recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Good spotting! Makes one wonder about the same situation for CAMM on the T31 + T26/CSC, as their VLS systems are presumably not offset, and whether there is a safety feature built in?
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Royal New Zealand Navy Discussions and Updates
- Thread starter Padman
- Start date
I doubt that it is just the falling back and damaging the launchers is the main issue as the forward speed of the ship should negate this. It would be that you don't want a live missile , with warhead landing anywhere on the ship as it would still have the potential to ignite or explode.
John Fedup
The Bunker Group
Is the LM ExL launcher CAMM setup a cold launch?
It is a cold launch system, yes. The cold launch system is part of the missile canister and the missile canister is the same for all systems.
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Redlands18
Well-Known Member
Video supplied by USNI News.
recce.k1
I'm obviously an IT Luddite as am unable to gain assess to this website.
Apologies for asking but could you copy&paste the 2.3 Naval Combat words, if appropriate?
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Hey Gooey the Naval Combat section is rather brief itself but for fuller context here are the sections which followed on from NgatiMozart's post (leading up to section 2), as this background info can be used to shape the capabilities needed. Section 2 to follow separately (word limit).
1.6 Role of the RNZN Fleet
1.6.1 The RNZN plays a crucial role in the defence of New Zealand and its interests by meeting the Government’s security and stability requirements in the maritime domain. Each ship in the fleet is capable of operating independently or in concert with other RNZN vessels. The maritime fleet is able to partake in larger NZDF deployments with embarked military forces and helicopters or multinational maritime coalitions comprising vessels and aircraft from different countries. Whether operating alone or alongside partners, the fleet supports a wide range of military and non-combat tasks, such as:
(a) Naval combat operations. This may include operating as part of a coalition naval task group with partners.
(b) Naval escorts to protect shipping and seaborne trade;
(c) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
(d) Regional and global stability and support operations (SASO);
(e) Naval diplomacy, for example port visits or joint maritime exercises;
(f) Patrols to detect and deter illegal activities, for example piracy, and drug and people trafficking;
(g) Patrols to detect and deter illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Pacific, and the Southern Ocean, including in the Ross Sea;
(h) Search and Rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, particularly in response to natural disasters and adverse weather events in New Zealand and the Pacific; and
(i) Science and research support, including through data collection, and the facilitation of access for scientists and supplies to remote locations, such as Antarctica and the Kermadec Islands.
1.6.2 The above role description is derived from the New Zealand Defence Force – Maritime Doctrine (2018). Refer to:
www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/RNZN-MARITIME-DOCTRINE_first_ed.pdf
2. FUTURE FLEET CHARACTERISTICS
2.1 Maritime Fleet Capabilities
2.1.1 As the intent of this Industry Engagement is to encourage a wide range of ideas for the future fleet configuration, and as specific user requirements have not been developed yet, the number and type of each ship (or other asset) has not been specified.
2.1.2 Within the Future Force Design Principles, there is a strong emphasis on improving the concurrency of operations and reducing the complexity of the organisation. This may be achieved through having more of the same class of ship and greater commonality of systems
across the fleet. This could mean fewer classes. The ability to combine multiple capability roles into fewer common hull forms needs to be critically examined.
2.1.3 This section provides some guidance on the type of capabilities that might be delivered by the fleet. Although the existing fleet provides an example of how these capabilities are currently delivered by each ship class, the Respondents do not have to follow this approach and are
encouraged to propose alternatives. Where a particular capability is difficult to achieve for a proposed fleet configuration, the Response should make this clear. Delivery of every capability within this section is not mandatory. This Industry Engagement is simply seeking views on the
ways to link policy objectives, capabilities, and potential fleet configurations.
2.1.4 The delivery of capability described below does not have to be by assets within the RNZN fleet. A whole of maritime domain approach should be considered. There are other NZDF assets that contribute in this environment e.g. the P-8A Maritime Surveillance aircraft. For
more information on NZDF assets, please visit the NZDF website.
www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/our-equipment
2.1.5 Additionally, the role of other New Zealand Government agencies in delivering capability can be proposed. For an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all Government Agencies refer to Annex II of the Maritime Security Strategy 2020.
www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Report/MSS_V6_U.pdf
1.6 Role of the RNZN Fleet
1.6.1 The RNZN plays a crucial role in the defence of New Zealand and its interests by meeting the Government’s security and stability requirements in the maritime domain. Each ship in the fleet is capable of operating independently or in concert with other RNZN vessels. The maritime fleet is able to partake in larger NZDF deployments with embarked military forces and helicopters or multinational maritime coalitions comprising vessels and aircraft from different countries. Whether operating alone or alongside partners, the fleet supports a wide range of military and non-combat tasks, such as:
(a) Naval combat operations. This may include operating as part of a coalition naval task group with partners.
(b) Naval escorts to protect shipping and seaborne trade;
(c) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
(d) Regional and global stability and support operations (SASO);
(e) Naval diplomacy, for example port visits or joint maritime exercises;
(f) Patrols to detect and deter illegal activities, for example piracy, and drug and people trafficking;
(g) Patrols to detect and deter illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in New Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Pacific, and the Southern Ocean, including in the Ross Sea;
(h) Search and Rescue (SAR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, particularly in response to natural disasters and adverse weather events in New Zealand and the Pacific; and
(i) Science and research support, including through data collection, and the facilitation of access for scientists and supplies to remote locations, such as Antarctica and the Kermadec Islands.
1.6.2 The above role description is derived from the New Zealand Defence Force – Maritime Doctrine (2018). Refer to:
www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/RNZN-MARITIME-DOCTRINE_first_ed.pdf
2. FUTURE FLEET CHARACTERISTICS
2.1 Maritime Fleet Capabilities
2.1.1 As the intent of this Industry Engagement is to encourage a wide range of ideas for the future fleet configuration, and as specific user requirements have not been developed yet, the number and type of each ship (or other asset) has not been specified.
