Australian Army Discussions and Updates

[Armchair]

How many LPD’s or LHD’s are stationed in Townsville? Or Brisbane?

LHDs don’t need to transit the Torres Strait to reach Brisbane or Townsville from their Sydney base and they do regularly operate from Townsville (though the Port of Townsville web home page no longer highlights one). In a benign environment they would send a LHD To lift 1 Bde. I can’t believe though that in a moderate threat environment they would send a LHD and all of the available RAN surface fleet through the Torres Strait and have it stuck on that side of it.

Project LAND 8710 isn’t about uplifting a mechanised battle group, or even a motorised one. You need LHD’s or LPD’s for that regardless of where they are based.

And 1 Bde won’t have a mechanised battle group to provide so I presume they believe the Phase 2 vessels will be capable of lifting what they can send. The problem I see (apart from that the lift vessels are not even selected yet) is escorting those vessels when they arrive.

Again I am just trying to offer reasons for baffling decisions based on what the government has done. A lot of the reasons on Australian threads on this forum boil down to “they are idiots” and “that is what one side of politics does” and “they are trying to save money”.
All three are probably right from time to time, and are always worth considering, but the “saving money” line does not work here (And least in 10 year terms). The Army changes will be very expensive In many ways.

I suspect a lot of the baffling Army stuff is about problems with RAN availability and crewing (not the RAN’s fault).

 

[old faithful]

Another problem that's been created, is Army doesn't know if it's Arthur or Martha.
Senior officers are tasked to design a model for Army's future. This is not done over night. They make a plan, and years after it has been modified to the politicians approval, it gets canned.
Another plan is made and so on and so on.
The can gets kicked further along the road.
The damage that is created with these changes is sometimes irreparable, especially when it comes to viewing the political masters. How can these soldiers, who waste their time on fantasy organisations take their governments serious when they are tasked to change their plans over and over again?

 

[Armchair]

Another problem that's been created, is Army doesn't know if it's Arthur or Martha.
Senior officers are tasked to design a model for Army's future. This is not done over night. They make a plan, and years after it has been modified to the politicians approval, it gets canned.
Another plan is made and so on and so on.
The can gets kicked further along the road.
The damage that is created with these changes is sometimes irreparable, especially when it comes to viewing the political masters. How can these soldiers, who waste their time on fantasy organisations take their governments serious when they are tasked to change their plans over and over again?

I know that this is not widely believed here but the Army changes imposed by government (and apparently badly executed) are consistent with a response to a changing threat. The Australian Army is concentrating force in Queensland specifically Townsville. The reason is not clear but it is very difficult for cultural and political reasons for an Australian government to articulate the nature of the regional contingency it is planning for while it is heavily engaged in soft power diplomatic efforts to prevent a threat from being realised.

By analogy the Australian government was not publicly ventilating its plans to deploy thousands of personnel to (what was at the time) Indonesian territory prior to East Timorese independence in 1999.

 

[Volkodav]

The army structure in much of the 60s and into the 70s was an infantry division with 9 battalions, supported by a regiment of tanks a CAV Regt, and an APC CAV Regt (supposed to be a brigade lift but often only a battalion lift). Supporting field and medium Artillery (mostly WWII vintage guns), aviation, engineers etc.

The 2nd division was meant to mirror this but never had the required manning or equipment.

Armoured divisions were formed but never deployed in WWII. They were mostly equipped with M-3 Grants/Lees and M-3 Stuarts. The Stuart's were deployed in the Pacific but weren't ideal, the Matilda's however performed well. They were used as a brigade, supporting a corps, i.e. similar scale of 1 regiment per division, or a troop per battalion.

Wartime trials let to the order of Churchill's, with an apparently excessive number of 95mm close support versions and the intention of deploying a lot of Crocodile flame versions. This was in line with the primary infantry support doctrine.

Late war plans included an integrated armoured division, with a regular component of five regiments of centurions forming a brigade, and two reserve brigades equipped with Comets. This obviously never happened.

Australia, with the Abrams, Boxer, ASLAV, and Bushmaster, as well as the Redbacks replacing some M-113s, is actually heavier, better equipped and more survivable than it has ever been. The scale of heavy, up to date equipment, while arguably not enough, is still better than it has ever been.

 

[old faithful]

Maybe the ASLAVs will mirror the the M113s and have an extended life....I doubt it though.
Our Army has a posted strength of @30,000.
It has not changed since the 80s. The population of Australia has however changed.
In the 80s it was somewhere around 15 million, now somewhere around 26 million. Army has room to grow.
The current government says it has surplus of 22 billion dollars, however it could afford 1/2 a billion on a referendum that everyone knew would fail, they have broken nearly every election promise they have made, including spring up defence ASAP.
Army has been reorganised yet again, and if the current government is a one term government, Army can expect to be reorganised yet again.

