The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

BAMCIS

New Member
Putin started using an armored train All because the plane can be easily tracked, but the train is not. The train travels at maximum speed and without stops. The train has a bedroom and office, as well as separate railcars for security escorts and special communications.
The armored train was designed back in 2014-2015, but it did not arouse much interest in Putin until the Kremlin began preparing to invade Ukraine. He now uses the train mainly to travel around Russia and to get to his residence in Valdai.



Putin-cambia-avion-tren-desplazarse-rusia-miedo-ataque-ucraniano
Putin changes the plane for the train for fear of a Ukrainian attack
 
Last edited:

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
Being new to the forum, I do not control the rules of the forum. I will try to take it into account for future comments.
I apologize for it.
No worries - that was just my friendly splash of green ink and some advice. Happy posting :)
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I need to catch up with my responses, lol. I’ll address the following and then try to see if there is something else I have not responded to later.


So the current BMPT is the result of a long list of compromises Russia's defense industries must have made, resulting in a sub-optimal design that lacks capabilities Russia would have wanted.
The one article I read a while back, I remember called it something like “they had a problem and came up with a very Russian solution” or something like that.

That link wasn't posted as “look, you are wrong”, btw. Something I read and remembered about when I saw yours and the other posts, as stated.

There's no reason they can't adapt it to carry HARMs or lob rocket pods the way Ukraine's jets currently do. Not as useful as one would expect a Typhoon to be? Sure. Useless? Far from.
Not useless, of course. But from the cost/benefit/risk perspective, probably not useful enough.

I'm pretty sure some sort of stand-off munitions would be provided. I don't know why you think Ukraine won't be able to operate it. A private company could conduct the repairs, or repair facilities could be set up in Poland. Basic maintenance could be done on the ground. How long has the UkAF been operating out of Mirgorod? Russia hasn't shut that down yet. Why wouldn't Typhoons be able to do the same?
How successful are their operations from Mirgorod? Would the Typhoon be significantly more successful? Like I said in my other post, I do not see too many (any) headlines talking about the Ukrainian sorties and their immaculate success. About the closest they come is a guessing game of how many planes they still have left and interviews with a certain pilot nicknamed Juice (I think?). Sure, there are reports of aviation use, but they are fairly limited and its success and overall effect on the outcome is questionable at best.

Why it wasn’t shut down, I don’t know (just like I don’t know why they haven’t shut down a bunch of other things way back when and still). They did have a few strikes on it, no? The last one I remember late summer or early fall, claiming they took out a few jets. Whether they did the latter or not is another question. I also remember some reports of a strike in November, but would have to look it up to make sure I am mot mistaken, and no idea if there was any damage and its extent. Regardless, that can probably be shut down if need be?

Also, on these Typhoon planes. Even if GB decides to give however many units to Ukraine, shouldn’t Germany and Italy agree to it? Germany outright said no to the jets (but commitment and pressure may change that); Italy would probably say the same (I don’t recall hearing their position on the issue).

Furthermore, my guess is this training that the Brits have offered is probably in-class training of some sort, improving tactics, etc. That would make a lot more sense, in my opinion. They can’t get trained on Typhoons and then fly F-16s instead if those are ever provided either. Finally, It’s not like these (allegedly) available but scarce trained pilots are going to be sent to battle if they don’t have any planes to fly currently. So the training is probably a start of preparation and planning for the (likely very) distant future.

Yeah, I don’t think any jets are coming any time soon.

They went on the offensive in Kharkov quite successfully without the air power in question. They also managed to create sufficient pressure on supply lines in Kherson region to convince Russia to withdrawn without actually pushing Russian forces back across the Dnepr.
Yes, they went on the offensive in Kharkov and Kherson. Was it due to some brilliant planning and extraordinary abilities to operate without significant air support? Well, probably not really. They went on the offensive and succeeded (greatly) mainly because of the Russian extremely poor… I don’t even know what to call it anymore - planning, strategy, etc, add one or a few and make your pick(s), or all of the above. None of those areas were anywhere near to be properly defended, starting (and ending?) with a significant shortage of men. It was a matter of time and a given ones Ukrainians get it together, which they did, and some significant support from our side. Hence, came Russian mobilization (which isn’t necessarily enough either, depending on the goals). However it is no longer going to be a run through (for either side) because the positions are well defended and there is a well defined (and stable?) front line that isn’t likely to change significantly any time soon. It is going to be a (deadly) grind, as it has been for the past while.

Also, for how long can this grind be sustained from both man power and ammunition availability? Stoltenberg said the other day that any artillery shells order placed today will only be delivered 2.5 years later.

“The war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles,” Stoltenberg said. “The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain.”

According to some estimates, Ukraine is firing up to 6,000-7,000 artillery shells each day, around a third of the daily amount that Russia is using almost one year into the war.