2.1.2 Within the Future Force Design Principles, there is a strong emphasis on improving the concurrency of operations and reducing the complexity of the organisation. This may be achieved through having more of the same class of ship and greater commonality of systems
across the fleet. This could mean fewer classes. The ability to combine multiple capability roles into fewer common hull forms needs to be critically examined.
2.1.3 This section provides some guidance on the type of capabilities that might be delivered by the fleet. Although the existing fleet provides an example of how these capabilities are currently delivered by each ship class, the Respondents do not have to follow this approach and are
encouraged to propose alternatives. Where a particular capability is difficult to achieve for a proposed fleet configuration, the Response should make this clear. Delivery of every capability within this section is not mandatory. This Industry Engagement is simply seeking views on the
ways to link policy objectives, capabilities, and potential fleet configurations.
2.1.4 The delivery of capability described below does not have to be by assets within the RNZN fleet. A whole of maritime domain approach should be considered. There are other NZDF assets that contribute in this environment e.g. the P-8A Maritime Surveillance aircraft. For
more information on NZDF assets, please visit the NZDF website.
www.nzdf.mil.nz/nzdf/our-equipment
2.1.5 Additionally, the role of other New Zealand Government agencies in delivering capability can be proposed. For an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all Government Agencies refer to Annex II of the Maritime Security Strategy 2020.
www.transport.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Report/MSS_V6_U.pdf
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
2.2 Future Fleet Configuration
2.2.1 The Future Force Design Principles have been developed to be applied to all Defence domains. For a more specific application to the maritime domain the following opportunities should be considered:
(a) Opportunities to reduce the number of ship classes;
(b) Opportunities to achieve greater concurrency across platforms;
(c) A reduction in capability system complexity and bespoke maintenance requirements;
(d) Through-life support solutions with industry;
(e) Partnering with military and commercial partners, including in relation to design, engineering, sustainment concepts, training, crewing, and doctrine;
(f) The leveraging of existing naval and commercial designs, including those that are already in service or in development;
(g) Development of uncrewed asset capabilities; and
(h) Workforce optimisation, including alternative crewing models, training and capability generation, organisation support structures, and the distribution of on-board personnel demand.
2.3 Naval Combat
2.3.1 The naval combat capabilities of the fleet should be able to contribute to the protection of New Zealand’s sovereignty and to protect NZDF personnel and assets deployed in the maritime environment.
2.3.2 Independent missions would need to be sustainable and achievable for the NZDF. Independent activity would likely be focussed on fulfilling New Zealand’s commitments to stability in the Pacific region.
2.3.3 Where ships are operating in a coalition naval task group with partners, a level of defensive capability may be anticipated to be provided from other ships in the task group. However, ships that are designated with a naval combat role would be expected to provide a meaningful contribution to the layered defences of the task group. This would require suitable defensive systems as well as adequate levels of secure networking for communication and data transfer.
2.4 Maritime Security Operations
2.4.1 There are a range of maritime security operation roles undertaken by the NZDF, sometimes in collaboration with other New Zealand Government agencies. These would typically be in either benign or low threat environments, so defensive capabilities should be appropriate to operate in these environments.
2.4.2 Other capabilities that typically contribute to these roles are:
(a) The endurance for prolonged time on station to patrol a maritime area;
(b) The ability to detect, track, and keep pace with vessels; and
(c) The ability to board vessels for inspection of illegal activity.
2.5 Sealift / Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR)
2.5.1 Sealift capabilities are needed to support NZDF operations ashore through the maritime domain.
2.5.2 The following capabilities for Sealift and HADR are particularly useful:
(a) The ability to transfer troops and disaster response personnel;
(b) Command and control of military/HADR operations;
(c) Large solid cargo capacity, either palletised or in TEU containers, including the ability to transfer to a wharf or over the shore, or where practical by air;
(d) Vehicle stowage capacity, including the ability to transfer to a wharf or over the shore by air or sea.
(e) The ability to evacuate civilians in an emergency;
(f) The ability to make bulk fresh water (significantly in excess of ships own use), and transfer ashore; and
(g) The ability to survey harbours and ports to allow for safe maritime access.
(h) The ability to transport and provide an operational platform for rotary wing aircraft
2.5.3 The NZDF Sealift capabilities are focussed on benign or low threat environments rather than contested landings, but the ability to project forces ashore in areas with limited or no wharf infrastructure is a relevant mission. Consequently the relative benefits of over the shore
transfer by helicopter, landing craft, or ship’s boats is material to the fleet’s capabilities. The infrastructure in many parts of the region will further limit the ability for larger vessels to operate. Sea state has historically been a limiting factor for ship to shore operations and options for expanding beyond current limitations need to be considered.
2.6 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
2.6.1 It is critical for New Zealand to have broad maritime domain awareness in the Pacific region and in any area in which the NZDF is operating. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the maritime domain can be achieved using multiple NZDF assets including aircraft, ships, and shore facilities. It is not expected that every ship in the fleet would have the same levels of ISR capability but the ability to receive and contribute to a Common Operating Picture would be necessary for effective operations.
2.7 Southern Ocean & Polar Patrol
2.7.1 New Zealand has interests within the Southern Ocean which are protected and promoted through the Antarctic Treaty system governance framework, including by undertaking maritime monitoring and surveillance in the Ross Sea region to support implementation of CCAMLR
rules.2 The current Naval Tanker HMNZS Aotearoa has the ability to operate in the Ross Sea, although it was designed for a specific resupply mission of the Scott and McMurdo scientific research bases. For the final approaches to McMurdo base, Aotearoa requires ice breaker support. Additional capabilities to conduct patrol operations in the Southern Ocean and Polar Region would be beneficial to meet current Government policy objectives in this area. These capabilities would need to be able to operate independently in the Ross Sea during the Antarctic summer months (October – February). It may not be practical to be able to operate over this entire period considering environmental conditions and opportunities for
replenishment but patrol capabilities should aim to cover as much of this time period as possible. Specific patrol capabilities that would be an advantage are:
(a) The ability to detect, track, and record data of vessels and aircraft in this area;
(b) The ability to keep pace with vessels; and
(c) The ability to board vessels (where legally allowed).