 

[Volkodav]

T

Maybe the ASLAVs will mirror the the M113s and have an extended life....I doubt it though.
Our Army has a posted strength of @30,000.
It has not changed since the 80s. The population of Australia has however changed.
In the 80s it was somewhere around 15 million, now somewhere around 26 million. Army has room to grow.
The current government says it has surplus of 22 billion dollars, however it could afford 1/2 a billion on a referendum that everyone knew would fail, they have broken nearly every election promise they have made, including spring up defence ASAP.
Army has been reorganised yet again, and if the current government is a one term government, Army can expect to be reorganised yet again.

To be honest, things are moving quicker in defence than they did in the 75, 83, 96, 07, or 13 changes of government.

In each case there was either sweet FA change, or there were massive changes in direction, that resulted in cuts in capability before the new options came on line.

 

[ADMk2]

3 Bde will have tanks, cav, IFVs and light infantry (with PMVs and also co-located medium lift helicopters). That is as balanced as an Australian Army brigade can get given the limitations set by gov’t.
If your critique is that it should have two mechanised battalions in order to be coherent then I fully agree but that option was not available to Army.
i guess the two infantry battalions could be mixed mechanised/motorised. Would that be better In your view? If more IFVs are ordered in 2028 then that might make transition easier (though for reasons raised by Takao I agree they should not all be in Townsville).

That is the definition of unbalanced in an operational sense. One half of the “one mechanised brigade” DSR said was a “priority” (of which I again refer to my earlier point of one inf battalion does not a brigade make) is protected, mobile and lethal. The other is a rapidly deployable air mobile light infantry force, that is not protected, is not tactically mobile and has limited lethality. The air mobile inf force for instance. Are they to be supported by 55 ton, tracked SP guns in these air-mobile operations based on the brigade structure?

The two elements are chalk and cheese operationally speaking…

The very reason we moved away from these silo’d ‘one shot’ capabilities that we have used before in the 80’s and 90’s, is that they are actually useless when any sort of operation comes along. Somali revealed it. Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan reinforced it. Army doesn’t want it, hence Army Objective Force and yet here we are…

The reality is they are a peacetime construct designed to fit a budget. As an operational capability they are useless. They are grouped together for admin purposes only.

1 mech battalion tanks, cav and engineers is a combat team, not a brigade. Similarly the light inf half of the “brigade” is also a combat team. Neither of which can be sustained, reinforced or replaced by like forces.

it’s a rubbish capability that is a literal backward step from what we already have, directed by a Government that talks a big game but in reality couldn’t give 2 hoots about our defence.

 

[ngatimozart]

The army structure in much of the 60s and into the 70s was an infantry division with 9 battalions, supported by a regiment of tanks a CAV Regt, and an APC CAV Regt (supposed to be a brigade lift but often only a battalion lift). Supporting field and medium Artillery (mostly WWII vintage guns), aviation, engineers etc.

The 2nd division was meant to mirror this but never had the required manning or equipment.

Armoured divisions were formed but never deployed in WWII. They were mostly equipped with M-3 Grants/Lees and M-3 Stuarts. The Stuart's were deployed in the Pacific but weren't ideal, the Matilda's however performed well. They were used as a brigade, supporting a corps, i.e. similar scale of 1 regiment per division, or a troop per battalion.

Wartime trials let to the order of Churchill's, with an apparently excessive number of 95mm close support versions and the intention of deploying a lot of Crocodile flame versions. This was in line with the primary infantry support doctrine.

Late war plans included an integrated armoured division, with a regular component of five regiments of centurions forming a brigade, and two reserve brigades equipped with Comets. This obviously never happened.

Australia, with the Abrams, Boxer, ASLAV, and Bushmaster, as well as the Redbacks replacing some M-113s, is actually heavier, better equipped and more survivable than it has ever been. The scale of heavy, up to date equipment, while arguably not enough, is still better than it has ever been.

That's the difference between the Aussie and NZ armies during WW2. We had an armoured division in Europe and a part one in the Pacific. We used tanks in the islands against the Japanese.

 

[Volkodav]

That's the difference between the Aussie and NZ armies during WW2. We had an armoured division in Europe and a part one in the Pacific. We used tanks in the islands against the Japanese.

Yes, South Africa did the same, as well as the UK. Faced with manpower shortages they converted entire brigades and divisions from infantry to armour. Less manpower required but more combat power delivered.

 

[ngatimozart]

Yes, South Africa did the same, as well as the UK. Faced with manpower shortages they converted entire brigades and divisions from infantry to armour. Less manpower required but more combat power delivered.

