What type of ammos? The biggest shortfall is with 155 mm shells. Europeans promised 1 million of such shells. They delivered 300 000.
But if you count all types of shells from 40 mm and up, numbers are of course larger.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
But if you count all types of shells from 40 mm and up, numbers are of course larger.
F16 have been spotted with Ukrainian cocards on their wings (I don't know in which country). That they are already in Ukraine is a rumour. It shouldn't be long before this rumour becomes reality. They indeed be stationed in western Ukraine at the beginning. They may not use them immediately, waiting for more to arrive. Then test the Russian defences gradually.Rybar says they're already there doing flights in Western Ukraine with a squadron of 12 and 3 training aircraft with another squadron planned by mid spring. Not sure how we knows though...
Рыбарь
Одна полная эскадрилья F-16 находится уже на территории так называемой Украины: до 12 боевых и 3 учебных самолётов. К середине весны планируется передача ещё одной эскадрильи. Весь декабрь через Львов идет завоз высокоточки для данных самолётов. Поэтому и бьют по Староконстантинову...t.me
However, the air war is illustrative of a conflict taking place under unusual constraints. Neither force can effectively attack the ISR, space assets or full logistic chain of the other side.
@KipPotapych
I listened to the debate and it was great. My summary is not as long as yours. But still.
The number of >300K Russian causalities looks like an accepted number among analysts. And given that soldiers mobilised one year ago hasn't been replaced yet, that the level of invalidity to be dismissed is very high (I have heard of someone sent back to the front after losing an eye, another after losing a finger, from an off line, albeit reliable, source) means the Russians have a problem replenishing the ranks too (as well as Ukraine).
Also the fact that Russian are doubling or tripling military production is, of course, bad news for the Ukrainians, but confirms the huge number of tanks and IFV's and other vehicles lost since the beginning of the invasion.
I mean what we know about Russian losses are quiet accurate and this is the good news.
The bad news is, of course, that Ukraine could lose the war in the mid term because the number of shells Ukraine needs may not be provided, Ukraine may not be able to mobilise enough men, motivation to fight could wane, etc.
Despite all the hesitation about voting mega budgets for Ukraine in a the US and in the EU as well, I think that the West really doesn't want to lose this war. That would be devastating for our reputation all over the world. The whole Global South is watching and wait to see who will win to join the winner. The issue of this war will define alliances for most of the emerging powers, the BRICS, the emirates, Africa etc.
And they know that. At least I hope. And that's why I think that bi partisan support for Ukraine will continue.
The whole point is, will it be enough?
Snegova and Koffman are spot on when they say that the West had under estimated the military capacity of Russia and doesn't have a long term plan to cope with its war of expansion.
I would say, that we not just under estimated, in fact we knew quite well what was the power of the Russian army, but we completely failed to see their will to engage in a full scale war. We never expected that Putin would engage the entire forces of the Russian army into a conflict over the DonBas. It was unbelievable for us when he actually did it.
That's why the West, and Europe in particular, had, and still doesn't have, any long term view, beyond increasing shell production in emergency, because we have no idea what Putin will do, and even what he wants. What is Putin's goals is at the core of all the debates among analysts. Nobody knows. Putin himself doesn't know, I guess.
I listened to the debate and it was great. My summary is not as long as yours. But still.
The number of >300K Russian causalities looks like an accepted number among analysts. And given that soldiers mobilised one year ago hasn't been replaced yet, that the level of invalidity to be dismissed is very high (I have heard of someone sent back to the front after losing an eye, another after losing a finger, from an off line, albeit reliable, source) means the Russians have a problem replenishing the ranks too (as well as Ukraine).
Also the fact that Russian are doubling or tripling military production is, of course, bad news for the Ukrainians, but confirms the huge number of tanks and IFV's and other vehicles lost since the beginning of the invasion.
I mean what we know about Russian losses are quiet accurate and this is the good news.
The bad news is, of course, that Ukraine could lose the war in the mid term because the number of shells Ukraine needs may not be provided, Ukraine may not be able to mobilise enough men, motivation to fight could wane, etc.
Despite all the hesitation about voting mega budgets for Ukraine in a the US and in the EU as well, I think that the West really doesn't want to lose this war. That would be devastating for our reputation all over the world. The whole Global South is watching and wait to see who will win to join the winner. The issue of this war will define alliances for most of the emerging powers, the BRICS, the emirates, Africa etc.
And they know that. At least I hope. And that's why I think that bi partisan support for Ukraine will continue.
The whole point is, will it be enough?