2.8 Replenishment
2.8.1 Although ships should have the range and endurance to be able to undertake their intended role without the need for replenishment the fleet replenishment capabilities are intended to extend the time on station for these missions. Typical replenishment capabilities include:
(a) Abeam replenishment at sea for fresh water, F76 naval fuel, and F44 aviation fuel;
(b) Solid cargo capacity in TEU containers;
(c) Aviation capabilities to undertake Vertical Replenishment; and
(d) The ability to produce fresh water.
2.9 Littoral Operation Support
2.9.1 The NZDF operate in deep ocean and in the littoral zone. Typical capabilities that need to be delivered in this area include the use of specialist boats, dive operations, and using Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). The roles undertaken include:
(a) Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA) of coastal areas;
(b) Mine Countermeasures;
(c) Hydrographic Survey of critical seaways; and
(d) Advanced force operations.
2.10 Remotely Operated and Autonomous Uncrewed Assets
2.10.1 There is an expectation that all areas of fleet capability will be affected by the growing technological development of autonomous or remotely operated uncrewed air, surface, and sub-surface vehicles. These may be deployed from shore or from ships.
2.10.2 Defence intends to experiment and grow these uncrewed capabilities so investment in this area is expected to be part of the future fleet development. It is expected that initially these capabilities would enhance the ship capabilities rather than replace them.
2.10.3 The Respondent should make it clear in its Response how the concept of operations for uncrewed assets would operate. This should include whether they are shore or ship deployed, how they might be launched and recovered, how the data transfer and processing would occur, and the potential scale of this capability to achieve an effect. I.e. how many uncrewed assets might be needed.
2.11 Personnel Considerations
2.11.1 People are the Defence Force’s most important capability. All proposals for the maritime future fleet should consider the personnel impact on board ships and ashore. There are 2219 personnel in the RNZN3. The number of personnel that could be at sea at any time is reflected in the core crew and additional berth capacities of the current fleet. Refer to Schedule 2 for more information.
2.11.2 This Industry Engagement does not define any constraints on the future fleet configuration, in terms of personnel number, or the distribution of personnel between specific trades. However, consideration should be made as to how the RNZN could transition to a force structure for the
future fleet, both in terms of a pragmatic timeframe for the change and the level of change required.
2.11.3 Proposals for a fleet configuration could include alternative approaches to personnel including:
(a) Different crewing models such as crew rotation, and use of civilians in some specialist roles on-board and ashore;
(b) Greater use of support ashore for mission planning, and operation; and
(c) Increased use of advanced training and simulation for capability generation.
2.2.1 The Future Force Design Principles have been developed to be applied to all Defence domains. For a more specific application to the maritime domain the following opportunities should be considered:
(a) Opportunities to reduce the number of ship classes;
(b) Opportunities to achieve greater concurrency across platforms;
(c) A reduction in capability system complexity and bespoke maintenance requirements;
(d) Through-life support solutions with industry;
(e) Partnering with military and commercial partners, including in relation to design, engineering, sustainment concepts, training, crewing, and doctrine;
(f) The leveraging of existing naval and commercial designs, including those that are already in service or in development;
(g) Development of uncrewed asset capabilities; and
(h) Workforce optimisation, including alternative crewing models, training and capability generation, organisation support structures, and the distribution of on-board personnel demand.
2.3 Naval Combat
2.3.1 The naval combat capabilities of the fleet should be able to contribute to the protection of New Zealand’s sovereignty and to protect NZDF personnel and assets deployed in the maritime environment.
2.3.2 Independent missions would need to be sustainable and achievable for the NZDF. Independent activity would likely be focussed on fulfilling New Zealand’s commitments to stability in the Pacific region.
2.3.3 Where ships are operating in a coalition naval task group with partners, a level of defensive capability may be anticipated to be provided from other ships in the task group. However, ships that are designated with a naval combat role would be expected to provide a meaningful contribution to the layered defences of the task group. This would require suitable defensive systems as well as adequate levels of secure networking for communication and data transfer.
2.4 Maritime Security Operations
2.4.1 There are a range of maritime security operation roles undertaken by the NZDF, sometimes in collaboration with other New Zealand Government agencies. These would typically be in either benign or low threat environments, so defensive capabilities should be appropriate to operate in these environments.
2.4.2 Other capabilities that typically contribute to these roles are:
(a) The endurance for prolonged time on station to patrol a maritime area;
(b) The ability to detect, track, and keep pace with vessels; and
(c) The ability to board vessels for inspection of illegal activity.
2.5 Sealift / Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR)
2.5.1 Sealift capabilities are needed to support NZDF operations ashore through the maritime domain.
2.5.2 The following capabilities for Sealift and HADR are particularly useful:
(a) The ability to transfer troops and disaster response personnel;
(b) Command and control of military/HADR operations;
(c) Large solid cargo capacity, either palletised or in TEU containers, including the ability to transfer to a wharf or over the shore, or where practical by air;
(d) Vehicle stowage capacity, including the ability to transfer to a wharf or over the shore by air or sea.
(e) The ability to evacuate civilians in an emergency;
(f) The ability to make bulk fresh water (significantly in excess of ships own use), and transfer ashore; and
(g) The ability to survey harbours and ports to allow for safe maritime access.
(h) The ability to transport and provide an operational platform for rotary wing aircraft
2.5.3 The NZDF Sealift capabilities are focussed on benign or low threat environments rather than contested landings, but the ability to project forces ashore in areas with limited or no wharf infrastructure is a relevant mission. Consequently the relative benefits of over the shore
transfer by helicopter, landing craft, or ship’s boats is material to the fleet’s capabilities. The infrastructure in many parts of the region will further limit the ability for larger vessels to operate. Sea state has historically been a limiting factor for ship to shore operations and options for expanding beyond current limitations need to be considered.
