The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Ukraine used MICLICs in Zaporozhye. The problem is that the minefields are too deep. They make an inroad, insert an armored taskforce with mineclearing vehicles, a pair of MBTs, and a platoon or two of mech infantry in vehicles for support, and have to move in a narrow column that then gets shot apart by Ka-52s with ATGMs at long range, and Russian SpN teams hiding in the treelines. Immobilize (don't even have to kill) mine breaching vehicles and the column stalls. Hit the back vehicles and backing out requires maneuvering around them in a minefield. Meanwhile artillery is firing. This is how all the initial attacks went. This was compounded by the massive depth of the minefields, the presence of multiple false safe passages (we saw Ukrainian mobile teams riding wheeled vehicles trying to follow openings only to run into dead ends), and many hidden Russian positions that ran through the treelines but were somewhat manned, somewhat not, with registered artillery TRPs all over the place, and all of that covered by masses of artillery, EW, tons of UAVs, and loitering munitions available in quantity, and you have quite a tough nut to crack. Ukraine didn't fail because they were bad. They failed, at least so far, because this is massive defense set up.
Not an expert here but how about airpower? Say a repeated run of SU-25s with FAB-250s along a single file or some form of thermobaric munition that has good overpressure, assuming that Russian airdefense can be suppressed for a shortwhile within the operational area.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Ratings of that sort are mostly nonsense. For example the Russian Pacific Fleet would likely lose the fight to the South Koreans, nevermind the Chinese or Japanese. Australia would pose a significant problem. Does this mean Russia is weaker then them? For all practical purposes, yes. On the other hand if the Japanese ground forces were teleported to the modern Ukrainian battlefield, there's no guarantee they would fare a whole lot better then the Ukrainians. So Russia is.... stronger? If you're into counting artillery tubes, tanks, AFVs, etc. then maybe. In the real world strength is relative not only to the opponent but also to the type of conflict being fought, and the objectives one has. If Russia has purely defense objectives, it doesn't matter how weak the Pacific Fleet is. As long as Russia can nuke Tokyo, and dozens of other major cities, there's no real chance of a Japanese invasion of Vladivostok (leaving aside the question of why they would even want to). If Russia wants to add Hokkaido to the Kuril Islands, then the weakness of the Pacific Fleet is once again a major problem. And of course there's the question of US involvement. Suddenly our strength question goes beyond just military questions and into diplomacy. In 2015 Russia went into Syria and drastically altered the geo-political trajectory of the Middle East using primarily the VVS, with some support from naval and ground forces assets. This is at a time when Finland would have been a tough nut for the VVS to crack. Russia is stronger then the US when it comes to determining the outcome of the war in Syria but weaker then Finland? With both primarily being airpower questions? I'll end where I started. Ratings are mostly nonsense.
Agree that ratings are nonsense but a country that had large amounts of hardware and had used such hardware in the past to impose its policies on other counties either directly or indirectly may find itself in a difficult position without such large amounts of military hardware
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The Russian problem in Ukraine is poor leadership, planning, and logistics. It's not so much the Russian General Staff's fault but very much so the political leadership with Putin and Shoigu keeping everything to themselves and thinking that they have the skills of Napoleon or Zhukov; they don't. Hitler did the same thing from about 1942 onwards. The other problem is the corruption within Russia, where funds for the modernisation of the Russian military have been diverted into some peoples back pocket.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Not an expert here but how about airpower? Say a repeated run of SU-25s with FAB-250s along a single file or some form of thermobaric munition that has good overpressure, assuming that Russian airdefense can be suppressed for a shortwhile within the operational area.
You'd have to have a pretty good idea of where these defenses are, not get your Su-25 shot down, and be ready to attack immediately after (Ukraine suffers from coordination issues too). Around Rabotino for example Ukraine has taken Russian positions more times then I can count, but can't hold them. Retreating Russian forces mine their own positions, pull back, and let artillery and other long range fires soften Ukrainian forces before retaking the positions. Suppressing Russian positions isn't the issue. And let's remember, none of these are Russia's primary defense lines. Those haven't really been reached yet. It also doesn't answer the question of what to do about Russian Ka-52s picking apart your advancing force that has to move in a column to make use of the breach in the minefield you've made. And the bottleneck of that breach could close behind you if a Russian pickup with a remote minelayer in the back throws a few dozen mines into it. None of this is impossible to defeat, but there's no simple solution.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
So far there has been many reports and footage of Leo-2‘s being hit. I’m curious if there are also reports of Leo-2 hitting targets and doing damage. What are Ukrainian troops saying about them? Are they doing a better job than their Soviet counterparts, or there is no real improvement? It’s been a while since they’ve been on the frontline, so Ukrainian troops should already know about their effectiveness in real combat. Anyone heard anything ahout this?
I’ve been wondering the same thing in regards to the Leo’s and have not found any answers.