Snegova and Koffman are spot on when they say that the West had under estimated the military capacity of Russia and doesn't have a long term plan to cope with its war of expansion.
I would say, that we not just under estimated, in fact we knew quite well what was the power of the Russian army, but we completely failed to see their will to engage in a full scale war. We never expected that Putin would engage the entire forces of the Russian army into a conflict over the DonBas. It was unbelievable for us when he actually did it.
That's why the West, and Europe in particular, had, and still doesn't have, any long term view, beyond increasing shell production in emergency, because we have no idea what Putin will do, and even what he wants. What is Putin's goals is at the core of all the debates among analysts. Nobody knows. Putin himself doesn't know, I guess.
@Armchair Since the beginning, this conflict was unbalanced, mostly by the Russian having the capacity to strike the Ukrainian's rear bases, energy network, transportation networks, industries, warehouse, almost everything. Whereas the Ukrainians couldn't.
@ngatimozart NATO vsUSSR Russia or China in air superiority is not a simple topic.
Nobody has seen what the F35 is really capable of in serious conflict. And nobody has seen the Chinese air force in action neither. We only know thanks to Ukes, that Su34's can be downed quiet easily with Patriot or IRIS-T systems.
@ngatimozart NATO vs
Nobody has seen what the F35 is really capable of in serious conflict. And nobody has seen the Chinese air force in action neither. We only know thanks to Ukes, that Su34's can be downed quiet easily with Patriot or IRIS-T systems.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
The best thing Putin has going for him is the lack of resolve amongst Western nations. Some of this is do to pathetic leadership but even competent leaders are influenced by their electorates. The biggest failure in the West is not articulating to the masses how damaging a Ukrainian defeat will be and how bad the long term fallout will be geopolitically and economically.
Most commentators point out how vulnerable armour is and are even starting to question its future on the battlefield. I haven’t heard as many people talk about how ineffective manned air power has been in this conflict. Russia arguably had the second most powerful airforce in the world going into this conflict and yet it seems to contributing very little to this confict.
Really what we seem to be witnessing is a decline in capability of most manned systems in a battlefield that now seems dominated by drones and missiles.
Even the Russian navy seems to be struggling against land based systems.
II suspect military experts will be spending years analysing this war.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
A very interesting question wrt Chinese and Western military aviation, which would prevail? China potentially has the ability to replace losses better. The US has a stealth advantage. A really big issue is how well can the F-35 fleet be maintained? The West currently has superior numbers of 4+ and 5th Gen fighters but AA capabilities may be an issue wrt China. Hopefully the stuff doesn’t hit the fan before the early 2030s.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
I doubt Russia has the second most powerful AF (excluding bombers with nukes). China has close to 200 J-20s versus Russia’s 12-15? Su -57s. New bombers along with Y-20 transports/ tankers plus a likely carrier jet (J-35) seems to indicate China would be number 2.
Actually factoring in age of equipment, quality of the equipment, quality of training, maintainence and so on I am not sure I would even rate them third. I would question the ability of the Russian airforce to deal with even a relatively small number of fifth generation fighters. Interesting to see if they can even handle a few squadrons of secondhand F-16.
Not relevant to this thread and it is a rabbit hole that should be avoided.
The individual merits of a single platform (E.g F-35) isn't the deciding factor, but how it is used and sustained and the support assets in play. Discussions of F-16 (especially early model Blk10/15) for Ukraine as some kind of a game changer is way off the mark.
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- Thread Starter Thread Starter
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Platform to platform... it depends on what variant of the F-16 we're talking about here. Something more modern with AESA? Definitely a problem. Russia might have to lean on their Su-57s and we will have to see if their AESA is any good. Older F-16s? They will likely be outclassed by the Irbis radars on the Su-35S. Depending on the age, they could even get outclassed by the Bars on the Su-30SM despite it's age. The Zaslon-M remains a mystery. Before this war I would have discounted the value of the MiG-31BMs but they shockingly did well against Ukrainian fighters at longer ranges, so maybe they will weigh in on this fight. Lastly Russia has a small handful of MiG-35s. Some allege they came with the Zhuk-AE AESA. If this is the case, they might get their day in the sun. Emphasis on "might".
However Russia has AEW and Ukraine doesn't. Can Russia maintain AEW in the frequently enough or have it ready to go fast enough to create problems for the Ukrainian airforce? Unclear. Is NATO willing to use their AEW as part of the kill chain for Ukrainian fighters in sky? Also unclear. If yes, this creates a problem for Russia and we can expect more "unprofessional maneuvers" near NATO aircraft over the Black Sea.
