I have been following the discussions here with great interest. In terms of getting new ships that offer a greater capability than the Anzac-class into the water as quickly as possible, I can’t see the Commonwealth backing out of building the Hunter-class FFGs to the existing design. I agree with what others have stated in terms of it being too late to stop and change direction, or cancel the Hunter class entirely – doing so would cost billions, cause even more delays and push the acquisition of new capabilities even further down the road.
With Aegis, CEAFAR2 radar, Type 2150 hull-mounted sonar, Type 2087 towed-array sonar and the ability to embark 2 MH-60Rs, the Hunters will have a good combat system and ASW capability, but with only 32 Mk 41 VLS cells and some NSMs, they simply won’t have enough firepower to be considered Tier 1 surface combatants in comparison to vessels that other countries, especially the PRC with the Type 055 DDG/CG, are deploying. The Hunters will be very big, gold-plated Tier 2s.
That begs the question of how the Hunters can best be used once they enter service to justify the enormous expenditure of building them. The following are my thoughts on this issue.
I think there is one role in which the Hunters would be able excel, and that is as specialist ASW and close-range AAW escorts for high-value units. This is the role that the RN’s Type 26 FFGs will perform for the QE-class CVs. So why not employ the Hunters in the same way as part of friendly naval formations in the Indo-Pacific? If a maritime conflict with the PRC in the South China Sea or the East China Sea occurs in the future, a key priority for the PRC will be to destroy or disable friendly high-value units (HVUs) e.g. CVNs, LSDs, LPDs, LHAs and LHDs.
If we are serious about deepening our defence co-operation with the US and our other allies in response to the PRC’s military build-up, I think the best way the Hunters could be used is as specialist ASW and close-range AAW escorts for HVUs within friendly naval formations. This specialist escort role would be a great way to make use of their strengths, as well as deepening our ties with the US and our other regional allies. I think we should offer the Hunters for employment in this role. For the RAN to be able to have at least three Hunters available for deployment at any time, all nine planned Hunters would need to be built.
ASW: PRC tactics in a future maritime conflict would certainly involve submarine attacks against friendly HVUs using torpedoes and AShMs. The Hunter’s ASW capabilities will make it well-suited to countering such attacks, and their ASW performance will likely be superior to that of most (if not all) DDGs and FFGs of allied navies. Including Hunter-class FFGs in friendly naval formations as specialist ASW escorts for HVUs would help to reduce the risk of submarine attacks, and have the ancillary benefit of freeing up DDGs and other FFGs (e.g. Constellation-class) for other tasks.
AAW: PRC tactics in a future maritime conflict would also include swarm attacks by large numbers of sea-skimming AShMs launched from surface ships, aircraft and/or shore batteries against friendly naval formations, in an effort to overwhelm their AAW defences.
Realistically, with only 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, the Hunters simply won’t have enough missile capacity to make a meaningful difference to the long-range AAW (SM-2 and SM-6) or strike capability (Tomahawk and LRASM) of friendly naval formations. Long-range AAW and strike should be left to other, more heavily armed ships that are better suited to these roles (Burkes and the like).
Obviously, a key role of escorting DDGs and FFGs in a naval formation is to defend against AShM attacks and intercept them as far out from the HVUs as possible. However, in the case of swarm attacks by large numbers of sea-skimming AShMs, it has to be expected that at least some missiles will get through the outer layers of defence.
The following table sets out what I have calculated as the available reaction time against a selection of sea-skimming AShMs currently in PRC service moving at their publicly available maximum speeds, assuming detection at a range of 30km.
Missile Type | YJ-62 | YJ-8/82 | YJ-83 | SS-N-21 | YJ-18 | YJ-12 | YJ-91 |
Missile Speed (km/h) | 980 | 1,103 | 1,715 | 2,800 | 3,675 | 4,900 | 5,512 |
Reaction Time (seconds) | 110 | 97 | 62 | 38 | 29 | 22 | 19 |
Clearly, with such short reaction times available against AShMs such as the YJ-12, YJ-18 and YJ-91, every second of warning time is precious.
Notwithstanding their limited number of VLS cells, I think the Hunters could have a valuable role to play as goalkeepers against any missiles that get through the outer layers of defence. The Hunter’s CEAFAR2 S-band radar panels will be located approximately 90 feet above the waterline, giving the Hunters the ability to detect sea-skimming (less than 20m altitude) AShM threats at a range of approximately 30km. This is a greater range than a Burke-class DDG’s SPY-1D(V) or SPY-6 radar or a Constellation-class FFG’s EASR radar would be able to detect the same target, because their radar panels are sited much lower on their superstructures – as a result, these radars will only detect threats at closer ranges, meaning even less time to react. Some Burke-class DDGs do have the SPQ-9B as a horizon-search radar, but it is a 2-D radar that provides range and bearing data, not altitude, so its intrinsic utility against high-speed AShM threats is limited, apart from potentially giving air-search and missile guidance radars some warning about where to look. In short, the Hunter is likely to be the best available platform for defending HVUs against sea-skimming AShMs that penetrate the outer defences of a friendly naval formation.
What will be required to defend HVUs against high-speed sea-skimming AShM swarms is the ability to get a
lot of ESSMs into the air very quickly. Filling the Hunters’ 32 VLS cells with quad-packed ESSM Block IIs for a total of 128 missiles, plus 2x CIWS and soft-kill defences (ESM/ECM suite, Nulka, MASS, chaff) would give the Hunters a considerable short to medium range AAW capability.
A key benefit of the Block II ESSM is that it has an active radar seeker, so while it can be guided by the missile guidance radars of the ship firing it, it can also rely on its own inbuilt radar to find its target – this could be a critical advantage in AShM swarm attacks, where the defences of vessels employing semi-active missiles which rely on guidance illumination from missile guidance radars, could be overwhelmed.
I think employing the Hunters in these roles would make best use of their strengths while minimizing their shortcomings. The fact that the Hunters are to be Aegis-equipped will mean that they can be networked into the overall tactical picture with other Aegis-equipped vessels, enabling them to employ CEC, thus offsetting their limited firepower to at least some degree.
Of course, I’m thinking of the employment of the Hunters in a tactical sense, which was how the RAN trained me to think as a PWO. Am I missing anything? Their designed speed of ~27 knots might mean they can’t keep up with a USN carrier battle group moving at full speed, but most of the time this wouldn’t be a problem.
I’d be grateful for any opinions either in agreement or disagreement with my thoughts, as long as they are expressed respectfully.