The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Ukraine don't urgently need fighter jets -- they need spare parts. And they need munitions, and they need tanks. Also long-range missiles would make a big difference at this point in time. ATACMS for instance.
I have to assume S-300 missiles are running low, too. I wonder if you could bodge some sort of replacement missile to work in those launchers ?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I did a little more digging today after reading your post and it does appear that the source of the article is correct and the Tranche 1s aren't going to be particularly useful in Ukraine from the operating perspective. Symbolism? Sure, but it doesn’t look like it can be anything more than that. Here is one of the better articles I read on the subject from the Royal United Services Institute:

There's no reason they can't adapt it to carry HARMs or lob rocket pods the way Ukraine's jets currently do. Not as useful as one would expect a Typhoon to be? Sure. Useless? Far from.

It also quite nicely outlines why any but the most modern jets wouldn’t be a very viable option without the LRMs either, which I talked about earlier in this thread. I do not believe there is a way to make fighter jets work in Ukraine without going to war with Russia (though jets on their own are a questionable move itself as far as the line red line is concerned, in particular because the Ukes won’t be able to operate them from Ukraine - I am certain of that and I do not see anything that could even remotely convince me otherwise at the moment).
I'm pretty sure some sort of stand-off munitions would be provided. I don't know why you think Ukraine won't be able to operate it. A private company could conduct the repairs, or repair facilities could be set up in Poland. Basic maintenance could be done on the ground. How long has the UkAF been operating out of Mirgorod? Russia hasn't shut that down yet. Why wouldn't Typhoons be able to do the same?

In turn, with no air power, tanks aren’t going to be particularly useful as far as the promised “counter-offensive” goes and the Ukrainians likely don’t have enough to go on the offensive any time soon anyway…
They went on the offensive in Kharkov quite successfully without the air power in question. They also managed to create sufficient pressure on supply lines in Kherson region to convince Russia to withdrawn without actually pushing Russian forces back across the Dnepr.

Overall, things don’t particularly look good for Ukraine, imo. I see these numerous reports indicating that Ukraine is winning and going to win, push Russians out, some suggesting that includes Crimea as well, and we need to prepare for Russia losing the war, whatever that means. It looks to me more like Ukraine lost the initiative and with the expected Russian offensive, they actually may lose the entire Donbas and perhaps more. Who knows. We shall wait and see how things develop in the coming weeks.
Ukraine has pulled out ~50k troops to train in the west, at least according to reports I've seen. It's been repeatedly reported that Ukraine is training 3 new army corps, totaling 70-90k troops. I suspect Russia's current, rather modest gains, are a product of some Ukrainian forces being withdrawn to train, and Russian forces getting an infusion of fresh blood from the mobilization. What happens once Ukraine throws those fresh army corps into the fight? Now Russia is not without strategic reserves this time around, with reportedly about half of the mobilized troops sitting in Russia still training. But there is every reason to think Ukraine is planning a spring offensive and Russia's gains are a temporary function of Ukraine being stretched thin.

We don't have a major leap in Russian ability to conduct offensive operations, this much is clear. Look at Ugledar. What we do have is Russia training better infantry in larger number then before, and tying Ukraine down in attrition battles that wear down Ukrainian units and allow Russia to gain some ground. Remember, not a single major city is on the line here. Kharkov is now pretty far from the front line. The advance in Zaporozhye stalled almost immediately and there's no sign Russia is planning to capture that city. Can Russia overrun a few more small towns and villages? No doubt. But will this win the war? Unlikely. Clearing the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk regions would be a plausible stopping point for Russia, but only if Ukraine is willing to negotiate. And they're not. Even in the best case scenario for Russia, fall of Artemovsk/Bakhmut and Seversk, Ukrainian forces rolling back to the Slavyasnk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkovka-Konstantinovka line, nothing really changes. Even Russia recapturing Kupyansk and Krasniy Liman doesn't fundamentally alter the situation. The entire current war effort is a battle for the forest-keepers hut. Russia's only strategic military victory possible under current conditions is Ukraine being bled dry through attrition. And this will take a very long time. By the time that happens there will be tanks, jets, LRMs, and more foreign fighters to deal with.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Russian offensive movements around Artemovsk/Bakhmut are continuing. There are two salients developing, one north and one south of town. They distinctly threaten the roads in and out of the city. However it's noteworthy that so far Russian troops have not been able to capture any of the villages, and instead appear to be advancing between Ukrainian positions. On the flip side it seems Ukrainian positions are now fairly porous, possibly due to accumulated losses, and are allowing Russian troops to get through. At this point only one road out of the city remains open, with the rest being cut by Russian forces somewhere along the line. The real question becomes, whether Russian forces can maintain what they've done (ideally grabbing a hold of something like Chasov Yar), and whether the resulting pressure is enough to collapse Ukrainian resistance inside Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

It's interesting to note that the northwards advance out of Soledar has been stopped. Russian troops are fighting over a pair of villages there. And in Belogorovka after an initial Ukrainian retreat, they seemed to have rallied and still hold part of the villages.


