Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[Volkodav]

For me the Hobarts are much better than the Hunters because weaponry, varied, and radar, i put importance in that, not in abstract terms like you say, upgrades, growing space, are abstract terms, empty, weaponry and radar is much more important. Hobarts are upgrading the Aegis now.

But the F110 has electric motors and 2 hangars for unmanned systems or 2 helos, it has growth of power supply for laser weapons, so there is no difference but in size between Hunters and F110.

On publicly available data, the F-110 is smaller, slower and less well armed than the Hobart's, why would the Navy want them?

The Hunters are larger, quieter, have better sensors than the Hobart's, not to forget a massive multi mission deck. Why would Australia cause further delays switching to something that is designed for a different role?

 

[swerve]

The only argument I can see in favour of the F-110 as an alternative to some Hunters is cost. Could be cheaper to build & operate. Wouldn't be able to carry everything that's being loaded onto the Hunters, though. Maybe a GP frigate to supplement the grade A ASW Hunters.

Note that I'm not suggesting this. I'm just examining the arguments.

 

[Redlands18]

The corvettes Arabia Saudi is purchasing are very well armed.

So what? plenty of well-armed Corvette designs out there and if we only had an EEZ the size of Saudi Arabia's than they would be fine, but Australia's is the 3rd largest in the world.

 

[Volkodav]

The only argument I can see in favour of the F-110 as an alternative to some Hunters is cost. Could be cheaper to build & operate. Wouldn't be able to carry everything that's being loaded onto the Hunters, though. Maybe a GP frigate to supplement the grade A ASW Hunters.

Note that I'm not suggesting this. I'm just examining the arguments.

It seems everyone has their favourite platform that they think Australia should get, whether there is a role for it or not, even if it is at the expense of a platform specifically redesigned to meet Australian requirements.

The options are Hunter, or a capability gap while something else is sorted out.

Well in reality it would be an additional capability gap on top of those we already have.

There is the destroyer capability gap resulting from the Perth Class DDGs being retired without replacement.

There is the frigate capability gap from only three FFGs being acquired to replace six.

There is the ASW gap from acquiring a patrol frigate instead of an ASW frigate, then failing to procure a replacement before it's scheduled retirement.

There is the over arching major surface combatant gap from the required 16 to 23 major surface combatant numbers never being achieved, despite these numbers being established by geography and recognised by every serious review into naval strength for as long as there has been a Royal Australian Navy.

There is the minor warfare vessel gap from Australia failing to acquire any survivable minor warfare vessels with any level of combat power, since the end of WWII, despite this being seen as necessary and raising as a requirement every decade or so.

There is the submarine gap from failing to acquire a sufficient number of submarines to generate the required capability, then failing to replace those we did acquire before their scheduled end of life.

There is the littoral warfare gap where capability has declined instead of increasing during a period where the capability was needed for humanitarian and disaster relief if not warlike operations.

The RAN has been operating with equipment that is often over age, not for for purpose, and acquired in insufficient numbers for decades.

I thought the current ship building program was meant to address this, a couple of continuous builds, underpinning a sovereign industry capability and avoiding block obsolescence, but no, we can't even manage that. The life extensions and interim capabilities intended to facilitate the change to a continuous build are now becoming our long term solutions while various talking heads try and move everything off shore again.

 

[Todjaeger]

I thought the current ship building program was meant to address this, a couple of continuous builds, underpinning a sovereign industry capability and avoiding block obsolescence, but no, we can't even manage that. The life extensions and interim capabilities intended to facilitate the change to a continuous build are now becoming our long term solutions while various talking heads try and move everything off shore again.

This.

The above covers a number of my concerns following the DSR, the upcoming naval review, as well as some of the commentary and reported leaks. The impression that comes across is that some in gov't and/or commentators do not want or do not see the value in Australia having a continuous build programme for naval vessels.

 

[Stampede]

The Navy does not approve purchases of ships etc. That is the responsibility of the Government, sometimes even listening to the expert advice they are given.