2.6 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
2.6.1 It is critical for New Zealand to have broad maritime domain awareness in the Pacific region and in any area in which the NZDF is operating. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the maritime domain can be achieved using multiple NZDF assets including aircraft, ships, and shore facilities. It is not expected that every ship in the fleet would have the same levels of ISR capability but the ability to receive and contribute to a Common Operating Picture would be necessary for effective operations.
2.7 Southern Ocean & Polar Patrol
2.7.1 New Zealand has interests within the Southern Ocean which are protected and promoted through the Antarctic Treaty system governance framework, including by undertaking maritime monitoring and surveillance in the Ross Sea region to support implementation of CCAMLR
rules.2 The current Naval Tanker HMNZS Aotearoa has the ability to operate in the Ross Sea, although it was designed for a specific resupply mission of the Scott and McMurdo scientific research bases. For the final approaches to McMurdo base, Aotearoa requires ice breaker support. Additional capabilities to conduct patrol operations in the Southern Ocean and Polar Region would be beneficial to meet current Government policy objectives in this area. These capabilities would need to be able to operate independently in the Ross Sea during the Antarctic summer months (October – February). It may not be practical to be able to operate over this entire period considering environmental conditions and opportunities for
replenishment but patrol capabilities should aim to cover as much of this time period as possible. Specific patrol capabilities that would be an advantage are:
(a) The ability to detect, track, and record data of vessels and aircraft in this area;
(b) The ability to keep pace with vessels; and
(c) The ability to board vessels (where legally allowed).
2.8 Replenishment
2.8.1 Although ships should have the range and endurance to be able to undertake their intended role without the need for replenishment the fleet replenishment capabilities are intended to extend the time on station for these missions. Typical replenishment capabilities include:
(a) Abeam replenishment at sea for fresh water, F76 naval fuel, and F44 aviation fuel;
(b) Solid cargo capacity in TEU containers;
(c) Aviation capabilities to undertake Vertical Replenishment; and
(d) The ability to produce fresh water.
2.9 Littoral Operation Support
2.9.1 The NZDF operate in deep ocean and in the littoral zone. Typical capabilities that need to be delivered in this area include the use of specialist boats, dive operations, and using Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). The roles undertaken include:
(a) Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA) of coastal areas;
(b) Mine Countermeasures;
(c) Hydrographic Survey of critical seaways; and
(d) Advanced force operations.
2.10 Remotely Operated and Autonomous Uncrewed Assets
2.10.1 There is an expectation that all areas of fleet capability will be affected by the growing technological development of autonomous or remotely operated uncrewed air, surface, and sub-surface vehicles. These may be deployed from shore or from ships.
2.10.2 Defence intends to experiment and grow these uncrewed capabilities so investment in this area is expected to be part of the future fleet development. It is expected that initially these capabilities would enhance the ship capabilities rather than replace them.
2.10.3 The Respondent should make it clear in its Response how the concept of operations for uncrewed assets would operate. This should include whether they are shore or ship deployed, how they might be launched and recovered, how the data transfer and processing would occur, and the potential scale of this capability to achieve an effect. I.e. how many uncrewed assets might be needed.
2.11 Personnel Considerations
2.11.1 People are the Defence Force’s most important capability. All proposals for the maritime future fleet should consider the personnel impact on board ships and ashore. There are 2219 personnel in the RNZN3. The number of personnel that could be at sea at any time is reflected in the core crew and additional berth capacities of the current fleet. Refer to Schedule 2 for more information.
2.11.2 This Industry Engagement does not define any constraints on the future fleet configuration, in terms of personnel number, or the distribution of personnel between specific trades. However, consideration should be made as to how the RNZN could transition to a force structure for the
future fleet, both in terms of a pragmatic timeframe for the change and the level of change required.
2.11.3 Proposals for a fleet configuration could include alternative approaches to personnel including:
(a) Different crewing models such as crew rotation, and use of civilians in some specialist roles on-board and ashore;
(b) Greater use of support ashore for mission planning, and operation; and
(c) Increased use of advanced training and simulation for capability generation.
Thanks recce. Awesome.
Para 2.3 Naval Combat seems suitably ambiguous for the politicians and treasury to have plenty of wiggle room. My read of this is that the left and right arc's are pliable for the eyes of the beholder.
For some, myself included, "2.3.3 ... ships that are designated with a naval combat role would be expected to provide a meaningful contribution to the layered defences of the task group. This would require suitable defensive systems as well as adequate levels of secure networking for communication and data transfer."
... reads like a Hunter or Constellation-class FFG; for others it might be a tier II Type 31, or worse.
Based on the election attention thus far that defence and foreign affairs has received, and the 'cost of living' that has drawn the crabs, I'd reluctantly concede that there will be little future change in NZDF and RNZN.
Para 2.3 Naval Combat seems suitably ambiguous for the politicians and treasury to have plenty of wiggle room. My read of this is that the left and right arc's are pliable for the eyes of the beholder.
For some, myself included, "2.3.3 ... ships that are designated with a naval combat role would be expected to provide a meaningful contribution to the layered defences of the task group. This would require suitable defensive systems as well as adequate levels of secure networking for communication and data transfer."
... reads like a Hunter or Constellation-class FFG; for others it might be a tier II Type 31, or worse.
Based on the election attention thus far that defence and foreign affairs has received, and the 'cost of living' that has drawn the crabs, I'd reluctantly concede that there will be little future change in NZDF and RNZN.
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Hey Gooey "we" are still in the early stages of reshaping the NZDF (or RNZN for this thread). So far we have heard the Govt's views (and those of academic defence/security analysts), but what are the views of the Services themselves?
