Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

[ADMk2]

Rowan Moffitt is a retired rear admiral with 40 years’ service in the RAN, the last 14 years in Defence’s senior leadership, including as the Fleet Commander, has acquired himself some 18in gun turrets and fired a broadside at the current state of the RAN. He states that it is unfit for purpose and lays the blame on the RAN, politicians, defence acquisition agencies and defence strategy since 1987. He doesn't hold back.

RAN unfit for purpose: retired admiral | The Australian Naval Institute

navalinstitute.com.au

There are one or two Australian Defence Professionals on here who will either know the Admiral personally or by reputation. I think that they may be able to speak to his professionalism, skills etc., and critique his comments in the link above.

One common theme - these “courageous gentleman” have gone their entire careers and ensured their pensions were secure, before they spoke so forthrightly and openly about the the diminution of the RAN they have presided over (he and Shackleton)…

Neither do much to help current day RAN in my opinion. They come off much like the F-111 fanboi brigade from years back who had many motivations, but helping the ADF was far from any of them.

Whinging about the past is easy. Helping the future is somewhat more difficult…

 

[Volkodav]

One common theme - these “courageous gentleman” have gone their entire careers and ensured their pensions were secure, before they spoke so forthrightly and openly about the the diminution of the RAN they have presided over (he and Shackleton)…

Neither do much to help current day RAN in my opinion. They come off much like the F-111 fanboi brigade from years back who had many motivations, but helping the ADF was far from any of them.

Whinging about the past is easy. Helping the future is somewhat more difficult…

If they broke ranks while in uniform they would never have reached high rank.

They fought and lost many battles, more often with PM&C, finance and DFAT than with the other services. In fact with the professionalisatiin and jointness of defence these days many senior sirs in the RAAF and Army are more supportive of Navy than the other departments are.

I know there are personal biases in play. I like armour, I like pointy fast things, I actually prefer them to PBs and subs, but any real defence expert will acknowledge, irrespective of the uniform, if any, they wear, that the surface fleet is undersized and under equipped.

No bias, simple fact. Huge sums of money have been wasted on upgrades, life extensions and, occasionally, early replacements, that would not have been necessary, had the right number, of the right platforms, been acquired in the first place.

 

[Volkodav]

Rowan Moffitt is a retired rear admiral with 40 years’ service in the RAN, the last 14 years in Defence’s senior leadership, including as the Fleet Commander, has acquired himself some 18in gun turrets and fired a broadside at the current state of the RAN. He states that it is unfit for purpose and lays the blame on the RAN, politicians, defence acquisition agencies and defence strategy since 1987. He doesn't hold back.

RAN unfit for purpose: retired admiral | The Australian Naval Institute

navalinstitute.com.au

There are one or two Australian Defence Professionals on here who will either know the Admiral personally or by reputation. I think that they may be able to speak to his professionalism, skills etc., and critique his comments in the link above.

Having read the article and comparing it to known facts and my own experience, I can say it is spot on.

He didn't pull any punches and laid blame where it was due.

This isn't a Labor v Liberal thing, both sides screwed the pooch.

This isn't a navy v army v airforce thing either, it's a case of the majority of money spent on the navy in the last couple of decades has been wasted by stupid decisions and bad acquisitions.

The single biggest culpret, as Moffitt said, was delaying decisions, then buying the wrong thing.

 

[spoz]

I knew Rowland well, having served with him a couple of times. He was very sharp, and most of what he says I completely agree with.

However, he’s missed what I think is the key problem with Navy acquisition process. Up till the 90s it was run by Navy, latterly by a dedicated group led by an Admiral known as ACMAT-N. Navy’s proposals were then vetted by the Forces of Darkness and Annihilation (Force Design and Analysis) before going to the Defence Committee, and then to Government. Navy had to win two arguments -FDA and DC - and then convince Government. It was never easy, but it was a straightforward process which, for Anzac, ran for about 4 years before contract award. (A PS; there were no USN designed ships available the, and the price the Brits wanted for the T23 derivative was too high). After approval, ACMAT managed the build process, using the services of a team of professional APS people which included naval architects, engineers of all flavours, and lobbies; most of whom had many years of experience. That was all sacrificed on the altar of commonality, and we were faced with winning the same fight through a plethora of central bodies and committees, any one of which could it back to the start for “reexamination” or “clarification”. Snakes and ladders on a vast scale.

