An area in the quarterdeck was recently boxed out on Parramatta with corflute to give an idea of the size of the towed array compartment. Ship staff then worked out how it would potentially impact line handling. I believe it is now going through the engineering changes required to make it fit. Cheers.
Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0
- Thread starter OPSSG
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Lolcake
Active Member
He is still saying there is 800m unaccounted for. He has since updated the articleSeems Mr Bergman has not done any research has he.
He quotes the number missiles bought at 190.
However, each pod has 6 missiles, some quick maths shows that the total number of missiles is closer to 800, or around 780.
GMLRS: Precision Rocket Artillery
Supporting ranges of 70 KM and beyond, GMLRS is the go-to guided missile for precision strikes and assured mission success.www.lockheedmartin.com
"As several readers have pointed out from the first version of the article, the number of rockets is greater than the first glimpse of the figures suggests because they come pre-packed in a disposable fibreglass container in bundles of six. As an astute person has pointed out – thank you – this equates to an order for 1,140 rockets. The order for 60, 40, 66 and 24 units of various variants respectively are orders for pods of 6 rockets, not individual rockets. This brings the total to 190 pods, equalling 1,140 individual rockets for 22 HIMARS systems.
However, the mystery remains because on April 27, Lockheed Martin were awarded a not to exceed US $4.79 billion contract for 2 years of full rate GMLRS production. Full rate production is 10,000 per year, which works out at an average of US $240,000 per rocket. If you multiply that by 1,140 it’s still only US $273.6 million, or AU $425 million.
This still leaves around $800 million to explain because the trucks and launchers are cheap. The former are standard Army issue 6 x 6 vehicles that have some cabin protection added and the launchers are cheap throwaway containers, of which the US still has many thousands remaining from the Cold War. At the very least it would suggest that rockets are being sold to Australia and other customers at grossly inflated prices – which might explain why some countries are ditching HIMARS in favour of systems from Israel and South Korea"
Well let’s be honest, he isn’t exactly Robinson Crusoe in that regard. If you say it quickly something like building three extra Hobarts in Spain and changing over production from OPV 80s to C90s might sound like a quick and easy fix, but it wouldn’t be of course.
Both ships would require significant redesigns and in the case of building Hobarts you would be sending work off shore..
As for something like the C90. Could it really carry something the size of a Seahawk for example. The Bulgarian version will carry a light helicopter, the AS565MB Panther to be precise. To carry a Seahawk you would need a bigger hanger, some sort of RAST system, strengthened deck all on a ship slightly larger than an OPV 80. You would also need to find room for full length VLS, fit it with a CEAFAR radar, find space for anti ship missiles, CIWS and so on.
It would be a waste of time and money to even attempt to turn a C90 into anything that would even be remotely useful for Australia. I know the argument that it is better than nothing, but it is only slightly better than nothing.
I am really not sure there is an answer to getting capability into service quickly. Honestly I think we need to just stick with the course we are on and plan properly for a Tier two vessel in the 2030s.
If you really want crappy, poorly thought out solutions to Australia’s woes I am sure the US would be willing to sell us some secondhand Littoral Combat Ships.
Kym can be a bit like a dog with a bone on some subjects and not let go.
HIMARS is the current subject in the firing line.
Are we paying too much for what is supplied?
Could we get a better outcome with an alternative supplier, I cannot say.
Fair to ask the question if there is some reality to the question.
Back to Navy.
Will we see HIMRAS employed off a vehicles stapped to a flight deck on a Navy ship?
Cheers S
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Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
It might be better to strap NASAMS to the deck of LHD’s, AOR’s, etc
I believe the capability has been demonstrated.
As for Sheridan and others, quick easy solutions never are. Build three more F-100s in Spain, great idea, just look at the scope of work to upgrade our existing, already superior three?
History lesson, it was exactly the same with the Perths and then the Adelaide's, we bought smaller cheaper ships than we needed, then had to spend up big, when they were still new on significant upgrades, bigger, better ships wouldn't have needed until later.
Build the Hunters but be smarter with what follows, i.e. proper destroyers.