Captain Stephen Lenik RNZN analyses the recent Defence Policy Review and its implications for the Royal New Zealand Navy (Navy Today Sept 2023 pages 4-9).
So the Govt, defence/security analysts and now the RNZN itself is talking about change. The Services just don't do that unless ... it is following Govt's settings.
Talking generally I'm surprised some people don't seem to believe this? If so this is at odds with Govt statements on regional and global security which has been aligning with our allies and partners. The world order has changed with several (typically non-democratic) states openly or covertly (eg via cyber- warfare) are challenging the rules based order that we have lived under since the end of WW2 (hey I know you know this I'm simply talking generally).
Yes of course after two generations of decline (the end of the cold war "peace dividend" coinciding with the "neo-liberal" state sector reforms which also impacted and reduced defence - although none of this was unique to NZ as practically all Western nations did this - trouble is for a small country with a small defence force and because it lacked "mass" the cuts did do irreparable damage to some important capabilities which will take years to re-learn and re-build), which for us here has been a major part of our lives so course I understand some people's cynicism.
But oddly enough (albeit stupidly) this is also the state sector reform process in motion. It was designed to "ramp up" defence when there is a perceived need to do so. So this is the state sector "market" reforms in play (I well remember, and I'm sure many of us older members here as well, NZ reformed at a much greater pace and intensity/ferocity than say Australia in the 80's/90's - anything thatwasn't was nailed down was prised apart and sold to private enterprises, and defence was caught up in these reforms eg reducing capabilities and personnel therefore closing bases and outsourcing support etc). Anyway I digress and to go back the reforms also meant when there was a need to "ramp up" then it would which is what we are starting to see now. My only (actually many) criticism(s) is that should have started 20 years ago post East Timor (like the Oz Govt did) and also when the NZ economy rebounded. So we are behind the 8 ball but better late than never I suppose (about expletive time!) now we have potential conflict on our doorstep!
So back to RNZN. They have been given the opportunity to re-shape the fleet (as per the RFI). And among several important attributes "combat" and "concurrency" are being mentioned, aspects that haven't been heard since the 1980's defence white papers when the Cold war was still in motion. This suggests the NZDF will finally be gearing up but over time. Because the need to grow personnel (and experience) is a crucial factor in all of this.
What can Govt/NZDF/RNZN do in the meantime? Apart from planning for growth over time IMO it needs to also ensure it is maximising its existing capabilities that it has now as that's what they deploy or fight with.
Also now that Devonport naval base is being retained as the Navy's primary base let's have the Govt fund replacement infrastructure development to make DNB fit for purpose and an attractive place to work. Advance plans and build the drydock in Northland with space reserved for future berthing for secondary basing needs and/or small-medium vessel construction (for future commercial partnership eg Babcock NZ or whomever. Politically this will appeal to NZ First if they return to Parliament and is a logical outcome in terms of economic development rather than shifting the entire RNZN fleet from Auckland as they originally wanted). And advance the plans and build the Southern Naval Base once a location has been finalised (more on this another time).
Captain Stephen Lenik RNZN analyses the recent Defence Policy Review and its implications for the Royal New Zealand Navy (Navy Today Sept 2023 pages 4-9).
So the Govt, defence/security analysts and now the RNZN itself is talking about change. The Services just don't do that unless ... it is following Govt's settings.
Talking generally I'm surprised some people don't seem to believe this? If so this is at odds with Govt statements on regional and global security which has been aligning with our allies and partners. The world order has changed with several (typically non-democratic) states openly or covertly (eg via cyber- warfare) are challenging the rules based order that we have lived under since the end of WW2 (hey I know you know this I'm simply talking generally).
Yes of course after two generations of decline (the end of the cold war "peace dividend" coinciding with the "neo-liberal" state sector reforms which also impacted and reduced defence - although none of this was unique to NZ as practically all Western nations did this - trouble is for a small country with a small defence force and because it lacked "mass" the cuts did do irreparable damage to some important capabilities which will take years to re-learn and re-build), which for us here has been a major part of our lives so course I understand some people's cynicism.
But oddly enough (albeit stupidly) this is also the state sector reform process in motion. It was designed to "ramp up" defence when there is a perceived need to do so. So this is the state sector "market" reforms in play (I well remember, and I'm sure many of us older members here as well, NZ reformed at a much greater pace and intensity/ferocity than say Australia in the 80's/90's - anything that
So back to RNZN. They have been given the opportunity to re-shape the fleet (as per the RFI). And among several important attributes "combat" and "concurrency" are being mentioned, aspects that haven't been heard since the 1980's defence white papers when the Cold war was still in motion. This suggests the NZDF will finally be gearing up but over time. Because the need to grow personnel (and experience) is a crucial factor in all of this.
What can Govt/NZDF/RNZN do in the meantime? Apart from planning for growth over time IMO it needs to also ensure it is maximising its existing capabilities that it has now as that's what they deploy or fight with.
Also now that Devonport naval base is being retained as the Navy's primary base let's have the Govt fund replacement infrastructure development to make DNB fit for purpose and an attractive place to work. Advance plans and build the drydock in Northland with space reserved for future berthing for secondary basing needs and/or small-medium vessel construction (for future commercial partnership eg Babcock NZ or whomever. Politically this will appeal to NZ First if they return to Parliament and is a logical outcome in terms of economic development rather than shifting the entire RNZN fleet from Auckland as they originally wanted). And advance the plans and build the Southern Naval Base once a location has been finalised (more on this another time).
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
I must have missed that but let's not forget he is a first time politician (has only been in for 3 years) so may not be on top of all matters and perfected responses. (But yes I have heard him talking around in circles occasionally on other issues, again presumably because he is not from the "professional political class" i.e. not someone who has spent their working life within the beltway. Perhaps that is a good thing)?Unfortunately, if the current front runners get into power, I see little extra money being available for defence. When the said leader has been asked a question on defence he has talked around in circles.