I have also been wondering about the whereabouts of the Challengers. The plan, as I recall, was to employ them as mine and obstacle clearing trench filling machines. Something along the lines of “if there are dragon teeth, there should be a dentist for the job”. Are they waiting to deploy them once (or rather a big if, at this point) they get to the actual/primary Russian lines of defence and the “dragon teeth”?

To stay kosher, I looked it up and the exact quote was the following:

“If there is such a thing as ‘dragon’s teeth,’ there must be a ‘dragon’s dentist,’” the defense ministry quipped.

From: Ukraine’s Challenger 2 Tanks Can Plow Right Through Russian Fortifications. The mediocre article from Forbes also discusses the mine clearing trench filling machines as well.

Kind of ironic that the Brits were the first to announce sending MBT’s to Ukraine with the Americans to follow, and Germans being most cautious and last, yet the Leopards are the first and so far the only ones that we see out there making no difference (as far as the offensive is concerned), at least as it appears from the reports. Of course, I understand the numbers game, but… Back in March (when they arrived to Ukraine, being among the first western MBT’s, if I recall correctly), Reznikov stated that the Challengers were soon to see the battle:

“These fantastic machines will soon begin their combat missions,” he wrote

From: Ukraine Gets Its First Western Tanks. Here's What to Know

In quantities supplied (or promised to supply) neither Challengers nor Abrams would make any difference either, I am sure. ATACMS still appear to be off the table:

But U.S. defense and administration officials familiar with the issue said that despite what one called a growing public perception of “some sort of slow, gravitational pull” toward approval, there has been no change in U.S. policy and no substantive discussion about the issue for months. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to address the sensitive subject.

The Pentagon believes that Kyiv has other, more urgent needs than ATACMS, and worries that sending enough to Ukraine to make a difference on the battlefield would severely undercut U.S. readiness for other possible conflicts.


From: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/22/ukraine-us-long-range-missiles/

And from the same article:

The number of ATACMS in American stockpiles is fixed, awaiting replacement with the next generation, longer-range Precision Strike Missile, called the Prism, for PrSM, which is expected to enter service by the end of this year, officials said. Lockheed Martin still manufactures 500 ATACMS each year, but all of that production is destined for sale to other countries.

While a cautious reader would notice a bit of contradiction in the article in terms of production and availability, but are there any other countries with a more urgent need?

Furthermore, the Americans now, that the Brits and French have supplied Storm Shadows and SCALP’s, respectively, 140 of them in total, according to the article, believe that there is even a lesser need for ATACMS because of it. From the same article:

The recent arrival of British Storm Shadow and French SCALP missiles means Ukraine has even less need for ATACMS, Colin Kahl, until early this month the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy, said during the same Aspen panel at which Yermak appeared.

Kind of the opposite of what the Brits intended, at least as was reported publicly (ie, “opening the doors” for others as they supposedly did with MBT’s). The question that is begged to be asked is what is the end game here?

The idea of F-16’s, for example, has been discussed to death and many experts on the subject described why these will make no difference anyway (for months now and previously referenced by myself and others), yet that is all that is on the table and still a maybe, and will take quite a while, according to Blinken (which is completely reasonable):

"But it's not just the equipment itself. It's the training, it's the maintenance, it's the ability to use it in combined arms operations. All of that takes time," Blinken said. "If a decision were made to actually move forward on the F-16s tomorrow, it would be months and months before they were actually operational."

Well, it’s kind of a “duh” sort of moment because, again, it has been talked about for “months and months”. Literally, everything he said has been talked about for nearly a year now. This is the article for the last quote, before I forget, ABC News: Sending F-16s to Ukraine to fight Russia would take 'months and months': Blinken. It’s not behind a paywall, so I won’t make many quotes aside from the parts (most) relevant to the post.