Post the reviews of the early 90s all that was swept away and we ended up with jointery as effectively the one and only goal, and Navy was forced to adapt to common processes, not all of which were ideal from the perspective of buying ships. At the same time the “contractor will always know best and do a better, more cost effective job” mantra was running through government, and all that experience was seen as valueless, because the contractor would be able to do it better without interference from the CoA. Naive of course, but that was the high priced advice to Government was saying, anf they bought it over the objections of the Services. So we lost all that expertise; and nothing, certainly no contractor, replaced it.

Rowan was a bit junior to see most of that; but he has pointed to DRP as the most seriously flawed (from this perspective) of the reviews of that period. He’s also a little polemical about Hunter; it’s better armed that the T26 for example.

 

[el Cid]

Hi, do you know any aspects of the offer from Navantia for 3 more Hobarts 2.0? Will they have the electric motor like the F110, will they have 2 hangars for 2 helos or other? Will they have as combat system the spanish Scomba, which includes the subsystem Aegis, or will they have the australian Saab-Aegis? How off the shelf is going to be the contract? Which electronic warfare is going to include? It´s taking time to assess the offer, probably is truly a Hobart 2.0 derived from the F110, with innovations worth to study.

 

[John Fedup]

One common theme - these “courageous gentleman” have gone their entire careers and ensured their pensions were secure, before they spoke so forthrightly and openly about the the diminution of the RAN they have presided over (he and Shackleton)…

Neither do much to help current day RAN in my opinion. They come off much like the F-111 fanboi brigade from years back who had many motivations, but helping the ADF was far from any of them.

Whinging about the past is easy. Helping the future is somewhat more difficult…

Yes, retirement removes the restraints on constructive criticism. Same thing happens in Canada and no doubt in many other countries as well. Having a military that can tell its civilian masters to get stuffed has bigger drawbacks though.

 

[Redlands18]

Hi, do you know any aspects of the offer from Navantia for 3 more Hobarts 2.0? Will they have the electric motor like the F110, will they have 2 hangars for 2 helos or other? Will they have as combat system the spanish Scomba, which includes the subsystem Aegis, or will they have the australian Saab-Aegis? How off the shelf is going to be the contract? Which electronic warfare is going to include? It´s taking time to assess the offer, probably is truly a Hobart 2.0 derived from the F110, with innovations worth to study.

It was an unsolicited offer from Navantia, there is zero sign that Australia has accepted the offer but Who knows what is going to come out of the current Navy Review?

 

[el Cid]

It was an unsolicited offer from Navantia, there is zero sign that Australia has accepted the offer but Who knows what is going to come out of the current Navy Review?

As far as i saw it, it was a petition from the australian navy personnel to the australian politicians, and the prime minister met the spanish president in Madrid to ask for the offer, it is my interpretation of the published information. What is sure is that australian navy personel prefers a batch of Hobarts 2.0 than the Hunters. The more Hobarts 2.0 the less Hunters. It´s better for Australia to have more Hobarts 2.0 than Hunters, because of weaponry and radar, it´s a superior ship in a war against China, dont think F100 is the same as F110, and probably the Hobart´s 2 are cheaper than Hunters. Maybe Hunters could have 2000 kms more of range.
What is unsolicited is the offer for the Bams, the Avantes corvettes, which Australia is purchasing in the next White Paper.

 

[Volkodav]

As far as i saw it, it was a petition from the australian navy personnel to the australian politicians, and the prime minister met the spanish president in Madrid to ask for the offer, it is my interpretation of the published information. What is sure is that australian navy personel prefers a batch of Hobarts 2.0 than the Hunters. The more Hobarts 2.0 the less Hunters. It´s better for Australia to have more Hobarts 2.0 than Hunters, because of weaponry and radar, it´s a superior ship in a war against China, dont think F100 is the same as F110, and probably the Hobart´s 2 are cheaper than Hunters. Maybe Hunters could have 2000 kms more of range.
What is unsolicited is the offer for the Bams, the Avantes corvettes, which Australia is purchasing in the next White Paper.

