Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

hauritz

Well-Known Member
This pic just makes me sad we didn't get the 4th Hobart. hurry up Hunter
I know what’s past is past but the failure to continue building Hobarts is one of the blunders that irks me the most.

They had an option to continue building at least one more ship. They knew that they had a looming valley of death in the shipbuilding industry, they knew our strategic environment was deteriorating, they had a proven design and they had a hot production line, Really blind Freddy could see that we had to continue building these ships.

The failure to build more of these ships may yet go down as one of the most consequential decisions every made by an Australian government.

Had we continued to build these ships we would not be in the rather dire position we find ourselves in at the moment, at least in relation to our surface fleet.

Annoys me no end.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
I know what’s past is past but the failure to continue building Hobarts is one of the blunders that irks me the most.

They had an option to continue building at least one more ship. They knew that they had a looming valley of death in the shipbuilding industry, they knew our strategic environment was deteriorating, they had a proven design and they had a hot production line, Really blind Freddy could see that we had to continue building these ships.

The failure to build more of these ships may yet go down as one of the most consequential decisions every made by an Australian government.

Had we continued to build these ships we would not be in the rather dire position we find ourselves in at the moment, at least in relation to our surface fleet.

Annoys me no end.
Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.
I remember Rudd's speach at the opening of the Osborne Shipyard, it was weird, it was almost like it had been written to announce ship 4, then didn't. A couple of months later Gillard was PM and we were on our way to an election and the worst decade of political dysfunction we had seen in 100 years.

If I recall, this was apparently when Minchin lamented that good policy was being opposed based on ego and ambition, with no thought to the future.
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
No, the option for the fourth ship expired in October 2008. If you had wanted to build more after that it would have required major changes to the contract, with the contractor effectively having the upper hand. No government is going to do that - and they are right not to.

Further, after 2009, changes to the MARPOL rules would have required the diesel engines, diesel generators and sewerage system to be changed, which in turn would potentially have required significant redesign and would have left us with a one off.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
No, the option for the fourth ship expired in October 2008. If you had wanted to build more after that it would have required major changes to the contract, with the contractor effectively having the upper hand. No government is going to do that - and they are right not to.
There was hope of a second batch to an improved design but instead the first batch was slowed. Not only wasnt the initially planned workforce never hired in full, the initial workforce was shrunk.

Adding insult to injury, when this reduced workforce couldn't ramp up as planned then Degmin Johnstone started carrying on about canoes.

It was the perfect opportunity to hammer the previous government over stuffing the shedule, instead they blamed the contractor.
 
Blame Joel Fitzgibbon and the rest of Krudd’s government; Defence argued for it but was overruled.
If you want to be taken seriously cut out the schoolboy insults. It always seems to be from the same side of politics.
You appear to be somewhat thin skinned if someone states something that goes against your personal political beliefs. You are not a Moderator and don't try to be one. Leave any moderation to those who are Moderators. By this post you are the one introducing politics. FYI politics is allowed to be discussed within the context of defence procurement / acquisitions and @spoz has not broken any rules WRT that.

Ngatimozart.
 
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Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
If you want to be taken seriously cut out the schoolboy insults. It always seems to be from the same side of politics.
There is good reason for those involved to be annoyed about the fourth ship not being ordered. The RAN jumped through hoops and basically promised to sacrifice their first born to get those ships.

There was a very real chance that not only would the DDGs not be replaced, but that the FFGs would eventually age out without replacement as well. So instead of three DDGs, six FFGs and eight ANZACs, the RAN would hit 2020 with only the ANZACs and maybe, just maybe Melbourne and Newcastle.

Timor did two things, it showed we needed big amphibs, but it also made it very clear those big ships had to be protected.

A whole new yard was built, a new workforce grown, a lot of people put a lot of blood sweat and tears into making the AWD a possibility. Three proper destroyers were seen as the minimum, the smaller frigate was selected instead, specifically after pricing was done for four ships instead of three for both designs. The only reason the F-100 made sense was if the extra ship was ordered. Then it wasn't.

