This supports the idea that Russia lost ~1,000 soldiers that one day. I have no idea what Russia is trying to accomplish. I see a lot morale issues with them.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
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This supports the idea that Russia lost ~1,000 soldiers that one day. I have no idea what Russia is trying to accomplish. I see a lot morale issues with them.
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- #5,582
I've been a little behind. The story here is that Russia launched an attack at Pavlovka, and had initial success but then got bogged down in heavy fighting and rumors are circulating of heavy casualties. Without necessarily questioning the authenticity of the reports, there are a lot of questions here. Normally Russia deploys a btln at a time from a single brigade. Maybe two btlns. How many elements of the 155th MarBde were involved for 300 casualties in dead, wounded, and missing to even be possible? How many units are involved? The village in question isn't that large. Is the scope and scale of the fighting there greater then has been reported so far? Russian lines there aren't broken. So far Russian force haven't even fallen back from Pavlovka itself. How many troops are committed? It's a strange situation, hopefully we will get more information as things unfold. I also haven't seen much footage of the fighting there so far. With such apocalyptic battles taking place, I'd expect something to surface.
@Feanor Those two VVS Tu-95 Bears reportedly flying over Ukraine. They are a gimme for any half decent SAM system and any fighter pilot worth his salt would be on to those like a bear onto a honey pot given half a chance. We know that the Ukrainians have had their Su 27 Flankers up and about as well as some Mig-29 Fulcrums. The VVS wouldn't risk their Bears anywhere near an ADS or fighters. So I wonder if they are over Crimea or within Russia itself?
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- #5,584
Is the Russian IADS over Crimea somehow weaker then one over Belgorod? What's the significance of the distinction between Crimea and other Russian regions? Where from and how would a Ukrainian SAM have to operate to catch a Russian Tu-95 over Crimean airspace? Remember, Ukrainian SAMs are already frequently hiding and operating from ambush, and Ukrainian jets are flying very low altitude to avoid detection. And while NATO AEW is available in principle, I doubt they can real-time guide a Ukrainian jet to target over Crimea, without exposing it to many Russian GBAD assets and a possible Russian fighter CAP. SEAD efforts in Kherson notwithstanding, Russia still has buckets of SAMs in Crimea.
There is an allegation in this article of bonuses given to senior officers for successful attacks and hiding military losses of personnel from superiors
Elite Russian Naval Unit Reacts to Stunning Loss of 300 Men: 'Baffling' (msn.com)
The author Thomas Kika does not appear to be a Ukraine source
Articles by Thomas Kika’s Profile | Newsweek Journalist | Muck Rack
Elite Russian Naval Unit Reacts to Stunning Loss of 300 Men: 'Baffling' (msn.com)
The author Thomas Kika does not appear to be a Ukraine source
Articles by Thomas Kika’s Profile | Newsweek Journalist | Muck Rack
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #5,589
We've got our first alleged footage out of Pavlovka. We have a pair of MBTs rolling around, one is on fire, and the crew bails after presumably being unable to put out the fire. We have another with the front vehicle of a column getting hit, and another of the same. Lastly we have some destroyed vehicles, allegedly Russian (plausibly so, they look like BTRs and the Marines ride primarily BTR-82As, with one btln of BMP-3s in the 155th and 336th).
Moscow calling
А на этих видео - тот самый легендарный 1% картошки и мармеладок боевого состава, потерянного при атаке на Павловку за счёт грамотности действий командиров. Сомневаться в словах МО РФ мы права не имеем, поэтому будем считать, что атака была осуществлена с помощью беспилотной техники. И да...
t.me
Moscow calling
Ещё одно видео боёв из Павловки, полностью подтверждающее, что за счёт грамотного командования безвозвратные потери морпехов не превышают 1%, а потери украинцев в 7 раз больше, а на отдельных участках и во все 9 раз. Саундтрек на обоих видео - очень сильный, несмотря на то, что одно...
