The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
No doubt there is a lot of work to be done. On the other hand it's not nearly as bad as Russian propaganda keeps claiming.
DW fact-checked some persistent myths:

USA today fact checked a story about a man pictured with Swastika and concluded he was Russian not Ukrainian: Fact check: Images show Russian citizen with swastika tattoo, not Ukrainian soldier

Unpacked story about this topic: Does Ukraine really have a ‘Nazi problem?' - Unpacked
referring to American Jewish Committee’s report which says that Jews in Ukraine in general do not face acts of violence or public condemnations of Israel. In 2018, the Pew Research Center found Ukraine to be the most accepting of Jews among all Central and Eastern European countries.

It is also difficult to understand that a country with a huge Nazi problem can have a Jewish president and Jewish (ex)-PM.
Right wing extremism takes many forms. Jews may or may not be targets. And of course with a much bigger threat in the form of Russia, it's entirely logical that anti-semitism takes a back seat. I've explained this several times, but I'll do it again. Ukraine's problem with right wing extremism is not that there are many of them. There aren't. They can't win elections. It's that they've been allowed into force-wielding structures in disproportionate numbers, and the ideas they hold are not discouraged or kept in check.

Referring to Russian propaganda is pointless in this discussion. The word propaganda is a dead giveaway.

On the other hand, it's clear that Ukraine is not a liberal democracy as we have in most "Western" countries. But I am confident that the illegal unprovoked invasion by Russia will act as a catalyst and accelerate change in Ukraine. Ukraine has seen the ugly face of Russian imperialism, and the only option they have is to fully embrace the liberal democracy and fight corruption. A large majority of Ukranians now support both EU and NATO membership, and they are ready for change. They just have a war to win first.
This really is the best hope for Ukraine. Pre-war the reforms that Poroshenko initially started were basically dead in the water. This war could serve as the catalyst for real reforms. But the resistance of Ukraine's corrupt elites would have to be overcome. And that's the context in which Ukraine will have to deal with the right wing extremists in their armed forces.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
We have unconfirmed reports of Wagner forces wrapping around Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the north. Initially Russian troops pushed on the south through Klescheevka with the intent of cutting off Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the east first at Ivanovskoe/Krasnoe, then at Stupochki, ultimately with the goal of advancing into Chasov Yar. These attempts have failed and there have been two Ukrainian counter-attacks that pushed Russian forces back from the road, though neither counter-attack managed to contest Klescheevka. The solution seems to be to wrap around from the north, this made by possible by the eventual fall of Krasnaya Gora and now Praskovievka. These are confirmed. Russian forces are now pushing onward, and there are reports Yagodnoe has fallen too though Verkhovka remains in Ukrainian hands. The northern and north-western roads out are definitely cut but the route through Khromovoe is almost certainly open, and the one through Chasov Yar. There is still a significant Ukrainian garrison inside the town and if Russia moves fast enough, they could be trapped in the city. The last reports I saw had Ukrainian reinforcements and supplies heading into the town but they're Russian-sourced so reliability is unclear. Unless something drastically changes, the fall or Artemovsk/Bakhmut is a question of when, not if, and a question of whether any significant Ukrainian forces end up encircled or not.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I’ll try to make this one shorter.

Useful enough for what? They're getting value out of their existing Soviet-era jets, and are likely receiving more of those transferred quietly from abroad.
They are getting some value. What I am saying, however, is that if there is only limited benefit to strengthening the Ukraine positions, they are not going to provide the aircrafts. If there is only marginal increase in Ukrainian capabilities, they are not going to provide the aircraft. If there is a high risk of losing the assets, they are not going to provide them. At the moment, and likely for the foreseeable future, it appears that all these boxes are ticked. Hence, there will be no western or “NATO-standard” fighter jets provided any time soon. I am sure they have been “sneaking in” Mig’s and Su’s for a while though.