I can find you RAN personnel who will tell you the Armidales are the best thing since sliced cheese, but it doesn't make it fact.

As someone who was on the Hobart build from before first steel was cut, I can assure you it was known they were two small, too tight, and would already be in need of major upgrades before they achieved FOC. As for those upgrades, it was known they would be difficult and expensive to undertake, and that with only three available, it would be very difficult to undertake those upgrades.

The Hobarts are not superior to the Hunters, even post upgrade they will not be.

They are a much older, much more limited design, with the exception of the gas turbine, ASW systems, and active phased array radar, which are more modern with superior performance to the legacy systems in the Hobart, the majority of the other systems are more modern, more capable derivatives of what is already fitted to the Hobarts.

Reality check, the Hobarts were too small and too tight. The issues the Hunters are having, relate to it being difficult to fit all the required capability into the Type 26 platform, which is much larger than the F-100 or F-110. How are you going to fit all of the required systems into a smaller baseline platform design?

The only solution was a clean sheet design but that was vetoed by the then SECDEF years ago. The RAN were literally told to choose an existing ASW frigate and fit the other capabilities to it, so they chose the largest design, which was also conveniently, the most adaptable, as the starting point.

When you tell someone they have to choose between an apple and an orange, you don't blame them for not being able to turn it into a steak dinner.

 

[Volkodav]

I knew Rowland well, having served with him a couple of times. He was very sharp, and most of what he says I completely agree with.

However, he’s missed what I think is the key problem with Navy acquisition process. Up till the 90s it was run by Navy, latterly by a dedicated group led by an Admiral known as ACMAT-N. Navy’s proposals were then vetted by the Forces of Darkness and Annihilation (Force Design and Analysis) before going to the Defence Committee, and then to Government. Navy had to win two arguments -FDA and DC - and then convince Government. It was never easy, but it was a straightforward process which, for Anzac, ran for about 4 years before contract award. (A PS; there were no USN designed ships available the, and the price the Brits wanted for the T23 derivative was too high). After approval, ACMAT managed the build process, using the services of a team of professional APS people which included naval architects, engineers of all flavours, and lobbies; most of whom had many years of experience. That was all sacrificed on the altar of commonality, and we were faced with winning the same fight through a plethora of central bodies and committees, any one of which could it back to the start for “reexamination” or “clarification”. Snakes and ladders on a vast scale.

Post the reviews of the early 90s all that was swept away and we ended up with jointery as effectively the one and only goal, and Navy was forced to adapt to common processes, not all of which were ideal from the perspective of buying ships. At the same time the “contractor will always know best and do a better, more cost effective job” mantra was running through government, and all that experience was seen as valueless, because the contractor would be able to do it better without interference from the CoA. Naive of course, but that was the high priced advice to Government was saying, anf they bought it over the objections of the Services. So we lost all that expertise; and nothing, certainly no contractor, replaced it.

Rowan was a bit junior to see most of that; but he has pointed to DRP as the most seriously flawed (from this perspective) of the reviews of that period. He’s also a little polemical about Hunter; it’s better armed that the T26 for example.

I don't think many people realise how flawed defence procurement was in the early to mid 2000s.

There had already been cut backs and delays in critical capability replacements. When Timor demonstrated we could not do without those capabilities, established wisdom was ignored, and a procurement policy, intended to streamline the acquisition of trucks and laptops, (Kinard) was bastardised to select warships.

At the same time as the RAN was trying to select the most complex system it had ever procured, using an unsuitable system, government bypassed this same system to select Abrams, F-35, P-8, F/A-18F, and many other necessary capabilities.

The problem appears to be unit price. When the unit price of a capability hits the hundreds of millions or low billions, politicians, and the public, lose their minds. Commonsense no longer applies, professionals are no longer listened to, and stupid decisions are made.

Fighters, tanks, MPAs etc. the unit price is lower, though the project price is still high. The right capability can be selected, even if costs are reduced by reducing the numbers to be acquired.