On the Kupyansk axis, Russian forces have gained another village (Dvurechye), creeping closer and closer to the town, however the pace of advance is very low. The Russian advance in the Torskoe-Terny area towards Liman has mostly halted. It's likely after regrouping and reinforcing Russia will try again.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The RU have been after that bridge for some time, but whats the point strategically ? They have no ability to amphib. invade the area, so whats the point ?
If Russia can effectively take out Ukrainian bridges without having to expend a dozen or more expensive cruise missiles, Russia can try to hit bridges across the Dnepr, as well as any others, severely restricting Ukrainian traffic corridors.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
The RU have been after that bridge for some time, but whats the point strategically ? They have no ability to amphib. invade the area, so whats the point ?
According to the comments it's this bridge-
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineRussiaReport/comments/10z4plq
So makes it harder to get things from Romania.

On a side note, the war has given me a lot of respect for Soviet Engineering they really built thir stuff to withstand a full our nuclear war. Just the sheer robustness of Ukraine's power infrastructure is insane.

I still remember the Mauripol factory, the underground bunkers weren't kept up for the last 30 or so years, but back in soviet times, they had planned for their factories to keep on producing in the middle of all out nuclear war.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
They went on the offensive in Kharkov quite successfully without the air power in question. They also managed to create sufficient pressure on supply lines in Kherson region to convince Russia to withdrawn without actually pushing Russian forces back across the Dnepr.
And they'll be getting GL-SDB (though when?), with twice the range of the longest range rockets they can currently fire from their HIMARS & M270. That should increase their ability to attack Russian supply lines

Ukraine has pulled out ~50k troops to train in the west, at least according to reports I've seen. It's been repeatedly reported that Ukraine is training 3 new army corps, totaling 70-90k troops. I suspect Russia's current, rather modest gains, are a product of some Ukrainian forces being withdrawn to train, and Russian forces getting an infusion of fresh blood from the mobilization. What happens once Ukraine throws those fresh army corps into the fight? Now Russia is not without strategic reserves this time around, with reportedly about half of the mobilized troops sitting in Russia still training. But there is every reason to think Ukraine is planning a spring offensive and Russia's gains are a temporary function of Ukraine being stretched thin.
News reports I've read suggest that the Ukrainians are firm believers in economy of force & are trying to hang on in Bakhmut & nearby with as few troops as possible, rotating them when they can, while holding back their best-equipped units & training as many new ones (or giving additional training to undertrained ones), & absorbing new equipment into newly trained/retrained units. Western trainers all seem to agree that the Ukrainians they're training are highly motivated (entirely credible) & learn fast. The latter could be optimism, but well-motivated students do usually learn fast, & perhaps the Ukrainians are being selective in who they send west. I've noticed that a lot of the news clips from the front lines show rather old-looking Ukrainian soldiers, while those shown training in the UK look sharp - & obviously include experienced soldiers, e.g. NCOs.

We don't have a major leap in Russian ability to conduct offensive operations, this much is clear. Look at Ugledar. What we do have is Russia training better infantry in larger number then before, and tying Ukraine down in attrition battles that wear down Ukrainian units and allow Russia to gain some ground. Remember, not a single major city is on the line here. Kharkov is now pretty far from the front line. The advance in Zaporozhye stalled almost immediately and there's no sign Russia is planning to capture that city. Can Russia overrun a few more small towns and villages? No doubt. But will this win the war? Unlikely. Clearing the rest of Donetsk and Lugansk regions would be a plausible stopping point for Russia, but only if Ukraine is willing to negotiate. And they're not. Even in the best case scenario for Russia, fall of Artemovsk/Bakhmut and Seversk, Ukrainian forces rolling back to the Slavyasnk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkovka-Konstantinovka line, nothing really changes. Even Russia recapturing Kupyansk and Krasniy Liman doesn't fundamentally alter the situation. The entire current war effort is a battle for the forest-keepers hut. Russia's only strategic military victory possible under current conditions is Ukraine being bled dry through attrition. And this will take a very long time. By the time that happens there will be tanks, jets, LRMs, and more foreign fighters to deal with.
Everyone says the Ukrainians have used the time spent defending Bakhmut to build defensive lines behind it, where the terrain is supposedly quite favourable for defence. They seem to be getting ready to abandon an empty shell to the Russians when they have to, & trying to bleed them until then.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
And they'll be getting GL-SDB (though when?), with twice the range of the longest range rockets they can currently fire from their HIMARS & M270. That should increase their ability to attack Russian supply lines.
A big factor in Kherson was the canalization of Russian supply lines into a few easy to hit bottlenecks. Replicating this is going to be hard. The SL-SDB is definitely an important added capability, especially when coupled with western satellite intel, but it's not clear immediately what effect it will have.

