Royal Australian Navy Discussions and Updates 2.0

Mikeymike

Active Member
One option is rather than choose a 2000t corvette that we struggle to fit anything useful into choose something similar to the type 31 to complement the type 26. This is more of a GP frigate rather than a corvette though.

This would be very similar to the UK plans.

Obviously costs are very hard to pin down when comparing across nations but that could be within the cost range of 5-6 billion depending on the fit out.
 

Stampede

Well-Known Member
I think you might have accidently linked back to the thread unfortunately


Its an interesting big step which is well worth taking imo. I'm not sure if there are any concepts on doing this to remaining PBs that might still have life in them (the six CCPB might be an option once all the OPVs are online, provided they aren't donated or sold) or what function it could serve, but the PBAT definitely appears focused on learning how to operate large USV, rather than creating an actual concept or design.

One of the goals of the PBAT will probably be a focus point going ahead:



Keeping in mind they're doing this on an already well-worn PB, its hard to see major mechanical issues being overcome easily. A lot of complex machinery all working for prolonged periods is bound to go wrong at some point - such as it does on manned ships, only there won't be a technical department to perform daily checks, maintenance and repairs when things do go wrong.

The greatest part is probably related to AUKUS and what inputs the US and UK will have on it (as well as what outputs PBAT will have). DARPA and the USN already have a lot of experience with testing and trialling large USV as it is.
Rushed post
Thanks for the pickup and amendment.

Cheers S
 

spoz

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
This whole discussion strikes me as that of a fantasy fleet, based as it is on two articles in the press which are of very dubious authority.

However, and as previously discussed, the F100 is not only mature as a design, but is over aged. Any new build might look like a Hobart, and will certainly have the limitations of a Hobart hull, but its equipment fit will be very different due to the unavailability of equipment which, for the originals, was ordered 15 years ago, and at what was effectively the end of the production life of some of them.

The limitations of corvettes have been well covered by others, but I would add that small size makes a less stable platform; and that you don’t get something for nothing so you will inevitably trade off Frigate capabilities in one respect or another if you go for a ship one third the size.

Minor Navies accept that trade off and seek to minimise its effect by choosing the trade off in the area of least importance to them. That is frequently range but can be electronics or sensor capability, a warfare area, or many other things. Australia could not afford to do that in our environment. So if you want a second tier ship, and there is no actual indication as yet that the Government does, you are certainly better off going for something like a T 31.

The main armament of the Arafuras is not intended to be a 25 mm Typhoon over the longer term. The original 40 choice, proposed in its bid by Luerssen, had some problems, and they are now selecting something else. That is supposed to be announced in the not too far distant future. However, it is my understanding that the OPVs are not built to front line surface combatant standards in a number of areas where that is not needed for their constabulary role. (See the discussion immediately above re trade offs when comparing the Bruneian ships). You could certainly add sensors and weapons, but that fundamental limitation of the design remains as does the role in anything other than full out war - and arguably they would have minor role as is even there.

That Arafura, and the OPV Program, might be running late and have a few problems as implied by the ABC report is no real surprise. Luerssen have never previously built a ship outside Germany, ASC had not built that design or dealt with the Luerssen way of shipbuilding, and Civmec at Henderson have never built a warship, or indeed ship at all - it is not the same as general heavy engineering. So there will have been multiple learning taking place; and that has its issues. No one will deny that many Defence projects, overseas as well as here, start with over optimistic schedules (the ANZACs sure did) but that usually gets overcome in time; but the end product has normally been good,
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Before this fantasy fleet (and make no mistake, until verifiable sources are used, that's all this is) discussion completely spirals out of control and this thread gets locked yet again, I'll continue my broken record statement of how are you going to man these extra platforms ? Here's a fact for all you speculators : the RAN currently has exit rates in junior ranks between 25 - 40% depending on the category (rate), and retention rates amongst senior sailors isn't much better, so there are real manning pressures on fleet operations before you start magically adding extra racks, ops rooms, bridges and engine rooms that need to be manned by mature, qualified sailors. And before the inevitable "just swap out crews when you decommission the Anzacs" statements start appearing, there is still platform specific training required for certain rates which will impact on training and crewing pipelines.
 

