The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 4: Thinking & speculating about 3rd order effects for a change

1. Ukraine began shaping operations from 29 to 31 Aug 2022, with a series of 48 pinpoint attacks on targets mostly in Kherson Oblast (province). It is likely that American intelligence would have done some battle damage assessments and shared it with Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1565016509029695488

2. Ukraine has also damaged bridge after bridge in the oblast until more recently hitting the last one, and the other bridges closer to the city of Kherson was already damaged — it is now a challenge for Russia to resupply its increasingly isolated troops. In pocked areas, supply depots are under attack.

Ukraine has been successful on two sections, namely Ukrainian forces have apparently broken through at Sukhoi Stavok and are advancing behind Russian forces north of them, and Ukrainian forces have advanced directly towards Kherson, having taken Kiselevka.

https://i.ibb.co/pnWLxk1/31-08-1.jpg

3. IMO, the imaginary map drawn by Russian sources does not seem to make sense.

​

(a) Ukraine needs to be focused on soldifying gains they can hold. With Ukraine’s limited C4ISR capabilities, they really can’t afford to fight in this manner (a deep penetration with a hook) — the sheer volume of Russian disinformation being spewed out at the moment is mind-numbingly high.​

​

(b) IMO, it is possible Russian sources only invented these “Ukrainian advances” to claim in a few days, they recaptured all of these areas and stopped the Ukrainian advance.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1564646832696971264

4. At this time, Ukraine is sensible in refusing to confirm any information on their advance. If advances are successful, it will be eventually confirmed by more reputable news agencies in a few days — I would rather wait for more reliable info than rush to judgement. Meanwhile, here’s a dog preventing a Russian reporter from reporting to entertain you.

 

[vikingatespam]

A single narrow penetration wont get you far. it remains to be seen if the UKR can really capitalize on breaking loose a bit.

 

[Feanor]

3. IMO, the imaginary map drawn by Russian sources does not seem to make sense.

​

(a) Ukraine needs to be focused on soldifying gains they can hold. With Ukraine’s limited C4ISR capabilities, they really can’t afford to fight in this manner (a deep penetration with a hook) — the sheer volume of Russian disinformation being spewed out at the moment is mind-numbingly high.​

​

(b) IMO, it is possible Russian sources only invented these “Ukrainian advances” to claim in a few days, they recaptured all of these areas and stopped the Ukrainian advance.​

That explanation doesn't make sense to me. I don't think these advances even if eventually recaptured, are a sign of competence on Russia's part. If true, Russia failed, and this breakthrough is in my opinion a credible threat. Especially when you consider that Russia appears to have mainly VDV, Marines, and LDNR reservists in this section of the war, against heavy mechanized formations.

Keep in mind, Ukraine has attempted to captured Davydov Brod and hold it many times already. This hook threatens those positions credibly. You might be right about Ukraine not being able to afford to fight in this manner. But this partially depends on how good or poor Russian performance is too. And then there's the question of the purpose of the attacks. We have more footage of Ukrainian troops getting hit here then we've had from one section of front in a long time. These attacks are costly to Ukraine.

What objective would make this worth while?

A credible advance on Kherson itself, even without taking the city would. It would show locals that Russian hold on the area is tenuous, show the world that Ukraine can move the front line, and possibly even show Russian leadership that they don't necessarily hold what they have all that well, thus forcing Russia to negotiate.

A encirclement of some sizable Russian detachment followed by their destruction or surrender would do it too. The image of a ~btln or even a ~company of Russian soldiers as POWs after a Ukrainian offensive would show a powerful image to the world, to the Ukrainian people, and to Russian leadership. The breakout at Sukhoi Stavok looks to me like a credible attempt to do the latter. The advance on Kiselevka like the former.

These make sense as goals. A handful of costly frontal assaults that recapture a handful of villages don't make sense as goals. Especially when you consider that the front line here isn't perfectly static. Russia took Blagodatnoe and Aleksandrovka right before this offensive took place, Ukraine hasn't recaptured them so far. A front line inching back and forth across these hamlets and villages isn't worth these kinds of resources, at least in my view.

