This pic just makes me sad we didn't get the 4th Hobart. hurry up HunterBig and small. HMAS Warramunga outboard of HMAS Brisbane at FBE. Photo by me.
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This pic just makes me sad we didn't get the 4th Hobart. hurry up HunterBig and small. HMAS Warramunga outboard of HMAS Brisbane at FBE. Photo by me.
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Submariners are at the top of the food chain. Only got to look at my pay slip to confirm that.Please do not insult submariners like that. They are like fighter pilots; very fragile egos.
I know what’s past is past but the failure to continue building Hobarts is one of the blunders that irks me the most.This pic just makes me sad we didn't get the 4th Hobart. hurry up Hunter
Just need to find a way to keep the boats running until the SSNs arrive. Need to make sure you can keep earning that pay cheque.Submariners are at the top of the food chain. Only got to look at my pay slip to confirm that.
Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.I know what’s past is past but the failure to continue building Hobarts is one of the blunders that irks me the most.
They had an option to continue building at least one more ship. They knew that they had a looming valley of death in the shipbuilding industry, they knew our strategic environment was deteriorating, they had a proven design and they had a hot production line, Really blind Freddy could see that we had to continue building these ships.
The failure to build more of these ships may yet go down as one of the most consequential decisions every made by an Australian government.
Had we continued to build these ships we would not be in the rather dire position we find ourselves in at the moment, at least in relation to our surface fleet.
Annoys me no end.
I remember Rudd's speach at the opening of the Osborne Shipyard, it was weird, it was almost like it had been written to announce ship 4, then didn't. A couple of months later Gillard was PM and we were on our way to an election and the worst decade of political dysfunction we had seen in 100 years.Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.
I thought it was Gillard who turned off the taps on production?Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.
There was hope of a second batch to an improved design but instead the first batch was slowed. Not only wasnt the initially planned workforce never hired in full, the initial workforce was shrunk.No, the option for the fourth ship expired in October 2008. If you had wanted to build more after that it would have required major changes to the contract, with the contractor effectively having the upper hand. No government is going to do that - and they are right not to.
If you want to be taken seriously cut out the schoolboy insults. It always seems to be from the same side of politics.Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.
There is good reason for those involved to be annoyed about the fourth ship not being ordered. The RAN jumped through hoops and basically promised to sacrifice their first born to get those ships.If you want to be taken seriously cut out the schoolboy insults. It always seems to be from the same side of politics.
2x Regiments worth of HIMARS, was already in the IIP. SPG is definitely a cut.None of these are real cuts.
- The SPGs have been substituted for HIMARS. Artillery is significantly strengthened.
- Extra F35s were never announced. We had an option, which neither the current nor previous Governments exercised.
- Aren’t the Hercs going from 12 to 20?
- A delay is not a cancellation.
Now do I agree with all of the decisions they’ve made? No.
Do I think they’re doing a pretty good but not perfect job maximising within broader budget constraints? Yes, pending the outcome of the surface force review.
Is this a continuation of a pretty good but not perfect investment program they inherited? Also yes.
Too many Armchair Economists aren’t taking the broader fiscal and economic environment into consideration.
On Air Capability only - how has Air Combat Capability been cut when there was never any firm plan to acquire extra F35s? Unless you know something that we do not, the extra F35s were only ever an 'option'. As for a cut, we have gone from 71 x F/A-18 classic and 43 (in total) F111 although towards the end, you would argue many were not mission ready, to now 72 x F35, 24 x F/A-18F and 12 x EA/18G. So whilst slightly smaller in overall number, the air combat capability offered by the F35/ Super Hornets / Growlers would far outway any drop in numbers over what was operated before.2x Regiments worth of HIMARS, was already in the IIP. SPG is definitely a cut.
Additional air combat capability has been cut.
The Hercs are increasing. From 12 to 20, but still fewer than the 24 we used to run…
Thanks for the post!Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.
The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.
The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.
Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.
Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.
Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.
The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.
Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.
A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.
If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.
The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.
What do you mean about the rumour 9 C17s if it’s true? Where would they come from!Thanks for the post!
So in poor words and if I understood well the Argentinians sunk your fleet. And this without even receiving the french exocets.
If their super Etendards would have received a conspicuous amount of exocet and their outcome on the british Navy your navy would have lost even more in favor to the RAAF.
It is a bit OT I know about F-111 Role in Vietnam but did they also do TASMO or other marine roles?
And now that there are high chances that sixth generation fighters are going to be way bigger and long range (just like the F-111), at least the GCAP is going to be, FCAS not since it is carrier based, but i bet also NGAD will have a similar range as a J-20, how is this going to affect your fleet planning?
Good overview.Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.
The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.
The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.
Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.
Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.
Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.
The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.
Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.
A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.
If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.
The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.
Actually what they did was cherry pick yo affirm their existing biases and beliefs. Had a CTOL carrier been affordable they would have argued the F/A-18 was too heavy and inferior to land based types and a carrier could get afforded as the RAAF needed to cancel the FA-18 and buy F-15 and F-16 instead.Thanks for the post!
So in poor words and if I understood well the Argentinians sunk your fleet. And this without even receiving the french exocets.
If their super Etendards would have received a conspicuous amount of exocet and their outcome on the british Navy your navy would have lost even more in favor to the RAAF.
It is a bit OT I know about F-111 Role in Vietnam but did they also do TASMO or other marine roles?
And now that there are high chances that sixth generation fighters are going to be way bigger and long range (just like the F-111), at least the GCAP is going to be, FCAS not since it is carrier based, but i bet also NGAD will have a similar range as a J-20, how is this going to affect your fleet planning?
I'm sure that this refers to the KC30's - if you re-read it you will understandWhat do you mean about the rumour 9 C17s if it’s true? Where would they come from!