With ships, three ships cost what three ships cost. Numbers have already been trimmed from nine, to six to four, three is the absolute minimum, so individual capability is compromised to meet a price.

The capability is needed so the upgrade cycles start. Because so much time and money has been spent on upgrades, there is a reluctance to look at a replacement capability. Deferal of the replacement capability leads to the atrophy of the design, acquisition, procurement and build capabilities. This makes replacing the existing, already insufficient capability, even more expensive, so cost reductions are sought, leading to the repeat of all the same mistakes.

 

[Redlands18]

As far as i saw it, it was a petition from the australian navy personnel to the australian politicians, and the prime minister met the spanish president in Madrid to ask for the offer, it is my interpretation of the published information. What is sure is that australian navy personel prefers a batch of Hobarts 2.0 than the Hunters. The more Hobarts 2.0 the less Hunters. It´s better for Australia to have more Hobarts 2.0 than Hunters, because of weaponry and radar, it´s a superior ship in a war against China, dont think F100 is the same as F110, and probably the Hobart´s 2 are cheaper than Hunters. Maybe Hunters could have 2000 kms more of range.
What is unsolicited is the offer for the Bams, the Avantes corvettes, which Australia is purchasing in the next White Paper.

At this time the only major RAN procurement announcements made by Australia, are.
3-5 Virginia SSN
up to 8 SSN-AUKUS
9 Hunter FFG
12 Arafura OPV
This is currently under review, no announcements to change this plan have been released at this time. There is no White Paper currently happening, all there is, is a RAN review as a result of the Defence Strategic Review released in April this year. Most people in Australia see Corvettes as a poor choice for the RAN due to their size not being able to provide the combination of firepower, range and endurance the RAN requires.

 

[StingrayOZ]

Hi, do you know any aspects of the offer from Navantia for 3 more Hobarts 2.0? Will they have the electric motor like the F110, will they have 2 hangars for 2 helos or other? Will they have as combat system the spanish Scomba, which includes the subsystem Aegis, or will they have the australian Saab-Aegis? How off the shelf is going to be the contract? Which electronic warfare is going to include? It´s taking time to assess the offer, probably is truly a Hobart 2.0 derived from the F110, with innovations worth to study.

None of these answers are known in the public space. RAND was commissioned to do a study, and then it went off into a black hole of nothing, neither the answer (yes it was possible, no it was not) was made public or any other recommendation. TBH we don't even know if a study was conducted.

Presumably any new large surface combatant would use Aegis back bone with the Saab consoles. Any small combatant would use the 9LV and the saab consoles. Radars are the billion dollar question.

We aren't even sure if the Spanish are offering Hobarts, Hobarts 2.0, or F110. Language is ambiguous.

The scuttlebutt is that HMAS ANZAC is to be retired early (end of this year, early next year). That way the Government saves money from not doing the TransCAP upgrade for ANZAC and her crew can bolster the remaining fleet. So we will shortly be down to 10 major surface combatants.

I'm not sure that decreases the possibility of acquiring new ships.

Having the Anzacs already start to decommission is going to apply further pressure to the surface fleet. We have used them and their crews heavily. At some point you either have to invest in the Navy, or disband it.

Part of the reason we can't keep crews is because crews don't see a future on an old broken ship.
At the moment our ships are aging out faster than we can replace/upgrade them, because of all the delays in selection and initiating construction.

 

[Todjaeger]

I'm not sure that decreases the possibility of acquiring new ships.

Possibly long-term, but for the short-term, it would mean an overall reduction in numbers for RAN MFU's. As little as most of us probably like this. it will still be several years before a new major vessel is brought into RAN service, and that is most likely going to be the lead ship of the Hunter-class FFG.

Having the Anzacs already start to decommission is going to apply further pressure to the surface fleet. We have used them and their crews heavily. At some point you either have to invest in the Navy, or disband it.

Part of the reason we can't keep crews is because crews don't see a future on an old broken ship.
At the moment our ships are aging out faster than we can replace/upgrade them, because of all the delays in selection and initiating construction.