They're putting pressure on Russian air defenses, and forcing Russian forces to expend SAMs on engaging them. We also have cases of confirmed destruction of Russian SAMs, perhaps not many but definitely some. The only way to evaluate if they're effective/worth it is with internal Ukrainian information on the sorties and effects they're having. Unfortunately we're not in a position to evaluate this.
Yes, I agree, we are not in that position. Perhaps, though, we are in a position to speculate based on what we see/what has been reported? We can speculate that there isn’t much success in that department simply because it isn’t advertised or talked about at all. By anyone. I’d say this would be a fair assumption simply based on what we see and what is being (not) reported. Is it necessarily the case? Not really, but it seems like very limited success (and less?) is more likely than anything more than that. Readiness and availability of the “first grade” and most experienced pilots for training suggest the same. Again, it is not necessarily the case.

I honestly don't know. Presumably yes, but for some reason its not a priority. And this during a dedicated SEAD campaign that took place from mid-October.
Maybe it isn’t a priority because they do not see a significant or any threat coming from it at this time? I have no idea, really. Some things/decisions are very… weird and hard to understand. Yet again, all we can do is speculate. This also may suggest that the Ukrainian air force is currently not an issue.

I daresay they're not in a position to say no. Zelensky called Scholtz a liver sausage. Germany is still donating tanks to Ukraine.
I believe that was Melnyk, or what’s his name, the guy that used to be the top Ukrainian diplomat in Germany, that has since been removed from that position and promoted to the position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. And he was only removed from that position after an interview to a German outlet where he talked about Bandera being a hero and claiming that it was Russian propaganda that the “banderites” murdered en masse both Jews and Poles because he believes it didn’t happen.

You do have a very valid point in your assessment regardless.

There's a difference between they shouldn't supply them and they can't supply them immediately. I think jets are coming and it's only a matter of when.
Hard to argue with that, but I doubt there will be any aircrafts provided before there is some kind of resolution to this conflict, in one way or another.

This is not true. Kherson was defended properly and Ukrainian forces took massive casualties in that offensive. In that area geography was very much in play. But also in play was Russia's inability to hunt down and destroy the HIMARS. to this day we have no confirmed cases of the destruction of HIMARS or M270s. It's likely some got hit somewhere, but in a way where BDA footage from the Russian side is not available, and Ukraine has made a practice of quickly hauling off damaged or destroyed vehicles. In reality Russia has serious problems finding targets beyond the range of regular quadcopter operations with Orlans being relatively scarce. The ranges at which HIMARS operates makes it very hard for Russia to do much about them. Of course on the flip side it's not like Ukraine has destroyed many Tornado-S or Iskanders.
I think the question becomes whether western ISR assets can be effective enough to identify Russian supply lines and allow Ukraine to strike them in depth, considering those assets can't operate inside Ukrainian airspace. Longer range munitions are being provided to Ukraine for a reason. Note what happened after the HIMARS first showed up. There was a flurry of strikes against Russian munition dumps. Russia has since pushed bigger munition dumps further back, parallelized and spread out supplies of munitions closer to the front. But this problem could easily repeat itself in the future.
There is almost certainly a spring offensive coming by Ukraine, unless Russia inflicts such losses in current fighting that the reserves Ukraine has been training in the west have to be committed to holding the line. This is partly why some western sources have been advocating a withdrawal from Artemovsk/Bakhmut. If Russia can force Ukraine to expend many of its existing forces in the current attrition battles without having to commit its own reserves of the second 150k mobilized personnel, then when the offensive comes Russia can counter with strategic reserves, and Ukraine may not be able to launch the attack on nearly as large a scale. If Russia takes significant losses themselves, they may choose to commit their own reserves early, a costly mistake in my opinion. If they don't manage to deal enough casualties, it will be a battle of reserves. It's also unclear how many people Ukraine is managing to mobilize now. Based on footage coming out Ukraine is clearly working extra-hard to pull more people. It's possible Ukraine can throw enough bodies into the fight without having to commit the rumored 3 new corps.