In my opinion, if this breakthrough is Russian fiction is a very bad idea as it shows Ukraine as a credible fighting force that can wage maneuver warfare and threaten the Russian rear. If it's real it's a sign of poor performance by Russian forces in the area and possible greater Ukrainian competence then people have given them credit for.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 4: Thinking & speculating about 3rd order effects for a change

What objective would make this worth while?

5. Good question. I think the current advance/attack is at least 2 to 6 months too early; and it is driven by political motives or other objectives that are not strictly military.

A credible advance on Kherson itself, even without taking the city would. It would show locals that Russian hold on the area is tenuous, show the world that Ukraine can move the front line, and possibly even show Russian leadership that they don't necessarily hold what they have all that well, thus forcing Russia to negotiate.

6. True.

A encirclement of some sizable Russian detachment followed by their destruction or surrender would do it too. The image of a ~btln or even a ~company of Russian soldiers as POWs after a Ukrainian offensive would show a powerful image to the world, to the Ukrainian people, and to Russian leadership. The breakout at Sukhoi Stavok looks to me like a credible attempt to do the latter. The advance on Kiselevka like the former.

7. I don’t think that will happen; rather I am more afraid of an Ukrainian ABG being decimated (if they probe too deep) and having their troops captured as POWs, by the Russians BTGs sent to counter attack in Kherson.

These make sense as goals. A handful of costly frontal assaults that recapture a handful of villages don't make sense as goals. Especially when you consider that the front line here isn't perfectly static. Russia took Blagodatnoe and Aleksandrovka right before this offensive took place, Ukraine hasn't recaptured them so far. A front line inching back and forth across these hamlets and villages isn't worth these kinds of resources, at least in my view.

8. They have thrown at least 3 to 4 ABGs into the fight. The question is how big are the Ukrainian reserves on standby (to exploit the gaps created). The real battle is the battle of the reserves (2 more ABGs, as reserves, behind the each main effort) — that fight has not occurred, yet.

In my opinion, if this breakthrough is Russian fiction is a very bad idea as it shows Ukraine as a credible fighting force that can wage maneuver warfare and threaten the Russian rear. If it's real it's a sign of poor performance by Russian forces in the area and possible greater Ukrainian competence then people have given them credit for.

9. Have Russian attempts at propaganda ever made sense? Or even internally consistent over time?

10. I believe that of the 5 areas attacked, at least 2 are ‘decoys’ or rather, not the main effort. I suspect that the Ukrainians only have enough for 2 to 3 main efforts — this will become apparent in 2 to 3 weeks, when the reserves are thrown in.

11. And after the reserves fight (in week 3 to 5 of this offensive), the relief in place forces will need to be thrown in (at brigade strength to hold ground), while the Ukrainian forces decimated by the fighting are rebuilt (in 3 to 6 months).

 

[Feanor]

5. Good question. I think the current advance/attack is at least 2 to 6 months too early; and it is driven by political or other objectives.

I agree, but even the political objectives have to make some sort of sense. My proposed objectives are political. Encircling or destroying a Russian company or even btln doesn't move the needle much, and Ukrainian armor brushing the outskirts of Kherson, to be inevitably repulsed, isn't a military achievement.

7. I don’t think that will happen; rather I am more afraid of an Ukrainian ABG being decimated (if they probe too deep) and having their troops captured as POWs, by the Russians BTGs sent to counter attack in Kherson.

This is what Russian sources are claiming about the breakout at Sukhoi Stavok-Kostromka. However, that's what they were claiming about the breakout when it was just Sukhoi Stavok. What happens if they aren't decimated because Russia can't manage reinforcements and supplies at the same time, due to decreases in throughput on the pontoon crossing?

8. They have thrown at least 3 to 4 ABGs into the fight. The question is how big are the Ukrainian reserves on standby (to exploit the gaps created). The real battle is the battle of the reserves (2 more ABGs, as reserves, behind the each main effort) — that fight has not occurred, yet.