The type of corvettes purchased by another country have little or no bearing on what Australia might buy. It is especially true when one country is buying corvettes for an effectively enclosed sea as opposed to Australia's situation with 3 oceanic areas to consider.

Maybe a question to be asked is do we put time, capital and human resources to crew and build a stop gap class of vessels.
The premise being this addition to the fleet while not perfect, does provide some additional capability and options in the short term.

Again working on the assumption it's a viable proposition.

Excellence is the enemy of good.

Thoughts S

 

[Morgo]

The corvettes Arabia Saudi is purchasing are very well armed.

The Persian Gulf is 241,000 km2. Australia’s EEZ (which is only the start of our area of operations) is 8.2 million km2.

Saudi Arabia’s needs are very different from ours.

 

[Brissy1982]

The options are Hunter, or a capability gap while something else is sorted out.

Well in reality it would be an additional capability gap on top of those we already have.

There is the destroyer capability gap resulting from the Perth Class DDGs being retired without replacement.

There is the frigate capability gap from only three FFGs being acquired to replace six.

There is the ASW gap from acquiring a patrol frigate instead of an ASW frigate, then failing to procure a replacement before it's scheduled retirement.

There is the over arching major surface combatant gap from the required 16 to 23 major surface combatant numbers never being achieved, despite these numbers being established by geography and recognised by every serious review into naval strength for as long as there has been a Royal Australian Navy.

There is the minor warfare vessel gap from Australia failing to acquire any survivable minor warfare vessels with any level of combat power, since the end of WWII, despite this being seen as necessary and raising as a requirement every decade or so.

There is the submarine gap from failing to acquire a sufficient number of submarines to generate the required capability, then failing to replace those we did acquire before their scheduled end of life.

There is the littoral warfare gap where capability has declined instead of increasing during a period where the capability was needed for humanitarian and disaster relief if not warlike operations.

The RAN has been operating with equipment that is often over age, not for for purpose, and acquired in insufficient numbers for decades.

I thought the current ship building program was meant to address this, a couple of continuous builds, underpinning a sovereign industry capability and avoiding block obsolescence, but no, we can't even manage that. The life extensions and interim capabilities intended to facilitate the change to a continuous build are now becoming our long term solutions while various talking heads try and move everything off shore again.

This is the most eloquent summary of the origin of the shortfalls in the current RAN fleet's size and capabilities that I have ever seen, and it sums up why I decided to leave the service - decades of short-sighted decision-making by successive governments (no matter their political colour) that have constantly asked those in uniform to do more tasks with fewer ships with less capability. Anyone who wonders why the RAN is facing recruitment and retention problems only has to read this summary to understand the cause. Will we see the surface fleet review recommend a genuine increase in the RAN's fleet size and capabilities? I truly hope so. Will the political will exist to implement such a recommendation, if made? Only time will tell. The coming weeks will be very interesting.

 

[Volkodav]

Maybe a question to be asked is do we put time, capital and human resources to crew and build a stop gap class of vessels.
The premise being this addition to the fleet while not perfect, does provide some additional capability and options in the short term.

Again working on the assumption it's a viable proposition.

Excellence is the enemy of good.

Thoughts S

Good is producing Hunters as soon as possible. Excellent is following them with proper DDGs or even modern day DLGs.

 

[StingrayOZ]

The options are Hunter, or a capability gap while something else is sorted out.

Well :

• if the Anzacs are aging out and already starting to decommission
• if the Hobarts are out of the water for upgrade
• if the Anzacs are out of the water for upgrade (and probably -1)
• if the Collins are out of the water for upgrade (and probably -1)
• And we want to quickly grow the RAN to 14-16 surface combatants and 12 subs

Should we start a second production line for the Hunter at Henderson? 3-5 ships?

I would have thought if those at Osborne feel threatened by acquisition of a Hobart type ship, through say Spain/Henderson, then they absolutely would hate the idea that Henderson starts a second production line of Hunters? Particularly in number. It would require BAE and CIVMEC to pair up.