That's kind of my point. If significant changes happen it will be due to a Ukrainian breakthrough. If that doesn't happen, it will be more of this.
Ukraine has sent reinforcements to both but unlike Artemovsk/Bakhmut, where Ukrainian forces are reportedly taking severe casualties, and reports are coming out of entire btlns reduced to less then a company of personnel, and entire brigades being chewed up in the fighting, and having to pull out for reforming, at Ugledar the large casualties are on Russia's side. Ukraine has moved reserves there, and the 155th Marines do have a foothold in the town but Russian forces attempting to envelop have failed miserably and lost many killed and many vehicles in the process. There are no similar reports, at least that I have seen, for the Ukrainian side. I suspect Ugledar will still eventually fall. But it isn't a Russian success.
It may have been properly defended except for the fact that one cannot cross one of the largest rivers in Europe, move 50-60 kilometres in, set up the defences and assume all is good. On the satellite images, I counted two bridges (one is a rail) over Dnieper on the stretch of the land the Russians occupied.

Massive casualties on the Ukrainian side and almost casual and very successful Russian retreat, where they took their time, in turn, may indicate the weakness and limited ability of the Ukrainian army to conduct a massive offensive once the limiting factors (in this case, a mighty river) are eliminated. No? Various reports indicate that the Russians are dug in quite well and pretty deep around their current (stable) positions, so it isn’t going to be another Kherson, where supply lines were extremely limited and obvious, or north east, where they were simply overrun due to poor defences and very limited man power. However, I absolutely agree, supply lines, while not as scarce, are still the crucial part of both success and failure.

As for spring offensive, I don’t believe there is one coming, like I already mentioned. It doesn’t make sense simply because much of the promised equipment won’t come until later in the year, mid-summer or later. Tanks they were expecting aren’t going to be there until later and in significantly lower numbers. Training just started a couple/few weeks ago. They do not have the men to try now before they are best equipped and trained later in the year. In other words, they do not get two tries in this in a relatively short period of time, so later (summer-ish?) offensive makes more sense at this time. As long as they can defend what they hold. Though if that isn’t the case, the talk about an offensive is just it, talk.

I agree with the rest.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Jan 20th-21st

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Russian AGS fires, Kherson region. Note it's unlikely they're firing across the river, more likely the fighting is over islands.


Oskol Front.

Ukrainain CASEVAC near Svatovo-Kremennaya area. Note there has been increased Russian pressure there lately.


Russian T-90M operating near Balka Zhuravka.


Ukrainian troops doing mineclearing with a Slovak Bozena 5.


LDNR Front.

Russian artillery forces operating near Spornoe. This is dead east of Seversk and Russian-LNR forces have been stalled here for months.


Allegedly a Ukrainian munition dump going up in Krasnopol'evka.


There are reports of Wagner forces capturing Krasnopol'evka north of Soledar.


Footage of a firefight in Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the Ukrainian side.


Ukrainian Roshel Senator burns in Artemovsk/Bakhmut area.


Wagner forces continuing their advance in Artemovsk/Bakhmut, very slowly.


Footage from Opytnoe, a southern suburb of Artemovsk/Bakhmut. It fell to Wagner a little while ago.


Ukrainian troops in the Artemovsk/Bakhmut riding BMP-1s, BRM-1s (possibly captured), BTR-3s, Humvees, Pantera T6s (I think) 2S1s, 2S3s, M113s, MT-LBs, and MBTs. We also see one artillery recon vehicle ( I think) on the BMP chassis), and a truck with an S-60 in the back.


Russian T-90M operations in Mar'inka.


DNR 3rd SpN btln firing an ATGM at a Ukrainian infantry element.


DNR 11th Rgt artillery fires.


Misc.


Russian T-90M with softshell era operating in an urban environment. This might be Mar'inka.


Russian Ka-52 ATGM fires. Note this is the only Russian helo that continues to be able to use it's ATGM. The 10km range is likely what allows it to operate outside of MANPADS/SHORAD range.


Apparently a Ukrainian MBT hitting a landmine.