Part of the issue also has to do with decisions (delays) made by successive GOTD's which led to the 'Valley of Death' in naval ship construction in Oz, the work slowdown which dragged out the Hobart-class build, as well as the bun fights between different regional/state GOTD's which kept relocating naval shipbuilding. TBH I believe we are seeing a degree of this going on even now, with the bulk of the Arafura-class OPV order supposed to be getting built by Civmec in WA. We might learn more if & when the naval review comes out, but I would not put it past WE-based pollies to try and steer some of the naval construction contracting to Civmec and/or Austal, without any regard to what the RAN wants or needs, simply because they are based in WA.

 

[Stampede]

Possibly long-term, but for the short-term, it would mean an overall reduction in numbers for RAN MFU's. As little as most of us probably like this. it will still be several years before a new major vessel is brought into RAN service, and that is most likely going to be the lead ship of the Hunter-class FFG.



Part of the issue also has to do with decisions (delays) made by successive GOTD's which led to the 'Valley of Death' in naval ship construction in Oz, the work slowdown which dragged out the Hobart-class build, as well as the bun fights between different regional/state GOTD's which kept relocating naval shipbuilding. TBH I believe we are seeing a degree of this going on even now, with the bulk of the Arafura-class OPV order supposed to be getting built by Civmec in WA. We might learn more if & when the naval review comes out, but I would not put it past WE-based pollies to try and steer some of the naval construction contracting to Civmec and/or Austal, without any regard to what the RAN wants or needs, simply because they are based in WA.

A lot to consider.

At this stage it's about a way forward.

Naval Review.........
Will it be bold and revolutionary or limited in change.
Will in fact actually be implemented going forward?

At this stage it would be great to have a mythical Naval Q store where we could go shopping for XY and Z.
Alas I'd doesn't exist.

Hopefully a few answers within a couple of weeks

I've become very sceptical for a balanced and capable Navy and Army.

Give that I'm still in the doubters camp re the SSN aquistion coming to frution as planned, this places more pressure on balance across all three services.

Challenges ahead.

Concerned S

 

[Todjaeger]

A lot to consider.

At this stage it's about a way forward.

Naval Review.........
Will it be bold and revolutionary or limited in change.
Will in fact actually be implemented going forward?

At this stage it would be great to have a mythical Naval Q store where we could go shopping for XY and Z.
Alas I'd doesn't exist.

Hopefully a few answers within a couple of weeks

I've become very sceptical for a balanced and capable Navy and Army.

Give that I'm still in the doubters camp re the SSN aquistion coming to frution as planned, this places more pressure on balance across all three services.

Challenges ahead.

Concerned S

TBH I am more worried about the naval review recommending devolutionary changes, with the overall DSR leading to a changed force posture that is at once both very expensive, and very incapable.

Something like cutting back the number of Hunter-class frigates from the planned nine to only six, with no plans to bring the Hobart-class DDG replacement programme forward or to have it increase in numbers. If that is done, especially if done in concert with a build of corvettes or patrol frigates to make up hull numbers at Civmec, would effectively kill a national shipbuilding programme. That in turn would put Australia back to boom/bust cycles with naval shipbuilding and lead to work forces needing to be repeatedly re-raised and trained as yards open or close depending on what contracts are available and who has won them.

At that same time, I worry that Australia might purchase kit to provide niche capabilities, but not actually have those capabilities be viable in an Australian context (land-based AShM batteries, I am looking at you...) and come at the expense of capabilities Australia has or could actually make use of.

 

[StingrayOZ]

TBH I believe we are seeing a degree of this going on even now, with the bulk of the Arafura-class OPV order supposed to be getting built by Civmec in WA. We might learn more if & when the naval review comes out, but I would not put it past WE-based pollies to try and steer some of the naval construction contracting to Civmec and/or Austal, without any regard to what the RAN wants or needs, simply because they are based in WA.

But does it really matter if Osborne is busy with At least 6 committed hunters, 6 Collins LOTE, 3 Hobart upgrades, 7-8 Anzac Upgrades, and 3x SSN building? Thats quite a lot of work. More work than any Australian ship yard has ever had.

If Henderson spits out a handful of smaller ships plus perhaps 2-3 majors, it doesn't really implode Osborne. Osborne is still the major hub, and in fact, I think any fitout of any major ship will involve time at Osborne.