News reports I've read suggest that the Ukrainians are firm believers in economy of force & are trying to hang on in Bakhmut & nearby with as few troops as possible, rotating them when they can, while holding back their best-equipped units & training as many new ones (or giving additional training to undertrained ones), & absorbing new equipment into newly trained/retrained units. Western trainers all seem to agree that the Ukrainians they're training are highly motivated (entirely credible) & learn fast. The latter could be optimism, but well-motivated students do usually learn fast, & perhaps the Ukrainians are being selective in who they send west. I've noticed that a lot of the news clips from the front lines show rather old-looking Ukrainian soldiers, while those shown training in the UK look sharp - & obviously include experienced soldiers, e.g. NCOs.
This is not my impression. From what I've seen, there are absolutely massive quantities of Ukrainian troops in and around Artemovsk/Bakhmut. Some estimates ranging as high as ~100k troops in and around the area. I think that number is too high to be credible but the number of Ukrainian brigades that have elements in the area is in the double digits. Ukraine is in fact rotating troops but this is partly a function of having enough troops to rotate (until the current mobilization Russia distinctly did not), and partly a function of lessons learned from the campaigns of '14-'15. I don't know if economy of force is exactly the reason. I do know that Russia not rotating many units out for 6+ months had disastrous consequences for those units.

Everyone says the Ukrainians have used the time spent defending Bakhmut to build defensive lines behind it, where the terrain is supposedly quite favourable for defence. They seem to be getting ready to abandon an empty shell to the Russians when they have to, & trying to bleed them until then.
I think we will have to wait and see. Chasov Yar is an exposed position, and if Artemovsk/Bakhmut falls (well... when it falls) it could quickly become a salient. I suspect that if Russia is successful at Artemovsk/Bakhmut and Seversk, the new front line will run Slavyansk-Kramatorsk-Druzhkovka line. Of course a lot will depend on how long it will take Ukraine to complete formation and throw the reportedly 3 new Army Corps into the battle. And as always, the enemy gets a vote. When/how will Russia commit the second half of their first mobilization wave?

Personally, if I was Russian command I would be much more focused on pushing north in Zaporozhye area, then westward in the Donbas. The potential threat to the landbridge there has strategic implications.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update. Jan 8th-11th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.

Russian strikes landing in Kherson.


One of the buildings damaged was a maternity ward where a fire started due to a near impact.


A large explosion in Ochakov, possibly a Russian strike hitting Ukrainian munition storage. Russian sources claim a Ukrainian radar was also destroyed there. Note the area is a Soviet-era naval mine and torpedo storage facility, but could well have been used for more relevant munitions as well.


Ukrainian forces operating an ex-Afghan Mi-17-V5, Kherson region.


Municipal trash removal services have stopped working in Kherson. The city is likely not going to be able to function if the front line remains where it is.


Ukrainian mobilization efforts, Odessa.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian Orlan operations in the Zaporozhye area.


Russian troops including mobilized personnel training in the rear areas of Zaporozhye. Based on the BTR-D, I think this is a VDV unit. Based on the suppressors, probably a recon element.


Oskol Front.

Russian T-90Ms firing on Ukrainian positions in Balka Zhuravka. This is a significant terrain feature on this segment of the front line.


Russian strikes landing in Kharkov.


Kremennaya area, Chechen fighters, Russian mobilized fighters and with LNR forces on the front lines. The front line is relatively stable with many small fire fights.


Russian forces have captured a Polish Fly Eye UAV.


LDNR Front.


Ukraine's 46th Bde riding Wolfhound MRAPs and operating L119 howitzers near Soledar.


In Blagodatnoe, between Artemovsk/Bakhmut and Soledar, a destroyed Ukrainian BTR-80, BMP-1, and truck.


Ukrainian CASEVAC, Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


In a shocking Ukrainian news clip from Artemovsk/Bakhmut, a local complains that Ukrainian tank fires are hitting the city.


Battle damage in Kramatorsk from a recent Russian strike. The target was allegedly a Ukrainian staging area but it looks like it hit a road.


Russian strike in the center of Slavyansk, allegedly Ukrainian munition storage.