One such part is:

"Every step along the way ever since, we've worked to try to get them what they need, when they need it."

Well, that is a bit dishonest simply because, as the most relevant supplies have ben behind the curve, as most here I am sure have noticed a long time ago. It seems to me that whatever is supplied at any given time is just in order to have this going.

From the same ABC article:

"Our military leaders are using their best expertise possible to help determine what it is that can be most effective for the Ukrainians. How quickly can it be deployed? How effectively can they use it? That will continue and the process on the F-16s is moving," Blinken said.

At the same time, from the WP article cited above:

The minefields are the primary cause of delay in the Ukrainian offensive, according to Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Right now, [the Ukrainians] are preserving their combat power and they are slowly and deliberately and steadily working their way through all these minefields. And it’s a tough fight. It’s a very difficult fight,” Milley said after Tuesday’s virtual meeting of the 50-plus group of Ukraine’s international backers.

“The various war games that were done ahead of time have predicted certain levels of advance and that has slowed down,” he said. “Why? Because that’s the difference between war on paper and real war. These are real people in real machines that are out there really clearing real minefields and they’re really dying.”


On the other hand, Kiev Post reports the following:

“The situation is very hard. The Russians were given too much time to get prepared for the widely announced Ukrainian counteroffensive. It was clear to them that one of the directions of the Ukrainian strike, if not the main one, would be Zaporizhzhia,” a combat medic said. He requested Kyiv Post not make his name public.

He added: "And they prepared very well… Every square inch is mined. They plant mines on approaches to their positions and blow them when they retreat.

“Nobody expected the whole terrain to be mined, so we’ve been banging our heads against the minefields, moving at a snail's pace,” he added. "We really lose very many sappers. They always go ahead of the troops.”


Has no one while running “various war games” accounted for “the whole terrain to be mined”? Highly unlikely, in my opinion. I mean the media citing various sources reported about it for months and it was not (should not have been?) news even to a casual observer. I have a great amount of respect for Gen. Milley and he had said in every interview I read prior to the offensive (some posted here previously) that he did not expect any significant advancement of the UA forces this year and that whatever was to come would be very difficult, etc; now, it appears, even his conservative or realistic outlook (especially as compared to many others’) have taken a bit of a plunge.

The same Kiev Post articles also mentions the following:

“As long as we are standing and holding on, we can say there are no losses; there may be some light injuries. As soon as we move forward, there are hefty losses. Up to half a unit for every kilometer we capture, and it is not a given that we will hold this kilometer later,” he said.

That’s more than quite a bit to lose. Furhermore:

“I think about it like this: people in a crashing plane have no chance, and according to statistics, we have 30 percent killed and 40 percent wounded, so there is a chance of survival, and people in the plane have none. So, it’s not so bad. In ordinary life, too, bricks can fall on your head,” he said.

Funny enough (not really funny, but as a figure of speech), the same article claims that the units around Bakhmut report quite the opposite, as if everything is nice and dandy (figure of speech, again).

To be continued (maybe today, maybe later) due to the allowed character limit.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Very briefly…

Currently, it appears that there is nothing we can or are willing to supply to Ukraine due to various reasons that can significantly or at all change the frontline. Ukrainians are still claiming that there is no negotiations to be had with Russia until their borders as recognized by the UN are restored (what’s to negotiate in that case? -> i.e. completely unwilling to negotiate and has a totally unrealistic position, specifically in regards to Crimea, all else aside). Russia says they are willing to negotiate, but are not really willing to give up any of the land they are currently controlling and are, possibly, asking for more (i.e. not willing to negotiate, but has a somewhat realistic position, given the first proposition in this post).