Time travel isn't an option but it would be interesting to work out what five or six modified Flight IIA Burke's would have cost to build at Williamstown as a direct follow on to the ANZACs. Cancel the FFGUP plus no F-100s. ANZAC replacement is a modified Type 26, no AEGIS, but 9LV and Mk41, ESSM, SM-6 and Tomahawk. Again, built at Williamstown.
I suspect that would have cost less than what we have done while delivering far greater capability. Savings from not building a new shipyard, not having a ship building black hole, not having to upgrade the FFGs, not building the Hobart's, not having to upgrade the Hobart's, not having to fit AEGIS to the Hunters.
he is saying 1140 missiles but that number could be muddy ….but …… it’s a fair point he is making. No harm in asking the question of defence on this one. how did this end up on Navy thread! It’s not the first time we have heard the SK option is a lot cheaper.Seems Mr Bergman has not done any research has he.
He quotes the number missiles bought at 190.
However, each pod has 6 missiles, some quick maths shows that the total number of missiles is closer to 800, or around 780.
GMLRS: Precision Rocket Artillery
Supporting ranges of 70 KM and beyond, GMLRS is the go-to guided missile for precision strikes and assured mission success.
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Sheridan has a Navy piece in The Australian today.
Can't really critisise the broad theme of what Navy has and its history and how it's not fit for the world we live in.
As to answers........ Hmmmmmm!
I don't mind option pieces that are critical so long as they also offer some realistic solutions.
Hopefully in a month or so we will get some clarity.
Will be interesting as to what Sheridan and other commentators make of the review outcome.
Cheers S
Going Boeing
Well-Known Member
In all the discussion about what to do with the remainder of the Arafura order, there hasn’t been much mention of the proposed follow on order for MCM, Naval Survey vessels, etc.
As the long lead items for the remaining 6 Arafuras would have already been ordered, one of the possible outcomes from the review is that the remainder of these vessels are constructed in MCM & Survey configurations by Luursen Australia, Civmec, etc which would meet the contract requirements, keep existing staff employed, provide shipbuilding training for new staff, etc.
While this construction is ongoing, a Tier 2 design can be selected, conduct engineering design changes and new contracts signed, eg if a version of the AH140/Type 31 is chosen, Babcock would need to enter into a commercial agreement with Civmec to have access to a local builder for the project. Obviously, if the final construction of a Tier 2 vessel can be done at Henderson, it would allow Osborne to concentrate its efforts on Tier 1 vessels such as the Hunters & additional AWD’s (& replacements).
This would be a good use of existing infrastructure and skills but, it doesn’t get new vessels into service as fast as the political situation warrants - the only way to get them faster would involve overseas construction which would involve some compromise.
We should know soon.
As the long lead items for the remaining 6 Arafuras would have already been ordered, one of the possible outcomes from the review is that the remainder of these vessels are constructed in MCM & Survey configurations by Luursen Australia, Civmec, etc which would meet the contract requirements, keep existing staff employed, provide shipbuilding training for new staff, etc.
While this construction is ongoing, a Tier 2 design can be selected, conduct engineering design changes and new contracts signed, eg if a version of the AH140/Type 31 is chosen, Babcock would need to enter into a commercial agreement with Civmec to have access to a local builder for the project. Obviously, if the final construction of a Tier 2 vessel can be done at Henderson, it would allow Osborne to concentrate its efforts on Tier 1 vessels such as the Hunters & additional AWD’s (& replacements).
This would be a good use of existing infrastructure and skills but, it doesn’t get new vessels into service as fast as the political situation warrants - the only way to get them faster would involve overseas construction which would involve some compromise.
We should know soon.
I wonder if it occurred to Mr Bergman that precise stocks of guided EO are actually classified and perhaps everything we are buying hasn’t actually been revealed publicly even if the estimated price has?
Then of course one has to remember these aren’t contracts or orders. They are estimates announced publicly as required by US legislation and for the approval (or not) of the US Congress…
Might that account for a figure that is “seemingly” vastly higher than our last request for almost the exact same capability?