Speaking on the eve of a two-day meeting of NATO defense ministers, Stoltenberg said the waiting time for the supply of “large-caliber ammunition has increased from 12 to 28 months,” and that “orders placed today would only be delivered two-and-a-half years later.”


I mean ammunition stockpiles of a few dozens of countries are depleted. You are probably more aware than most here what the situation is in Russia like in regards to the same.

Having said above, I do not believe there is any huge Ukrainian offensive coming in the near future.

Ukraine has pulled out ~50k troops to train in the west, at least according to reports I've seen. It's been repeatedly reported that Ukraine is training 3 new army corps, totaling 70-90k troops. I suspect Russia's current, rather modest gains, are a product of some Ukrainian forces being withdrawn to train, and Russian forces getting an infusion of fresh blood from the mobilization. What happens once Ukraine throws those fresh army corps into the fight? Now Russia is not without strategic reserves this time around, with reportedly about half of the mobilized troops sitting in Russia still training. But there is every reason to think Ukraine is planning a spring offensive and Russia's gains are a temporary function of Ukraine being stretched thin.
You may be right about that. Like I said above, I do not believe there will be any significant changes to the current front line in the near future. I also do not believe that time is on the side of Ukraine.

How thin they are stretched quality wise because of training is also questionable. There are reports that Ukraine keeps sending more and more reinforcements to Ugledar and Bakhmut. I also saw reports in the Russian and Ukrainian news that Zhorin (the commander of Azov in the past) saying that he hasn’t seen this much intensity in fighting since 2014 and stating that Ukraine is sending their best troops to the area. Whether these reports are true or not is not clear.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Didn’t fit in the previous post…

We don't have a major leap in Russian ability to conduct offensive operations, this much is clear. Look at Ugledar. What we do have is Russia training better infantry in larger number then before, and tying Ukraine down in attrition battles that wear down Ukrainian units and allow Russia to gain some ground. Remember, not a single major city is on the line here. Kharkov is now pretty far from the front line. The advance in Zaporozhye stalled almost immediately and there's no sign Russia is planning to capture that city. Can Russia overrun a few more small towns and villages? No doubt. But will this win the war? Unlikely. Clearing the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk regions would be a plausible stopping point for Russia, but only if Ukraine is willing to negotiate. And they're not. Even in the best case scenario for Russia, fall of Artemovsk/Bakhmut and Seversk, Ukrainian forces rolling back to the Slavyasnk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkovka-Konstantinovka line, nothing really changes. Even Russia recapturing Kupyansk and Krasniy Liman doesn't fundamentally alter the situation. The entire current war effort is a battle for the forest-keepers hut. Russia's only strategic military victory possible under current conditions is Ukraine being bled dry through attrition. And this will take a very long time. By the time that happens there will be tanks, jets, LRMs, and more foreign fighters to deal with.
Can’t argue about that and I agree. However, I do not believe there will be any jets of LRMs any time soon.

At this point, in addition to what has already been said, I see that neither side is ready for talks, but neither side is capable of any significant advances. At the same time, there remains a probability that one or the other will break the defence and move forward to some significant degree. Hence why I said that Ukraine may lose more ground, including the entire Donbas and possibly more. Sure, they may gain some by the same logic, but things don’t look too bright from what I see being reported. The probability of losing or remaining where they are is significantly higher either way. Costs, however, keep rising, including human capital (mainly), infrastructure damage, as well as actual monetary resources, and I am not even talking about economy.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Not useless, of course. But from the cost/benefit/risk perspective, probably not useful enough.
Useful enough for what? They're getting value out of their existing Soviet-era jets, and are likely receiving more of those transferred quietly from abroad.

How successful are their operations from Mirgorod? Would the Typhoon be significantly more successful? Like I said in my other post, I do not see too many (any) headlines talking about the Ukrainian sorties and their immaculate success. About the closest they come is a guessing game of how many planes they still have left and interviews with a certain pilot nicknamed Juice (I think?). Sure, there are reports of aviation use, but they are fairly limited and its success and overall effect on the outcome is questionable at best.
They're putting pressure on Russian air defenses, and forcing Russian forces to expend SAMs on engaging them. We also have cases of confirmed destruction of Russian SAMs, perhaps not many but definitely some. The only way to evaluate if they're effective/worth it is with internal Ukrainian information on the sorties and effects they're having. Unfortunately we're not in a position to evaluate this.

Why it wasn’t shut down, I don’t know (just like I don’t know why they haven’t shut down a bunch of other things way back when and still). They did have a few strikes on it, no? The last one I remember late summer or early fall, claiming they took out a few jets. Whether they did the latter or not is another question. I also remember some reports of a strike in November, but would have to look it up to make sure I am mot mistaken, and no idea if there was any damage and its extent. Regardless, that can probably be shut down if need be?
I honestly don't know. Presumably yes, but for some reason its not a priority. And this during a dedicated SEAD campaign that took place from mid-October.