So the question, again, what is the end game here? The NBC had previously reported that there may be some behind the scene talks taking place, which exclude Ukraine. The Moscow Times had further expanded on that more recently. The “hawks” still insist on Ukraine “driving right through Russian defences and leaving Russia no choice but to come up with their own way out of Ukraine” (a quote from the NBC article). The latter, at this point, seems to be fairly an unrealistic scenario. So, what is next?
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Very briefly…

Currently, it appears that there is nothing we can or are willing to supply to Ukraine due to various reasons that can significantly or at all change the frontline. Ukrainians are still claiming that there is no negotiations to be had with Russia until their borders as recognized by the UN are restored (what’s to negotiate in that case? -> i.e. completely unwilling to negotiate and has a totally unrealistic position, specifically in regards to Crimea, all else aside). Russia says they are willing to negotiate, but are not really willing to give up any of the land they are currently controlling and are, possibly, asking for more (i.e. not willing to negotiate, but has a somewhat realistic position, given the first proposition in this post)....
I don't think that "willing to negotiate as long as we get more than we have now" is realistic, especially from the side which is (1) the aggressor & (2) has broken its previous agreements. To the Ukrainians, & me, that looks like "We'll settle for an agreement that leaves us in a good position to break it when we're ready". An agreement that leaves the aggressor better placed than it is now is not at all realistic.

Realism has to take into account past behaviour & likely future behaviour.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Very briefly…

Currently, it appears that there is nothing we can or are willing to supply to Ukraine due to various reasons that can significantly or at all change the frontline. Ukrainians are still claiming that there is no negotiations to be had with Russia until their borders as recognized by the UN are restored (what’s to negotiate in that case? -> i.e. completely unwilling to negotiate and has a totally unrealistic position, specifically in regards to Crimea, all else aside). Russia says they are willing to negotiate, but are not really willing to give up any of the land they are currently controlling and are, possibly, asking for more (i.e. not willing to negotiate, but has a somewhat realistic position, given the first proposition in this post).

So the question, again, what is the end game here? The NBC had previously reported that there may be some behind the scene talks taking place, which exclude Ukraine. The Moscow Times had further expanded on that more recently. The “hawks” still insist on Ukraine “driving right through Russian defences and leaving Russia no choice but to come up with their own way out of Ukraine” (a quote from the NBC article). The latter, at this point, seems to be fairly an unrealistic scenario. So, what is next?
I don't think that "willing to negotiate as long as we get more than we have now" is realistic, especially from the side which is (1) the aggressor & (2) has broken its previous agreements. To the Ukrainians, & me, that looks like "We'll settle for an agreement that leaves us in a good position to break it when we're ready". An agreement that leaves the aggressor better placed than it is now is not at all realistic.

Realism has to take into account past behaviour & likely future behaviour.
Again, I don't think this is Russia's position. I suspect that Russia is willing to give up some of what it has taken to legitimize the rest as Russian territory. But the situation is murky. And I suspect as it stands nobody is willing to acknolwedge any of Russian territorial gains as legitimate, regardless of anything else. Which is the real impasse.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update Zaporozhye.

It appears Ukraine has launched a major attack in Zaporozhye. The attach primarily hit two areas. One of them is again the Vremyevskiy bulge where Ukraine finally captured the ruins of Staromayorskoe. Note there is a good chance the village of Urozhaynoe will also fall as it's in a lowland area, overlooked from Staromayorskoe. The other is Rabotino where Ukrainian elements penetrated pretty deep into Russian lines but failed to hold any positions, ultimately losing many vehicles.


Bradley drops off infantry at a position, and the trench line gets hit second later by awfully accurate strikes. Krasnopol' maybe?


Some of the fighting around Orekhov. From the Russian side the main participants were the 70th MRRgt from the 42nd MRD, 177th MarRgt and 810th MarBde.


5 Ukrainian POWs allegedly captured near Rabotino. Note considering the scale of the fighting, this is not a large quantity.


A knocked out Leo-2A4 and a destroyed T-72B, Ukrainian, Rabotino area.


A destroyed Sisu XA-180 near Orekohv. A unit riding these is operating in Zaporozhye, this is iirc the second destroyed one we see.


A look at a destroyed T-72M1 uparmored, Ukrainian, near Rabotino. Warning footage of corpses.


2 T-72M1s destroyed east of Rabotino.


2 Leo-2A6 knocked out and abandoned in the eastern part of Rabotino.


5 BMP-1s destroyed east of Rabotino. It's part of the mech company riding BMPs that got hit really hard.


A BMP-1 stuck in a Russian trench, part of the company that got hit above.


Ukrainian Humvee and a pickup truck get hit by an FPV drone south of Novodanilovka.


T-72EA getting hit near Orekhov.


T-72B destroyed near Rabotino.


A knocked out Bradley, east of Rabotino, getting finished off. Note it's unclear if we've seen it before.


Another Bradley getting hit east of Rabotino.