t.me
Some thoughts. 300 casualties total in 4 days is a lot. But it's not as crazy as it sounds at first. If it's 3:1 WIA:KIA, we're talking ~75 KIAs in 4 days, or roughly 15-20 KIAs per day. While significant, this looks far more realistic then 1000 KIAs in one day. While I can't confirm the story about commanders getting bonuses, it's not impossible and it does appear that someone in Russian command made a decision to try and grab Pavlovka as a target of opportunity. The village is in a depression, and is overlooked by Ugledar, which is a town with multistory structures, making for a particularly disadvantageous position. Reportedly Russian troops apparently dislodged Ukrainian defenders in the initial attack and entered the town but were counter-attacked and it bogged down into a grinding urban fight. Given Russia's traditional shortage of infantry in a squad, and Ukraine's ability to deploy lots and lots of infantry, a key factor in MOUT, the outcome is not surprising.
I think this shows several issues. This attack doesn't appear to be part of a general plan to assault Ugledar, and isn't a particularly advantageous position to hold (likely at least part of the reason why Russia wasn't holding it already). Russia doesn't have good CAS, but Russia did recently showcase heavy use of loitering munitions, just the kind of the thing that could have come in awfully handy for dealing with Ukrainian forces in an urban setting. Yet it doesn't appear any were allocated for this. We've seen them being used on the least significant targets of opportunity, like a jeep with some infantry. It was an opportunistic move by Russian forces, trying to rely on a relatively capable unit to grab a target of opportunity, but without sufficient support or follow-through. As a result we have heavy losses, and no reason to think they will even be able to clear Pavlovka.
Please note, I'm treating the information I have on what took place as reliable. Any of this information could be wrong, down to the entire letter about casualties being fake and the vehicles getting hit in the videos being Ukrainian. However it seems awfully plausible given everything we know so far.
vikingatespam
Well-Known Member
300 casualties to a btl-sized unit wrecks it. About 50% of an infantry type unit is trench strength, the rest is support and rear area personnel. That unit is toast and is only good for pulling to the rear until it can be reconstituted.
If true, this is another example of shockingly poor command.
Or a case of a unit being required to perform a task without the support of others assets which weren't - for whatever reason - available; leading to the unit suffering casualties which might have been avoided.
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- #5,592
I'm still not sure how many elements were in play. Remember, the 155th MarBde trained a whole volunteer btln to fight alongside them. Could we be looking at 2 line btlns and the volunteer formation? Spread across 3 btlns it's not nearly as catastrophic. So far there's no information on Russian forces falling back from Pavlovka. So they at least have enough bodies in place to hold the line.
That's just shockingly poor command but one step up the chain. His point stands.
EDIT: Not sure how I missed it but the 3rd MarRgt from Kamchatka was reformatted into the 40th MarBde. Apparently they're in play at Pavlovka as well. So we're looking potentially at two marine btlns in the area. Allegedly mobilized personnel are part of the fighting too.
Colonelcassad
О боях за Павловку в материале от @voin_dv Основная тяжесть боев за этот населенник легла на плечи морпехов 155-й и 40-й бригад Тихоокеанского флота. При этом обе эти бригады активно участвуют в боях с самого начала СВО. Сначала это было Киевское направление, потом Мариуполь, Попасная...
t.me
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Well if the Ukrainian air defence isn't such a problem then why aren't VVS fixed wing aircraft operating more freely in Ukrainian airspace instead of cowering behind the Russian border? Crimea isn't Russian territory but Ukrainian and that's recognised under international law despite what Putin and his acolytes claim. If Biden took the gloves off Zelenskiy and let him loose, supplying him with what he actually requires and wants, then there would be a lot of hurt crossing the border into Russia. Meanwhile.
"Grisly videos of Russian infantry in poorly prepared positions being struck by artillery have partly supported those assertions, as has reporting in Russian news media of mobilized soldiers telling relatives about high casualty rates. The videos, filmed by Ukrainian drones, have not been independently verified, and their exact locations could not be determined."