Also, on these Typhoon planes. Even if GB decides to give however many units to Ukraine, shouldn’t Germany and Italy agree to it? Germany outright said no to the jets (but commitment and pressure may change that); Italy would probably say the same (I don’t recall hearing their position on the issue).
I daresay they're not in a position to say no. Zelensky called Scholtz a liver sausage. Germany is still donating tanks to Ukraine.

Furthermore, my guess is this training that the Brits have offered is probably in-class training of some sort, improving tactics, etc. That would make a lot more sense, in my opinion. They can’t get trained on Typhoons and then fly F-16s instead if those are ever provided either. Finally, It’s not like these (allegedly) available but scarce trained pilots are going to be sent to battle if they don’t have any planes to fly currently. So the training is probably a start of preparation and planning for the (likely very) distant future.

Yeah, I don’t think any jets are coming any time soon.
There's a difference between they shouldn't supply them and they can't supply them immediately. I think jets are coming and it's only a matter of when.

Yes, they went on the offensive in Kharkov and Kherson. Was it due to some brilliant planning and extraordinary abilities to operate without significant air support? Well, probably not really. They went on the offensive and succeeded (greatly) mainly because of the Russian extremely poor… I don’t even know what to call it anymore - planning, strategy, etc, add one or a few and make your pick(s), or all of the above. None of those areas were anywhere near to be properly defended, starting (and ending?) with a significant shortage of men. It was a matter of time and a given ones Ukrainians get it together, which they did, and some significant support from our side. Hence, came Russian mobilization (which isn’t necessarily enough either, depending on the goals). However it is no longer going to be a run through (for either side) because the positions are well defended and there is a well defined (and stable?) front line that isn’t likely to change significantly any time soon. It is going to be a (deadly) grind, as it has been for the past while.
This is not true. Kherson was defended properly and Ukrainian forces took massive casualties in that offensive. In that area geography was very much in play. But also in play was Russia's inability to hunt down and destroy the HIMARS. to this day we have no confirmed cases of the destruction of HIMARS or M270s. It's likely some got hit somewhere, but in a way where BDA footage from the Russian side is not available, and Ukraine has made a practice of quickly hauling off damaged or destroyed vehicles. In reality Russia has serious problems finding targets beyond the range of regular quadcopter operations with Orlans being relatively scarce. The ranges at which HIMARS operates makes it very hard for Russia to do much about them. Of course on the flip side it's not like Ukraine has destroyed many Tornado-S or Iskanders.

I think the question becomes whether western ISR assets can be effective enough to identify Russian supply lines and allow Ukraine to strike them in depth, considering those assets can't operate inside Ukrainian airspace. Longer range munitions are being provided to Ukraine for a reason. Note what happened after the HIMARS first showed up. There was a flurry of strikes against Russian munition dumps. Russia has since pushed bigger munition dumps further back, parallelized and spread out supplies of munitions closer to the front. But this problem could easily repeat itself in the future.

Also, for how long can this grind be sustained from both man power and ammunition availability? Stoltenberg said the other day that any artillery shells order placed today will only be delivered 2.5 years later.

“The war in Ukraine is consuming an enormous amount of munitions and depleting allied stockpiles,” Stoltenberg said. “The current rate of Ukraine’s ammunition expenditure is many times higher than our current rate of production. This puts our defense industries under strain.”

According to some estimates, Ukraine is firing up to 6,000-7,000 artillery shells each day, around a third of the daily amount that Russia is using almost one year into the war.

Speaking on the eve of a two-day meeting of NATO defense ministers, Stoltenberg said the waiting time for the supply of “large-caliber ammunition has increased from 12 to 28 months,” and that “orders placed today would only be delivered two-and-a-half years later.”


I mean ammunition stockpiles of a few dozens of countries are depleted. You are probably more aware than most here what the situation is in Russia like in regards to the same.

Having said above, I do not believe there is any huge Ukrainian offensive coming in the near future.
There is almost certainly a spring offensive coming by Ukraine, unless Russia inflicts such losses in current fighting that the reserves Ukraine has been training in the west have to be committed to holding the line. This is partly why some western sources have been advocating a withdrawal from Artemovsk/Bakhmut. If Russia can force Ukraine to expend many of its existing forces in the current attrition battles without having to commit its own reserves of the second 150k mobilized personnel, then when the offensive comes Russia can counter with strategic reserves, and Ukraine may not be able to launch the attack on nearly as large a scale. If Russia takes significant losses themselves, they may choose to commit their own reserves early, a costly mistake in my opinion. If they don't manage to deal enough casualties, it will be a battle of reserves. It's also unclear how many people Ukraine is managing to mobilize now. Based on footage coming out Ukraine is clearly working extra-hard to pull more people. It's possible Ukraine can throw enough bodies into the fight without having to commit the rumored 3 new corps.