A destroyed Ukrainian truck, reportedly 3 KIA, 5 WIA. Possibly artillery or a landmine.


Russian engineer unit somewhere in the south, either Kherson or Zaporozhye area likely.


Captured Russian T-72B3 operating in Ukrainian hands. Note the sidescreens. They used the K-5 tiles along the entire length but it's not the newer B3mod'16, it's the origina K-5 tiles from T-90As and T-72B3mod'11s. It's likely Ukraine did this after capturing the vehicle. Why Russia didn't do this from the start for the T-90A and T-72B3/Ba variants is unclear.


Ukrainian mobilization efforts are getting downright ugly with people being grabbed on the streets, and wherever they can be found.


The World.

Reports continue to circulate of alleged DPRK artillery shell supplies to Russia.


Germany is reportedly donating 500 military trucks to Ukraine, namely Iveco VM90s, ACL 90s, and Renault TRM.


First footage of the German IRIS-T in Ukraine. Note the coloring, it was allegedly initially meant for Egypt.


Ukraine's 43rd Bde with ex-Italian PzH-2000s and Oshkosh trucks.


Ukraine has apparently received S61 Sea Kings for their naval aviation.

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
We have unconfirmed reports of Wagner forces wrapping around Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the north. Initially Russian troops pushed on the south through Klescheevka with the intent of cutting off Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the east first at Ivanovskoe/Krasnoe, then at Stupochki, ultimately with the goal of advancing into Chasov Yar. These attempts have failed and there have been two Ukrainian counter-attacks that pushed Russian forces back from the road, though neither counter-attack managed to contest Klescheevka. The solution seems to be to wrap around from the north, this made by possible by the eventual fall of Krasnaya Gora and now Praskovievka. These are confirmed. Russian forces are now pushing onward, and there are reports Yagodnoe has fallen too though Verkhovka remains in Ukrainian hands. The northern and north-western roads out are definitely cut but the route through Khromovoe is almost certainly open, and the one through Chasov Yar. There is still a significant Ukrainian garrison inside the town and if Russia moves fast enough, they could be trapped in the city. The last reports I saw had Ukrainian reinforcements and supplies heading into the town but they're Russian-sourced so reliability is unclear. Unless something drastically changes, the fall or Artemovsk/Bakhmut is a question of when, not if, and a question of whether any significant Ukrainian forces end up encircled or not.

Depends actually, and I think it is still IF not WHEN.

WE don't know what the Ukrainians are up to and if they thought that a Russian breakthrough in and around Bahkmut as a real threat to them, then they would have moved significant forces into the battle. But by all accounts they haven't and it appears that they are doing enough to hold or slow the Russians to an absolute crawl. It has been claimed by various sources that this Russian push in and around Bakhmut is their much vaunted Spring Offensive. If it is then they aren't achieving much if anything at all. They haven't committed their airpower and if it is the much fabled Push then the lack of airpower says a lot about Russian airpower; the lack of it.

The Russians are more dangerous now than they were 12 months ago, because they finally have started to learn some lessons but not all. Putin has reorganised the top brass a few times but the Minister Of Defence Sergey Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff, General Gerasimov, are still in charge.

"Three months before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, CIA Director William Burns and U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Sullivan met in Moscow with Nikolai Patrushev, an ultra-hawkish adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Burns and Sullivan informed Patrushev that they knew of Russia’s invasion plans and that the West would respond with severe consequences if Russia proceeded. According to Burns, Patrushev said nothing about the invasion. Instead, he looked them in the eye, conveying what Burns took as a message: the Russian military could achieve what it wanted. ...
"According to Russian doctrine, an interstate war such as this one should begin with weeks of air and missile attacks against an enemy’s military and critical infrastructure during what strategists call “the initial period of war.” Russia’s planners consider this the decisive period of warfare, with air force operations and missile strikes, lasting between four and six weeks, designed to erode the opposing country’s military capabilities and capacity to resist. According to Russia’s theory, ground forces are typically deployed to secure objectives only after air forces and missile attacks have achieved many of their objectives. ...
"It is difficult to know exactly why Russia deviated so wildly from its military doctrine (and from common sense). But one reason seems clear: the Kremlin’s political interference."
What Russia Got Wrong (Sorry it's paywalled).​