Of course Russia recently executed a series of rather effective strikes against Ukrainian jets on the ground. It doesn't matter how good your F-16s are if they get smacked with a Lancet or a Kh-38M while parked. And while Ukraine's current tiny inventory of active jets can be easily rotated between many airfields and kept safe, if Ukraine really gest "a few squadrons" (let's say 3-5) of F-16s and uses them actively, it will be much harder to hide from Russian lond range strikes.
Lastly it's still crickets on Russia's claim about using the 40N6 missile in conjuction with A-50Us to down a number of Ukrainian jets. Russia's claim of 20+ is unrealistic but I wouldn't be surprised to hear they got some. Can Russia execute something similar against an emboldened Ukrainian airforce flying buckets of free F-16s? Quite possibly.
Overall I currently would concur with those saying the F-16s won't be a game changer. I will add that they will keep the Ukrainian air force in the fight for years to come (assuming the war lasts that long) and will add some capabilities even if they don't have the newer radars. They will especially add capabilities if they do come with newer radars. When discussing ratings of airforces, I find the discussion silly and pointless. There are times when Russia has punched drastically above their weight outperforming what anyone could reasonably expect. There are times when Russia has tripped over their own feet and faceplanted spectacularly. Both have happened during this war and during previous conflicts. Russia maintains an large and modern airforce, one of the strongest in the world overall, without getting into rankings. Certainly not the strongest, the USAF outclasses everyone by far. It remains a major threat to virtually any opponent, and even a combined NATO effort, while eventually prevailing (pretend Russia won't go nuclear) would not be that easy.
@Feanor how are the other Russian sources talking about the Su-34 ambushes? So far Fighter bomber acknowledged one loss during the day of the 3-su-34 ambush claims. The channel also mentioned htat Ukraine may be putting their Patriots on theor railways systems( google translate, so not even sure if they even meant that).
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #9,174
That's what he alleged. I've seen different Russian sources talk about either 3 downings or "multiple". I would assume 3 to be the correct number. Although I found something else interesting. Weapon Master who tracks OSINT videos and updates his maps based on that notates that Russian infantry seems to be in the center of Krynki for the first time since Ukraine took up positions there. It seems that, first off the foothold might be on it's last legs, and second off Russia may no longer be able to drop bombs there because it would be danger close.
Discusses Kherson starting at 2:45. The english subtitles seem to be pretty good overall.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
I was the one who used the word “joke” in this unedited summary of mine (as was noted, I believe). The exact words were:
[…]between 75 and 90 thousand main calibre artillery shells per month, just looking at usage rates. The United States provides the overwhelming (the last word stressed by the speaker) majority of that monthly artillery ammunition supply and a significant amount of also air defense munitions[…] Just to make it abundantly clear, Europe is increasing its production of ammunition but it isn’t simply an issue of money and the percentage of, I think, the ammunition that Europe provides of that monthly package is quite low. Whatever number you are thinking of, think of a lower number, alright? The reality is that if assistance was cut off[…]
So don’t “kill the messenger”.
However, I also looked for the numbers, but very briefly, because it didn’t sound right to me either. My quick search provided me with the following.
Borrell also said the bloc had provided more than 300,000 artillery shells and missiles under the first track of the scheme, which involved EU member states delivering from their own stockpiles.
This is from the Guardian article from Nov 14. Note that he said “artillery shells and missiles”. Also of utmost importance, imo, from the same article:
Borrell suggested that an immediate issue was the export commitments of EU defence manufacturers outside the bloc. “About 40% of the production is being exported to third countries, so it is not a lack of production capacities,” he said.
“It is that they send their products to another market. So maybe what we have to do is to try to shift this production to the priority one, which is the Ukrainians,” he said.
From the Reuters article published on Dec 6:
European Union countries have placed orders for only 60,000 artillery shells under an EU scheme to help get 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ukraine by next spring, according to people familiar with the figures.
The scheme was a centrepiece of an EU initiative to ramp up the supply of vital 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine, allowing countries to place orders with industry through contracts negotiated by the bloc's European Defence Agency (EDA).
The same article, however, states:
The broader initiative, launched in March, offered various schemes to get 1 million shells and missiles to Ukraine within a year for the war against Russia's invasion.
Together, those schemes have yielded some 480,000 munitions, according to the EU - less than half of the target, with about four months to go.[…]
The European Defence Agency in September that seven countries had ordered ammunition through the pioneering joint procurement scheme. Lithuania, Denmark and Luxembourg said they were among the seven.