AndyinOz

Member
Forgive any silly amateur mistakes or errors in thinking when it comes to this topic on my part as I am definitely no expert nor is it my area, but I wonder what purpose vessels like this would serve for the country given the opportunity cost in acquisition, manning, maintenance etc. The ships mentioned in articles and discussions surrounding this seem to be operated in locations that when compared to ours are but mere ponds from what I can tell. The Levantine and to a greater extent the Mediterranean Seas or the North and Baltic Seas leading into the North Atlantic. Vastly different situations from what I can understand to the environment surrounding ourselves.
But perhaps I am missing something. Granted the circumstances we find ourselves are difficult and are worsening by the year, but we appear to have our hands full with projects already on the books or in advanced stages of planning. I am certainly willing to be shown to be wrong but the suggestion in the article almost reads like a solution looking for a problem that it fits, but I am not sure that the problems we are facing and I can conceive of fit this particular solution.
 

ddxx

Well-Known Member
One option is rather than choose a 2000t corvette that we struggle to fit anything useful into choose something similar to the type 31 to complement the type 26. This is more of a GP frigate rather than a corvette though.

This would be very similar to the UK plans.

Obviously costs are very hard to pin down when comparing across nations but that could be within the cost range of 5-6 billion depending on the fit out.
Being mindful to not go down a rabbit hole here, but just on this point in regards to cost if anyone is interested:

Contract value to Babcock for the Type 31 program based on their Arrowhead 140 design is £1.25 billion for five frigates.
This is just the ship component on the cost, i.e. value to the shipbuilder, excluding weapons systems etc.

That works out to roughly AU$440 million per frigate for the shipbuilding component (i.e. value to Babcock).

For comparison, contract value to Luerssen Australia for 12 Arafura OPVs is AU$1,988 million, or AU$166 million per OPV as per budget statements.
 

ASSAIL

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Forgive any silly amateur mistakes or errors in thinking when it comes to this topic on my part as I am definitely no expert nor is it my area, but I wonder what purpose vessels like this would serve for the country given the opportunity cost in acquisition, manning, maintenance etc. The ships mentioned in articles and discussions surrounding this seem to be operated in locations that when compared to ours are but mere ponds from what I can tell. The Levantine and to a greater extent the Mediterranean Seas or the North and Baltic Seas leading into the North Atlantic. Vastly different situations from what I can understand to the environment surrounding ourselves.
But perhaps I am missing something. Granted the circumstances we find ourselves are difficult and are worsening by the year, but we appear to have our hands full with projects already on the books or in advanced stages of planning. I am certainly willing to be shown to be wrong but the suggestion in the article almost reads like a solution looking for a problem that it fits, but I am not sure that the problems we are facing and I can conceive of fit this particular solution.
I’d like to give some perspective to the distances RAN patrol/constabulary forces deal with and relate that to the European theatre.
Long ago I commanded an Attack Class PB (33mtrs/140 tons )based in Darwin.
Our normal patrol was the equivalent of leaving Plymouth, proceeding to Gibraltar for fuel and then spending 2 weeks patrolling the entire Mediterranean, fuelling once, returning to Gibraltar, fuelling again then returning to Plymouth, a standard 3 or 4 week patrol.
I also Later planned these as the Command Operations Officer in NHQ Darwin.
The point being, small low endurance hulls are simply unsuitable in our context.
Further, those of us who served in Type 12/River DE’s well know the difficulty of lack of endurance and the restrictions imposed.
 

AndyinOz

Member
I’d like to give some perspective to the distances RAN patrol/constabulary forces deal with and relate that to the European theatre.
Long ago I commanded an Attack Class PB (33mtrs/140 tons )based in Darwin.
Our normal patrol was the equivalent of leaving Plymouth, proceeding to Gibraltar for fuel and then spending 2 weeks patrolling the entire Mediterranean, fuelling once, returning to Gibraltar, fuelling again then returning to Plymouth, a standard 3 or 4 week patrol.
I also Later planned these as the Command Operations Officer in NHQ Darwin.
The point being, small low endurance hulls are simply unsuitable in our context.
Further, those of us who served in Type 12/River DE’s well know the difficulty of lack of endurance and the restrictions imposed.
Thank you for the response, that certainly puts into perspective the circumstances that those making the decisions as to acquisitions need to consider carefully. It was as I was suspecting from my own research when I read the article, that these vessels don't seem to be very useful in and Australian context. We will just have to wait and see I imagine what future developments play out.
 