Stalin was a control freak but he always knew to let his Generals plan the war and he gave them general guidance. Of course if they displeased him they would be off for a trip to the Lubyanka and if "unlucky" spent time in the gulags. The lucky ones were executed by the NKVD. Unlike Hitler, Stalin knew what had to be done and he knew when and when not to interfere. He did listen to his generals and if he liked what they told him, he let them live for another day. Very encouraging for his generals. Also he liked to play them off against each other, and a classic example of that was the final asault on Berlin when he played Zhukov off against Rokossovsky.

However Putin doesn't know how to run a war and he has let his emotion overrule his logic. The goals that he set were not realistic and the resources in adequate. He keeps changing his mind and his addiction to OPSEC made it very difficult for his military planners to properly plan the campaign. The intelligence that they used was deeply flawed. The operation was blown three months before the invasion started and everybody knew that he was going to invade. Any prudent person would have reappraised the plan and made adjustments. He didn't. The rest is history and countless Russina lives and equipment have been lost because of this fatal flaw. Kings and courtiers have been executed for far less and this leadership style certainly rates as one of the worse in military history. Hitler was the allies greatest general; Putin is Ukraines greatest general.

Nothing has sufficiently changed for me to alter the view that I have held since March that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov et al., are nothing but incompetents and that has had severe negative impacts upon the Russian forces. Even if they have a modern equivalent of Zhukov and Rokossovsky, the rot and incompetence is to far ingrained for them to alter the course of the war.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
This really is the best hope for Ukraine. Pre-war the reforms that Poroshenko initially started were basically dead in the water. This war could serve as the catalyst for real reforms. But the resistance of Ukraine's corrupt elites would have to be overcome. And that's the context in which Ukraine will have to deal with the right wing extremists in their armed forces.
One thing to bear in mind is that if Ukraine emerges from this intact, having beaten off the Russians, Zelensky will have immense prestige. If he's determined to clean up, he could be successful. And somehow, I don't think he'll be keen on anti-semitic right wing extremists.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Depends actually, and I think it is still IF not WHEN.

WE don't know what the Ukrainians are up to and if they thought that a Russian breakthrough in and around Bahkmut as a real threat to them, then they would have moved significant forces into the battle. But by all accounts they haven't and it appears that they are doing enough to hold or slow the Russians to an absolute crawl. It has been claimed by various sources that this Russian push in and around Bakhmut is their much vaunted Spring Offensive. If it is then they aren't achieving much if anything at all. They haven't committed their airpower and if it is the much fabled Push then the lack of airpower says a lot about Russian airpower; the lack of it.
All the information I have seen indicates that Ukraine has committed significant forces to the battle for Artemovsk/Bakhmut, going to so far as to send newly formed territorial defense units into battle in a hurry, after the fall of Soledar. The footage coming out of there has Ukrainian troops reporting large casualties and complaining about lack of support. What makes you think this is not the case?

As for the Russian "spring offensive", I think the smartest thing Russia can do is not launch one. The best sign would be that the second half of Russia's mobilized personnel are committed, but so far that remains unclear.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Writers for breaking defence suggesting that a political settlement and succession of land by Ukraine should be tied to further arms supplies. May be just give the Russians Alaska instead? A controversial idea: Jets for Ukraine in exchange for treaty talks with Moscow - Breaking Defense
1. Currently, there are plenty of smart people saying stupid things. They suggest that most wars end through negotiation. I have seen some who suggest that to secure a peace, concessions must be made by Ukraine while disregarding of Putin’s current objectives.