The EDA did not specify the size of the orders. But people familiar with the figures told Reuters on condition of anonymity the total was just 60,000 shells.
Another option for EU members was to deliver from existing stocks, yielding some 300,000 shells and missiles, the EU says.
It is my interpretation that they have delivered 300,000 shells and missiles from the existing stockpiles and 180,000 came from… the new orders? Not entirely sure.
This is also supported, in part, by the following article from December 18 published by Defense News:
Germany approved orders for more than $400 million worth of 155mm artillery shells for Ukraine in recent days, in separate deals with Rheinmetall and an unidentified French company.
Sounds very optimistic. Until you keep reading that is:
The German army placed an order for several tens of thousands of shells for the Ukrainian armed forces under an existing framework agreement with Rheinmetall, with a value of at least €100 million, or $110 million, the company said in a Dec. 18 statement.
That follows a Dec. 14 announcement that the Defence Ministry is buying 68,000 shells for Ukraine from a French armament company for €278 million.[…]
Germany’s Bundeswehr ordered 155mm ammunition for a “three-digit million euro amount,” with delivery scheduled for 2025, according to Rheinmetall. The order is part of a framework agreement concluded with the company in July for delivery of several hundred thousands of shells, fuses and propellant charges through to 2029, with a potential gross order volume of around €1.2 billion.
The latest order is at least the fourth announced by Rheinmetall under the framework agreement, and it includes high-explosive, smoke and practice rounds.
And:
Germany also approved the purchase of 68,000 155mm shells for Ukraine from a French company, the defense ministry said Thursday.[…]
French artillery-shells manufacturer Nexter declined to either confirm or deny it received an order for 155mm rounds from Germany. The company plans to increase annual capacity by 50% in 2024 from 60,000 shells before the war in Ukraine, and to more than double output in 2025, Nexter spokesman Gabriel Massoni told Defense News.
68K shells for 278M euro implies the price of about €4,100 per shell. So the Rheinmetall order due in 2025 must be for about 25,000 munitions. If this cannot be defined as a joke then what can? If there are some better hard numbers that support the argument the other way, I am all ears.
It seems to me that the US has been providing the shells from their own stockpiles, that are considerably larger than those of the EU, for the most part, including some (lots of?) new production. Once they felt they were running short/low, they started sending the cluster munitions that most/all of the EU has on the ban list but no one said a word because they cannot deliver themselves what they had promised.
This is also an interesting tidbit from a Defense One article from Nov 27:
[…]And in a twist that belies Europe’s reputation for state-owned businesses, its dilemma is set by market conditions, while U.S. progress is made possible by state-control of ammo manufacturing.[…]
In October, NATO’s senior military officer, Adm. Rob Bauer, that the price for one 155mm shell had risen from 2,000 euros ($2,171) at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to 8,000 euros ($8,489.60).
For comparison, the U.S. currently pays $3,000 for its most modern shells, according to an Army spokesperson. That price includes the charge, fuze, and shell body.
Unlike the U.S., European 155mm production is primarily in the hands of the commercial market. That means that European countries can incentivize production increases through purchases, but cannot order factories to invest in automation, double shifts, or build new plants, as the U.S. has.[…]
European munitions firms, meanwhile, have few opportunities to raise money from private hands, thanks to regulations on banks and arms makers, Loss said. They therefore have trouble increasing production merely on the expectation of higher orders.[…]
The irony here is that the Americans (along with us here in Canada) will be the first ones to tell you that anything run by government is a plaque (and they would be correct more often than not).
Military officers will disagree. Battle tanks, and armoured vehicles are still extremely effective and necessary in a modern war. Russians suffered a spectacular loss of armoured vehicle in this war because of incompetence and because of obsolete armour and inefficient reactive armour. It doesn't mean armour is useless. It still protects you from machine guns.
It's true that armour is not the ultimate protection it once was. Technology to pierce ut has evolved faster than the armour itself. Yet it's still not easy to destroy a tank. ot takes an average of two Javeline shots to destroy one.
Anti-tank drones does barely better. But drone adds a capability to the portable anti-tank systems. Drones can strike where a portable rocket won't and offer reconnaissance during the attack.
Ukrainians have said recently (sorry I lost the link), that drones were more effective than artillery in destroying tanks and vehicles (maybe not against buildings or infantry concentration). This makes sens because to hit a tank with a classic shell, from 10 miles away, you have to be lucky. Even the most advance and most expensive, guided shells needs two or three shots to hit a targeted vehicle. And this is already an incredible technological achievement.