CIVMEC business model doesn't need exactly continuous high end shipbuilding. They spread across mining, infrastructure like roads, renewable power, and ship building. They are kind of dependant on government spending, but not specifically military ship spending. CIVMEC is more about steel fabrication. So they are a yard, but a yard that can happily be fed, mining, bridges, maintenance etc.

IMO I don't think Austal gets anything as a prime going forward. Thats part of what CIVMEC brings. Anything bigish goes through CIVMEC. CIVMEC's yard is light years ahead of anything else on the west coast. CIVMEC had like a billion in revenue last year. Austal is having a bit of a tough time with the LCS ending and the expeditionary class. Despite what WA thinks, they are still part of the country. Money spent their does filter around the economy as a whole.

In less than two weeks we will know. People will be disappointed, but hopefully, it provides some sort of pathway to the RAN expanding fleet numbers.

Also I don't think there is much of an issue of the RAN disposing of ships before they are completed rusted out. Ship building is complex business, and smaller countries would often quite happily pick up a ex-RAN ship in good condition ~10-20 years old. We won't make a lot of money on said ship, but I don't think we will lose a lot of money either. If in 10 or 15 years we had to get rid of the existing Hobarts, I don't think that would be hard to find an interested buyer.

 

[Todjaeger]

But does it really matter if Osborne is busy with At least 6 committed hunters, 6 Collins LOTE, 3 Hobart upgrades, 7-8 Anzac Upgrades, and 3x SSN building? Thats quite a lot of work. More work than any Australian ship yard has ever had.

If Henderson spits out a handful of smaller ships plus perhaps 2-3 majors, it doesn't really implode Osborne. Osborne is still the major hub, and in fact, I think any fitout of any major ship will involve time at Osborne.

CIVMEC business model doesn't need exactly continuous high end shipbuilding. They spread across mining, infrastructure like roads, renewable power, and ship building. They are kind of dependant on government spending, but not specifically military ship spending. CIVMEC is more about steel fabrication. So they are a yard, but a yard that can happily be fed, mining, bridges, maintenance etc.

IMO I don't think Austal gets anything as a prime going forward. Thats part of what CIVMEC brings. Anything bigish goes through CIVMEC. CIVMEC's yard is light years ahead of anything else on the west coast. CIVMEC had like a billion in revenue last year. Austal is having a bit of a tough time with the LCS ending and the expeditionary class. Despite what WA thinks, they are still part of the country. Money spent their does filter around the economy as a whole.

In less than two weeks we will know. People will be disappointed, but hopefully, it provides some sort of pathway to the RAN expanding fleet numbers.

Also I don't think there is much of an issue of the RAN disposing of ships before they are completed rusted out. Ship building is complex business, and smaller countries would often quite happily pick up a ex-RAN ship in good condition ~10-20 years old. We won't make a lot of money on said ship, but I don't think we will lose a lot of money either. If in 10 or 15 years we had to get rid of the existing Hobarts, I don't think that would be hard to find an interested buyer.

What I am concerned about is that sustainable levels of work and development are maintained at one Australian naval construction facility, a national centre of excellence if you will. This would of course be a change for Australia, given the RAN's order history post-WWII, with a one point Codock, then Williamstown/Transfield/Tenix/BAE, now ASC in Osborne, etc.

As I understand it, if the Hunter-class order gets cut to ~six vessels, the last of these would likely be completed by the end of the 2030's if not a little sooner. By that point, any upgrades for the Hobart-class should have been long completed, and the ANZAC-class frigates would have been decommissioned. It is at this point where sustainable naval shipbuilding could once again be in trouble. Absent a national shipbuilding programme, then the RAN might once more have a shipbuilding 'Valley of Death' were little or nothing is ordered, which would waste the time and expertise which would have been built up at Osborne, as well as the efforts to establish a digital shipyard there. Or more vessels might get ordered, but not what are MFU's but instead what might be considered Tier 2 (or 3, or 4...) vessels which are less capable and cost less, and might be able to be built elsewhere.