The JMSDF has two through-deck "destroyers" which are exactly that: Hyūga & Ise. ASW helicopter carriers with local defence SAMs & enhanced command & control facilities.
Brissy1982
Active Member
I have been following the discussions here with great interest. In terms of getting new ships that offer a greater capability than the Anzac-class into the water as quickly as possible, I can’t see the Commonwealth backing out of building the Hunter-class FFGs to the existing design. I agree with what others have stated in terms of it being too late to stop and change direction, or cancel the Hunter class entirely – doing so would cost billions, cause even more delays and push the acquisition of new capabilities even further down the road.
With Aegis, CEAFAR2 radar, Type 2150 hull-mounted sonar, Type 2087 towed-array sonar and the ability to embark 2 MH-60Rs, the Hunters will have a good combat system and ASW capability, but with only 32 Mk 41 VLS cells and some NSMs, they simply won’t have enough firepower to be considered Tier 1 surface combatants in comparison to vessels that other countries, especially the PRC with the Type 055 DDG/CG, are deploying. The Hunters will be very big, gold-plated Tier 2s.
That begs the question of how the Hunters can best be used once they enter service to justify the enormous expenditure of building them. The following are my thoughts on this issue.
I think there is one role in which the Hunters would be able excel, and that is as specialist ASW and close-range AAW escorts for high-value units. This is the role that the RN’s Type 26 FFGs will perform for the QE-class CVs. So why not employ the Hunters in the same way as part of friendly naval formations in the Indo-Pacific? If a maritime conflict with the PRC in the South China Sea or the East China Sea occurs in the future, a key priority for the PRC will be to destroy or disable friendly high-value units (HVUs) e.g. CVNs, LSDs, LPDs, LHAs and LHDs.
If we are serious about deepening our defence co-operation with the US and our other allies in response to the PRC’s military build-up, I think the best way the Hunters could be used is as specialist ASW and close-range AAW escorts for HVUs within friendly naval formations. This specialist escort role would be a great way to make use of their strengths, as well as deepening our ties with the US and our other regional allies. I think we should offer the Hunters for employment in this role. For the RAN to be able to have at least three Hunters available for deployment at any time, all nine planned Hunters would need to be built.
ASW: PRC tactics in a future maritime conflict would certainly involve submarine attacks against friendly HVUs using torpedoes and AShMs. The Hunter’s ASW capabilities will make it well-suited to countering such attacks, and their ASW performance will likely be superior to that of most (if not all) DDGs and FFGs of allied navies. Including Hunter-class FFGs in friendly naval formations as specialist ASW escorts for HVUs would help to reduce the risk of submarine attacks, and have the ancillary benefit of freeing up DDGs and other FFGs (e.g. Constellation-class) for other tasks.
AAW: PRC tactics in a future maritime conflict would also include swarm attacks by large numbers of sea-skimming AShMs launched from surface ships, aircraft and/or shore batteries against friendly naval formations, in an effort to overwhelm their AAW defences.
Realistically, with only 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, the Hunters simply won’t have enough missile capacity to make a meaningful difference to the long-range AAW (SM-2 and SM-6) or strike capability (Tomahawk and LRASM) of friendly naval formations. Long-range AAW and strike should be left to other, more heavily armed ships that are better suited to these roles (Burkes and the like).
Obviously, a key role of escorting DDGs and FFGs in a naval formation is to defend against AShM attacks and intercept them as far out from the HVUs as possible. However, in the case of swarm attacks by large numbers of sea-skimming AShMs, it has to be expected that at least some missiles will get through the outer layers of defence.
The following table sets out what I have calculated as the available reaction time against a selection of sea-skimming AShMs currently in PRC service moving at their publicly available maximum speeds, assuming detection at a range of 30km.
Clearly, with such short reaction times available against AShMs such as the YJ-12, YJ-18 and YJ-91, every second of warning time is precious.