We had to bring our 3rd Division back from the islands due to severe manpower shortages here. We used the services from about 1941 onwards to help with the various harvests. From 1942 - 45 we were a major supplier of food to the US forces in the Pacific. We found it very difficult to fight a war on two fronts.

 

[Takao]

I know that this is not widely believed here but the Army changes imposed by government (and apparently badly executed) are consistent with a response to a changing threat. The Australian Army is concentrating force in Queensland specifically Townsville. The reason is not clear but it is very difficult for cultural and political reasons for an Australian government to articulate the nature of the regional contingency it is planning for while it is heavily engaged in soft power diplomatic efforts to prevent a threat from being realised.

They are?

What's the threat?

Even better - what's the role Army in responding to the threat? Because I can tell you that the mission hasn't changed. And if the mission, to prepare land forces for combat, remains extant, how have the changes helped meet that mission? The ability to do combined arms (an absolute foundational skill for any professional force, as has been the case for centuries) has decreased, access to training areas has decreased, access to populations to support retention has decreased, ability to train all year around has decreased. So what has improved?

By analogy the Australian government was not publicly ventilating its plans to deploy thousands of personnel to (what was at the time) Indonesian territory prior to East Timorese independence in 1999.

Because every 'great strategic thinker' focused on Defence of Australia. Just like now. And because every 'great strategic thinker' knew the end of the Cold War was the end of conflict and that Australian interests only started at the 12 nm line.

And it bit us hard. The recently released official histories show how close it was to failure. If Jakarta had even decided to play a little bit (and not necessarily with conventional forces) we would have failed. The thing is, Australian interests do not end at the 12 nm line, and almost all the time we need to put land forces somewhere to get our voice heard. A Joint Force is only as strong as it's weakest link - and it doesn't matter if your super duper F-35s clear the skies and the Hunters clear the seas when all you can put ashore is a light force that dies quickly. Not @ADMk2 post: A single Bn of IFVs means we have a sustainable Combat Team - nothing more. In 1999 we had a sustainable BG+...

 

[Volkodav]

A cynical suggestion, the main advantage of moving much of the army to Queensland is the troops will be closer to the areas they need to support in floods, cyclones and bushfires. Climate change is meant to be one of the biggest threats going forward.

 

[ADMk2]

A cynical suggestion, the main advantage of moving much of the army to Queensland is the troops will be closer to the areas they need to support in floods, cyclones and bushfires. Climate change is meant to be one of the biggest threats going forward.

Also means they don’t have to build more facilities in Adelaide for the incoming fires regiment. In Darwin they are moving 1 Avn Regiment out of Robertson and I’d bet pounds to peanuts the ”Littoral Manoeuvre” Regiment will be moving in… Maybe they’ll go to Larrakeyah but space seems to be at a premium there…

There are significant defence estate concerns tied up in these moves and again, it’s about saving money, not enhancing capability in this time of strategic decline…

 

[Volkodav]

Also means they don’t have to build more facilities in Adelaide for the incoming fires regiment. In Darwin they are moving 1 Avn Regiment out of Robertson and I’d bet pounds to peanuts the ”Littoral Manoeuvre” Regiment will be moving in… Maybe they’ll go to Larrakeyah but space seems to be at a premium there…

There are significant defence estate concerns tied up in these moves and again, it’s about saving money, not enhancing capability in this time of strategic decline…

Robo was a bit of a ghost town when I was last there and facilities were going up everywhere at RAAF Darwin. The move of so much of 1 BDE south, coinsiding with the end of major gas construction projects tanked the NT economy and shrunk the population.

Great coats on, great coats off. There are always winners and losers, my feeling is the pengulum swung to far one way and now it's swinging back too far again.

The ADF became too much about deploying and sustaining expeditionary forces, and too little about war fighting, in particular, strike power.

We could deploy and sustain niche capabilities, as part of a coalition, for the long term but would struggle doing anything else.

With new capabilities there is a need to consentrate effort, knowledge and experience to get them up and working. Some of the decisions make sense in this light. Once the doctrine has been developed and the skills built and refined, that knowledge and experience can be rolled out elsewhere before the conservatively minded make the concentration into permanent stove pipes.

 

[Anthony_B_78]

That's the difference between the Aussie and NZ armies during WW2. We had an armoured division in Europe and a part one in the Pacific. We used tanks in the islands against the Japanese.

That's not really the case. The 2nd New Zealand Division was formed as an infantry division. One of its infantry brigades was converted to armoured, but other units - including a cavalry regiment - were later converted to infantry to restore it to three infantry brigades. Effectively, it was an infantry division supported by its own tank brigade, not an armoured division as such. The 3rd New Zealand Divisions - which only had two brigades - had few tanks in the Pacific. Australia did use tanks in the theatre. The Australian 1st Armoured Division was formed for service in the European theatre, but not deployed there before Japan entered the war, and ultimately it was disbanded with constituent units used to support the infantry. This was the norm in the Pacific - the terrain and the logistical difficulties did not support armoured maneuvre warfare as seen in North Africa / Europe. The Americans did not deploy a single one of their many armored divisions to the Pacific; they deployed tanks in support of infantry. The lessons remain relevant for us today.