The yard work for subs I see a bit differently, simply because it is my understanding that at least some of the skills and techniques used for subs do not quite translate to being useful when working on surface vessels. To put it another way, a yard worker who is skilled in working on surface warships might not be qualified to work on subs.

Now if the Hunter-class order is to be cut to just six, then have a project to replace the Hobart-class stood up, so that construction on those replacements can begin not long after the last of the Hunter-class is launched. Something worth keeping in mind (and part of the reason why I have kept banging on about timelines and timeframes and how bloody slow and long the process is to have naval vessels ordered and built) is that the SEA 5000 project first commenced in 2015 and the contract ordering nine Hunter-class frigates was not signed until the end of 2018, whilst first steel was not cut for another four years after that, or about seven years after commencement. If the last of the (six) frigates ordered is planned to start trials ~2037 or 2038, then projects to provide work after SEA 5000 is complete would likely need to start by ~2030. At the same time, there would need to be some recognition by gov't and/or the RAN that such a project is needed, before it could be initiated. Where we appear to stand now, is that there does not seem to be official recognition of a need to have surface warship work once SEA 5000 is done.

 

[el Cid]

At this time the only major RAN procurement announcements made by Australia, are.
3-5 Virginia SSN
up to 8 SSN-AUKUS
9 Hunter FFG
12 Arafura OPV
This is currently under review, no announcements to change this plan have been released at this time. There is no White Paper currently happening, all there is, is a RAN review as a result of the Defence Strategic Review released in April this year. Most people in Australia see Corvettes as a poor choice for the RAN due to their size not being able to provide the combination of firepower, range and endurance the RAN requires.

i am sure the australian navy personel is going to approve the purchase of 3 new Hobarts based on the F110, in Sky News Australia they told that they wanted them fast track for the end of decade, so the doubt is how many Hunters are they going to build.

The corvettes Arabia Saudi is purchasing are very well armed.

 

[el Cid]

I can find you RAN personnel who will tell you the Armidales are the best thing since sliced cheese, but it doesn't make it fact.

As someone who was on the Hobart build from before first steel was cut, I can assure you it was known they were two small, too tight, and would already be in need of major upgrades before they achieved FOC. As for those upgrades, it was known they would be difficult and expensive to undertake, and that with only three available, it would be very difficult to undertake those upgrades.

The Hobarts are not superior to the Hunters, even post upgrade they will not be.

They are a much older, much more limited design, with the exception of the gas turbine, ASW systems, and active phased array radar, which are more modern with superior performance to the legacy systems in the Hobart, the majority of the other systems are more modern, more capable derivatives of what is already fitted to the Hobarts.

Reality check, the Hobarts were too small and too tight. The issues the Hunters are having, relate to it being difficult to fit all the required capability into the Type 26 platform, which is much larger than the F-100 or F-110. How are you going to fit all of the required systems into a smaller baseline platform design?

The only solution was a clean sheet design but that was vetoed by the then SECDEF years ago. The RAN were literally told to choose an existing ASW frigate and fit the other capabilities to it, so they chose the largest design, which was also conveniently, the most adaptable, as the starting point.

When you tell someone they have to choose between an apple and an orange, you don't blame them for not being able to turn it into a steak dinner.

For me the Hobarts are much better than the Hunters because weaponry, varied, and radar, i put importance in that, not in abstract terms like you say, upgrades, growing space, are abstract terms, empty, weaponry and radar is much more important. Hobarts are upgrading the Aegis now.

But the F110 has electric motors and 2 hangars for unmanned systems or 2 helos, it has growth of power supply for laser weapons, so there is no difference but in size between Hunters and F110.

 

[OldTex]

i am sure the australian navy personel is going to approve the purchase of 3 new Hobarts based on the F110, in Sky News Australia they told that they wanted them fast track for the end of decade, so the doubt is how many Hunters are they going to build.

The corvettes Arabia Saudi is purchasing are very well armed.

The Navy does not approve purchases of ships etc. That is the responsibility of the Government, sometimes even listening to the expert advice they are given.

The type of corvettes purchased by another country have little or no bearing on what Australia might buy. It is especially true when one country is buying corvettes for an effectively enclosed sea as opposed to Australia's situation with 3 oceanic areas to consider.