That correlates with what I have been seeing on Twitter and elsewhere.
Source:
The image of the UK MOD tweet above further illustrates the morale and discipline problem that the VDV faces. This is something that Stalin did by having the NKVD stand behind the Red Army frontline formations during WW2. The NKVD wasn't noted for it's kindness This is an article on it which doesn't mention the NKVD.
The Soviet Army Once Shot Its Own Troops For Retreating. The Russian Army Might Do The Same.
Barrier troops punish fleeing soldiers by arresting them. Or even shooting them, as Soviet barrier forces sometimes did during World War II.
www.forbes.com
For those unfamiliar with the NKVD it was the Naródnyy komissariát vnútrennikh del (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and was a nasty piece of work. It was the forerunner to the KGB.
The new RUSI report on the Russian Air War in Ukraine is available for download (free of charge). Many interesting observations, and several recommendations for what kind of support Western countries should prioritize. https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf
When it comes to Western fighter jets, they suggest the Swedish Gripen to be a good candidate. It was designed specifically for operating from dispersed air bases/highways; this is reflected in ground support requirements. Also, the long-range Meteor a2a missile makes Gripen an attractive choice. However, it has been produced in small numbers and I doubt Sweden has any to spare. Also, politically it is more probable that a US made fighter will be chosen, and the F-16 seems like a natural choice, produced in large numbers with lots of spare parts available, and many being phased out these days due to the shift to F-35.
Executive summary:
When it comes to Western fighter jets, they suggest the Swedish Gripen to be a good candidate. It was designed specifically for operating from dispersed air bases/highways; this is reflected in ground support requirements. Also, the long-range Meteor a2a missile makes Gripen an attractive choice. However, it has been produced in small numbers and I doubt Sweden has any to spare. Also, politically it is more probable that a US made fighter will be chosen, and the F-16 seems like a natural choice, produced in large numbers with lots of spare parts available, and many being phased out these days due to the shift to F-35.
Executive summary:
- Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks.
- During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
- Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
- From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
- Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
- Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
- Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired stand-off missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
- Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
- The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria.
- It follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, and ultimately augmented and replaced with Western equivalents over time, the VKS will regain the ability to pose a major threat.
- In the short term, Ukraine also needs large numbers of additional man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, such as the Gepard, to sustain and increase its ability to intercept the Shahed-136s and protect its remaining power infrastructure and repairs to damaged facilities.
- In the medium term, Ukraine needs cost-effective ways to defend itself against the Shahed-136. One option could be compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective against them.
- The Ukrainian Air Force fighter force needs modern Western fighters and missiles to sustainably counter the VKS. Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect.
- Any Western fighter supplied in the short–medium term needs to be capable of dispersed operations using mobile maintenance equipment and small support teams, and flying from relatively rough runways, to avoid being neutralised by Russian long-range missile strikes.
Even if it does would Sweden want to risk an intact Meteor falling into Russian hands?
Indeed. There was a video which I posted weeks ago in which Justin Bronk mentioned the Gripen as being more suitable compared to the F-16. It was designed to be operated from austere locations and requires a less elaborate support infrastructure compared to other Western types and was intended to be maintained by conscripts. He also mentioned how existing pilots would take some months to gain some level of proficiency but that it would take longer for support crews.
I would think that the Russians did better in various areas than what is commonly known and believed. It's just that most of the news we're getting comes from the other side. Another problem is we tend to hear more about the Russians; their losses; derivatives, etc but less of the Ukrainians.
That is well known. What we lack unfortunately is a mean of verifying actual air to air losses from both sides but like I've mentioned in previous posts; it's still early days; a lot we still don't know.
There's been so much reporting about the deliveries of NASAMs, Hawks and Aspide; the message given is that they will be 'gamechangers' [how I detest this cliche]; like the M-777s, Stingers and other things before. Whether these new systems will really lead to Russia facing limitations in deploying airpower is something which really remains to be seen.