I've seen reports of Ukrainian T-64BM2s in the fight, suggesting that some reserves are committed already. I also suspect Ukraine has thrown more then just those ABGs into the fight.

9. Have Russian attempts at propaganda ever made sense? Or even internally consistent over time?

I allow for the possibility that this is pure misinformation. But I also allow for the possibility that this is a real breakout, and Russian positions west of the Dnepr are more precarious then initially perceived.

EDIT: Think "declaration against interest" as a concept. I don't think it's in Russia's interest to admit a dangerous Ukrainian breakout, which gives it some credibility. I'm still waiting for footage of some sort to emerge.

10. I believe that of the 5 areas attacked, at least 2 are ‘decoys’ or rather, not the main effort. I suspect that the Ukrainians only have enough for 2 to 3 main efforts — this will become apparent in 2 to 3 weeks, when the reserves are thrown in.

You think this fight will continue for 2-3 more weeks? Interesting. I would have thought it would end in days not weeks.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 3 of 4: Thinking & speculating about 3rd order effects for a change

You think this fight will continue for 2-3 more weeks? Interesting. I would have thought it would end in days not weeks.

12. I think this Ukrainian offensive will cumulate in 3 to 5 weeks, if it goes to plan. It’s not going to be a 3 to 5 day fight — it will be a mutual slug festival with lots of deaths. Oleksiy Arestovych said in a recent interview there will be "no quick success in Kherson" because it means "a lot of blood" and they need "as many Ukrainians as possible to come back home."

13. On the current Kherson offensive, Oleksiy Arestovych, presidential adviser and key spokesperson for Ukraine at war said: "No point waiting for quick radical changes. This is a long story. Russians have 25-30 BTGs there, knocking them out quickly won't work. But what will work is to open up their logistics and smash it with artillery and HIMARS".

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1565093330454777858

14. Mass Russian surrenders will only come in weeks 2 to 3 onwards, only if Ukraine succeeds in a manner Russia does not expect. Visually confirmed Russian tank losses during the:

First Chechen War: 193​

Second Chechen War: 23​

Russo-Georgian War: 3​

Russo-Ukrainian War: 1002​

15. I am still suspicious of the Ukrainian Special Forces explanation for the repeat attacks on Russian targets in Crimea. There is some evidence that suggests Kyiv now has long-range missiles.

 

[Feanor]

Part 3 of 4: Thinking & speculating about 3rd order effects for a change

12. I think this Ukrainian offensive will cumulate in 3 to 5 weeks, if it goes to plan. It’s not going to be a 3 to 5 day fight — it will be a mutual slug festival with lots of deaths. Oleksiy Arestovych said in a recent interview there will be "no quick success in Kherson" because it means "a lot of blood" and they need "as many Ukrainians as possible to come back home."

13. On the current Kherson offensive, Oleksiy Arestovych, presidential adviser and key spokesperson for Ukraine at war said: "No point waiting for quick radical changes. This is a long story. Russians have 25-30 BTGs there, knocking them out quickly won't work. But what will work is to open up their logistics and smash it with artillery and HIMARS".

14. Mass Russian surrenders will only come in weeks 2 to 3 onwards, only if Ukraine succeeds in a manner Russia does not expect. Visually confirmed Russian tank losses during the:

First Chechen War: 193​

Second Chechen War: 23​

Russo-Georgian War: 3​

Russo-Ukrainian War: 1002​

This doesn't make sense either. If Ukraine has committed 4 ABGs to 2-3 real offensives, how do they hope to "knock out" 25-30 Russian BTGs? And if the reserves are 2 ABGs, what hope is there of mass surrenders? The scale of the effort would have to be an order of magnitude greater to hope for success. And you would have to hope that Russia doesn't have another handful of loitering munitions in reserve to hunt those HIMARS and artillery as they get used more actively to achieve the desired effect. You would also have to make assumptions about the inability of Russian airpower to have a significant impact, and there's a difference when it's Ukrainian troops hitting Russian lines vs the other way around.