TScott

Member
Before this fantasy fleet (and make no mistake, until verifiable sources are used, that's all this is) discussion completely spirals out of control and this thread gets locked yet again, I'll continue my broken record statement of how are you going to man these extra platforms ? Here's a fact for all you speculators : the RAN currently has exit rates in junior ranks between 25 - 40% depending on the category (rate), and retention rates amongst senior sailors isn't much better, so there are real manning pressures on fleet operations before you start magically adding extra racks, ops rooms, bridges and engine rooms that need to be manned by mature, qualified sailors. And before the inevitable "just swap out crews when you decommission the Anzacs" statements start appearing, there is still platform specific training required for certain rates which will impact on training and crewing pipelines.
Isnt that kind of the point of these modern Corvette’s though?

The SA’AR 6 is manned by 65 personnel.

As apposed to 180+ for a Hobart?

With marginal rounding, you get 3 ships to 1 with the same personal.

You have the same manning requirements for 10-12 of those as 3-4 Hobarts.

Yes, there’s going to be a trade off in range, sensors and further capabilities, however if it’s used as a supplementary vessel, surely there’s some value in the amount of firepower 2-3 of these vessels would add as apposed to just 1 Hobart?
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
Isnt that kind of the point of these modern Corvette’s though?

The SA’AR 6 is manned by 65 personnel.

As apposed to 180+ for a Hobart?

With marginal rounding, you get 3 ships to 1 with the same personal.

You have the same manning requirements for 10-12 of those as 3-4 Hobarts.

Yes, there’s going to be a trade off in range, sensors and further capabilities, however if it’s used as a supplementary vessel, surely there’s some value in the amount of firepower 2-3 of these vessels would add as apposed to just 1 Hobart?
SA'AR 6, great ship, packed with a lot of firepower but at what cost? Does the Israeli Navy need ships with any more than 7 days endurance? They have a range of about 2500nm, You would be running on fumes by the time you sailed from Perth to Sydney. Israel is 424km long North to South, they can give up endurance for firepower we can't.
 

Volkodav

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Isnt that kind of the point of these modern Corvette’s though?

The SA’AR 6 is manned by 65 personnel.

As apposed to 180+ for a Hobart?

With marginal rounding, you get 3 ships to 1 with the same personal.

You have the same manning requirements for 10-12 of those as 3-4 Hobarts.

Yes, there’s going to be a trade off in range, sensors and further capabilities, however if it’s used as a supplementary vessel, surely there’s some value in the amount of firepower 2-3 of these vessels would add as apposed to just 1 Hobart?
The platform is the means of getting the mission systems to where they need to be. Irrespective of whether you can fit the systems a high end DDG or FFG requires on a Corvette (and you can't), if the platform is incapable of reaching the objective, let alone surviving the transit, there is no point having it.
 

alexsa

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Isnt that kind of the point of these modern Corvette’s though?

The SA’AR 6 is manned by 65 personnel.

As apposed to 180+ for a Hobart?

With marginal rounding, you get 3 ships to 1 with the same personal.

You have the same manning requirements for 10-12 of those as 3-4 Hobarts.

Yes, there’s going to be a trade off in range, sensors and further capabilities, however if it’s used as a supplementary vessel, surely there’s some value in the amount of firepower 2-3 of these vessels would add as apposed to just 1 Hobart?
There is a significant difference in the role, weapons and range of the SA'AR 6 compared to the Hobart Classs DDG. Suggest you look as weapons, systems and range before making such an arguement. The manning on the Hobart DDG is quite low for its size and capability. The crew of the Hunter will be smaller again noting the 180 crew include the embarked flight crew for the helicopters carried.

The SA'AR 6 is speciaised to suit the needs of Israel and does not need the weapons capacity and range of of a vessel going in harms way in the environment that the RAN must be able to operate in. Added to this, both the Hobart and the Hunter are intended to resupply at sea for extended operations (which is necessary given the area to be covered). This adds to the crew required in order to be effective.

I suggest that if you are going to promote a second tier vessel the base requirement would be equivalent to a fully modernised ANZAC in systems, sensors and weapns with a bit more power generation capacity. The weapons systems and combat systems would have to be compatible with those fitted to (or intened to be fitted to) the Hunter and ANZAC. This reflects the nature of the threat the RAN may need to operate in. The SA'AR 6 is an impressive vessel for what it does but it is not in the same ball park as a Hunter or Hobart.
 