If they don't want to do that, then I guess gov can shop elsewhere.

 

[Volkodav]

Well :

• if the Anzacs are aging out and already starting to decommission
• if the Hobarts are out of the water for upgrade
• if the Anzacs are out of the water for upgrade (and probably -1)
• if the Collins are out of the water for upgrade (and probably -1)
• And we want to quickly grow the RAN to 14-16 surface combatants and 12 subs

Should we start a second production line for the Hunter at Henderson? 3-5 ships?

I would have thought if those at Osborne feel threatened by acquisition of a Hobart type ship, through say Spain/Henderson, then they absolutely would hate the idea that Henderson starts a second production line of Hunters? Particularly in number. It would require BAE and CIVMEC to pair up.

If they don't want to do that, then I guess gov can shop elsewhere.

ASC is government owned, the Minister for finance is the sole share holder, their board is appointed by the government, their exec team is appointed with the approval of the government.

ASC is less independent than the Public Service as their management and staff can be sacked or made redundant at the whim of the government of the day.

Why would you start a second yard producing Hunters when it would be more effective and efficient simply to increase the build tempo at Osborne once the design is complete.

 

[Todjaeger]

Maybe a question to be asked is do we put time, capital and human resources to crew and build a stop gap class of vessels.
The premise being this addition to the fleet while not perfect, does provide some additional capability and options in the short term.

Again working on the assumption it's a viable proposition.

Excellence is the enemy of good.

Thoughts S

From my POV additional questions would need to be asked as well, lest any/all such 'stop-gap' vessels cease being stop-gap additions to the RAN fleet and instead become long serving vessels in place of more appropriately armed and kitted out warships for the RAN. It does not take much imagination to see where pollies and possibly even the public would balk at retiring 'nearly new' RAN warships that might have only seen 10-15 years service, if that, because they were 'stop-gap' units which were not actually fitted out as the RAN wants/needs.

Realistically, most of the public as well as pollies are unlikely to recognize the potentially significant difference in fitout between a replacement FFG with a pair of Mk 41 Mod 5 or Mk 41 Mod 16 VLS, and a Mk 41 Mod 10 VLS or something else even larger.

 

[Stampede]

Volk you know stuff,. and in principle I don't disagree.
The naval review exists for a reason.
Why it exists
Honestly I don't know.

The DSR outcomes were identified for Army and Air Force. I'm at a loss to know why a separate review was needed for Navy and the DSR was so vacant for this service.

Smoke and mirrors

I had thought that the outcomes for navy wouldl be as unspectacular as that of the other two services.

Not now.

I'm now open to some big announcements in fleet composition going forward.

It's a personal opinion and speculation only but it's all I can conclude.

Money goes to subs and everything else is a compromise.

Negative maybe , but we will know shortly.

It could be that a 80 m Arafura gets a medium calibre main gun only.
It's called a tier two battle ship and their are reductions across the surface fleet going forward.

Not hopeful

Alas S

 

[Todjaeger]

ASC is government owned, the Minister for finance is the sole share holder, their board is appointed by the government, their exec team is appointed with the approval of the government.

ASC is less independent than the Public Service as their management and staff can be sacked or made redundant at the whim of the government of the day.

Why would you start a second yard producing Hunters when it would be more effective and efficient simply to increase the build tempo at Osborne once the design is complete.

Also, how long would it take to stand up Henderson as a facility capable of producing Hunter-class frigates? Relating to that question, could Henderson be gotten ready to the point that delivery of frigates in WA could begin before ASC could really start seeing the benefits of ongoing production?

IMO it would make very little sense to try and stand up a 2nd yard, to build examples of the same design, whilst experiencing the same design learning curve/re-inventing the wheel issues, particularly if it turns out to be true that the number of Hunter-class frigates to be ordered ends up getting reduced.