I don't have a whole lot of faith in what Arestovych says. He may well be managing expectations if Ukraine hasn't gotten the results they want. For example if the Russian narrative around Sukhoi Stavok is accurate, then Ukraine may have gotten as deep as they had by committing reserves (remember those T-64BM2s) and is now overextended and exposed.

I guess we will see if the fight escalates or slowly winds down.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 4 of 4: Thinking & speculating about 3rd order effects for a change

16. “Ukrainian forces have pushed the front line back some distance in places, exploiting relatively thinly held Russian defenses,” the U.K. MoD said. The WSJ spoke to soldiers wounded in Ukraine’s counter-offensive at a hospital behind the frontlines, where they spoke of significant advances but an extremely brutal fight.

​

(a) “They’re throwing everything against us,” said a 22-year-old Ukrainian soldier who said Russians were fighting with artillery, tanks, helicopters and mortars. “They have a lot of equipment but few men.”​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1565227480075702274

(b) “We’re advancing in some areas and being battered in others,” said Pavlo, a 22-year-old soldier who was concussed in a battle on Tuesday and says he now hears a sound akin to a broken television in his head. The WSJ conducted interviews with 8 soldiers who took part in the fighting & it offers the most detailed on-the-ground picture yet from an offensive that Ukraine hopes will help it seize the initiative & prove that its military can take on Moscow’s army and win.​

​

(c) Ukraine’s Kherson offensive has utilized HIMARS and long range weapons to neutralize Russian HQs plus degrade its C4ISR capabilities. The recently acquired HARM anti-radiation missiles are also being used with good effect to degrade Russian air defense complexes, creating all sorts of problems with the Russian basing of fighters in Crimea.​

​

(d) The Ukrainians are now preparing to expand that in the east to take back land lost in Donbas and around Kharkiv in the north. Quentin Sommerville and camera-journalist Darren Conway of the BBC have been given exclusive access to a unit of Ukrainian troops. The fighting here is different. "They are not coming in such big numbers," Svarog says. "They no longer advance in battalion groups - they advance in a platoon, a detachment."​

​

17. As Michael Kofman on WOTR podcast said: "my best guess is that the Ukrainian military may not be planning to necessarily fight for the city of Kherson, but instead placed the Russian forces in an untenable position and forcing them to retreat across the river, this is probably the smartest approach that Ukraine could have taken, rather than a much larger, bolder offensive. That would have been a lot riskier...the most important thing is that they've taken an operational approach that makes the most sense at this juncture."

18. In addition, I agree with Michael Kofman who said:

​

"Ukraine definitely has advantage because they do appear to be using armour and infantry fighting vehicles ... this may not be what we will classically call combined arms, but definitely seems to have some of those elements [eg] some tactical aviation in terms of support."​

Further, the numbers discussed below are purely speculative, not based on evidence I have seen but they do show the min. scale that is needed to have an impact.

This doesn't make sense either. If Ukraine has committed 4 ABGs to 2-3 real offensives, how do they hope to "knock out" 25-30 Russian BTGs?

19. I think we have a misunderstand on what I wrote earlier. That’s not how I count it. In week 1, only 3 to 5 ABGs committed to 2-3 real offensives, via passage of lines through the existing ‘front.’

And if the reserves are 2 ABGs, what hope is there of mass surrenders?

20. In week 2, the reserves (twice the size, at 4 to 6 ABGs are committed, with some leg infantry battalions — at least 3 to 6). I suspect that Ukraine does not have enough armour and trained personnel to form even 8 ABGs — which means spoiling counter attacks by the Russians can work (in a few days). But NATO will warn Ukraine, once they see large troop movements.

The scale of the effort would have to be an order of magnitude greater to hope for success.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1565049889645641728

21. They have war gamed this prior to any troop movements. On top of existing troops at the ‘front’, I suspect Ukraine has committed in total another 12 to 16 battalions of infantry to this offensive (as 1 week troops in all of which are in 6 ABGs, as 2nd week reserves of unknown size & also the relief in place forces).

 

[Exonian]

Part 2 of 4: Thinking & speculating about 3rd order effects for a change

5. Good question. I think the current advance/attack is at least 2 to 6 months too early; and it is driven by political motives or other objectives that are not strictly military.