This meant the entire cost of building the yard in Adelaide and upgrading facilities in Melbourne and Newcastle, had to be swallowed by the program and used as a stick by opportunistic types to beat the case for local shipbuilding into a coma.
 

ADMk2

Just a bloke
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
None of these are real cuts.

- The SPGs have been substituted for HIMARS. Artillery is significantly strengthened.

- Extra F35s were never announced. We had an option, which neither the current nor previous Governments exercised.

- Aren’t the Hercs going from 12 to 20?

- A delay is not a cancellation.

Now do I agree with all of the decisions they’ve made? No.

Do I think they’re doing a pretty good but not perfect job maximising within broader budget constraints? Yes, pending the outcome of the surface force review.

Is this a continuation of a pretty good but not perfect investment program they inherited? Also yes.

Too many Armchair Economists aren’t taking the broader fiscal and economic environment into consideration.
2x Regiments worth of HIMARS, was already in the IIP. SPG is definitely a cut.

Additional air combat capability has been cut.

The Hercs are increasing. From 12 to 20, but still fewer than the 24 we used to run…
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.

The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.

The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.

Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.

Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.

Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.

The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.

Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.

A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.

If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.

The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.
 
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Aardvark144

Active Member
2x Regiments worth of HIMARS, was already in the IIP. SPG is definitely a cut.

Additional air combat capability has been cut.

The Hercs are increasing. From 12 to 20, but still fewer than the 24 we used to run…
On Air Capability only - how has Air Combat Capability been cut when there was never any firm plan to acquire extra F35s? Unless you know something that we do not, the extra F35s were only ever an 'option'. As for a cut, we have gone from 71 x F/A-18 classic and 43 (in total) F111 although towards the end, you would argue many were not mission ready, to now 72 x F35, 24 x F/A-18F and 12 x EA/18G. So whilst slightly smaller in overall number, the air combat capability offered by the F35/ Super Hornets / Growlers would far outway any drop in numbers over what was operated before.

As for C130 - yes we did operate 24 x C130; however, they were standard fuselage C130 we will now have 20 x C130J-30 plus, do not forget, 8 x C17, 7 (perhaps 9 if the rumours are true) KC30 and 10 x C27, notwithstanding the C27 issues, I would argue our airlift is far superior over the 60s/70s and 80s.
 
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Meriv90

Active Member
Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.

The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.

The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.

Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.

Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.

Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.

The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.

Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.

A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.

If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.

The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.
Thanks for the post!

So in poor words and if I understood well the Argentinians sunk your fleet. And this without even receiving the french exocets.

If their super Etendards would have received a conspicuous amount of exocet and their outcome on the british Navy your navy would have lost even more in favor to the RAAF.

It is a bit OT I know about F-111 Role in Vietnam but did they also do TASMO or other marine roles?

And now that there are high chances that sixth generation fighters are going to be way bigger and long range (just like the F-111), at least the GCAP is going to be, FCAS not since it is carrier based, but i bet also NGAD will have a similar range as a J-20, how is this going to affect your fleet planning?
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Thanks for the post!

So in poor words and if I understood well the Argentinians sunk your fleet. And this without even receiving the french exocets.

If their super Etendards would have received a conspicuous amount of exocet and their outcome on the british Navy your navy would have lost even more in favor to the RAAF.

It is a bit OT I know about F-111 Role in Vietnam but did they also do TASMO or other marine roles?

And now that there are high chances that sixth generation fighters are going to be way bigger and long range (just like the F-111), at least the GCAP is going to be, FCAS not since it is carrier based, but i bet also NGAD will have a similar range as a J-20, how is this going to affect your fleet planning?
What do you mean about the rumour 9 C17s if it’s true? Where would they come from!
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
Reading the carbinet papers relating to the carrier replacement are an eye opener. Others (Spoz & Assail) may be able to add further insight, but basically the deputy chief scientist, department of primeminister and cabinet, and the RAAF representative provided advice to government, in 1982, that killed the carrier replacement program.

The government of the day didn't make a decision at the time as an election was approaching, but the overwhelming advice and sentiment, was not to replace Melbourne, especially as Invincible was nolonger available.