A quick google search shows support for defence by National (as well as Labour), eg:
April 2022:
August 2023: Both Labour, National and ACT appear supportive of defence. And of course the far-left Green and Māori Party want to go in the opposite direction but that's nothing new.
Woah that's news to me - good to see a party advocating for higher than 2% of GDP defence expenditure! As up to 2% will reinforce the status quo and provide some new capabilities. But over 2% will really make a noticible diference capability wise. No doubt these increases will be over time anyway.
Sept 2023:
That same RNZ article then goes on to say:
Now I am more disappointed in Labour's response than National's (because it shows Labour won't be pragmatic and revisit their decision to axe the ACF). But the reason why I give National (Luxon) the benefit of the doubt is because as Opposition (leader) he will not have been briefed to the same extent as the GOTD is on defence and international security matters. Now I know that the Opposition leader is briefed on internal security threats (SIS) but correct me if I am wrong, I don't think that is the same when it comes to foreign affairs?
So anyway whoever is the next Govt come October, in 2024 the defence assessments will guide them on capabilities hopefully like ACF, Naval Combat Forces and Army lethality that will be needed for the 2030's (and of course logistics support and crucial personnel).
Not wanting to divert the RNZN thread to the RNZAF but just to answer a post above.... if you'd like to see what National's thinking on the ACF might be, this might be relevant:
New Zealand defense priorities could slow after resignation of PM Jacinda Ardern - Breaking Defense
Political realities may push defense reform to the backburner, as another delay is revealed.
breakingdefense.com
It includes this paragraph:
"...The office of the shadow defense minister, Tim van de Molen, told Breaking Defense that its priorities were to increase pay and living conditions, improve basic equipment and oppose any re-establishment of a combat air wing — called the Air Strike Force — in the Royal New Zealand Air Force...."
recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Yeah I read that at the time and it doesn't make any sense (without context). I mean "oppose"? Seriously? To "oppose" suggests something has been "proposed" (which it hasn't)!Not wanting to divert the RNZN thread to the RNZAF but just to answer a post above.... if you'd like to see what National's thinking on the ACF might be, this might be relevant:
New Zealand defense priorities could slow after resignation of PM Jacinda Ardern - Breaking Defense
Political realities may push defense reform to the backburner, as another delay is revealed.
It includes this paragraph:
"...The office of the shadow defense minister, Tim van de Molen, told Breaking Defense that its priorities were to increase pay and living conditions, improve basic equipment and oppose any re-establishment of a combat air wing — called the Air Strike Force — in the Royal New Zealand Air Force...."
The only thing I can think of that makes sense in terms of "opposing" is purely the consideration of "cost". Eg $6b for a squadron of shiny new gen 4.5 or gen 5 aircraft. When we don't have the skillsets and personnel to operate and support them.
And that's why some of us suggest 2nd hand aircraft initially to raise the capability because we would likely lease them (so no upfront CapEx, capital charge and depreciation - the sort of stuff that make Treasury raise their eyebrows as they have to juggle these potential funds with other priority needs for NZ Inc). The lease could potentially cost around 5-10% of that figure. We could partner with another AF or training provider to re-learn the skills. Support could be provided by the aerospace companies until sufficient personnel are recruited and trained to undertake the day to day maintenance needs (with the multinationals still playing key roles). People join the air force and generally stay - they are the least affected service when it comes to attrition.
Plus also to afford to raise a second or third squadron (which was the post-war plan). One squadron won't be enough as it means no reserves. Which is why our ACF (eg Canberra's) weren't committed to say the Vietnam war, we would have likely lost them to SAM's and therefore the whole ACF within weeks. But OTOH if we don't commit or deploy our ACF into harms way then their utility is called into question. This is our Catch 22. Use it or lose it.
Anyway it is up to the defence assessment to decide on future needs and by then our pollies will be better informed as to whether to support it or not.
Linking this to RNZN. The potential problem I see with the RNZN and its future fleet ambitions is that it has some challenges particularly key support personnel (marine engineers and the like). This has been an issue for several years now (even pre-covid) and is just getting worse with vessels in care and custody. Will the future be any better?
In parallels to the lead up to WW2 the GOTD decided to direct effort and funding to the Air Force because it would be quicker and provide more flexible options. Of course nowadays we certainly need both (Navy and Air Force) but to disregard a more "balanced" role for the Air Force, including maritime strike, would be short sighted.
Hipkins won't dare to reinstall the ACF, unless he wants to raise the ire of Helen Clark. That's who they look up to, and fear the most, as she was around and in charge when some of the current crop of Labour Party politicians were working for her.
Although it's sad as you've said that neither party will commit to a reinstatement of the ACF, let alone increase the GDP spend on the NZDF.
My communication with the National party has not been promising, While extra money was indicated, it was clearly to be targeted at existing capabilities, wages and infrastructure, there did not seem to be any apatite to increase combat effectiveness. However reports due out next year may change that, though I am not holding my breath on that or anything happening at any pace.
Any start to an AFC will not require that sort of money for 10 to 15 years and shiny new may not be required for a purely defensive requirement, second hand F18E-F, or refurbished F16 to a current level would be more than adequate. You have to build the capability up and that takes some time. We don't have the pilots that are experienced in strike type operations or the command structure to allow this to happen. it is estimated by the air force that it would take up to 15 years to complete this. We also don't have the ground crew that are experienced in the level of intensity and additional dangers involved in this type of operations. This would not take as long to acquire.
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recce.k1
Well-Known Member
Good on you for doing that!