Ukrainian RM-70 MLRS getting hit by a loitering munition near Yasinovataya.


Sparta btln quadcopter drops near Vodyanoe.


Russian incendiary munitions being fired on Ukrainian positions in Mar'inka. The strikes are of questionable value given the terrain.


Footage of the battle damage, center of Mar'inka. The town is basically gone.


DNR 3rd Motor-Rifles dropping munitions from a quadcopter.


DNR 3rd SpN btln fires an ATGM at a group of Ukrainian infantry. And same unit, sniper fires.


DNR 6th Territorial Defense Btln assaulting Ukrainian trenches and taking POWs, exact location unclear.


Battle damage in Yelenovka, after a recent Ukrainian strike.


DNR Starobeshevskaya power plant got hit.


Footage from Severodonetsk-Lisichansk. The city remains in ruins. Unlike Mariupol' where Russian reconstruction efforts have a distinct political dimension, this city stands forgotten.


Russia.

Belgorod region a Russian UCAV crashed into powerlines. Note, while it's being claimed as a Forpost-RU with a KAB-20S bomb, the bomb doesn't match. This might be an Iranian munition, or even an Iranian UCAV.


Training of Russian volunteer defense formations continues, and they even got a visit from the governor of Kursk region who went through the training with them.


Repairs on the Crimean bridge continue.


Misc.

Interesting footage from a firefight somewhere. These are Russian troops, they've advanced into Ukrainian positions and are now engaged. A small number of soldiers are engaged in an active fire fight and appear to be pushing back Ukrainian forces. However they run low on ammo. One heads to the rear to get more ammo and we can see many more Russian soldiers holding positions, a good distance from the fighting, and not engaging the enemy in any way. One happily gives up some of his ammo.


Russian 42nd MRD (the one based in Chechnya) hitting allegedly a Ukrainian tank with an ATGM. They definitely hit something that was moving, and the explosion is pretty large.


Two Krab howitzers getting taken out by loitering munitions.


A Russian loitering munition hits a Ukrainian Grad. Note how easy it is to see the tracks in the snow, making it relatively easy to identify sections of the treeline where SP Arty is hiding.


Ukrainian 2S3 getting hit by a Russian loitering munition, possibly the Lancet-3 with a weak HE-FRAG warhead.


Damage to a Ukrainian T-64BV after a Russian Lancet-3M with a cumulative warhead hit the side of the turret, but failed to penetrate.


Ukrainian 2S1 knocked out after hitting a landmine. Unclear if the people filming are Russian or Ukrainian military but they're speaking in Russian.


A destroyed M109A5, location and context unclear but it looks like the ammo cooked off, ripping apart the vehicle.


Allegedly Ukrainian BMP burning, possibly near Svatovo.


A Russian Pantsyr destroyed, possibly by a HARM.


A Ukrainian M113 abandoned, stuck in the mud. Location and context unclear.


An M113 frozen solid into the ground. Note, this is a relatively minor winter, which actually contributes to this, since the thaw-freezing can cause this.


Ukrainian infantry carrying M-14s.


A Ukrainian ATGM technical.


Wagner fighters show off a T-72B3mod'16.


Russian Mi-28NM carrying an LMUR guided missile. Location and context unclear.


Russian Iskander operations, Ukraine.


Russian T-90M column with softshell ERA on top of their regular ERA.


NATO/EU.

T-72Ms being repaired and upgraded prior to shipment to Ukraine.


Lithuania is promising Ukraine L70 40mm AAA.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Ukraine was invaded by Russia.
What you are basically saying is that we should let Russia conquer Ukraine, and because our arms supply is what is giving Ukraine a chance to defend themselves, we should stop it.

Basically you are saying that, because the patient was shot by a criminal and he is in critical condition, we should just let him die because what is keeping him alive is our help and he would otherwise die.

As a European, a person who knows many Ukrainians, who is helping in housing those poor refugees, who's got friends dying in Donbass to defend their homes, your words are an insult to all those who have lost their lives and to all the Europeans who are making great sacrifices to help the Ukrainian people defend themselves against the Kremlin dictator.
1. This is not what I said.

2. I am not sure what you are insulted by, but I’ll apologize anyway.

3. You know nothing of me, how many Ukrainians I know, who I have helped and how, etc. I would refrain from emotion here, however. I’ll add, that your contribution and help is likely higher than mine (?).


Nobody has suggested missions should be flown out of Poland.
No one is talking about jets flying combat missions from Poland. I'd suggested that the technical burden of supporting any aircraft could be tackled by doing any depot level maintenance at a nearby friendly airfield, using personnel already familiar with the aircraft.