Ukrainian BMP-1 knocked out and BRM-1K destroyed east of Rabotino.


BMP-1 destroyed north-east of Rabotino.


A destroyed Bradley south of Gulyaypole, context unclear.


A armored Humvee taken out near Malaya Tokamachka.


A Bradley hit a mine near Malaya Tokamachka, and was successfully evacuated by Ukrainian forces.


Ka-52 fires, Zaporozhye.


Allegedly a destroyed Ukrainian Strela-10 hit by a Russian Msta-B, possibly a Krasnopol' strike.


Ukrainian T-72 getting hit by a loitering munition. It appears to catch fire. Unclear if ultimately destroyed.


BARS-11 hitting Ukrainian vehicles and infantry.


Other interesting tidbits.

Two Ukrainian UAVs hit Moscow-city, a skyscraper business district of Moscow. Russia claims they were downed by EW implying this wasn't their intended target.


At least one captured AMX-10 has been hauled off into Russia. We're aware of 3 knocked out ones that could theoretically have been taken intact, and one that was photographed up close and personal. This is likely that one. No word so far on captured Bradleys, of which there were two but evacuating which would have been difficult.


An interesting Ukrainian hybrid merging an R-149 BTR-80 based comms vehicle with a BRM-1K turret. The chassis might be a captured Russian vehicle.

 

ImperatorOrbis

New Member
I don't think UN will ever recognize annexed territories. Did UN ever in recent history ratify a conquest or an illegal anexation of terittory?

I don't think even China or India or Iran like the expansionism of Russia and would most likely not recognise the territorial changes. At most this will be a frozen conflict with a ceasefire in place. The west will most likely continue with sanctions indefinetly.

Before, Russia had Crimea and sanctions and now they will have more war torn land and even more sanctions.

Unless ofcourse Ukraine can win a war of attrition. It is doing it somewhat with destruction of RU arttilery but also loosing it with wasting life and vehicles.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
On a lighter note, All the tractor recovered Russian tanks did not go directly to the military. Someone in the Sumy region had a T-80 under a tarp in his yard for over a year. I wonder what he planned to do with it?

The guy was waiting to see what happens and thought returning it to the original owner who may come back could be a good idea? :)

A tank would do wonders in the field and keep the neighbours at bay, but feeding it with fuel would be a bitch! The guy realized the latter and turned it in :)

Maybe the guy realized that he is way over his head finding a buyer for a tank vs small arms and ammunition he has stacked in his shed/basement/elsewhere? :)

But enough with the lighter note. Let’s do a side note before moving on: involved in war crimes shelling a hospital or shelling a Ukraine position set up in a hospital?


This is a pretty good thread in regards to the Russian defensive positions in place around Rabotino/Rabotyne and the area. It also links an older thread with more discussion of the subject in Zaporozhie area.


Back in February (?) when the talk about the next (now ongoing) Ukrainian offensive was picking up speed, I expressed some serious doubts here about the ability of the UA forces to conduct a massive offensive against well defended Russian positions. Frankly, I still expected to see more progress when the offensive was to take place (I thought and posted here that it would be “summer-ish”, but honestly believed it would be a tad later in the summer, though don’t think it would make any difference at this point).

Looking at the older thread (the one in the tweet linked above, for example, as well as others), you can see many posts along the lines of “it is just demoralized kids and old men who will be defending these positions”, “they’ll all run when the Ukrainians unleash their power”, “their equipment is all but gone and they are digging out of fear and don’t have enough men to defend those positions anyway”, etc. Paraphrasing, of course, but this is more or less the sentiment, even of some that appeared to be making sense at one point or another. Most, if not all of these posts were basically reflecting the rubbish previously posted by the UK MoD, which I also expressed my concerns about here (including once or twice revealing their “intel” sources from questionable Russian or Ukrainian sites).