Notwithstanding their limited number of VLS cells, I think the Hunters could have a valuable role to play as goalkeepers against any missiles that get through the outer layers of defence. The Hunter’s CEAFAR2 S-band radar panels will be located approximately 90 feet above the waterline, giving the Hunters the ability to detect sea-skimming (less than 20m altitude) AShM threats at a range of approximately 30km. This is a greater range than a Burke-class DDG’s SPY-1D(V) or SPY-6 radar or a Constellation-class FFG’s EASR radar would be able to detect the same target, because their radar panels are sited much lower on their superstructures – as a result, these radars will only detect threats at closer ranges, meaning even less time to react. Some Burke-class DDGs do have the SPQ-9B as a horizon-search radar, but it is a 2-D radar that provides range and bearing data, not altitude, so its intrinsic utility against high-speed AShM threats is limited, apart from potentially giving air-search and missile guidance radars some warning about where to look. In short, the Hunter is likely to be the best available platform for defending HVUs against sea-skimming AShMs that penetrate the outer defences of a friendly naval formation.
What will be required to defend HVUs against high-speed sea-skimming AShM swarms is the ability to get a lot of ESSMs into the air very quickly. Filling the Hunters’ 32 VLS cells with quad-packed ESSM Block IIs for a total of 128 missiles, plus 2x CIWS and soft-kill defences (ESM/ECM suite, Nulka, MASS, chaff) would give the Hunters a considerable short to medium range AAW capability.
A key benefit of the Block II ESSM is that it has an active radar seeker, so while it can be guided by the missile guidance radars of the ship firing it, it can also rely on its own inbuilt radar to find its target – this could be a critical advantage in AShM swarm attacks, where the defences of vessels employing semi-active missiles which rely on guidance illumination from missile guidance radars, could be overwhelmed.
I think employing the Hunters in these roles would make best use of their strengths while minimizing their shortcomings. The fact that the Hunters are to be Aegis-equipped will mean that they can be networked into the overall tactical picture with other Aegis-equipped vessels, enabling them to employ CEC, thus offsetting their limited firepower to at least some degree.
Of course, I’m thinking of the employment of the Hunters in a tactical sense, which was how the RAN trained me to think as a PWO. Am I missing anything? Their designed speed of ~27 knots might mean they can’t keep up with a USN carrier battle group moving at full speed, but most of the time this wouldn’t be a problem.
I’d be grateful for any opinions either in agreement or disagreement with my thoughts, as long as they are expressed respectfully.
With Aegis, CEAFAR2 radar, Type 2150 hull-mounted sonar, Type 2087 towed-array sonar and the ability to embark 2 MH-60Rs, the Hunters will have a good combat system and ASW capability, but with only 32 Mk 41 VLS cells and some NSMs, they simply won’t have enough firepower to be considered Tier 1 surface combatants in comparison to vessels that other countries, especially the PRC with the Type 055 DDG/CG, are deploying. The Hunters will be very big, gold-plated Tier 2s.
That begs the question of how the Hunters can best be used once they enter service to justify the enormous expenditure of building them. The following are my thoughts on this issue.
I think there is one role in which the Hunters would be able excel, and that is as specialist ASW and close-range AAW escorts for high-value units. This is the role that the RN’s Type 26 FFGs will perform for the QE-class CVs. So why not employ the Hunters in the same way as part of friendly naval formations in the Indo-Pacific? If a maritime conflict with the PRC in the South China Sea or the East China Sea occurs in the future, a key priority for the PRC will be to destroy or disable friendly high-value units (HVUs) e.g. CVNs, LSDs, LPDs, LHAs and LHDs.
If we are serious about deepening our defence co-operation with the US and our other allies in response to the PRC’s military build-up, I think the best way the Hunters could be used is as specialist ASW and close-range AAW escorts for HVUs within friendly naval formations. This specialist escort role would be a great way to make use of their strengths, as well as deepening our ties with the US and our other regional allies. I think we should offer the Hunters for employment in this role. For the RAN to be able to have at least three Hunters available for deployment at any time, all nine planned Hunters would need to be built.