6. True.

7. I don’t think that will happen; rather I am more afraid of an Ukrainian ABG being decimated (if they probe too deep) and having their troops captured as POWs, by the Russians BTGs sent to counter attack in Kherson.

8. They have thrown at least 3 to 4 ABGs into the fight. The question is how big are the Ukrainian reserves on standby (to exploit the gaps created). The real battle is the battle of the reserves (2 more ABGs, as reserves, behind the each main effort) — that fight has not occurred, yet.

Maybe Ukraine assesses that it has sufficient military capability to seriously disrupt supplies crossing the Dneiper for 3 to 5 weeks?

If so perhaps a series of probing attacks along the front exploiting weakness where found would be the way to go as well as keeping up general pressure wherever possible. If supplies across the Dneiper remain stifled imagine the problems the Russians would face if they had to regularly ration the amount of artillery fire - that would be felt by all ranks pretty quickly.

The large amount of Russian units on the west bank of the river then might come to be a major hindrance if they do not have sufficient stockpiles of equipment to move and fight.

The best case outcome for Ukraine if this goes outstandingly well is that the Kherson Bridgehead becomes the Kherson Pocket, and Russia ends up withdrawing, leaving without fighting for the city itself while destroying or leaving behind heavy equipment. A dream scenario perhaps.

cheers

 

[vonnoobie]

If Ukraine has managed to amass enough personnel and equipment and can keep the pressure up then IMO it is going to come down to logistics. Russia has put a lot of equipment and manpower into the area all of which is reliant on 3 bridges that apperantly aren't useable now and some pontoons that are them selves are under attack. As such fuel, ammo, fued etc is all trickling in so what they have across the river already is for all intents and purposes what they have to fight the battle with, and those stockpiles are being carefully targeted.

The Russian forces very heavily armed with a lot of heavy equipment, but as such they need a lot of resources to maintain effective function, when stock piles under attack and supply lines at a trickle at best then sooner or later that heavy equipment becomes nothing more then giant paper weights. I think we might find the longer this counter attack goes on the harder it will be for the Russians and the easier for the Ukrainians but that all depends on if Ukraine has set aside enough assets to carry it on to reach a point that Russian supply to units starts plummeting.

 

[Feanor]

Kherson-Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog.

Footage from the first day, a pair of Ukrainian Su-25s lobbing rockets. They were later allegedly downed though no confirmation has emerged.

Повёрнутые на войне

Хохлы таки реально задействовали все что есть. Пара повытрыных Грачей сыпет С-13 с кабрирования.

t.me

T-64BM2s, allegedly part of the recent offensive.

Повёрнутые на войне

ВСУ применяли Т-64БМ2 из резерва.

t.me

Ukrainian forces moving out for the offensive.

Colonelcassad

Одно из видео начала наступления ВСУ на Херсон.

t.me

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️‍☠️Иностранные наёмники сняли начало наступления на Херсон Боевик "иностранного легиона" на видео говорит, что-то про "совместную операцию", "Херсон" и 28 августа t.me/RVvoenkor

t.me

A Ukrainian troop column, allegedly this is near Vysokopol'ye, and it's part of this column that we've seen destroyed.

Colonelcassad

29 августа. Начало наступления ВСУ в районе Высокополья. На дороге проносится тот самый грузовик с пехотой, который позднее будет брошен вместе с разбитой колонной под Высокопольем.

t.me

Allegedly a strike on Ukrainian troops, T-72 ammo cooking off, trying to advance on Novaya Kahovka from Kostromka. If true this is our first footage from the Sukhoi Stavok salient.

Повёрнутые на войне

Утром, примерно в 8:30 ВСУ вновь предприняли попытку наступления в направлении Великая Костромка - Новая Каховка. На кадрах детонирует бк в польском Т-72М1

t.me

Apparently a Russian strike on Ukrainian tanks, Kherson-Nikolaev axis.