You may be right about that. Like I said above, I do not believe there will be any significant changes to the current front line in the near future. I also do not believe that time is on the side of Ukraine.
That's kind of my point. If significant changes happen it will be due to a Ukrainian breakthrough. If that doesn't happen, it will be more of this.

How thin they are stretched quality wise because of training is also questionable. There are reports that Ukraine keeps sending more and more reinforcements to Ugledar and Bakhmut. I also saw reports in the Russian and Ukrainian news that Zhorin (the commander of Azov in the past) saying that he hasn’t seen this much intensity in fighting since 2014 and stating that Ukraine is sending their best troops to the area. Whether these reports are true or not is not clear.
Ukraine has sent reinforcements to both but unlike Artemovsk/Bakhmut, where Ukrainian forces are reportedly taking severe casualties, and reports are coming out of entire btlns reduced to less then a company of personnel, and entire brigades being chewed up in the fighting, and having to pull out for reforming, at Ugledar the large casualties are on Russia's side. Ukraine has moved reserves there, and the 155th Marines do have a foothold in the town but Russian forces attempting to envelop have failed miserably and lost many killed and many vehicles in the process. There are no similar reports, at least that I have seen, for the Ukrainian side. I suspect Ugledar will still eventually fall. But it isn't a Russian success.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
It could be fair to suggest that Russia has a disproportionate fixation on Bakhmut and has lost a significant amount of troops and material there ,Russia does not count Wagner losses amongst its military losses of course and using convicts may assist recidivism in their logic ,Ukraine though may consider that its losses here versus Russia's in a highly defensible position is preferable to Russia attacking elsewhere with strategic value and not so defensible
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Putin started using an armored train All because the plane can be easily tracked, but the train is not. The train travels at maximum speed and without stops. The train has a bedroom and office, as well as separate railcars for security escorts and special communications.
The armored train was designed back in 2014-2015, but it did not arouse much interest in Putin until the Kremlin began preparing to invade Ukraine. He now uses the train mainly to travel around Russia and to get to his residence in Valdai.

We require sources for material posted on here. Please provide sources in the future. Also please read the rules.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia has deployed 97% of their military in Ukraine. If that's true, this war is going to be a disaster that will hold back the Russian Military for generations.

Definitely not true. There are probably some qualifiers to what he means by this, but the Russian military has over 200 000 conscripts. They are not in Ukraine.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
According to ORYX, in one three day period the ratio of Russian to Ukrainian vehicle losses reached 5 to 1. Overall, during the war, the ratio has been about 3.1 to 1. This decrease in efficiency by Russian forces probably has several drivers pushing them to more risky attacks. Some that come to mind, are, the anniversary of the beginning of the SVO, The coming thaw, and the anticipation of more armor arriving in Ukraine. It seems to be reasonable to guess that the proportion of vehicle and soldier losses are somewhat proportional. Ukraine also tends to hang on to easily defensable areas where they can cause heavy attrition on the enemy.

 
Last edited:

swerve

Super Moderator
Definitely not true. There are probably some qualifiers to what he means by this, but the Russian military has over 200 000 conscripts. They are not in Ukraine.
I'm sure it's heavily qualified (e.g. fully trained), & could be correct for whatever definition is used. My argument with it is that to get that figure I think the definition must be so narrow that without knowing it, the statement conveys no useful information other than that Russia's armed forces are stretched, & even if known, the statement would probably tell us little.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
But partly, it seems to me, your argument boils down to

Putin is dangerous.
Putin controls powerful weapons.
Ukraine is small and weak.
Putin is attacking Ukraine.
if we help Ukraine, Putin might attack us.
We should be scared of Putin.
Putin is so strong and unpredictable we probably should just let him do whatever he wants, to anyone he wants because otherwise he might hurt us?
This is the first of the two posts due to length requirement.

Sorry, but this is a pretty weird conclusion you derived from my post, but I’ll play. Most of the things you stated are facts.

Is Putin dangerous? Yes.
Does he control powerful weapons? Yes.
Is Ukraine small? That depends on how you define small and what you compare it to, but in this case it is both small, as defined by almost any (relevant) measurable indicator, and big, as defined by geography and population (trimmed by over a quarter, but still big), as well as the amount of support from (notably) the world’s most developed nations. Is it weak? Yes.
Is Putin attacking Ukraine? Yes.
Can he potentially hurt us for helping Ukraine? Yes.