The cabs could be cycled through and Ukrainian maintainers could work alongside, learning the job as they go. Routine arming and fueling can be done locally.
I looked again and see that I misread the post. I still don’t think that would work or be acceptable.

I don't know, but in any case around here we look more at the information people are providing and the arguments they are making than their qualifications. If the info he is providing is incorrect/misleading and his arguments are weak then we should ignore it. Converseley if the info he is providing is correct and the arguments are strong we should pay attention.
The reason I asked for credentials is because they matter. For example, I don’t know nearly enough about Tranche 1 jets and have to rely on expert opinion, who I believe the author of the article I provided is and, no disrespect to Mr. Molinelli, not rely on some guy on Twitter because he disagrees with the expert. This is not to say that Mr. Molinelli is wrong and I considered his opinion and similar views and discussions when the whole “Typhoon talk” broke out, but I also read opinions of others, people who, I believe, are actually experts on the subject, suggesting that things aren’t so simple and clear and pointing out potential issues and why things might not work out as we, non-experts, think they would. Beside being experts on the subject at hand, their arguments make sense and are more convincing. I’ll even provide some examples. And these examples are on top of the fact where he says 1) and then runs with it through all of his posts (joke, but no bueno, obviously).

His first post in the thread is in the likes of “but what about” and ends with “Anyway, doesn't seem to have stopped existing ukrainian jets”. Well, it actually did stop the existing Ukrainian jets. Of course, not entirely, sure, but it did: I don’t see any articles indicating Ukrainian jets are making a difference, fighting the hard fight (they probably are), or any frequent articles involving the Ukrainian AF at all. Ukrainian should be capitalized as well, of course (I am no “grammar nazi”, by any means, and my post are probably full of mistakes as well, but if you want to be taken seriously, at least get the basics right).

His second post starts with “Are we seriously saying that AMRAAM C5 and ASRAAM Block 4 / IRIS-T wouldn't be a serious uplift to Ukraine's air force current capabilities? That is nonsense.” However, the author of the RUSI article clearly states: “Western fighters do offer a significantly enhanced capacity to push these Russian fighters back further from the frontlines and provide a better deterrent against future attempts to push deeper into Ukrainian airspace.” Following by indicating the real limitations: “However, they will have to fly very low to avoid the Russian GBAD threat, and so their missiles will be at a significant effective range disadvantage compared to Russian ones that are being launched from much higher up.” Following, yet again, by real solutions (which aren’t necessarily feasible): “Only the newest and longest-range models of Western air-to-air missiles are likely to provide practical equivalence in range, limiting options to the US AIM-120D or European Meteor. Typhoon Tranche 1 are not compatible with Meteor, and the export of AIM-120C8/D would require US approval.” Then comes more, but we can all read the original article. Therefore, Mr. Molinelli questions what wasn’t said (quite the opposite had been said, actually) and then calls it nonsense.

His third post states the following: “I honestly don't think that Typhoon will have much trouble taking off from same places the few ukrainian Su-27s, if not Mig-29s, take off from. It seems a very overplayed problem to me.” I understand that is what he thinks, but what is his thinking based on and what makes him think this is the case (note, it might be?). He doesn’t provide any reasonable or otherwise arguments to support his point of view. This, of course, is rubbish.

And so on. I could write more, but I believe I have made my point. Overall, his entire thread reads like an emotional and biased rant of a person who knows a little. Again, no disrespect to Mr. Molinelli, but he should clean up the act and bring substance to back up his thoughts and opinion. Why would anyone take serious what he wrote?

Hope the above clears it up.

NATO will not "get involved" apart from his supplying equipment and ammo (and training and intel -- funny that Russia did not already attack NATO...)
Nothing about it is funny, actually. And again, this is the same argument as before - that is, Putin is not suicidal, probably paraphrasing. If someone didn't get involved, doesn’t mean they won’t (however unlikely). We can also stretch the definition of involvement, which we (the West) have been for quite a while, in my opinion.

And again, “did not already attack NATO”, doesn’t mean they won’t. What would be the response if, say, Poland’s airbase servicing the jets we (supposedly) provided got struck? Would we strike Russia back? To what extent? Do we call for immediate deescalation first or after we strike? Poland will probably strike back, regardless (note, that there are members who would not on their own). What’s next? What’s the Russian response? Keep in mind that the assumption is no one is suicidal; we know for a fact that we are not and we are sure Putin isn’t either. What happens to Ukraine in this context?

I strongly disagree with your comparison of Ukraine to a dying patient. Ukraine still has control of most of it's territory, and is receiving more supplies every day. Longer range rockets/missiles will be supplied, and it will not lead to WW3.
There is a lot of emotion involved here, I understand.