My question to the more knowledgeable of tactics here is, what is it that the Ukes need and/or need to change in order to improve the results?
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I don't think that "willing to negotiate as long as we get more than we have now" is realistic, especially from the side which is (1) the aggressor & (2) has broken its previous agreements. To the Ukrainians, & me, that looks like "We'll settle for an agreement that leaves us in a good position to break it when we're ready". An agreement that leaves the aggressor better placed than it is now is not at all realistic.
Realism has to take into account past behaviour & likely future behaviour.
While I don’t necessarily disagree, or not entirely, I believe their position is more realistic than Ukraine’s simply because they never closed the door for negotiations and this is likely not their actual position to begin with (may sound contradictory to a part of my previous post, but I will try to expend either in this or the next post). Moreover, they have the upper hand in terms of territory control and means and it appears it may not change in the foreseeable future and time is also not on the Ukrainian side. Furthermore, if Ukraine completely exhausts their “offensive potential”, without any significant breakthroughs, what’s next? What if Russia keeps moving at the north east? What if they start moving elsewhere? Could a be long stretch, but we definitely cannot disregard this possibility. They may also simply sit tight and continue to wreck the country until it is no more. Can Ukraine function as a successful independent state or at least as what it was prior to 2022 (or prior to 2014?) with what is currently happening? Can it be a functional (and successful) state such as Israel? The answer to both is probably a no because it is a huge territory, Russians use more than “primitive” weapons, AD is in short supply, etc. Even if it was possible (and I don’t think it is) to establish a “shield” over the country of this size, it would simply take an enormous amount of time and resources, neither of which is available. Another possibility is the way of Korea, which Ukrainians rejected outright because that comes with the loss of territory and I am not sure it is in Russia’s interest to go that way either, but beggars can’t be choosers.

Currently, Ukrainian government is acting like it has unlimited resources via our backing, which is unreasonable. Don’t get me wrong, I get their “griefs and outrage” from my armchair, so to speak, but I am not talking about fairness here, but reality. You seem to refer to the former. Fairness is relative and what’s fair to one is not to the other and the opposing sides here see fairness very differently. It would be great if all lived in the great imaginary world of John Lennon, described in his probably best song, but we aren’t and, as they say, the world isn’t fair. It is not even remotely fair (or reasonable), for example, to assume that “we will be backing Ukraine as long as it takes” is an actual promise in the first place (firstly, backing how and secondly, as long as what takes?). I will discuss this point below. Realistically, it belongs in the same pile as “we are taking Crimea back and establishing a demilitarized zone in western Russia”. Another example from that pile is “we are demanding the NATO to move back to its -insert year- borders or else”. The latter ended up growing legs due to lack of effort and discussion, in my opinion, and we are debating the results or progress right now. I am fairly certain if we all could take this back and approach the crisis differently we all (or most reasonable of us) would. Some may even ask how did we f it up so badly.

I mentioned before, though some refuted my posts with their opinions, but it isn’t cheap in comparison to anything to keep this going. The current cost of this war (and I am talking about the last couple of years tops) is probably in trillions of actual dollars spent, as well as lost opportunities (some estimates suggest that the loss of income worldwide was as high as $2.8 trillion half a year ago because of this war: Opinion | What the War in Ukraine Has Truly Cost Us). One has to look no further than what the Euros (including the Brits) are spending on energy subsidies. That amount alone for the region reached nearly 800 billion euro for the period since September 2021 to February 2023: Europe's spend on energy crisis nears 800 billion euros. I am not going to talk about other costs at this point because I believe that alone sufficiently demonstrates the extend, especially as compared to the GDP of Ukraine of $160B last year and $200B on a good (in fact, best) day: Ukraine GDP - 2023 Data - 2024 Forecast - 1987-2022 Historical - Chart - News. The estimated cost of rebuilding Ukraine varies from significantly less to about half of, again, that amount alone, depending on the estimator (and is further significantly reduced if one takes into account that it would be Russia alone rebuilding what has been destroyed in the territories it controls). So it is far from “pennies” that some assume. Even if you only consider the equipment supplied by the west that many people think of right away as the main cost to us, which it isn’t. Sure, a number of countries very conveniently got rid of the junk and scraps they had rusting for decades, but what are the replacement costs? The NYT article cited above suggests that these costs might be 10-30% higher. Common sense, however, suggests that this is likely a very low estimate given the inflation of the past 2 years alone, as well as the bureaucracy, crippling interest rates, and so on. These costs are going to be astronomical in comparison to the numbers we hear today and I am not even going to mention the timeline of such an endeavour (though I can somewhat envision the poop show it is going to be for years to come). Some of the same is also true for the direct and indirect financial aid provided to Ukraine: no one is providing any of it from their surpluses and cash reserves. And this is quite literally a sunk cost with questionable returns and future costs do not provide any optimism either. The last few sentences are my opinion only, so no sources there.