Now those are facts. The argument is whether we should be scared of Putin because we are helping? I would argue that the answer is no. But it also can be yes, depending on how… not sure I can find an appropriate word here… I want to say reckless, but my guess is you may interpret it in the same way you interpreted my other post. I’ll use it anyway and say that it can be yes, depending on how reckless we are in providing such help.

Furthermore, is Putin strong? This is a matter of opinion and depends on how you define strength or power and what aspect of strength and power you want to look at. Is the army strong? Many thought so, including me, but we have been proven otherwise (relative to what we thought previously). Is he still strong on the geopolitical arena? Weakened, but still strong enough. Is he strong in Russia? Strong enough to be the only guy we are going to deal with for a while yet. For the laughs (yet relevant), is he physically strong? For a seventy-year old, I am going to argue he is likely in better shape than way over 90% of people in his age group, so we will likely be dealing with him for a long while yet (hence relevant). This is according to any knowledgeable analyst in the world, basically, as well the last assessment by Burns of the CIA (which I am not going to look for to link because likely everyone read what he said anyway), as well as the assessment of the Russians and the “inner circle”, in particular. The latter I will supply a link for because there was a relevant article at Reuters yesterday: Putin, secure in power, sets stage for long and draining war

I wouldn’t say he is that unpredictable though. He’s been talking about what is happening for well over a decade. Not sure why it came as a surprise to many and why there was nothing done to avoid it (I have my thoughts on the subject but that is for another thread, perhaps). So I guess, some may say he is unpredictable, but I believe that is either not being informed or self-cheating.

We clearly shouldn’t let him do whatever he wants. Have we? Not really.

A little about reckless. What are our goals here? I don’t believe we have defined one officially, at least not publicly. Sure, we stated that Russia needs to withdraw from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. But is it our goal? For example, it was reported by the Washington Post first (sorry, I spent quite some time looking for the article but to no avail; it was fairly recent, probably within the last month or so - I feel like I even posted it here) that Biden is changing his outlook towards supplying Ukraine with long range missiles and not opposing strikes on Crimea because he wants to let Putin know that he is threatened to lose it and that, according to his calculations, would bring him to the negotiating table. There are (at least) two things here that are (very) important to note. The first is that we are allowing and even expecting Crimea to be hit with our weapons of high precision, that are not only guided, but also targeted by our equipment that is operated by our military personnel. Before you jump at me saying it isn’t so or irrelevant, here is a good read from Washington Post on the subject from just a few days ago, titled Ukraine’s Rocket Campaign Reliant on US Precision Targetting, officials say: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/09/ukraine-himars-rocket-artillery-russia/

Since it is probably behind a paywall, I will paste some parts of the article. It begins to say:

Ukrainian officials say that they almost never launch HIMARS rounds without detailed coordinates provided by US military personnel situated elsewhere in Europe.

Then goes on:

Ukrainian officials said they require coordinates provided or confirmed by the United States and its allies for the vast majority of strikes using its advanced U.S.-provided rocket systems, a previously undisclosed practice that reveals a deeper and more operationally active role for the Pentagon in the war.

The disclosure, confirmed by three senior Ukrainian officials and a senior U.S. official, comes after months of Kyiv’s forces pounding Russian targets — including headquarters, ammunition depots and barracks — on Ukrainian soil with the U.S.-provided High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, and other similar precision-guided weapons such as the M270 multiple-launch rocket system.

One senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian forces almost never launch the advanced weapons without specific coordinates provided by U.S. military personnel from a base elsewhere in Europe. Ukrainian officials say this process should give Washington confidence about providing Kyiv with longer-range weapons.

A senior U.S. official — who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue — acknowledged the key American role in the campaign and said the targeting assistance served to ensure accuracy and conserve limited stores of ammunition for maximum effectiveness. The official said Ukraine does not seek approval from the United States on what to strike and routinely targets Russian forces on their own with other weapons. The United States provides coordinates and precise targeting information solely in an advisory role, the official said.

[…]

The senior Ukrainian official described the targeting process, generally: Ukrainian military personnel identify targets they want to hit, and in which location, and that information is then sent up to senior commanders, who then relay the request to U.S. partners for more accurate coordinates. The Americans do not always provide the requested coordinates, the official said, in which case the Ukrainian troops do not fire.

Ukraine could carry out strikes without U.S. help, but because Kyiv doesn’t want to waste valuable ammunition and miss, it usually chooses not to strike without U.S. confirmation, the official said, adding that there are no complaints about the process.

[…]

The senior Ukrainian official contended that the Ukrainian military would face the same limitations it does now with conventional HIMARS rounds if it received ATACMS, with Ukraine still dependent on U.S. targeting coordinates.

“You’re controlling every shot anyway, so when you say, ‘We’re afraid that you’re going to use it for some other purposes,’ well, we can’t do it even if we want to,” the senior Ukrainian official said.