ASW: PRC tactics in a future maritime conflict would certainly involve submarine attacks against friendly HVUs using torpedoes and AShMs. The Hunter’s ASW capabilities will make it well-suited to countering such attacks, and their ASW performance will likely be superior to that of most (if not all) DDGs and FFGs of allied navies. Including Hunter-class FFGs in friendly naval formations as specialist ASW escorts for HVUs would help to reduce the risk of submarine attacks, and have the ancillary benefit of freeing up DDGs and other FFGs (e.g. Constellation-class) for other tasks.
AAW: PRC tactics in a future maritime conflict would also include swarm attacks by large numbers of sea-skimming AShMs launched from surface ships, aircraft and/or shore batteries against friendly naval formations, in an effort to overwhelm their AAW defences.
Realistically, with only 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, the Hunters simply won’t have enough missile capacity to make a meaningful difference to the long-range AAW (SM-2 and SM-6) or strike capability (Tomahawk and LRASM) of friendly naval formations. Long-range AAW and strike should be left to other, more heavily armed ships that are better suited to these roles (Burkes and the like).
Obviously, a key role of escorting DDGs and FFGs in a naval formation is to defend against AShM attacks and intercept them as far out from the HVUs as possible. However, in the case of swarm attacks by large numbers of sea-skimming AShMs, it has to be expected that at least some missiles will get through the outer layers of defence.
The following table sets out what I have calculated as the available reaction time against a selection of sea-skimming AShMs currently in PRC service moving at their publicly available maximum speeds, assuming detection at a range of 30km.
| Missile Type | YJ-62 | YJ-8/82 | YJ-83 | SS-N-21 | YJ-18 | YJ-12 | YJ-91 |
| Missile Speed (km/h) | 980 | 1,103 | 1,715 | 2,800 | 3,675 | 4,900 | 5,512 |
| Reaction Time (seconds) | 110 | 97 | 62 | 38 | 29 | 22 | 19 |
Clearly, with such short reaction times available against AShMs such as the YJ-12, YJ-18 and YJ-91, every second of warning time is precious.
Notwithstanding their limited number of VLS cells, I think the Hunters could have a valuable role to play as goalkeepers against any missiles that get through the outer layers of defence. The Hunter’s CEAFAR2 S-band radar panels will be located approximately 90 feet above the waterline, giving the Hunters the ability to detect sea-skimming (less than 20m altitude) AShM threats at a range of approximately 30km. This is a greater range than a Burke-class DDG’s SPY-1D(V) or SPY-6 radar or a Constellation-class FFG’s EASR radar would be able to detect the same target, because their radar panels are sited much lower on their superstructures – as a result, these radars will only detect threats at closer ranges, meaning even less time to react. Some Burke-class DDGs do have the SPQ-9B as a horizon-search radar, but it is a 2-D radar that provides range and bearing data, not altitude, so its intrinsic utility against high-speed AShM threats is limited, apart from potentially giving air-search and missile guidance radars some warning about where to look. In short, the Hunter is likely to be the best available platform for defending HVUs against sea-skimming AShMs that penetrate the outer defences of a friendly naval formation.
What will be required to defend HVUs against high-speed sea-skimming AShM swarms is the ability to get a lot of ESSMs into the air very quickly. Filling the Hunters’ 32 VLS cells with quad-packed ESSM Block IIs for a total of 128 missiles, plus 2x CIWS and soft-kill defences (ESM/ECM suite, Nulka, MASS, chaff) would give the Hunters a considerable short to medium range AAW capability.
A key benefit of the Block II ESSM is that it has an active radar seeker, so while it can be guided by the missile guidance radars of the ship firing it, it can also rely on its own inbuilt radar to find its target – this could be a critical advantage in AShM swarm attacks, where the defences of vessels employing semi-active missiles which rely on guidance illumination from missile guidance radars, could be overwhelmed.
I think employing the Hunters in these roles would make best use of their strengths while minimizing their shortcomings. The fact that the Hunters are to be Aegis-equipped will mean that they can be networked into the overall tactical picture with other Aegis-equipped vessels, enabling them to employ CEC, thus offsetting their limited firepower to at least some degree.