Land concession is just asking for another war ten years later. Worse, it will tell the world that it's okay to invade a weaker neighbour to grab land. Either they win immediately and get the land, or they stretch the war for a year and then other countries force the neighbour to cede the land, thus giving them the land.
2. Taken to its logical conclusion, this concession of land narrative fails to take sufficient account of Russia’s current outlook, which is that it will eventually win the war & that negotiations are only desirable insofar as they undermine Ukraine’s support or capacity to resist.

3. Right now, Putin thinks if he waits — he can win. There is a reason why Putin has gambled repeatedly that the West will lack resolve. He will only negotiate if he thinks he is losing. This is why arms supply to Ukraine is so important.

4. When Crimea was invaded, the West showed Putin that he could gamble to win. But the surprise to me is the level of resolve shown thus far in the West by continuing to arm Ukraine.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears reports of the fall of Yagodnoe were incorrect/premature. This is significant since it opened the road to a Russian advance on one of the two main roads left out of Artemovsk/Bakhmut. It remains to be seen how this unfolds.

 

At lakes

Well-Known Member

There are quiet a few civilian sanitized Blackhawk's about in the US, no secret equipment etc. The Government appears it may have purchased one of these back and refitted for service in Ukraine. Unsure how many involved but this one has been there a while having flown combat missions already.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
This is where the air force comes in, I guess (Bloomberg, paywalled): US Is Giving Ukraine a Long-Range GPS-Guided Bomb That Can Hit Targets Miles Away

The US is providing Ukraine a long-range GPS-guided bomb made by Boeing Co. that’s capable of hitting targets 45 miles away, industry officials said.

The Pentagon hasn’t formally acknowledged it’s sending the modified version of Boeing’s Joint Direct Attack Munition, saying only it would send “precision aerial munitions” as part of a $1.85 billion package announced December 21. But two people familiar with the matter confirmed the weapon is the Extended-Range Jdam, known as the Jdam-ER. They asked not to be identified because the detail hasn’t been announced.

Pentagon spokeswoman Kelly Flynn said US won’t identify the munition, citing operational security. Jdam kits are used by the Air Force and US Navy and have been sold to over 26 countries.

The Jdam-ER can be bolted on unguided bombs ranging from 500 pounds to 2,000 pounds. Once dropped, the bomb deploys wings, allowing it to glide up to 45 miles and tripling the range of the original weapon. The Extended-Range Jdam was developed in cooperation with the Royal Australian Air Force.

The extended range kits “will significantly increase precision firepower using available stocks of munitions,” said Rebecca Grant, an Air Force systems specialist and president of IRIS Independent Research. “I’d bet this is one of the accelerated proposals put in motion” by Undersecretary for Acquisition William LaPlante, she said.

Extended Range kits can be used “to attack Russian front lines or their second echelon rear areas in Ukraine,” Grant said. “Watch for a spread of firepower, including Jdam-ER whenever Ukraine wants to push forward.”

Boeing on Jan. 20 received a $40.5 million order from the Air Force under an existing Jdam contract. The job calls for completion by June 30. The award indicates the US and Ukraine have cobbled together a method by which Soviet-era fighter jets flown by Ukraine can program and launch the Jdam-ER.

The Extended Range Jdam joins Boeing’s new bomb-tipped missile, the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb, that’s demonstrated a range of 81 miles among the new weapons the Pentagon’s sending Ukraine announced this month.


It points back to midsummer again though.
 

JohnWolf

Member
A variation of the Bradley has been proposed as a "Quarterback" coordinating and directing fire from different sources as a force multiplier, if it is employed on line of sight it may have to be situated geographically on terrain that allows this advantage or it may be difficult to use
Ukraine To Get Bradley M7 Vehicles To Act As Artillery Quarterbacks (thedrive.com)
Interesting.
So, they are aware of the Bradley's strong points, but it is also large and noisy (I spent several years in a couple of them) and not all that difficult to spot in contrast to the low-profile WP vehicles. I mention that because it appears they are going to spread them out in penny-pachets instead of grouping them together as I would have (see last page).
But, i ain't there and I don't really know how that Army is working on the ground.