Perhaps, the other coefficient on the same side of this equation is the Americans, who are partially cashing in on Euros’ losses and their MIC will, maybe, be the one benefitting most. These two - losses and gains - do not cancel each other out though.

Of course, on the same side is another coefficient and that coefficient is Ukraine itself, briefly discussed above. Human lives and suffering, destroyed economy, mental health of millions, catastrophic demographic implications, current and very likely significantly increased future substance abuse, and so on. This RUSI article from earlier in the year discusses some of these issues and touches on others as well: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/cost-war-ukraine. The country is trashed with no end in sight. Prognosis is not at all optimistic either. How does one monetize all of the above? In my view, even if it ends tomorrow and to Ukraine’s best satisfaction, there is still a question of the existence of the country in the long term.

One last coefficient I will mention from this side is the rest of the world, or the poor of the world, and all the misery that comes with it. That misery likely increased quite dramatically in the past couple of years.

What about the other side of the equation, what’s there? Russia, less stable (both financially and politically), less capable, less free, maybe more reckless and dangerous, less influential, and so on. As for influence though, Middle East, Africa, South America, among many others that are not opposing and some even supporting the aggression doesn't hurt and suggests not all is lost. Then there are those that can be thrown on either side of this equation. Probably Iran and North Korea that are likely benefitting from closer ties with Russia, etc. China is not necessarily “winning” here. India is probably benefiting as well, including lower energy costs, “buddying up” with the US while not frustrating Russia. Turkey is another beneficiary, which is nor here or there. I am not going to go over the entire list to make my point and one can shuffle what I mentioned here any way they want.

The point is that it is pretty clear, at least at the moment, that this is no equation at all, but an inequality and a strong inequality at that. So far Russia has not lost nearly as much as the other side and as many had predicted it would. These costs may increase to some degree in the future, but right now we have what we have.

So, how do we make it fair? What is the end game? What are we to do to change the sign of the inequality or at least turn it into an equation? My answer to the first and last questions is that it is impossible. The second question remains unanswered because I do not see an answer and it does not appear to me that others in play have one as well.

This is part one and part two is (probably) yet to come. I’d hate to be writing this on Twitter!
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
I don't think UN will ever recognize annexed territories. Did UN ever in recent history ratify a conquest or an illegal anexation of terittory?
...
Negotiations if any, is going to be between Ukraine and Russia. UN isn't going to be a factor if both sides agree to some form of settlement.

An armistice is a more likely outcome as this impass drags longer and there is an unwillingness to compromise on their positions.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
To the Ukrainians, & me, that looks like "We'll settle for an agreement that leaves us in a good position to break it when we're ready". An agreement that leaves the aggressor better placed than it is now is not at all realistic.
I don't think anyone has asked the Russians whether (1) is that what they want (2) are they prepared to accept something less, (3) what is that something less.

Realism has to take into account past behaviour & likely future behaviour.
I've touched on this in a previous post. If trust is a pre-requisite, I am not sure how you or the Ukrainians intent to qualify and validate.
Assumptions on what the other guy will do/not do, is not a good starting point for any negotiations. What Ukraine need is a set of iron-clad, harsh consequences (e.g missiles start flying) when non-compliant actions contrary to the deal occurs.

Realism is also taking into consideration your ability to make your positions a reality. Negotiations usually happen when both parties realise that they can't achieve that, and they have to accept something they don't like, however unpalatable that sounds.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group

Video that claim Russian 152mm Krasnopol already begin wide used in Ukrainian fronts. This is Russian answer for Western 155mm Excalibur.


Video on Russian array of EW specifically aim on jamming Western sensors and satellites guidance.

One Action bring Counter Action, and Russian seems showing that they are catching up on Western Tech and able to counteracts.

The abilities off course influence on propaganda, but then so does Western claim on their weapons. This war is good show case for export potential for both West and Russian customers. Russian customers now watching how Russian weapons counteracts Western ones. Most of Russian customers will not going to get access to latest West weapons tech anyways.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Besides "accepting" a pandemic, what were the options?
I am no that "sure" about people.
I don't live in Poland, this is not serious and I don't think Russia is going to invade Poland; WW3 would be serious. I don't live in Sudan, either.
Next Sunday's football match is serious, for the "people". US citizens got tired of the Vietnam "Special Operation" after a while, "people".
Yes, this is way off-topic.