Yes I understand where you are coming from. And them, they have said an increase to 2% will be over time and we can deduct from that an ACF is therefore lower on the priority list (as in unlikely in the short/medium term). [Well unless ACT promoting >2% has a strong say (as that will fund it) but I think we shouldn't rely on that (well unless they start making some noises on the subject, which they haven't so far I think). And I don't think Labour have committed to a 2% figure anyway and as Alberto says with Clark in Hipkin's ear (reportedly she rang him up last week to be more "assertive" in the political debates) she won't be wanting her legacies touched (so the key here is to bring her around with evidence)].So yes the reports next year will be the mostly likely way forward (or not). Short/medium term I think we can safely deduct that the defence assessment priorities (in terms of major capex) for existing capabilities will be the RNZN fleet renewal, which will cost $billions. And rightly so as technology and capability wise pushing the Frigates beyond 2030 seems to be stretching it (granted they are having their engines replaced again and hulls re-plated so they last into the mid-2030's but ideally they would need further expenditure on technology and longer range munitions - will the vessels be able to accommodate this and is it worth it for the time it takes and any remaining life?
A better option perhaps would be to fast track the replacement vessel planning with an increase in numbers in mind, so that at least two new replacement vessels could be ordered as soon as practically possible to supplement the ANZAC's in the early 2030's or earlier if it were practical eg A140 perhaps (so a combined fleet of 4 by the early 2030's i.e. yes of two different classes initially - which has been the norm in past times when renewing the fleet), with the vessels 3 and 4 replacing the ANZAC's in the mid-2030's (and perhaps they could be a "batch 2" with improvements, that can be retrofitted to vessels 1 and 2 etc).
There is some interest in the AH140 but the current T31 variants lacks a hull mounted sonar. Presumably RNZN will want a HMS judging by their need on the ANZAC's and previous Leander's. But it should be feasible (and presumably the RAN will want HMS if they select the A140 as their Tier 2 combatant) but it also means design considerations (and potential design compromises) and extra costs to be factored in.
I still favor a specialist ASW design (such as a T26/variant or other) as it will be designed fit for purpose (and that has been one of the RNZN's primary taskings over the last several decades, if not more so critical nowadays with the increased proliferation of subs in the asia-pacific). $6b+ would get us 2-3 such vessels and fit into a coalition naval task group. Leaving the A140 to prioritise on sea-lane patrolling, escorting and as a maritime presence in the wider Pacific region, Tasman Sea and Southern Ocean (up to a point). Ngati-Mozart has also floated the idea of the A120 design replacing the OPV's, which will give the commonality the RNZN fleet review is seeking, this could also be explored. But of course what I'm saying may just be too ambitious but I'm basing it on the lessons learnt from WW2 when the RNZN did suggest 3 Destroyers in lieu of (reluctantly) one of the Light Cruisers (not supported by the Admiralty - reference RNZN official history by S.D Waters), instead other minor warfighting vessels and Merchant Cruisers were pressed into service some of which were fit for their primary (limited, specialist) purpose and some were ad-hoc in nature. So howabout the RNZN gets the fleet it actually needs for the 2030's/40's and beyond? Finally for better context of the role of the RNZN in wartime, its duties from the Mediterranean, Southern Ocean, Pacific, to South and Central America, to the challenges it faces today and int the future I can't recommend enough reading that S.D. Waters official history. It just shows the Navy does need to be much better resourced.
Fully agree. But the challenge for RNZAF is the high cost to re-establish an ACF when there are much more other pressing existing capabilities and needs that require replacement or upgrading across all 3 Services. So Defence needs to think outside the box (and who am I to suggest this when they probably are already several steps ahead of us here commentating) but here goes.
As you say high expenditure is not needed for 10-15 years (well unless it was deemed a high priority - realistically unlikely to be the highest priority though) when there are cheaper options such as second hand for training purposes.
So some other ideas:
* Acquire (purchase/lease) current generation LIFT training aircraft, in order to build the air and ground crew skillsets, and use the capability as part of the advanced flying training syllabus (i.e. from T-6 to "T-xx") so all pilots receive fast jet flying training (like it was done in previous times with the Strikemaster and MB339). Select a few of the best pilots to receive additional advanced training in the areas of basic air-to-ground and air-to-air techniques and tactics. (Obviously will need to recruit or second some experienced flight instructors eg ex-RAF or RAAF etc). For those that have the right temperament, partner with say the RAF and send these pilots to their training schools to learn to fight and for those that pass they go onto an operational squadron for a few years. (Those that don't pass return to NZ for other non-combat squadron tasking or perhaps even do so in the RAF)? Then return to NZ in time to instruct or become part of a future combat operational squadron. Suggest RAF because it has the mass to absorb a few new pilots (and don't they have recruiting issues too so may welcome additional high achievers?) plus because of traditional and historical linkages between the two nations going back to WW1/WW2 etc. Sure could be another nation if there is a pathway.
*Use NZ's closeness (and historcial ties) with the UK and generate a squadron based in the UK with costs, resourcing and personnel shared between the two nations (the model I'm thinking of is the WW2 Article XV Squadrons of the RAF eg call it no. 485 Squadron of the RAF with mixed Brits and Kiwis). This way NZers get to learn advanced skillsets in an environment that cannot be replicated in NZ. Then bring back some of those experienced staff (whilst continuing to replace them) to become part of a future combat operational squadron(s) if the Govt supports the establishment of a fully operational ACF in the 2030's because of the strategic situation requiring it, and at least we can hit the ground running. This might sound like fantasy but again there is a historical precedent in suggesting this. At the start of WW2 whilst NZ was primarily training personnel for air campaigns and had very limited offensive aircraft (they were essentially obsolete and ex-RAF cast offs). But Britain asked NZ for form a fighter squadron that was sent to Singapore to fight the Japanese invasion. NZ pilots found themselves operating much more modern aircraft (Buffalos! and Hurricanes) than what it was used to back home and had to learn in a complex combat situation (and of course some pilots excelled). Like the conclusion of the RNZN commentary above, we need to have in place what we will deploy or fight with, as history shows we get caught out and we must prevent these situations from occurring ...