Both sides have achieved mutual air denial but depending on the operational circumstances are still able to deploy airpower at medium to high altitudes; albeit in a limited manner and duration. Both sides are extremely risk adverse; for good reason.
I'm starting to wonder if some of the reports alleging the use of Shaheds are actually of Lancets or other loitering munitions.
Maybe; maybe not. I would think that it would be ''a small number of Western fighters'' or any fighters for that matter; working in parallel with an early warning system; intel and improved AD systems.
I would assume that C3 and intel assistance would come externally.
Granted it would be easier to supply them with Western systems but ultimately if it was non Western systems would it really make a difference? Are issues the Ukrainians face due to inherent issues with Soviet designed AD systems or due to other reasons?
Any fighter would be able to operate in austere locations with a minimal support; the problem will be in sustaining ops over a protracted period. Western types need clean/sanitised flight lines and I can't think of any apart from Gripen which comes the closest in meeting Ukrainian requirements.
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For a less biased report on the air aspect of the war, I suggest you read the report I linked to above, it contains a lot of details above and beyond the Executive Summary I posted.
Russia already face limitations in deploying air power as noted many times. To me the importance of the NASAMs Hawks and Aspide is not so much being "game changers" but rather replacement of rapidly dwindling Ukranian SAM systems.
I agree -- perhaps it "goes without saying" and that's why they did not mention those factors explicitly?
I think it's mainly due to "other reasons" as they hint at in the text you quoted: "follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, [...]"
There is limited availability of supplies for existing Ukranian SAMs. For some reason the main supplier is hesitant to provide ammunition and spare parts, I wonder why....
A less biased and more detailed report. For some reason the air war has not been generally covered as extensively as the ground war and the one at sea.
It does make very interesting reading and quite a bit of what's mentioned was touched upon by Justin Bronk [RUSI analyst] in videos I previously posted.
Indeed. . As noted many times a large part of the reason is it doesn't deploy air power the way the West does. Gaining overall air superiority is not seen as a key prerequisite; the Russians or the Soviets before them never did perform a strategic air campaign. Priority for them was supporting the army and gaining air superiority over the battlefield. We also tend to overlook the fact that the Ukrainians too are not able to deploy air power as effectively as they'd like for some of the same reasons the Russians are facing.
To me they've oversold the issue; like they did with the M-777s, Stingers, Starstreak and various other things; reading between the lines the message was that all these would be "game changers"'. NASAMS and other AD systems will be serious threats but not necessarily more serious threats than AD threats the Russians are already facing and have been facing for months now.
Whether it's HAWK or NASAMS they would have to be deployed properly because they would be vulnerable to certain types of targets; like the Pantsirs and other systems which are great against certain targets but not optimised to deal with small UASs with low radar and infra red signatures.
Even if for some inexplicable reason the main supplier was willing; doubt he'd be in a position to...
The question I have is why are seeing
two different angles? One shows the boat from the starboard side and the other from the top as one would expect from a loitering munition about to hit a target. Only one boat was hit and by one loitering munition; why are we seeing different angles from what sevens like two different loitering munitions?
The Buk footage is interesting as we can see the launcher moving. Perhaps it had detected a threat but was unable to get a lock on. The footage looks real but the part when we get a much closer look as the Lancet approaches it from the left; to my eyes it just doesn't look right.
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We've got our first alleged footage out of Pavlovka. We have a pair of MBTs rolling around, one is on fire, and the crew bails after presumably being unable to put out the fire. We have another with the front vehicle of a column getting hit, and another of the same. Lastly we have some destroyed vehicles, allegedly Russian (plausibly so, they look like BTRs and the Marines ride primarily BTR-82As, with one btln of BMP-3s in the 155th and 336th).