I also can't understand why the Ukies have not taken out TransDnestria yet. There are obvously all sorts of surveillance units based there and the idea time to take it out would be.... now. Moldova can feild at least one good and a few crummy battalions to help out. I can't figure this out.

Maybe I should ask this goober -

..... or maybe not. :rolleyes:
 

JohnWolf

Member
Unless by agreement with Moldova that'd be an invasion of Moldova.
Then making an agreement would obviously be a good move!

After all, doing it w/o their knowledge would just be dumb. Then again, if Moldova is riddled with spies.... hmm.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Speaking of Moldova, there are allegations of an attempted Russian sponsored coup in Moldova Russia is planning coup in Moldova, says President Maia Sandu It appears that they were going to use a soccer game to infiltrate operatives from Russia, Montenegro, Belarus and Serbia into the country to foment civilian unrest. Shades of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The Russians have issued a warning to Moldova about allegations of an attempted coup Kremlin Warns Moldova As Tensions Rise Following Coup Plot Allegations. It must have struck a nerve in the Kremlin.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Interesting.
So, they are aware of the Bradley's strong points, but it is also large and noisy (I spent several years in a couple of them) and not all that difficult to spot in contrast to the low-profile WP vehicles. I mention that because it appears they are going to spread them out in penny-pachets instead of grouping them together as I would have (see last page).
But, i ain't there and I don't really know how that Army is working on the ground.

I also can't understand why the Ukies have not taken out TransDnestria yet. There are obvously all sorts of surveillance units based there and the idea time to take it out would be.... now. Moldova can feild at least one good and a few crummy battalions to help out. I can't figure this out.

Maybe I should ask this goober -

..... or maybe not. :rolleyes:
Transnestria is under international law the territory of Moldova, their independence recognized by nobody, including Russia. To the best of my knowledge the only Russian units there are guards for weapon stockpiles, and peacekeepers with light armor and unarmored vehicles. To top it off it's far from clear that there is a public concensus in Moldova about resolving the problem by force (not that people want to necessarily see Transnestria independent, but it doesn't mean they want to see war either). Most across that border, from both sides, don't really see the others as enemies. So despite the posturing from Moldovan and Transnestrian politicians, the situation remains relatively calm and peaceful.

Then making an agreement would obviously be a good move!

After all, doing it w/o their knowledge would just be dumb. Then again, if Moldova is riddled with spies.... hmm.
Nothing obvious about it. Moldova has had peace for over 2 decades (closer to 3). Will it still have peace in such a case? Which side were Ukrainian nationalists on in the Transnestrian war? It's one thing if Moldova does this itself. It's another move entirely if this is done by Ukrainian troops. And while we're at it, can Ukraine spare the troops?

EDIT: There has been talk about what Ukrainian units forces are committed to the fight around Artemovsk/Bakhmut. This is a Russian summary of the units that have recently been involved in the fighting. Note it's not guaranteed that entire brigades are there, but typically for regular army units it will be btlns, and for territorial defense units it can be companies, though btlns are more common. Note it's normal for Ukrainian (and Russian) units to not be full strength either, so a btln isn't guaranteed to be a btln in size.

 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Jan. 22nd-23rd

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.


Ukrainian Bayraktar fragments found in Odessa region.


The Russian flag flies over Bol'shoy Potemkin island on the Dnepr. There were several reported Ukrainian assaults on the island but it appears to still be at least contested.


Ukrainian mobilization efforts in Odessa. One one case they appear to be using an ambulance.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Allegedly a Ukrainian Kamaz with ammo and D-20 destroyed, Zaporozhye area.


Destroyed Russian vehicles in Zaporozhye, due to a recent offensive attempt that failed.


A destroyed T-72B1, allegedly Ukrainian, Zaporozhye area.


Allegedly Russian munition storage getting hit in Zaporozhye area.


Ukrainian T-72M1 hit a land mine, Zaporozhye area.