The patient was nearly gone, if it wasn’t for our help that brought him back to life. Now we saw that the patient can fight and, potentially, live, so we provide a little more to keep him fighting for his life, but we also understand that the consequences can be extremely severe for ourselves. Hence, there was no LRM’s provided yet. Not really sure what is there to be offended by. Isn’t this reality, what has actually happened and is happening? In the meantime, the patient is still (and will be for a long time) on life support because he is not able to live on his own. Is that not the case?

This has nothing to do with “Russia attacked” Ukraine (it is a fact), or stopping or continuing the supply of weapons, or monetary support, which everyone seems to forget about, or anything else, but about the reality. Is that not clear?

I’ll maybe reply to others tomorrow (if there are other responses).
 

Redshift

Active Member
1. This is not what I said.

2. I am not sure what you are insulted by, but I’ll apologize anyway.

3. You know nothing of me, how many Ukrainians I know, who I have helped and how, etc. I would refrain from emotion here, however. I’ll add, that your contribution and help is likely higher than mine (?).





I looked again and see that I misread the post. I still don’t think that would work or be acceptable.


The reason I asked for credentials is because they matter. For example, I don’t know nearly enough about Tranche 1 jets and have to rely on expert opinion, who I believe the author of the article I provided is and, no disrespect to Mr. Molinelli, not rely on some guy on Twitter because he disagrees with the expert. This is not to say that Mr. Molinelli is wrong and I considered his opinion and similar views and discussions when the whole “Typhoon talk” broke out, but I also read opinions of others, people who, I believe, are actually experts on the subject, suggesting that things aren’t so simple and clear and pointing out potential issues and why things might not work out as we, non-experts, think they would. Beside being experts on the subject at hand, their arguments make sense and are more convincing. I’ll even provide some examples. And these examples are on top of the fact where he says 1) and then runs with it through all of his posts (joke, but no bueno, obviously).

His first post in the thread is in the likes of “but what about” and ends with “Anyway, doesn't seem to have stopped existing ukrainian jets”. Well, it actually did stop the existing Ukrainian jets. Of course, not entirely, sure, but it did: I don’t see any articles indicating Ukrainian jets are making a difference, fighting the hard fight (they probably are), or any frequent articles involving the Ukrainian AF at all. Ukrainian should be capitalized as well, of course (I am no “grammar nazi”, by any means, and my post are probably full of mistakes as well, but if you want to be taken seriously, at least get the basics right).

His second post starts with “Are we seriously saying that AMRAAM C5 and ASRAAM Block 4 / IRIS-T wouldn't be a serious uplift to Ukraine's air force current capabilities? That is nonsense.” However, the author of the RUSI article clearly states: “Western fighters do offer a significantly enhanced capacity to push these Russian fighters back further from the frontlines and provide a better deterrent against future attempts to push deeper into Ukrainian airspace.” Following by indicating the real limitations: “However, they will have to fly very low to avoid the Russian GBAD threat, and so their missiles will be at a significant effective range disadvantage compared to Russian ones that are being launched from much higher up.” Following, yet again, by real solutions (which aren’t necessarily feasible): “Only the newest and longest-range models of Western air-to-air missiles are likely to provide practical equivalence in range, limiting options to the US AIM-120D or European Meteor. Typhoon Tranche 1 are not compatible with Meteor, and the export of AIM-120C8/D would require US approval.” Then comes more, but we can all read the original article. Therefore, Mr. Molinelli questions what wasn’t said (quite the opposite had been said, actually) and then calls it nonsense.

His third post states the following: “I honestly don't think that Typhoon will have much trouble taking off from same places the few ukrainian Su-27s, if not Mig-29s, take off from. It seems a very overplayed problem to me.” I understand that is what he thinks, but what is his thinking based on and what makes him think this is the case (note, it might be?). He doesn’t provide any reasonable or otherwise arguments to support his point of view. This, of course, is rubbish.

And so on. I could write more, but I believe I have made my point. Overall, his entire thread reads like an emotional and biased rant of a person who knows a little. Again, no disrespect to Mr. Molinelli, but he should clean up the act and bring substance to back up his thoughts and opinion. Why would anyone take serious what he wrote?

Hope the above clears it up.


Nothing about it is funny, actually. And again, this is the same argument as before - that is, Putin is not suicidal, probably paraphrasing. If someone didn't get involved, doesn’t mean they won’t (however unlikely). We can also stretch the definition of involvement, which we (the West) have been for quite a while, in my opinion.