Of course, I’m thinking of the employment of the Hunters in a tactical sense, which was how the RAN trained me to think as a PWO. Am I missing anything? Their designed speed of ~27 knots might mean they can’t keep up with a USN carrier battle group moving at full speed, but most of the time this wouldn’t be a problem.
I’d be grateful for any opinions either in agreement or disagreement with my thoughts, as long as they are expressed respectfully.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
There is one extremely important aspect of the Hunters that you have not touched on, and that is the huge mission bay and the ability to carry a wide range of deployable assets, including a 2nd Helicopter, multiple UAVs, XLUUVs and USVs. What you are leaving out is the potential firepower a XLUUV armed with 2 LWT deployed 100ks from the Hunter could bring, firepower that no Burke, nor Hobart could ever bring.
There does seem to be an ideology in the West of designing vessels with smaller VLS magazines, the logic defies me.
I am unconvinced that 32 cells is actually tactically resilient enough, as the surviving ship will be plausibly be obliged to retire from the AO after an exchange so as to re-arm.
I’m grateful that it does have a 5” gun tho.
It seems astonishing at face value, that in a ‘magazine is king’ fighting doctrine, a Type 055 has 112 VLS, but the West designs and new-builds ships apparently with …..32!
As to the Type 26 being ASW focused, in RAN service it’s apparent ASW capability is dependent on its helicopter.
the chopper itself is hugely complex and beset by possible unserviceables or adverse flying conditions.
not long ago we lost a Seahawk and the ship had none till replaced!
so until we adopt an ASROC equivalent, that will enable THE SHIP ITSELF to engage ASW contacts at meaningful ranges, then that point is somewhat mitigated. Then again, dedicating the limited VLS to ASROC is again limiting.
I don’t get it?
I am unconvinced that 32 cells is actually tactically resilient enough, as the surviving ship will be plausibly be obliged to retire from the AO after an exchange so as to re-arm.
I’m grateful that it does have a 5” gun tho.
It seems astonishing at face value, that in a ‘magazine is king’ fighting doctrine, a Type 055 has 112 VLS, but the West designs and new-builds ships apparently with …..32!
As to the Type 26 being ASW focused, in RAN service it’s apparent ASW capability is dependent on its helicopter.
the chopper itself is hugely complex and beset by possible unserviceables or adverse flying conditions.
not long ago we lost a Seahawk and the ship had none till replaced!
so until we adopt an ASROC equivalent, that will enable THE SHIP ITSELF to engage ASW contacts at meaningful ranges, then that point is somewhat mitigated. Then again, dedicating the limited VLS to ASROC is again limiting.
I don’t get it?
Strongly disagree with this type of thinking (in bold).
“Tier 1” represents the ability to operate in a high-threat environment, and to contribute effectively per doctrine. This starts with the sea control fight. With better ASW and UXV capabilities than any USN combattant, equivalent local area defence and ASuW capability (on par with any DDG), the Hunters will fall squarely in the Tier 1 category. Which is a rather silly term anyway as the task force commander probably doesn’t care about labels and only about whether such-and-such escort can cover its assigned position in the inner or outer defensive screen.
So let’s look beyond VLS cell comparisons. 32 goes a long way, especially with quad packed ESSM. Is it as good as 64, 96 or 128? No but it doesn’t have to be if the USN already has 100+ TLAM shooters and more VLS cells than it can buy long-ranged SAMs for. Also it seems fairly likely that the Hunters will have margins to increase the VLS count or at the very least add RAM to complement ESSM.
Long & short of it, stop worrying about Tier 1 comparisons and get the Hunters in the water ASAP. By all means start looking at reasonable capability extensions for the 2nd or 3rd group of Hunters, but the priority should be to figure out what to build at Civmec.
(And if need be, accelerate delivery of the “Henderson class” of whatever combattant type the RAN lands on for Civmec, by building the first 1-2 hulls abroad to get them in service before 2030)
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If you look at the DSR it has two key things, increased leathality and value for money.