The senior U.S. official disputed the characterization. It is “not true,” the U.S. official said, that “Ukrainians run targets by us for approval.”

[…]

The head of the Ukrainian military’s missile forces and artillery training, Maj. Gen. Andriy Malinovsky, told The Washington Post in an interview in October that Ukraine’s Western allies had confirmed coordinates for targets ahead of the Kharkiv counteroffensive.

The partners had worked out a process, he said, with Ukraine receiving precise coordinates to ensure they wouldn’t miss their mark with multiple-launch rocket artillery systems as the rapid counteroffensive caught Russian forces unprepared. The targeting information also provided a workaround for when Russian signal-jamming prevented aerial drone reconnaissance on the battlefield, Malinovsky said.

“According to our maps and software, a point will have one set of coordinates,” Malinovsky said. “But when we give this target to partners for analysis, the coordinates are different. Why? Because the Americans and NATO countries have access to military satellites.

“We’re all basically always online,” he added. “They immediately get us the coordinates and we then fire the MLRS right away.”

A third Ukrainian official confirmed that targeting all goes through an American installation on NATO soil and described the process as “very fast.” The Post is withholding the name of the base at the request of U.S. officials who cited security concerns.


Side note, how is that for not being directly involved in the conflict? In addition, there is probably a whole lot more going that we haven’t admitted to yet.

I said in one of my previous posts, regardless of what I or anyone here or elsewhere thinks, I believe Crimea is a game changer. The proposed strategy is clearly entering the territory of what the Russians call “the existential threat” to their country.

Continued in the next post.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The second thing to note is that the logic outlined (threaten to take Crimea and negotiations take place) is a fallacy because we are not going to dictate, as our official public position, what Zelensky should see as acceptable terms of peace. According to Zelensky, they are not going to settle until they take the entire pre-2014 territory and incorporate it back to Ukraine, which they cannot do in the foreseeable future as per Pentagon (and other numerous common sense sources): Ukraine can’t retake Crimea soon, Pentagon tells lawmakers in classified briefing

So, on the one hand, we are willing to escalate this significantly (very, in my opinion), in order for Ukraine to achieve the goals they have defined; on the other, our goals are pretty different, because we are clearly willing to sacrifice (at least) Crimea, as indicated by “threatened to lose it hence negotiate”, while Zelensky’s (unattainable) goal is to return it.

Furthermore, one of our official goals is to improve the Ukrainian position on the battlefield in order to have a better outcome in the negotiations. Is that not what has been declared numerous times? Once again, the Ukrainian position is that there are no circumstances under which they are going to negotiate with Putin and his regime. As described above, Putin is expected to live a long life yet and is also expected to remain to be the leader of Russia for some other (or the same) extended period of time.

Note, our own position went from the “butcher” and “cannot be allowed to stay in power” (as per Biden) to “rational actor who miscalculated” (as per Biden). Also note that I keep saying “we” and “our” because the United States, for the most part, has the greatest control (as the largest “donor”) of how things have been and will be evolving. Also, being in Canada, we are basically a reflection of their policy. That is probably true for numerous other actors. However, there are also dozens of other countries, including those in the EU and the EU itself, that also have their own positions, interests, and ideas of how far the conflict should be allowed to go and what the acceptable resolution is. Even within the EU there is plenty of tension, disagreement, and no clear single defined vision on the situation.

So, again, on the one hand, we are telling Zelensky that we are going to provide help and support as long as it takes. As long as what takes though? On the other hand, we are telling Putin that we are willing to (eventually?) negotiate and potentially sack (at least) Crimea. Negotiate what exactly?

The way we have and are setting this is up is to keep this going, potentially infinitely. Both sides, Russia and Ukraine, believe that they can at the very least gain if they keep this going. (Can we?) There is no winning here, in my opinion, regardless of how things end. Not for Russia or Ukraine at least.

To add more confusion, we promise hundreds of tanks, for example. And here “we” is pretty confusing because numerous players promise various things as individuals, at the same time not willing to act individually without coordination with the rest of the group. Once that coordination takes place, we, as a group now, realize that we cannot deliver anywhere near the amount of tanks that individual players have promised: Ukraine to Receive Fewer Battle Tanks From Allies Than Promised

German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius indicated that western allies are struggling to put together two full battalions of Leopard 2 tanks to send to Ukraine as promised.

Germany and Portugal are the only two nations to commit to sending the A6 version of the Leopard 2, with 14 pledged by the government in Berlin and three from the Portuguese, Pistorius told reporters Wednesday after meeting NATO counterparts in Brussels. “We will not reach the size of a battalion,” he said.