And again, “did not already attack NATO”, doesn’t mean they won’t. What would be the response if, say, Poland’s airbase servicing the jets we (supposedly) provided got struck? Would we strike Russia back? To what extent? Do we call for immediate deescalation first or after we strike? Poland will probably strike back, regardless (note, that there are members who would not on their own). What’s next? What’s the Russian response? Keep in mind that the assumption is no one is suicidal; we know for a fact that we are not and we are sure Putin isn’t either. What happens to Ukraine in this context?


There is a lot of emotion involved here, I understand.

The patient was nearly gone, if it wasn’t for our help that brought him back to life. Now we saw that the patient can fight and, potentially, live, so we provide a little more to keep him fighting for his life, but we also understand that the consequences can be extremely severe for ourselves. Hence, there was no LRM’s provided yet. Not really sure what is there to be offended by. Isn’t this reality, what has actually happened and is happening? In the meantime, the patient is still (and will be for a long time) on life support because he is not able to live on his own. Is that not the case?

This has nothing to do with “Russia attacked” Ukraine (it is a fact), or stopping or continuing the supply of weapons, or monetary support, which everyone seems to forget about, or anything else, but about the reality. Is that not clear?

I’ll maybe reply to others tomorrow (if there are other responses).
But partly, it seems to me, your argument boils down to

Putin is dangerous.
Putin controls powerful weapons.
Ukraine is small and weak.
Putin is attacking Ukraine.
if we help Ukraine, Putin might attack us.
We should be scared of Putin.

Putin is so strong and unpredictable we probably should just let him do whatever he wants, to anyone he wants because otherwise he might hurt us?
 

StobieWan

Super Moderator
Staff member
Giving aid to Ukraine doesn't spring from an emotional position however. Pragmatically, every day Ukraine remains in the fight, Russian is distracted and diminished. Right now, they're losing about 800 soldiers a day in the current fighting and they're losing armour, expending guided munitions they can't quickly or easily replace due to sanctions.

I've spoken with folks who served during the cold war, people who could point to the patch of land they were pretty sure they'd die on, at least in the case of tank crews plugging the Fulda Gap, and I'm damn sure if they'd been offered the chance to so completely entangle Russia for a rounding error in the budget, they'd have torn your arm off.

Doesn't matter if they can win - although I do wish them every success. If they do eventually fall, for Russia, that's actually the worst of all outcomes - because the invasion, that's the easy part. Holding territory, fighting a lengthy counter insurgency battle, particularly when the people you're fighting are technically adept, and will have an infinite supply of weapons fed to them - that's the hard part.

There is literally no case short of bowing to nuclear blackmail, in which it would benefit the current allies to cease supplying Ukraine.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Giving aid to Ukraine doesn't spring from an emotional position however. Pragmatically, every day Ukraine remains in the fight, Russian is distracted and diminished. Right now, they're losing about 800 soldiers a day in the current fighting and they're losing armour, expending guided munitions they can't quickly or easily replace due to sanctions.

I've spoken with folks who served during the cold war, people who could point to the patch of land they were pretty sure they'd die on, at least in the case of tank crews plugging the Fulda Gap, and I'm damn sure if they'd been offered the chance to so completely entangle Russia for a rounding error in the budget, they'd have torn your arm off.

Doesn't matter if they can win - although I do wish them every success. If they do eventually fall, for Russia, that's actually the worst of all outcomes - because the invasion, that's the easy part. Holding territory, fighting a lengthy counter insurgency battle, particularly when the people you're fighting are technically adept, and will have an infinite supply of weapons fed to them - that's the hard part.

There is literally no case short of bowing to nuclear blackmail, in which it would benefit the current allies to cease supplying Ukraine.
Without disagreeing with the main points I do have a disagreement with a post-collapse scenario. It's already clear Russia isn't going to win an invasion. The only thing Russia can militarily win is a drawn out conflict that exchausts Ukraine's resources and especially manpower. Considering the removal of refugees, and the casualties among men on the front line, if Russia does in the end occupy all or at least large parts of Ukraine, it's likely that the resistance won't be there simply due to exhaustion with the war and the casualties taken. In short, the type of scenario where Russia can defeat Ukraine militarily would be more akin to the collapse of the certain empires at the end of WWI rather then a relatively brief invasion followed by an occupation. Resistance movements often occur because there is a willingness to fight in the population and people available to do the fighting. But in this war, if this is the case, those people will get their opportunity to fight on the front lines of the war. They don't need to wait for a Russian occupation that might never come.

Russia is continuing to develop a salient north of Artemovsk/Bakhmut. This is a risky approach. The last time Russia operated in this manner, it paid dearly for it. On the other hand Ukrainian forces here have been fighting a bloody attrition battle for months, and it might be hard to organize a counter-attack. Especially considering Ukraine had to commit reserves first to cover the line west and north of Soledar, next to Russian forces in the south at Ivanovskoe/Krasnoe, and Stupochki. It's not clear if more reserves are available to try and counter-attack against this salient.