 

[Armchair]

They are?
What's the threat?

The threat has not been articulated so the only option is to speculate and I choose not to spell it out.
Let me put it in general terms though. In the next few years various nations or regions of nations just north of Australia are likely to have civil disturbances. Some of those nations will invite security partners to assist in peacebuilding/ peacekeeping. In some cases Australia will be a preferred security partner. The role of the Australian Army in those cases will centre around committing 7 Bde (or perhaps 1 Bde). In other cases the preferred security partner will be a potential adversary of Australia that will bring the force protection assets it believes it needs to make sure its peacekeepers are safe (much as Australia would). The role of the Australian Army will be to demonstrate that it could (in the event of a major conflict) commit 3 Bde to neutralise the threat posed by the protecting assets to Australia and its allies.

I don’t expect the conflict or the deployment. I expect the threat to dissipate (if you run an island facing insurrection do you want the smiling people driving trucks helping you now or the people driving tanks and shooting at other people in two years time) and the Australian force concentration to change (hopefully to something more sustainable).

Moving thousands of people around, jeopardising retention, training, sustainment are expensive and clumsy ways to make a point to people in other nations but that is what governments have done to armies for thousands of years (There would be easier ways to make a point but the USAF doesn’t have to keep F-22s in Florida either).

The factory to build Australia’s IFVs is still being built. I don’t know when FOC for LAND 400 Phase 3 is but I doubt it will be achieved before 2030. Until FOC there is no deployable combined arms capability in the Australian Army relevant to a major conflict. I expect the IFV numbers to increase in sync with the electoral cycle (I don’t think that is a good way to manage things). If a combined arms capability is needed then the gap is the fault of governments of the past (to whom it should have been obvious by 2002).

 

[rayb59]

I would like to see the adjusted costs figure of outfitting a recruit in 1982 to one at Kapooka in 2022. I suspect that the difference would be Eye watering.

Hi Im hoping you might be able to help me.
I feel you may have been at Kapooka during the same period as my older brother he was in Charlie company 28 platoon? (I hope that's the correct terminology.
His name is Stephen Byrne and unfortunately recently passed away and was hoping to get some old pic's of him and company.

Cheers

 

[Redlands18]

Hi Im hoping you might be able to help me.
I feel you may have been at Kapooka during the same period as my older brother he was in Charlie company 28 platoon? (I hope that's the correct terminology.
His name is Stephen Byrne and unfortunately recently passed away and was hoping to get some old pic's of him and company.

Cheers

Sorry Mate can't assist you on that one but good luck with your search. One piece of advice, if you are doing searches through Government sites for his record, use his Regimental number, works better than his name, should be on any old paperwork he had and if he had a retired members ID card.

 

[Armchair]

That is the definition of unbalanced in an operational sense. One half of the “one mechanised brigade” DSR said was a “priority” (of which I again refer to my earlier point of one inf battalion does not a brigade make) is protected, mobile and lethal. The other is a rapidly deployable air mobile light infantry force, that is not protected, is not tactically mobile and has limited lethality. The air mobile inf force for instance. Are they to be supported by 55 ton, tracked SP guns in these air-mobile operations based on the brigade structure?

Again I imagine that their envisaged operations involve protecting corps level missile batteries, and deploying to small islands (adjacent to larger islands where armour can manoeuvre ) that can be held by light infantry. Still should have 2 battalions of IFVs though.

If there are infantry, deployed by any means available to RAR, and it is appropriate to support them with howitzers, then those howitzers should be self propelled and armoured. I would similarly argue the howitzers in 7 Bde should be self propelled and armoured.

 

[Wombat000]

As I see it, excepting a response to a territorial incursion Army is effectively expeditionary.

Notionally it may have the basis of a dominant unit and be referred to as such, but it will be drawn from assets required for the task.
It may have an elements drawn of light infantry, and elements of rapid mobility and/or mechanised etc, & have required artillery, aviation assets to the BG.

The deployed BGs will be balanced for their task, the problem at least initially is depth of capability, considering production of IFVs and SPGs haven’t even started yet, one would ‘expect’ further orders to follow.
The current garrison structures are just that, garrison or basing and training formations, not the intended deployment formations.

The Brigades won’t be deployed as an entirety (this hasn’t happened since WW2, perhaps Korea, correct?).
This will preserve the cadre of the each Brigade focus and allow further regeneration of skill sets as newer members are posted from their IETs and posted from other Brigades.