Greater numbers of less capable ships is neither.
Tarted up OPVs is not value for money.
Craming too much into too small a hull is not value for money.
Fitting expensive weapon systems to too small and too compromised a platform neither increases leathality nor is value for money. If the sensors can't get the best out of the systems then fitting them is a waste. If the platform can't get to or survive the fight, then fitting enhanced weapons is a waste.
Having larger numbers of less capable ships requires more crew and costs than smaller numbers of more capable ships.
Where we got into trouble was we settled on acquiring larger numbers of the smallest, cheapest minimum that could do the job, then shunk, instead of increased numbers.
The ANZACs made sense when we had a decent number of DDGs and FFGs above them. Once the nine bigger more capable ships became three, the ANZACs were by default, too small and too limited.
F-100 made sense as a one for one replacement for the six FFGs, or as a cheaper supplement to a class of proper DDGs. It does not make sense as a class of three DDGs supported by eight upgraded patrol frigates.
Basically the force planning of every government we have had since 1993 has been totally inadequate.
Greater numbers of less capable ships is neither.
Tarted up OPVs is not value for money.
Craming too much into too small a hull is not value for money.
Fitting expensive weapon systems to too small and too compromised a platform neither increases leathality nor is value for money. If the sensors can't get the best out of the systems then fitting them is a waste. If the platform can't get to or survive the fight, then fitting enhanced weapons is a waste.
Having larger numbers of less capable ships requires more crew and costs than smaller numbers of more capable ships.
Where we got into trouble was we settled on acquiring larger numbers of the smallest, cheapest minimum that could do the job, then shunk, instead of increased numbers.
The ANZACs made sense when we had a decent number of DDGs and FFGs above them. Once the nine bigger more capable ships became three, the ANZACs were by default, too small and too limited.
F-100 made sense as a one for one replacement for the six FFGs, or as a cheaper supplement to a class of proper DDGs. It does not make sense as a class of three DDGs supported by eight upgraded patrol frigates.
Basically the force planning of every government we have had since 1993 has been totally inadequate.
Tier 1 ASW ships. Very definitely, just as the Type 45 is a tier 1 AAW ship. The hull is reckoned to be very quiet, & paired with its excellent ASW sensors, & ASW weapons, it should be very good indeed at hunting subs.
I think you've missed their point.
This is the problem with the entire "tier" way of thinking.
The best RN ASW ships for years were the Type 14 Blackwood Class 2nd rate ASW frigates, because all they did was ASW (and occasionally get rammed by Icelandic gunboats). They had the best asw sensors and weapons of the time, with highly trained specialist crews. They regularly out preformed the various Type 12 iterations.
In Australia we have been thinking tiers based on size and the presence or absence of an area air defence missile system. Basically tier 1 is medium size with areavair defence missiles, tier 2 is smaller medium, without area air defence missile system, tier 3 was meant to be like tier 2 but smaller, but ended up being not even worth calling a ship.
A 1st tier ASW capability for the RAN needs to have area air defence capability because we simply didn't buy enough other ships with it.
If area air defence and AWS are the primary tasks designated for you major surface assets, maybe we could adapt the American navy’s fit out for their Constellation class Frigates. Mounting a Mark 110 57mm in place of the 127mm mark 45 mod 4 would free up both space and weight allowing for the addition of either more VLS or alternatively a RIM-116 mark 49 with 21 rounds also you could replace the Phalanx aft with another mark 49, thus all your 32 strike length VLS could be fitted with longer range surface to air missiles.
As the present Government seems to like missiles over artillery they would probably like this solution.
As the present Government seems to like missiles over artillery they would probably like this solution.
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
We are not going to have 9 ASW Frigates, because at any one time, anywhere between 1 and 3 are going to have to deployed in a GP/AA/Land Attack role due to not enough Hobarts. So instead of concentrating on hunting Subs, they are going to have to do Area Air Defence, support of ground forces, tactical land strike. Whether this equates to a future batch of Hunters that surrenders some ASW capability for VLS cells, only time will tell.