I think that you have shown another way forward in the above. I would look to Australia and Canada as well, while the numbers they can take would be limited, even one or two a year would be welcome. As for the importance of an AFC, in my mind the primary task of any defence force is to protect their countries sovereignty and freedom and any other tasks are carried out as a result of them not needing to do this at the time. In my mind an AFC is the easiest way to do this and provide a deterrence at the same time.Good on you for doing that!
So yes the reports next year will be the mostly likely way forward (or not). Short/medium term I think we can safely deduct that the defence assessment priorities (in terms of major capex) for existing capabilities will be the RNZN fleet renewal, which will cost $billions. And rightly so as technology and capability wise pushing the Frigates beyond 2030 seems to be stretching it (granted they are having their engines replaced again and hulls re-plated so they last into the mid-2030's but ideally they would need further expenditure on technology and longer range munitions - will the vessels be able to accommodate this and is it worth it for the time it takes and any remaining life?
A better option perhaps would be to fast track the replacement vessel planning with an increase in numbers in mind, so that at least two new replacement vessels could be ordered as soon as practically possible to supplement the ANZAC's in the early 2030's or earlier if it were practical eg A140 perhaps (so a combined fleet of 4 by the early 2030's i.e. yes of two different classes initially - which has been the norm in past times when renewing the fleet), with the vessels 3 and 4 replacing the ANZAC's in the mid-2030's (and perhaps they could be a "batch 2" with improvements, that can be retrofitted to vessels 1 and 2 etc).
There is some interest in the AH140 but the current T31 variants lacks a hull mounted sonar. Presumably RNZN will want a HMS judging by their need on the ANZAC's and previous Leander's. But it should be feasible (and presumably the RAN will want HMS if they select the A140 as their Tier 2 combatant) but it also means design considerations (and potential design compromises) and extra costs to be factored in.
I still favor a specialist ASW design (such as a T26/variant or other) as it will be designed fit for purpose (and that has been one of the RNZN's primary taskings over the last several decades, if not more so critical nowadays with the increased proliferation of subs in the asia-pacific). $6b+ would get us 2-3 such vessels and fit into a coalition naval task group. Leaving the A140 to prioritise on sea-lane patrolling, escorting and as a maritime presence in the wider Pacific region, Tasman Sea and Southern Ocean (up to a point). Ngati-Mozart has also floated the idea of the A120 design replacing the OPV's, which will give the commonality the RNZN fleet review is seeking, this could also be explored. But of course what I'm saying may just be too ambitious but I'm basing it on the lessons learnt from WW2 when the RNZN did suggest 3 Destroyers in lieu of (reluctantly) one of the Light Cruisers (not supported by the Admiralty - reference RNZN official history by S.D Waters), instead other minor warfighting vessels and Merchant Cruisers were pressed into service some of which were fit for their primary (limited, specialist) purpose and some were ad-hoc in nature. So howabout the RNZN gets the fleet it actually needs for the 2030's/40's and beyond? Finally for better context of the role of the RNZN in wartime, its duties from the Mediterranean, Southern Ocean, Pacific, to South and Central America, to the challenges it faces today and int the future I can't recommend enough reading that S.D. Waters official history. It just shows the Navy does need to be much better resourced.
Fully agree. But the challenge for RNZAF is the high cost to re-establish an ACF when there are much more other pressing existing capabilities and needs that require replacement or upgrading across all 3 Services. So Defence needs to think outside the box (and who am I to suggest this when they probably are already several steps ahead of us here commentating) but here goes.
As you say high expenditure is not needed for 10-15 years (well unless it was deemed a high priority - realistically unlikely to be the highest priority though) when there are cheaper options such as second hand for training purposes.
So some other ideas:
* Acquire (purchase/lease) current generation LIFT training aircraft, in order to build the air and ground crew skillsets, and use the capability as part of the advanced flying training syllabus (i.e. from T-6 to "T-xx") so all pilots receive fast jet flying training (like it was done in previous times with the Strikemaster and MB339). Select a few of the best pilots to receive additional advanced training in the areas of basic air-to-ground and air-to-air techniques and tactics. (Obviously will need to recruit or second some experienced flight instructors eg ex-RAF or RAAF etc). For those that have the right temperament, partner with say the RAF and send these pilots to their training schools to learn to fight and for those that pass they go onto an operational squadron for a few years. (Those that don't pass return to NZ for other non-combat squadron tasking or perhaps even do so in the RAF)? Then return to NZ in time to instruct or become part of a future combat operational squadron. Suggest RAF because it has the mass to absorb a few new pilots (and don't they have recruiting issues too so may welcome additional high achievers?) plus because of traditional and historical linkages between the two nations going back to WW1/WW2 etc. Sure could be another nation if there is a pathway.
*Use NZ's closeness (and historcial ties) with the UK and generate a squadron based in the UK with costs, resourcing and personnel shared between the two nations (the model I'm thinking of is the WW2 Article XV Squadrons of the RAF eg call it no. 485 Squadron of the RAF with mixed Brits and Kiwis). This way NZers get to learn advanced skillsets in an environment that cannot be replicated in NZ. Then bring back some of those experienced staff (whilst continuing to replace them) to become part of a future combat operational squadron(s) if the Govt supports the establishment of a fully operational ACF in the 2030's because of the strategic situation requiring it, and at least we can hit the ground running. This might sound like fantasy but again there is a historical precedent in suggesting this. At the start of WW2 whilst NZ was primarily training personnel for air campaigns and had very limited offensive aircraft (they were essentially obsolete and ex-RAF cast offs). But Britain asked NZ for form a fighter squadron that was sent to Singapore to fight the Japanese invasion. NZ pilots found themselves operating much more modern aircraft (Buffalos! and Hurricanes) than what it was used to back home and had to learn in a complex combat situation (and of course some pilots excelled). Like the conclusion of the RNZN commentary above, we need to have in place what we will deploy or fight with, as history shows we get caught out and we must prevent these situations from occurring ...