Хроника оператора БпЛА

Про жизнь оператора БпЛА, дроны и тому подобное Аккаунт для связи,рекламы @operator_feedback Шевроны/футболки @nach_patr

t.me

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Abandoned, possibly broken down or knocked out, Ukrainian BMP-1s being finished off by dropping grenades from a quadcopter. This suggests that they're sitting in no-man's land where neither side can readily access them.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️Провал 1-го наступления ВСУ на юге: как "Призрак Херсона" уничтожил 3 БМП врага — 2 серия 29 августа "Призрак Херсона" из ВДВ на БПЛА решил добить технику разрозненных и разбежавшихся ВСУшников и забросил им несколько взрывных подарков. Как итог — детонация боекомплекта у двух "бэх" украинских...

t.me

Abandoned Ukrainian T-72AV being destroyed by a quadcopter hand-grenade. Allegedly the work of Russia's 247th Para-drop Rgt.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Abandoned Ukrainian T-64BVmod'17 being destroyed, allegedly by Russian troops (though I can't make out, and it could be Ukrainian personnel destroyed a vehicle they can't evacuate).

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Allegedly a Ukrainian tank being destroyed as part of the current offensive. Location unclear.

Colonelcassad

Уничтожение еще одного брошенного украинского танка в ходе "потужного наступу на Херсон". За последние дни на николаевском и криворожском направлении прошел самый настоящий геноцид украинской бронетехники. Полагаю, вам понятно, почему Генштаб ВСУ запретил украинским журналистам и блогерам все...

t.me

A destroyed BMP, allegedly Ukrainian.

ANNA NEWS

Российские десантники продолжают отражать "контрнаступление" ВСУ под Херсоном На кадрах уничтоженная в поле БМП противника. Видео: @Rubej99 @anna_news

t.me

A destroyed T-72 and dead crew, allegedly Ukrainian. Warning footage of corpses.

Старше Эдды

Три танкиста, три веселых друга. Хроники контрнаступа под Херсоном. Польский Т-72 и его украинский экипаж.

t.me

This is posted as a Russian/rebel artillery piece that literally fired until its barrel exploded. However it's a very interesting artillery piece. I think it's one of the rebel Nona-S turrets mounted on an MT-LB or possibly a BMP (it's hard to tell what the chassis is).

Повёрнутые на войне

Я вам вчера написал, что наша арта работала до красных стволов на Николаевско-Херсонском направлении, как видите я не шутил. Ничего, сделают перествол и самоходка снова пойдёт в бой.

t.me

The Ukrainian offensive near Snegirevka seems to have stopped.

Colonelcassad

На Снигиревском участке фронта сегодня тишина. Только остовы сгоревшей в результате самоубийственного наступления украинской техники украшают пасторальные пейзажи. @rybar

t.me

A Ukrainian first aid station and CASEVAC.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

‼️‍☠️ Кровавый провал наступления ВСУ на Херсон: одной из основных жертв самоубийственных атак стала 128-я горно-штурмовая бригада из Закарпатья На кадрах оказание первой медпомощи раненым в ходе атаки украинским военным из 128-й бригады, а также их эвакуация под огнём артиллерии. t.me/RVvoenkor

t.me

Large numbers of ambulances moving around, Odessa.

Украина.ру

Очередное видео с колонной машин скорой помощи в Одессе. Судя по всему, едут результаты наступления на Херсон. @milinfolive

t.me

A line of locals waiting to donate blood, Odessa. I believe Russian sources are posting this as evidence of casualties, but I would consider the other side. There are clearly quite a few people willing to make an effort to support Ukraine's armed forces.

Historywarweapon

You can view and join @historywarweapon right away.

t.me

Another map, however unreliable, of the Ukrainian salient out of Sukhoi Stavok. The source is Russian, so of course usual reservations apply. However it seems to show continuing Ukrainian success in the area. The base of the salient is significant expanded, there are reportedly 3 Ukrainian pontoon bridges, and Ukrainian forces still firmly control Anreevka, Lozovoe, Sukhoi Stavok, and Kostromka. The reported earlier attack on Bruskinskoe allegedly failed, but Ukrainian forces are now driving on Karlo-Marskovskoe (yes that's a village named after Karl Marx). It really doesn't look like a Russian propaganda ploy... it look like a significant Ukrainian breakthrough that Russia hasn't been able to counter effectively, only slow down.

https://i.ibb.co/H4dFB6p/1-09-ru-1.jpg

 

[Feanor]

Energodar-Zaporozhskaya NPP.