Russian security forces raiding houses in Energodar.


The North.

Ukraine is continuing construction of fortifications in Kiev region.


Oskol Front.

Russia's 76th VDV near Kremennaya engaging Ukrainian troops.


Russian artillery firing on Ukrainian positions near Svatovo-Kremennaya area.


LDNR Front.

Russian infantry clearing the undergrounds in Soledar. They could have hypothetically made for major resistance points by Ukrainian forces, but apparently are empty.


Wagner fighters allegedly downing a Ukrainian Mi-8 doing rocket launches near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Ukrainian HIMARS launches, Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Ukrainian Su-27 over Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Battle damage in Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Ukrainian YPR-765 in Chasov Yar.


Russian strikes landing in Kramatorsk. The town has been hit many times recently, suggesting it's at least perceived to be a major Ukrainian hub.


A fallen S-300 missile stage in Kramatorsk.


Allegedly a Russian T-72B3 that survived an ATGM impact in Mar'inka.


Ilovyask, allegedly a Ukrainian Tochka shot down.


DNR 11th Rgt and 3rd Bde (respectively) doing quadcopter munition drops.


Battle damage from a Ukrainian strike in Stakhanov.


Locals take journalists on a tour of Severodonetsk. The city remains dark and in ruins. It's unclear if Russian intends some sort of reconstruction efforts for it or not. Mariupol' was a major symbol and work there is ongoing though woefully inadequate given the pre-war size of the city. Severodonetsk-Lisichansk is less significant in history and public perception but the entire urban sprawl combined is about 1/2 of Mariupol' in size.


Shellings of Donetsk continue.


Ukrainian strikes on Ilovaysk.


Misc.

Russian T-72B3 fires in Ukraine, likely Mar'inka, based on the terrain.


Russian T-90M night fires.


Russian 2S4 gets hit but apparently survives and withdraws.


A destroyed MT-LB, allegedly a Ukrainian MEDEVAC.


Ukrainian Krab position with a net protecting the howitzer from loitering munitions. Note the Russian Lancet stuck in it.


A Ukrainian T-64BV tangled in powerlines, allegedly the Donbas.


Russian Msta-B from the Pacific Fleet Marines firing Krasnopol' rounds.


Ukrainian soldier with a captured Russian PKP machinegun. It's very compatible with the ubiquitous PKM.


Russian Tornado-G Operations in Ukraine. Despite being the newest Russian 122mm MLRS, we still don't have packet reloads, or really any sort of automation for the loading process.


An updated Russian T-80BVM variant has show up on the front line. It has better ERA placement, and a new Sosna screen inside.


Wagner forces operating a T-90S, an export variant.


A Russian sniper operating a captured M107A1 .50 cal sniper rifle.


Assorted videos of Ukrainian mobilization efforts.


NATO/EU.


Bradleys on a train in Poland, presumably meant for Ukraine.


Ukraine is reportedly receiving 2 more TRMD-4L radars from Germany.


Two mine trawlers handed over by the UK to Ukraine. They will presumably be relocated to Odessa at some point, but likely not during the war, since their combat value is low, and they make for great symbolic targets.


Reportedly Poland will equip and train a Ukrainian brigade. The unit will allegedly get T-72M1s, BMP-1s, and 2S1s (hello 1975, how are you doing).

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update on Artemovsk/Bakhmut. While reports of Yagodnoe falling were premature, the suburb is contested. Meanwhile Berkhovka has either fallen or Ukrainian forces have been pushed out to the outskirts, it's not clear if Russian forces have complete control of the village yet. A very slow Russian advance continues inside the town. Russian forces were apparently again counter-attacked from Stupochki-Krasnoe area, but they pushed back again. Russian forces can't contest either of those villages, but Ukrainian counter attacks can't contest Klescheevka. With this in mind the northern push becomes crucial for Russia to encircle the town.


EDIT: A sad one year anniversary is upon us. How many more such anniversaries lie ahead. It's "over by Christmas" all over again.
 
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