Poland has assembled about 30 units of the older A4 version of the Leopard 2, which is almost enough for the standard Ukrainian battalion of 31, but many of them are in poor condition and need repairs before they can be deployed, Pistorius said. Those tanks will only get to Ukraine at the end of April, he added.

The minister’s admission marks a setback in the bid by western allies to help the Ukrainian army deal with an expected intensification of fighting in coming weeks.


The same goes for jets. Poland says we need to provide jets. Biden says no from the American side, but won’t stop others if they decide to do so. In turn, Poland now says it is too dangerous, complicated, and they don’t have enough; neither would they do it without coordination with their partners. Scholz says almost categorically no. Yet Britain says nothing is off the table, knowing full well that they will likely need permission from Germany and Italy to send those aircrafts on their way to Ukraine. This can be continued with more examples but I believe this is sufficient.

While all this is happening, we are heading toward escalation and increasing risks even further to achieve what exactly? Again, I have ideas, but they probably belong in the other thread as well.

In the meantime, Ukraine, according to their government officials and, more notably, IMF, needs at least $3-5B of external help in budgetary needs alone, just to function and exist as a state (source is IMF)

So, $36-60B per annum, considering Russian attacks do not intensify and cause further damage (it would probably be fair to assume that they will?). As we saw over the past year, they require about the upper range of those numbers in military assistance (and that is only what we know of, we can all suspect that what has been actually provided could be significantly higher) to basically stay afloat and the amount will only grow as their own stockpile disappears. In addition, Zelensky mentioned a couple of weeks ago that the “spirits” aren’t as high as they used to be (source, via Google translate):

"Motivation is given not only by partners. Motivation is given by spirit within the state. I believe that at the very beginning of the war the spirit was stronger. We were all at war. In cities where there was no occupation, we had a full feeling that we were all at war. Now I see in some cities that they are on vacation," he said.

Zelensky said that he considers it a "weakness."

"I want to appeal to you, first of all, to journalists, and first of all to journalists of our state. You need to unite as soon as possible, strengthen this spirit, remind those who rest inside our state that we are all at war, and remind how it all began. […]”


What about the “spirit” of others, namely supporters? How long can we except the populations of the western countries providing the assistance to support doing so? In, and most importantly, the United States, the polls indicated that the numbers have dropped significantly since last March (source):

December polling from Morning Consult found that only 41 percent of voters were “very concerned” about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, down from 58 percent who said the same in March of last year. The same poll showed a decline in the share of voters who felt that the U.S. has a responsibility to protect Ukraine from Russia, from 47 percent in March to 40 percent in December.

That would be 17% drop in about 10 months. The most recent poll by the AP suggest a similar picture: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-biden-politics-poland-33095abf76875b60ebab3ddf4eede188

Certainly, as things drag on, the support will drop further. On the other hand, RAND argues (in some convincing ways) that it doesn’t matter here.

So what are the goals here? That would be our goals because they are clearly not necessarily the same as the Ukrainian goals. Dragging this on is not sustainable from any perspective, as outlined above and in my other post in regards to depleted ammunition stockpiles and, not the least, actual Ukrainian personnel to fight the fight will grow too thin.

Sure, we will have the next few months to see what happens with the offensive. Important to note is that the exact same things are being communicated now as they were last… spring-ish? These would be that we are at a crucial moment of the conflict and we need to supply Ukraine with everything they need in order for it to improve its position on the battlefield and, therefore, in the negotiations. However, since we have been told this the first time, Ukraine not only unilaterally withdrew from the negotiations, but is also rejecting the idea of any negotiations all together. Ironically, that is a direct result of its position on the battlefield being dramatically improved due to supply of our weapons, recon, intelligence, monetary support, etc.

As you can see, this has nothing to do with “Putin strong”, “afraid of Putin”, and so on. A good chunk of logic is clearly missing while we are potentially heading toward a no return scenario.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
I'm sure it's heavily qualified (e.g. fully trained), & could be correct for whatever definition is used. My argument with it is that to get that figure I think the definition must be so narrow that without knowing it, the statement conveys no useful information other than that Russia's armed forces are stretched, & even if known, the statement would probably tell us little.
Another data point: Land forces at Kola reduced to one-fifth, Norwegian Intelligence says | The Independent Barents Observer (thebarentsobserver.com)

If I still remember my school math correctly it means that land forces at Kola have been reduced by 80%... Those 80% are most likely killed, wounded, or in Ukraine. One should also keep in mind the strategic importance of Kola. Russia must keep significant land forces there, due to the strategic importance of all the nukes based there. Could it be that other, less sensitive, parts of Russia may have seen more than 80% of their land forces transferred or lost...?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Another data point: Land forces at Kola reduced to one-fifth, Norwegian Intelligence says | The Independent Barents Observer (thebarentsobserver.com)