Russian sources are reporting Ukraine attempted to seize the Zaporozhskaya NPP ahead of the IAEA visit there. Reportedly ~60 Ukrainian troops landed on 7 boats, and then two barges attempted to land more troops. We don't have footage of the combat action there, only of helos heading in that direction and a burning barge. Reportedly the attack was repulsed and the barges destroyed.

Десант у ЗАЭС

Рано утром около 6 утра в районе ЗАЭС противник попытался высадить десант на моторных лодках в районе Водяного. Также потоплены две самоходные баржи с десантом вышедшие из Никополя. Высадилось до 60 человек, которые хотели продвинуться к станции и осуществить ее захват. Попытка противника была…

colonelcassad.livejournal.com

Russian helos over Energodar.

Colonelcassad

Ударные вертушки над Энергодаром. По всей видимости идут работать по остаткам десанта ВСУ в районе ЗАЭС.

t.me

Burning barge.

Colonelcassad

Одна из барж, которая принимала участие в попытке десанта на Запорожскую Атомную Электростанцию. Источник: https://t.me/lostarmour/772

t.me

Colonelcassad

Дымящаяся баржа принимавшая участие в десанте на Запорожскую Атомную Электростанцию. Еще несколько таких фиксируются в Никополе.

t.me

VK.com | VK

vk.com

The IAEA visit took place despite this reported fighting. Reportedly some of their inspectors stayed behind at the plant. They were shown damage to the plant from recent fighting.

VK.com | VK

vk.com

Colonelcassad

Миссия МАГАТЭ несмотря на украинские обстрелы и попытки десанта рвется на Запорожскую АЭС.

t.me

Colonelcassad

Миссия МАГАТЭ несмотря на украинскую клоунаду все же доехала до Запорожской Атомной Электростанции. Видео РИА "Новости".

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Репортёр Руденко V

МАГАТЭ около часа уже находятся на АЭС. Меня удивил один факт, они не надели бронежилеты и каски. Уверены, что по ним хохлы стрелять не будут. Хозяева.

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[vikingatespam]

Do the UKR really want an attrition-fest, whittling away their (presumably) better trained troops ? This offensive should have a goal of getting more troops familiar with offensive operations.

If there is no real movement within a week, it doesnt bode well for the offensive. Even with the lack of permanent bridging, can the RU forces be starved out within a few weeks ?

 

[Feanor]

Do the UKR really want an attrition-fest, whittling away their (presumably) better trained troops ? This offensive should have a goal of getting more troops familiar with offensive operations.

If there is no real movement within a week, it doesnt bode well for the offensive. Even with the lack of permanent bridging, can the RU forces be starved out within a few weeks ?

You have to apply pressure if you want to starve them out at all. You have to force Russian troops to burn through their ammunition and fuel supplies, especially ammunition, otherwise it doesn't matter how many times you hit the bridges. It's why they're combining the attacks along a wide section of front, making both hard for Russia to concentrate overwhelming fires in one area, and forcing Russia to maximize ammunition expenditure, while hitting both fixed bridges and pontoon crossings.

On a side note Russian sources have been rumbling about a Ukrainian counter-attack in Kharkov region. Allegedly Ukrainian reinforcements have been coming in.

 

[Vivendi]

Thanks to all in general and Feanor and OPSSG in particular for their thoughts on the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Another hypothesis to explain the shape of the counteroffensive was recently presented by a military analyst from the UK, click on the link below to read the thread:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1565002835137540098

 

[Vivendi]

A soldier from a Northern European country volunteering in Ukraine, participated in the counteroffensive and has shared some details. I am concerned about OPSEC so therefore I cannot provide much details or link to sources at this point in time (perhaps I am being overly cautious, but better to be on the safe side).