Another important question which also needs to be asked, and some idea of the answer gotten, is what is to happen post-FFG build? If there are no plans to have something follow completion of the frigates, then the money and resources spend updating and expanding the yards, as well as building up the skilled workforce, is just going to end up having been wasted. Again.

Now if plans are being made for another type/class of warship to be brought into RAN service, something which is more akin to a direct replacement for the ANZAC-class frigates in GP/patrol frigate roles, and have these serve in addition to and alongside the Hunter-class frigates, there could be merit in having Henderson become a facility able to produce RAN warships.

The significant risks/dangers that I see with Henderson also becoming a site for Australian warship production, is that Civmec/Henderson and Osborne/ASC could end up fighting each other for orders, particularly if the RAN and/or gov't does not place or approve orders. Or the RAN could end up once again forced to 'make do' with using GP and or light warship vessels which need to be modified, rather than getting proper direct replacements. In many respects, this is at least partially how the RAN ended up in the state it currently is because destroyers were retired with frigates taking over their roles, whilst patrol frigates then had to be significantly upgraded to make them more into FFG's to take over for the FFG's which had been filling in for retired without replacement DDG's.

 

[StingrayOZ]

ASC is government owned, the Minister for finance is the sole share holder, their board is appointed by the government, their exec team is appointed with the approval of the government.

ASC is less independent than the Public Service as their management and staff can be sacked or made redundant at the whim of the government of the day.

Why would you start a second yard producing Hunters when it would be more effective and efficient simply to increase the build tempo at Osborne once the design is complete.

I didn't say it was logical or efficient. Certainly not sustainable.

Perhaps the Americans have told us to have two surface combatant production lines. *Shrug* Perhaps they want to hurry up Aukus sub capability in Osborne to fix backlogs in repairs for existing subs and surface. *shrug* Maybe cause the lord told them so.

I would point out sustainable is going out the window. China isn't sustainably building its fleet. We are now crash building territory.

Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns Of China's 200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity

The Office of Naval Intelligence is sounding the alarm about the huge gap in U.S. and Chinese shipbuilding capacity and its implications.

www.thedrive.com

I don't know what the DSR naval review holds, but I do know the strategic situation is very bad. Outlook is terrible. I am no longer sure somethings that were fears, or impossible or regarded as unlikely are still in that category. I also worry that the magical review isn't going to fix everything.

 

[Volkodav]

Had we continued with the three yard model used for the Hobart's, and I am not suggesting we try and switch now, there could have been real potential for competition and sustainability.

BAE produced the keel blocks and the hull block that mounted the gun, Newcastle did the hull blocks and some superstructure, Osborne did the complex superstructure blocks and the platform consolidation.

Continue doing this work breakdown but award the final consolodation of the next new order to the best performing yard for the previous.

 

[Scott Elaurant]

Why would you start a second yard producing Hunters when it would be more effective and efficient simply to increase the build tempo at Osborne once the design is complete.

The first rule in Defence acquisition politics seems to be “never build in one marginal electorate what can be built in two marginal electorates with half the efficiency.

I won’t pretend to know what is planned any better than others here. I watched the parliamentary estimates committee hearing on Hunter frigates with the BAE CEO last week. There were sharp questions from Julian Hill on Hunter class cost, delay, weight margins, weight, performance, jobs and % local content. There was a particular question for BAE on whether they had used any of the Hunter funds to complete aspects of the Type 26 build in Scotland. The general mood was pretty negative.

Parliament scrutinises weighty problems on $45 billion warship project

There are growing concerns about whether the fleet of future frigates will meet the navy's requirements.

www.abc.net.au

I would like to see the RAN expand like others here, and am also anxious to see Collins replaced ASAP, for operational safety reasons if nothing else.

When AUKUS was first announced I supported it, and favoured the RAN building Astutes as being much cheaper than Virginias and closer to meeting the RAN’s needs. Now those are unavailable and we are proceeding with the two most expensive and highest risk options possible - Virginias in the short term and SSN AUKUS in the long term.