Maybe we could go back to Staromaiorske. I read one reference about being retaken by Russia, but then I haven't been able to find any other mention. Is it still in Ukrainian hands?
According to Russian sources, Ukraine holds the northern part of the village. The southern part is empty, and Russian troops hold the heights south-west of the town. The village itself is basically in ruins. Urozhaynoe appears to be still in Russian hands.

EDIT; Some interesting tidbits.

Contradicting some other claims, according to Rybar Russia still holds Klescheevka and Andreevka. Part of Klescheevka appears to be contested, and it's likely there are some Ukrainian positions inside the village. We had footage before of Russian strikes into the village. Ukraine is normally quick to post videos of themeselves inside captured villages with typically a Ukrainian flag in the background (they did in Staromayorskoe within ~24 hours). lack of such footage from Klescheevka is consistent with Rybar's map, though of course doesn't prove anything.


An interesting video of a Ka-52 missile launch. Note the helo is barely moving, practically hovering. This is likely a view of some of those extra-long range Vikhr fires. The helo is relatively low to the ground, and the missile is a beam-rider.


A small assortment of footage of recent Russian strikes against Izmail in Odessa region, one of the ports hit in Russia's recent campaign of strikes against port infrastructure. The intent is clearly to disrupt the ability to use these ports for any sort of cargo traffic. Targets include a fuel storage facility, grain silos, and passenger terminals.


Two IRIS-T TELs got hit recently, one is suspected a decoy due to the lack of an explosion, but it's still packed up and evacuated later, on a real truck. Note the damage to the first is clearly not enough to destroy the vehicle. They were likely counting on the missile detonation to get the job done. The appearance of these systems on the front line suggests exhaustion of Soviet-produced SAMs either TELs or missiles (or both?).


It appears Russia did manage to haul away the captured CV90. Here's a video of it on a trailer allegedly 40 kms from the front line. The most logical thing would be for Russia to display some of the captured vehicles at the upcoming Army-2023 show. I think we might get a look at just what Russia has managed to capture and haul away. The claim of the Bradley and Leopard is still unsubstantiated.


Lt. Colonel Kurilkin, commander of the Somalia btln DNR, now Russian Army, has received a Hero of Russia award. Given the high performance of his unit and the extended amount of time it spent on the front lines, this is likely well deserved recognition, though of course details on the reasoning for the award are lacking.


And Gen. Teplinskiy, on VDV day (Aug. 2nd) addressed the public, stating that the VDV would be getting additional units. Despite rumors of his demotion or removal he appears to still be the commander of the VDV. Units he mentioned include a VDV artillery brigade, the 31st VDV Bde being turned into the 104th VDV Div. and two new regiments getting formed. Kit will likely come from storage, though some new BTR-82As or even BMD-4Ms are not out of the question (I'm kind of curious of BMD production is still ongoing). The biggest mystery is what artillery systems they will use.


Maj. Gen. Seliverstov who was reportedly removed from commanding the 106th VDV is apparently still in command, and has been spotted wearing fresh awards, including a For Military Achievements 4th award. It's a little murky whether he was removed and then reinstated or never actually removed.


Russian Territorial Defense formations in Belgorod region are now armed, but with civilian Sayga-AKs which only allow single fire, and cannot fire with a folded stock. In principle this is better then nothing, but reflects the continued murky status of these formations.

 
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Larry_L

Active Member
The grain deal is back in the news with talks between Erdogan and Putin. Negotiation is always a good sign. While Erdogan asks both sides not to escalate, it may be too late for that. In spite of the warning by Russia that they consider any ship headed to Ukraine to be capable of carrying military cargo, and the difficulty of finding insurance, 3 ships are registered as headed to Ukraine. After Russia made their threat to civilian shipping, Ukraine reciprocated with a similar statement.


Ships from Israel, Greece, and Turkey transit Black sea, watched over by Nato aircraft.


In other developments, as Russia, for the time being ignores these ships, there are indications that Ukraine has attacked a non military vessel. This is one of the vessels sanctioned by the west for military use. It may also have carried humanitarian cargo to Syria following the recent earthquake.





 
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