Some of the interesting things he said:

* They were told to attack a village. The number of Russian soldiers in the region was estimated to be roughly 20% more than the number of soldiers attacking. (so 1:0.8 relationship instead of the recommended "rule of thumb" 1:3 between defenders and attackers). In spite of this, the (initial) attack succeeded (according to him).
* The task force that attacked, consisted of a significant number of foreign (non-Ukrainian) soldiers, (including Chechenia), and also many special forces soldiers. Perhaps this applies only to the group he participated in, but nevertheless it makes you wonder how many volunteers from other countries participate in this counteroffensive.
* From his description it seemed clear they got pretty good real-time intel, mainly by using various types of drones continously.

I hesitate to tell more at this stage. However I got the clear impression that they are having some success, but also some setbacks and of course losses. Also it's clear that the motivation is extremely high. And unlike other conflicts in e.g. Afghanistan and Chechenia, these underdogs got full backing of "The West" meaning pretty good equipment and good intel. This, together with a strong motivation and a "can-do" attitude clearly makes this a huge challenge for the Russians who struggle with low morale, etc. At the same time Russia has the advantage of defending, and also the advantage of numerical superiority.

 

[vonnoobie]

They were told to attack a village. The number of Russian soldiers in the region was estimated to be roughly 20% more than the number of soldiers attacking. (so 1:0.8 relationship instead of the recommended "rule of thumb" 1:3 between defenders and attackers). In spite of this, the (initial) attack succeeded (according to him).

I would hazard a guess that the rule of thumb may under certain circumstances going forward be thrown out the window in future warfare and current when factoring in drones etc especially when they are used at the unit level giving them real time intel on how best to proceed. Allow's one to employ your own forces in the most optimal way minimising ones own casualties while achieving the same goals. Though their is also a flip side to this being defenders can use such tech in much the same way, hence "under certain circumstances"

At the same time Russia has the advantage of defending, and also the advantage of numerical superiority.

While technically correct these two points also have their draw backs. Being on the defence gives the opponent the choice of when and where to attack allowing them to mass force while defenders still have to cover everything even if their area isn't under attack its self and numerical superiority is only good if you can keep that force well supplied. With the present day limitations on getting supplies, men and equipment across the river the numerical numbers can very easily turn into a negative as it means running down on those supplies that they do have much faster.

 

[vikingatespam]

How could the UKR be at a numerical disadvantage at their place of choosing the attack ? Supposedly they have a very large manpower pool and have been extensively recruiting. By now, I would of expected a slight advantage in numbers. Does this simply higher than estimated losses, or that they are doing longer training cycles for new recruits ?

 

[STURM]

I would hazard a guess that the rule of thumb may under certain circumstances going forward be thrown out the window in future warfare and current when factoring in drones etc especially when they are used at the unit level giving them real time intel on how best to proceed.

Despite whatever assets an attacker has; including UASs; he would still have to maintain a high favorable ratio in troops due to terrain and the type of defences encountered. Also note that the 3:1 between attackers attackers and defenders is considered a general estimate; quite often an attacker would need a higher ratio of troops.

On another note; amidst all this talk about Kherson [the city and oblast] it's worth noting as a point of interest that 78 years ago a large body of German troops were encircled by numerically superior Soviet troops who also had the benefit of superior firepower. With great difficulty the Germans with help from a relief force managed to break out [minus their heavy gear of course]. The coming weeks will tell whether we see another pocket in the area; this time of Russian troops.

 

[Vivendi]

The BBC has researched open sources how many Russian "elite specialist" soldiers have been confirmed killed. As of September 1st, they have confirmed 900 "elite specialist" soldiers killed. The real number is of course higher; it's anybody's guess how much higher.

Interestingly they have confirmed 67 military pilots (including helicopter pilots) killed. Training an elite pilot can take 15-17 years and cost 12-14 million USD. This is a significant loss for Russia.

Article (in Russian -- I used google translate to English to read it): Элитные специалисты. Кого именно потеряла российская армия в Украине - BBC News Русская служба