Todjaeger

Potstirrer
Isnt that kind of the point of these modern Corvette’s though?

The SA’AR 6 is manned by 65 personnel.

As apposed to 180+ for a Hobart?

With marginal rounding, you get 3 ships to 1 with the same personal.

You have the same manning requirements for 10-12 of those as 3-4 Hobarts.

Yes, there’s going to be a trade off in range, sensors and further capabilities, however if it’s used as a supplementary vessel, surely there’s some value in the amount of firepower 2-3 of these vessels would add as apposed to just 1 Hobart?
In an Australian context, not really.

In order for one of these vessels to provide value, they would need to be able to bring useful capabilities to a conflict area. Given the small size and limited displacement of a corvette, by virtue of the characteristics of a corvette, that puts strict limitations on both the fitout (weapons and sensors) as well as the range, endurance and seakeeping.

The result would likely be a vessel which is lightly armed and without sufficient range to actually viably reach a conflict area, or a vessel with the range to get into harms way, but be completely inadequately (vs. lightly) armed to do anything, and might not even be able to manage self-defence.

Using the K-130 Braunschweig-class corvette as an example (which the Sa'ar 6 was based off) a transit from FBW to Singapore at 15 kts would consume a significant portion of the onboard fuel (over half) and take ~7.4 days at sea. Those days at sea would be a problem since the vessel has a seven day endurance unless there was RAS, an accompanying tender, or a port call to refuel and re-provision en route.

To provide a bit more of an area size comparison, several of the seas on or bordering northern areas of Australia like the Timor, Arafura, and Coral Seas, are all larger than the North Sea, and significantly larger than the Baltic Sea, with both European seas being areas that a K-130 would likely operate in. In the case of the Coral Sea, that has a surface area nearly twice that of the Mediterranean Sea. In short, the 'local' areas around Australia are enormous, and potential flashpoints and threats to friends/allies, and SLOC are even more distant.

What that in turn would mean, is that a corvette-sized warship, even if properly kitted out for a conflict, would be very hard pressed to ever be able to reach an area where it could be useful. This in turn would mean that whether or not the RAN could operate three corvettes for every DDG, would be irrelevant to providing a capability to the RAN, since the vessels would not be able to actually get to and then operate in areas where the RAN would need them to be.

If the RAN were to be restructured to provide littoral defence of the continent and associated islands, as part of some new Defence of Australia scheme, then maybe corvettes which would be based in and operate from Australian ports might be a viable approach. However, such a scheme would cede control of the SLOC to and from Australia beyond the littorals.
 

Redlands18

Well-Known Member
In an Australian context, not really.

If the RAN were to be restructured to provide littoral defence of the continent and associated islands, as part of some new Defence of Australia scheme, then maybe corvettes which would be based in and operate from Australian ports might be a viable approach. However, such a scheme would cede control of the SLOC to and from Australia beyond the littorals.
And in that case even Flight 111 Burkes would be useless as we would not be able to refuel them or things like Cars, Trucks, Buses, Trains, Planes as we are totally reliant on exported fuel coming through those SLOCs.
 

Massive

Well-Known Member
Here's a fact for all you speculators : the RAN currently has exit rates in junior ranks between 25 - 40% depending on the category (rate), and retention rates amongst senior sailors isn't much better, so there are real manning pressures on fleet operations
Though this is a different and very concerning problem that needs to be addressed regardless of discussions around Hunters, Spanish AWDs, Corvettes and Arafuras.

What are your thoughts on what needs to be addressed here?

Regards,

Massive
 

DDG38

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Though this is a different and very concerning problem that needs to be addressed regardless of discussions around Hunters, Spanish AWDs, Corvettes and Arafuras.
What are your thoughts on what needs to be addressed here?
Regards,
Massive
I would firstly disagree that they are different problems, you don't have platforms without crew so it's a total capability issue.
I am not a recruiter so cannot speak to how to fix recruitment but I would guess that it's going to take more money, more allowances/perks and more flexibility in accommodating family pressures and professional development which is no easy task in this job market. There was an announcement from CDF today saying how they are changing some conditions of service for ADF personnel so they obviously know they have to make the ADF an employer of choice.
 
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