A drone can be piloted directly on the target, rarely missing it. But their range are limited and they can intercepted.
Yet, as this war is concerned, artillery still dominate the battle field. Drones does change the way war is done, but their main use is artillery fire control. More than directly hitting targets with suicide drones.
The Russian air force is devastating for the Ukrainians. Ukrainians just hide their losses much better. They are also using the few planes they still have and cry for F16's.
I haven;t seen any unmanned aerial vehicle replacing a manned jet or bomber. Even the Predator can't replace a jet.
I think that it's because it's very difficult to fly a jet or a large plane remotely without crashing it. And that visibility from a camera is still too limited for complex operations.
155mm.
I think the biggest problem with European supplies so far has not been production capacity (though that is inadequate, & isn't being increased fast enough - but at least it's being increased) but stocks. They'd been drastically run down, limiting how many could be given to Ukraine. War stocks were already far too low, & donations to Ukraine have run them down further. With some production being exported, supplies are dangerously low IMO.
The British government says its latest (June 2023) contract for 155mm shells from BAE includes increasing UK 155mm production capacity eightfold, but it doesn't say what it was before, & I've not been able to find out. And that's by 2026 . . . It's not coming all at once, though: I understand that includes interim increases, some of which, such as employing more workers, have already been implemented. A new shell filling factory is being built, & the only factory in the UK making shells is expanding capacity. This isn't only needed to to supply Ukraine, but to replenish, then increase, stocks, which were already too low before a lot of 'em were given to Ukraine. Current facilities are producing at full capacity.
In January Nammo announced an investment to double 155mm production capacity to 200,000 per year - by 2028. It began investing in 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But it complained that governments were slow to come up with orders, & it couldn't afford to invest more without them. Norway, Denmark, Finland & Sweden came up with orders eventually.
Some other suppliers lack the money to increase capacity much without financing. I think that's true of some East Europeans, such as Slovakia, where two companies made about 20,000 155mm rounds in 2022, & were said to be expecting to make 30,000 this year. The Slovak defence minister announced in April 2023 that production would be increased to 150,000 per year, but I don't know when that'll happen, & the latest election may be causing difficulties.
There's also these countries' own internal problems. Germany for example will likely drop new deliveries from army stocks to next to zero fairly soon, and only pay for delivery from industry. Reason are budgetary shenanigans of our finance minister, which have basically resulted in the Bundeswehr having to pay for replacement of items delivered to Ukraine from their stocks out of their regular budget starting next year.
That won't affect artillery ammunition deliveries much (those come from industry), but in particular small arms ammunition (at over 40 million rounds we're now close in deliveries to what we donated to the USA in 2003) and other coveted items such as air defence, logistics vehicles, uniforms and medical equipment.
Ananda
The Bunker Group
Russian ALCM shown using flares as decoys for anti air defense, close to their terminal decent. Seems this war become spring board for Russian MIC on fasten development of their products. One thing for sure the initial negativity on Russian Military products in many Asian forums early in the war, begin to change toward positive sides again. As many Asian politicians use online forums as part of their assesment on public moods, it is not improbable changes in social media will reflect later on toward political swings.
A few months ago we were very proud that Ukrtainians shot down the famous Kinzhal missiles.
Now it appears that they had another missile, the X-32, that nobody managed to stop. And the Russian already fired 300 of them on Ukraine:
One possible explanation is that they dropped it on or near the frontline in east and the south where advanced anti-missile system were not deployed.
And that the Russians tested their symbolic Kinzhal on more symbolic targets like Kyiev.
Ukrainian air defence does pretty well with other types of cruise missiles.
I don't know how you could have a positive view of Russian military hardware with all the losses they had... But if people don;t have the information, they can believe anything.
Now it appears that they had another missile, the X-32, that nobody managed to stop. And the Russian already fired 300 of them on Ukraine:
It's very strange that they could down Kinzhal (Kh-47M2) and not the much older Burya (X-22).Yurii Ihnat said:
One possible explanation is that they dropped it on or near the frontline in east and the south where advanced anti-missile system were not deployed.
And that the Russians tested their symbolic Kinzhal on more symbolic targets like Kyiev.
Ukrainian air defence does pretty well with other types of cruise missiles.
Outside of Europe and North America, the Russian information campaign is very active. And many people believe it.Ananda said:
I don't know how you could have a positive view of Russian military hardware with all the losses they had... But if people don;t have the information, they can believe anything.