Moscow calling
А на этих видео - тот самый легендарный 1% картошки и мармеладок боевого состава, потерянного при атаке на Павловку за счёт грамотности действий командиров. Сомневаться в словах МО РФ мы права не имеем, поэтому будем считать, что атака была осуществлена с помощью беспилотной техники. И да...Moscow calling
Ещё одно видео боёв из Павловки, полностью подтверждающее, что за счёт грамотного командования безвозвратные потери морпехов не превышают 1%, а потери украинцев в 7 раз больше, а на отдельных участках и во все 9 раз. Саундтрек на обоих видео - очень сильный, несмотря на то, что одно...
Some thoughts. 300 casualties total in 4 days is a lot. But it's not as crazy as it sounds at first. If it's 3:1 WIA:KIA, we're talking ~75 KIAs in 4 days, or roughly 15-20 KIAs per day. While significant, this looks far more realistic then 1000 KIAs in one day. While I can't confirm the story about commanders getting bonuses, it's not impossible and it does appear that someone in Russian command made a decision to try and grab Pavlovka as a target of opportunity. The village is in a depression, and is overlooked by Ugledar, which is a town with multistory structures, making for a particularly disadvantageous position. Reportedly Russian troops apparently dislodged Ukrainian defenders in the initial attack and entered the town but were counter-attacked and it bogged down into a grinding urban fight. Given Russia's traditional shortage of infantry in a squad, and Ukraine's ability to deploy lots and lots of infantry, a key factor in MOUT, the outcome is not surprising.
I think this shows several issues. This attack doesn't appear to be part of a general plan to assault Ugledar, and isn't a particularly advantageous position to hold (likely at least part of the reason why Russia wasn't holding it already). Russia doesn't have good CAS, but Russia did recently showcase heavy use of loitering munitions, just the kind of the thing that could have come in awfully handy for dealing with Ukrainian forces in an urban setting. Yet it doesn't appear any were allocated for this. We've seen them being used on the least significant targets of opportunity, like a jeep with some infantry. It was an opportunistic move by Russian forces, trying to rely on a relatively capable unit to grab a target of opportunity, but without sufficient support or follow-through. As a result we have heavy losses, and no reason to think they will even be able to clear Pavlovka.
Please note, I'm treating the information I have on what took place as reliable. Any of this information could be wrong, down to the entire letter about casualties being fake and the vehicles getting hit in the videos being Ukrainian. However it seems awfully plausible given everything we know so far.
I'm starting to believe the reports of 300 casualties. The Russian forces look very unprofessional in this video. Why are they all converging to one house making themselves an easy target? Nothing makes sense about this war from Russia's perspective unless you take the simplest explanation which is Russia is incompetent.
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- #5,600
There is a difference between "Ukrainian SAMs aren't a problem" and "Ukrainian SAMs can freely reach into Crimean airspace at will".
I think you're missing my point. The question isn't one of legal ownership of territory. You're essentially saying that Tu-95s would be safe in say Belgorod region but unsafe in Crimea. This doesn't depend on who owns the territory in law. It depends on the ability of either Ukrainian SAMs to operate with impunity near enough the area to engage targets over it, or Ukrainian jets to operate in that airspace. I don't believe either is a viable option over Crimea.
Allegedly 155th MarBde service members from Pavlovka speaking. They report some casualties but claim they're still gaining ground. They state they're addressing the recent news about heavy casualties but don't directly contradict any of it.
Colonelcassad
Морские пехотинцы из 155-й бригады рассказывают о боях за Павловку. Для тех, кто хотел прямой речи от непосредственных участников штурма Павловки и боев на угледарском направлении.
t.me
EDIT: Second video in this link is new. It's a unit of 155th MarBde Marines that were rotated out of Pavlovka for rest. They confirm casualties, but state they are still advancing and will be heading back there soon. Again I note nobody is actually disputing the numbers, just making general statements to the effect that everything is ok.
VK.com | VK
vk.com
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