If I still remember my school math correctly it means that land forces at Kola have been reduced by 80%... Those 80% are most likely killed, wounded, or in Ukraine. One should also keep in mind the strategic importance of Kola. Russia must keep significant land forces there, due to the strategic importance of all the nukes based there. Could it be that other, less sensitive, parts of Russia may have seen more than 80% of their land forces transferred or lost...?
I'm honestly curious what land forces refers to. And if you read the article the numbers are contradictory. They talk about 1500 dead, which would imply another 4500 wounded. But the entire brigade (200th MRBde) is ~4200 soldiers. They then talk about 1274 children qualifying for school meals based on KIA or WIA parent. That's ~300+ KIA and ~900+ WIA. Also in Kola is the 61st Marines (Bde or Rgt, can't keep track of their flip-flopping). Technically neither the 200th nor the 61st are Land Forces. Both belong to the Northern Fleet Command. Thus the 200th MRBde falls under the Coastal Troops (forming a Corps together with the 80th Arctic MRBde just south of there). So technically the Land Forces aren't reduced at all because... I don't think there are any Land Forces units there?

Notable is that the 61st Marines has been entirely absent from the war in Ukraine, at least as far as I can tell. So if say Land Forces means forces that fight on land (rather then being the proper noun name of the Russian Army, which it is) then even if the 200th MRBde ceased to exist, it would still only reduce force strength by 50%.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Jan 16th-17th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Russian T-72B3mod'16 taking out allegedly a Ukrainian BMP, Kherson.


Alleged Ukrainian spotter taken out by Russian security forces in Kherson region.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.


The death toll from the Russian strike that hit a residential building in Dnepropetrovsk has risen to 40, all civilians. Note this is the strike that was potentially a Kh-22 that may or may not have been shot down by Ukrainian air defenses.


Battle damage from the Russian strike in Dnepropetrovsk.


Serbian volunteer fighters training, Russian side, Zaporozhye area.


The North.


Ukrainian decoy SP-howitzer on the Belorussian border.


Oskol Front.

Battle damage from a Russian strike in Kupyansk, allegedly a Ukrainian staging area.


LDNR Front.

Wagner fighters in Soledar.


In Soledar Wagner fighters have captured TOW launcher components.


A Ukrainian Iveco LMV burns on the road near Soledar. The road looks similar to the one of the Kozak-2M column below.


A column of Ukrainian Kozak-2M armored cars exiting Soledar.


French TRF1 howitzers in action around Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Apparently Ukrainian artillery did a friendly fire on a Kozak armored car near Kudryumovka.


Ukrainian Dana howitzer ops near Avdeevka.


Destroyed Ukrainian vehicles in Mar'inka, we have an M113, a Humvee, and Kipri MRAP. Unsure if the 3rd-4th link is the same M113.


More footage of the battle damage in Mar'inka. Again the town is basically gone.


155th Marine snipers, likely near Pavlovka/Ugledar.


DNR 3rd SpN btln taking out an alleged Ukrainian SPG-9 team with an ATGM. We've had quite a few videos from DNR SpN using ATGMs against non-characteristic targets.


DNR 9th Rgt doing quadcopter munition drops.


Shelling of Donetsk continues.


The ruins of the college building in Makeevka where many Russian soldiers died.


Russia.

Volunteer unit Stalingrad is heading to the front line from the famous Mamaev Kurgan in Volgograd (Stalingrad - damnit Khruschev).


Misc.


Russian T-90M firing, with Nakidka, possibly Kherson region (note the beach, it might the Dnepr).


Russian Ka-52 taking out something, allegedly a Ukrainian MBT. Note we have a clear distinction between Ka-52s and Mi-28NMs. The Ka-52s Vikhr with it's 10km range allows it to engage targets that are outside the protection of their SHORAD, and thus it remains active. Meanwhile the Mi-28NM is only capable of LMUR launches of rocket-lobbing.


Ukrainian L119 fires somewhere on the front line.


A large Ukrainian UAV apparently brought down by Russian small arms fires.


An extremely rare Ukrainian T-84. A total of 6 are in service with Ukraine's armed forces. Note this is not the Oplot BM with the new bustle. This is basically a very upgraded T-80UD.


A Ukrainian UAZ van ATGM carrier.


Another Ukrainian UAZ van but this one carrying what I think is a ZPU-4.


Ukrainian improvised MRL on a pickup truck chassis.


Russian MT-LBs equipped with machineguns taking from old warships.


Former OSCE mission armored SUVs are being handed over to Russian forces.


NATO/EU.

The UK is reportedly handing over FV430 Bulldog APCs to Ukraine.


The 8th Zuzana-2 howitzer is being handed over to Ukraine.


The Netherlands are reportedly considering sending their Patriots to Ukraine.

 
Top