We have gone from regionally superior Diesel subs to not only nuclear subs, but the world’s best and most expensive nuclear subs. The cash required to deliver AUKUS as defined now may constrain the rest of the fleet. If that is the case I would rather see the RAN return to the French (nuclear) SSN, which is not as capable as an Astute or Virginia but still adequate and half the cost and could be built now with less impact on the rest of the fleet.

 

[d-ron84]

The first rule in Defence acquisition politics seems to be “never build in one marginal electorate what can be built in two marginal electorates with half the efficiency.

I won’t pretend to know what is planned any better than others here. I watched the parliamentary estimates committee hearing on Hunter frigates with the BAE CEO last week. There were sharp questions from Julian Hill on Hunter class cost, delay, weight margins, weight, performance, jobs and % local content. There was a particular question for BAE on whether they had used any of the Hunter funds to complete aspects of the Type 26 build in Scotland. The general mood was pretty negative.

Parliament scrutinises weighty problems on $45 billion warship project

There are growing concerns about whether the fleet of future frigates will meet the navy's requirements.

www.abc.net.au

I would like to see the RAN expand like others here, and am also anxious to see Collins replaced ASAP, for operational safety reasons if nothing else.

When AUKUS was first announced I supported it, and favoured the RAN building Astutes as being much cheaper than Virginias and closer to meeting the RAN’s needs. Now those are unavailable and we are proceeding with the two most expensive and highest risk options possible - Virginias in the short term and SSN AUKUS in the long term.

We have gone from regionally superior Diesel subs to not only nuclear subs, but the world’s best and most expensive nuclear subs. The cash required to deliver AUKUS as defined now may constrain the rest of the fleet. If that is the case I would rather see the RAN return to the French (nuclear) SSN, which is not as capable as an Astute or Virginia but still adequate and half the cost and could be built now with less impact on the rest of the fleet.

A big reason why a French SSN is out of the question is the requirement to refuel in France, which leaves our nuclear submarines at the mercy of the french, not really a sovereign capability that we require

 

[el Cid]

On publicly available data, the F-110 is smaller, slower and less well armed than the Hobart's, why would the Navy want them?

The Hunters are larger, quieter, have better sensors than the Hobart's, not to forget a massive multi mission deck. Why would Australia cause further delays switching to something that is designed for a different role?

I dont believe things you say, i dont waste our time entering in polemics, but i am sure the Hobarts 2.0 Australia has asked for are based in the F110, it is the frigate of the future for Navantia, not the weaponry because F110 only has 16 cells, but the platform and radar. Now the price given by Navantia, 2 billion australian dollars each, should include the australianased combat system and rest of equipment, not off the shelf from Navantia.

 

[Volkodav]

I dont believe things you say, i dont waste our time entering in polemics, but i am sure the Hobarts 2.0 Australia has asked for are based in the F110, it is the frigate of the future for Navantia, not the weaponry because F110 only has 16 cells, but the platform and radar. Now the price given by Navantia, 2 billion australian dollars each, should include the australianased combat system and rest of equipment, not off the shelf from Navantia.

I'll give you some leeway because english obviously isn't your first language and I don't speak any Spanish but you need to think very carefully before pushing any harder.

The F-110 is not a suitable ship for Australia, and to be brutally honest nor was the F-100.

Maybe as an FFG replacement, but as a destroyer, going with Navantia was the wrong choice. There were better designs available from better partners.

The only reason F-100 got up was, after gutting defence of their capacity to select and manage major procurements, a bastardised selection process intended to choose which was the best civilian truck for the army, was used to select the RANs future premier warship.

All of the best options were evolved options, even Navantias best, design was an evolved design. This meant the winning design, when it was decided the G&C option was to risky, wasn't even second best, it wasn't even in the top several, it wasn't even the best Navantia had to offer.

Now F-110 is smaller than F-100 and F-100 isn't big enough. Please stop pushing it on this topic.