The key elements were:
1. The Harrier was useless, inferior to the F-5 Tiger etc. because it wasn't supersonic.
2. Helicopters were inferior to fixed wing ASW aircraft because dipping sonar was inferior to the "Barra" sonar buoy.
3. The only carrier worth getting, therefore, was one that could operate supersonic fighters and fixed wing ASW aircraft.
4. A conventionally powered CTOL version of a French design (that became CdeG) was the only viable solution, but too expensive.
5. In the current economic environment Australia couldn't afford to acquire such a ship, especially as acquiring an additional 10 P-3C aircraft ( which in their opinion were far superior at ASW than the RAN as a whole) was a much higher priority and Australia couldn't afford both.

Further to this:
1. Without supersonic fighter cover, even guided missile destroyers were too vulnerable to operate.
2. Being inferior to land based MPA aircraft, naval ASW helicopters weren't worth operating.
3. The RAN would have to become a coastal force, operating within Australian waters, under RAAF air cover.
4. This was a price worth paying to have a modern, effective air force.

Today these arguments would be ripped apart by a twelve year old using Google but back then they were the authoritive opinions of the experts on airpower, backed by the preeminent defence scientist. This was also following the preliminary information from the Falklands conflict.

Just as many unsubstantiated claims are being made about the future of warfare based on events in Ukraine, the Falklands some how was twisted to indicate that surface ships were unsurvivable and airpower was king.

The replacement carrier was gone, the ability to take effective ASW helicopters to sea was gone. The ability to triangulate to effectively use Ikara at longer range was gone.

Surface combatants were seen as incapable of defending themselves, therefore a waste of resources.

A follow on of losing the carrier, was losing justification for additional FFGs, there were initially meant to be ten (six instead of only two Australian built ships), plus the three DDGs and four US built FFGs. Also, initial plans to supplement the patrol boats with missile armed FACs died at the same time.

If memory serves, it was actually proposed to build a pair of Dutch M Class frigates instead of the last two FFGs. This was because the air power mafia had "proven" guided missile ships were a waste of resources.

The sad fact is, the Dibb report and the following white paper, actually improved things for the RAN from where they were heading. The RAN had done a very good job if convincing the political classes that a navy without a carrier, wasn't a navy. When the choice was made, based on advice not to replace the carrier, the navy, by its own statements, had become irrelevant.
Good overview.

Would of being interesting if the Navy back in the 80's post no HMAS Melbourne pushed for an LHD / LCH. No Harrier!
The USN were really the only operators of such ships back then, but Navy could of pushed the ASW potential ( Sailing under the motherly protection of the RAAF ) and the Amphibious role. "Get Army on board"

We would of been ahead of the game as this is now a popular class of ship in many a nations fleet.

If only!


Cheers S
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks for the post!

So in poor words and if I understood well the Argentinians sunk your fleet. And this without even receiving the french exocets.

If their super Etendards would have received a conspicuous amount of exocet and their outcome on the british Navy your navy would have lost even more in favor to the RAAF.

It is a bit OT I know about F-111 Role in Vietnam but did they also do TASMO or other marine roles?

And now that there are high chances that sixth generation fighters are going to be way bigger and long range (just like the F-111), at least the GCAP is going to be, FCAS not since it is carrier based, but i bet also NGAD will have a similar range as a J-20, how is this going to affect your fleet planning?
Actually what they did was cherry pick yo affirm their existing biases and beliefs. Had a CTOL carrier been affordable they would have argued the F/A-18 was too heavy and inferior to land based types and a carrier could get afforded as the RAAF needed to cancel the FA-18 and buy F-15 and F-16 instead.

Where the RN suffered was they didnt initially have spare Batch 2 Type 42s to deploy, once available they were able to dedcriminate low flying targets from background clutter and successfully engage.

This day and age the F-35B delivers greater capability than most land based types. AEGIS combined with Standard and ESSM if a horror story for combat pilots.

The piece I wrote was to illustrate how bad things could have been for the RAN, had successive governments not been more conservative in their outlooks than their advisors or worse, the opinionated but totally illinformed media.
 
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