 
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Feanor

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Staff member
An interview with a Russian artilleryman volunteer. I wanted to translate this because it outlines some of the issues the Russian military is facing that are not immediately obvious. The person being interview, named Edward, fought in the current war on a 2S3 Akatsiya as a loader. Note this won't fit in one post, so I will split up the interview into two posts, and add my own thoughts in a third post.

Our btln was equipped with these cannons. It should be noted that the unit was contract soldiers but diluted by volunteers. Generally experienced men, 40+ years of age that new where were going and why. But the reality shook this confidence quite a bit. The self-propelled howitzers were produced in the '70s. The condition was such that out of 6 howitzers in Edward's battery, the loading mechanism didn't work on any of them. The wear and tear of the barrel and mechanisms was such that they frequently failed to fire.

Question: How did you operate without a loading mechanism? How did this complicate operations?

On the command rapid fire, we're supposed to fire 3 shells in a minute. But since all operations had to be performaed manually, and a 152mm shell weighs around 50 kilos, meeting this requirement is unrealistic.

Question; What is realistic?

Realistically is 2 shots a minute at the start of the battle and half a shot a minute at the end. You have to remember that the howitzers were very "tired". Nothing worked including the ventilation. And after 10-12 shots you get nausea from the gas that you're breathing in. The equipment is in a sorry state. We were jealous of those operating towed guns, since they at least had room to move around and didn't have to breath in the fumes.

Was this just your battery or all of them in general?

No, it was probably just bad luck. Those operating Msta howitzers had it great, but we got this old junk. But if we're talking about loading mechanisms specifically, I think that in our btln of 18 guns none worked.

There are technical services, couldn't they repair them?

They exist, yes. There are guys 20 years younger then these howitzers there. They would be happy to fix them and we did ask, but where and how? In an open field you can't fix a loading mechanism with tree branches. And we didn't come there to conduct repairs, we came there to fire. So we fired.

Heaters inside the vehicles? Didn't work. When it's below freezing outside, it gets very unpleasant inside. And it's unpleasant that engineers and technical support personnel keep saying "vehicles unrepairable".

Is this lazyness or sabotage?

It's not laziness, they were with us at all times except when we were on firing positions. And they have no reason to sabotage us, they're going to be the ones responsible. But they have nothing to repair them with...

Radios?

Antiquated but they worked. Not very well but they gave us 10-12 kms of comms. At least we could get fire correction from the command post.

Right now there is much criticism of artillery for the "lunar landscapes" stating that artillery is shelling areas instead of targets. Is this because of old cannons or is something else missing?

I'm not a gunner, I don't know the details but when I get adjustments from the fire corrections officer, often the first 1-2 shells land somewhere else. In terms of accuracy there was more to be desired.

What about fire correction from UAVs? Did you have any?

We were told yes. We're not on the very front lines, we don't need a UAV. Someone else there needs to launch it to give us information on where to fire and corrections.

It worked like this; we had a fire corrections officer, he got information on his tablet. He was sent coordinates and results of fires (battle damage assessment - F.) The coordinates were put on the compass (there is an artillery aiming device, unsure how to translate correctly - F.) and on it calculations were made and corrections were provided.

How was training before going to the front?

With me it was simple. They took us all to a self-propelled howitzer, and showed us how it is; here's the shell, here's the barrel. Here's how you pass the shell, here's how you close the breach. That's it. Realistically there aren't many complex parts for a loader.

How did you end up in artillery?

By assingment. I'm a volunteer. I came, wherever they send me is not that important. They sent me to artillery. Since I had no prior experience, they made me a loader. But they often did it like that, at random. We fought not based on our MOS but based on our assingment. I'm not saying that's right, just that that's how it was. They say that mobilized personnel are handled more strictly, they observe and train them. It wasn't like that with us.

If it's not a secret, was your MOS close to artillery?

Well... technically. I served in the nuclear missile corps. But became an artilleryman.

Is this normal?

Understand, I'm a volunteer. So I volunteered to got o war. I fully understand that the nuclear missile corps won't be going to war. So no matter where they send me, I would serve there. If they gave me a machinegun, I'd be a machinegunner, they told be to load shells, so I load shells. We had many people that were useful where they were assigned, but looking at the MOS is just...

I'm not alone like that, we had many like me. We had platoon that was providing security us, their commander, a captain, was a pilot.

So that I was an artilleryman was not magical. It was pretty normal especially since I was a decent artilleryman.
 
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