily be able to sustain even defensive operation without the US. Europe, again, is basically a joke in this department.
• Ukraine had a 2 to 1 artillery advantage over Russia in July, at the height of the counteroffensive, while by November that advantage went to Russia by about 3 to 1 or more.
• Europe is not likely to replace the US as far as military assistance is concerned, even in another year, in Kofman’s opinion.
• Ukraine may offset this difference via their own production of drones and such, but would still require western financial assistance in order to do that.

I am not so sure that such a huge demand for artillery munitions can be offset by the production of drones in Ukraine. Just doesn’t seem quite logical to me. However, Mike surely has way better understanding of the subject matter than I do.

• War planning on the Ukrainian side is extremely complicated due to the uncertainty of the upcoming western aid and irregular supply of the frontline.
• If there is no aid coming from the US, the result would not be catastrophic, but quite terrible next year.

That was probably a nice way to put it?

• Russia is regenerating offensive potential and was able to try to conduct their own offensive effort late fall: we are likely to see that again over winter and next summer.
• Russia is stereotypically overconfident but are not thinking long term because Ukraine will build into 2025.

This is interesting because more and more (professional) voices are basically stating that this next year is going to be a somewhat of a rebuild and accumulation year for Ukraine for their next move in 2025. I do see a lot of issues with that, of course. First and foremost, it seems that the expectation is that Russia will not be successful in their offensive efforts in the next, has to be at least, 15 months. This is a very long time. Provided the periodic reports (by RUSI and others) of Russia constantly adapting through out this war, which so far lasted about 22 months, 15 months is a truly long time.

The fact itself that there aren’t any expectations of any significant actions by the Ukrainians in the next year is… I’ll call it unusual and different. Surely, the reality had settled in (or still is for some), but…

• Ukraine may start losing the war, but will keep fighting, regardless of the aid coming from the US.
• The initial goal of Putin was likely, without any documentation and evidence, to topple the Ukrainian government and partition the country, roughly absorb half of Ukraine into Russia, and make Russia one of the decisive players in Europe.
• Attacking NATO (Poland, Baltic states, etc) is a “fantasy that doesn’t interest Putin”.

All three participants of the discussion agree on this. This is common sense too, in my opinion, which I mentioned here previously, but saw opposition to that and many seem to be convinced otherwise.

• The second dimension of Putin’s goal is basically to defeat the US and make NATO look like a “paper tiger” and weak, by inserting Russia into the basics of security architecture of the European continent, consequentially changing the world order (in a nutshell).

One point here is that Russia, whether anyone (or everyone?) likes it or not, is the integral part of the European security architecture, regardless of what happens in Ukraine. It would be silly to think otherwise.

• Given the stakes, the lack of urgency in the west is somewhat odd.
• While we celebrated Europe cutting their dependence on Russia (carbon hydrates), we are forgetting that the same may be celebrated in Russia, cutting their dependence on the West.
• The latter point leads to the more autonomous and likely more ambitious foreign policy of Russia, an anti-western foreign policy and this is largely independent of what is going to happen in Ukraine on the ground.
• We keep overestimating and underestimating Russia.
• Russia is far more resilient than people expected, especially in regard to the military output.
• China, Iran, North Korea, etc are increasingly growing factors in sustainability of the Russian war effort, economy, and so on.
• There is a whole other part of the planet out there that may not see things and this war the way we do.
• Many have settled on the fact that Russia has been strategically defeated, but the history will be the judge of that. Yet, many think that there is no other significant action needed to be taken as far as this war is concerned.
• While there appears to be a lack of urgency, this war can still take a negative trajectory.
• Consequences for the European security are significant and you are better off seeing weakened Russia that feels it has been defeated than the Russia you see today.
• We failed to contain Russia.

Honestly, I think the last 30 minutes of this conversation is better than the first (though the entire thing is very solid). While the first part greatly discusses the situation with a lot of contingencies (ie the war), the second part, more or less, talks about the geopolitical side of it and what the war is actually all about.

• Azerbaijan, Middle East, etc; inability of the West to deal with Russia will provide ideas to other more aggressive actors, and so on.

One note here is that Russia is a key player to dealing with many “more aggressive actors”.

• Of course, Iran is doing well militarily, regardless of sanctions, and, of course, there is China.
• There is still a positive outcome for Ukraine possible if a) they can hold their ground next year, b) can solve manpower issue, c) increase their industrial capacity concerning the drone production and other issues, d) consolidate the force (meaning work out the logistic issues and the circus of variety of the equipment they have been provided, including service and maintenance, etc), e) restore their capacity to fight, and f) which includes all of the above and more, set the conditions for retaking the advantage by developing a strategy.
• Long-term plan and investment needs to be developed because we have been going on a six-month strategy until now.
• There are no resources for the Ukrainian offensive to retake territory next year.
• Ukraine needs extra mobilization efforts in order to replenish their forces as losses have been significant over the past two years and they need to mobilize younger man because you need them for the offensive(s).
• Ukraine needs to work on force quality issues and rotation of troops is necessary.

Pretty much the same issues they have talked about concerning the Russian forces.

• Economically speaking, Russia can be pulling this off “indefinitely”, and definitely for the foreseeable future, unless there is a great shock to the oil prices.
• The Russian economy is not really a militarized economy, but the war does contribute greatly to the gross domestic product to the point that it may be hard to actually stop it because there is not necessarily an alternative.

That was a good mention because it seems many may be a bit confused on the subject.

• Let’s hope that the situation in the west is hopeless but not serious and in the Ukraine serious but not hopeless.

It is a great discussion overall, hands down. Everyone interested in the subject should listen to it.

 

[swerve]

...The US started the war making 14,000 main calibre artillery shells per month; they are now making 28,000 and going for 36,000. Europe is basically a joke.

Supposedly, EU production pre-war was (at annual rate) 230,000. That doesn't include the UK & Norway.

14,000 per month is roughly 170,000 per year.

Rheinmetall (not the only European producer) said a few months ago that it expected to produce 400,000 this year (2023) & 600,000 next year. Nammo (Norwegian) says it expects to make 80,000 in 2024. Nexter only expects to make 3000 in Jan 2024 (up from 1000 in Jan 2023), but continuing to increase.

And so on . . .

A joke?

 

[Feanor]

It's quite possible, but the level of probability is debatable. However I wouldn't be surprised f F-16s appear in UKR markings inside UKR borders by this Monday.

Rybar says they're already there doing flights in Western Ukraine with a squadron of 12 and 3 training aircraft with another squadron planned by mid spring. Not sure how we knows though...

Рыбарь

Одна полная эскадрилья F-16 находится уже на территории так называемой Украины: до 12 боевых и 3 учебных самолётов. К середине весны планируется передача ещё одной эскадрильи. Весь декабрь через Львов идет завоз высокоточки для данных самолётов. Поэтому и бьют по Староконстантинову...

t.me