The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

OPSSG · Sep 5, 2022

Post 2 of 2: A partial reply to Jaykaro

(c) Ukraine at this stage has concluded phase 1 shaping operations. They are now in find, fix and fight the enemy in defensive sectors — there will be some ups and downs but the battlefield geometry has evolved to the point that the Russian Army will have to pay a heavy price to hold this pocket.

(d) Ukraine is in the process of slicing a chunk of Russian-occupied territory into progressively smaller sectors that will soon be isolated from and unable to support each other. The first sector is Kherson Oblast (including the city of Kherson) west/north of the Dnipro River. The next sector is the rest of Kherson Oblast (along with Zaporizhzhia Oblast), where Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets have occurred.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1566783630281740291

5. While the Ukrainian Army’s Armoured Battle Groups (ABGs) are not capable of ‘true’ combined arms warfare, of the calibre we see in Desert Storm, it is pretty impressive to see the scale of Ukrainian armour, infantry and artillery in action in Kherson. So it looks like the fighting is at an ABG level (and not that of a brigade).

Jaykaro said:
Also, a Russian Pantsir missile system was destroyed in Oleshki, of course Russian propaganda said that it was driving in the wrong position and just exploded (Facepalm)

6. I find Russian propaganda so strange. I have seen footage of Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UCAV in action; which means SAM cover is either gone or minimal in the "Kherson pocket." Below, a Russian 9A317 Buk SAM burns in this video posted by Ukraine Weapons Tracker.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1566862026173038594

Feanor · Sep 5, 2022

OPSSG said:
Post 2 of 2: A partial reply to Jaykaro

…

5. While the Ukrainian Army’s Armoured Battle Groups (ABGs) are not capable of ‘true’ combined arms warfare, of the calibre we see in Desert Storm, it is pretty impressive to see the scale of Ukrainian armour, infantry and artillery in action in Kherson. So it looks like the fighting is at an ABG level (and not that of a brigade).

6. I find Russian propaganda so strange. I have seen footage of Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UCAV in action; which means SAM cover is either gone or minimal in the "Kherson pocket." Below, a Russian 9A317 Buk SAM burns in this video posted by Ukraine Weapons Tracker.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1566862026173038594

They took out a Tor as well, possibly 2 though the second was in question, though they allegedly lost one Bayraktar.

OPSSG · Sep 5, 2022

Post 1 of 2: Replies to a clarification for context

Feanor said:
They took out a Tor as well, possibly 2 though the second was in question, though they allegedly lost one Bayraktar.

Thanks for this clarification.

1. Ukraine is not basing the timing of its Kherson ops to satisfy the impatience of itchy Twitter fingers of those who find it easier to tweet nonsense but miss the bigger picture of this 3 to 5 week offensive— the progressive hollowing out of Russian positions (before attack) — Ukraine is attacking targets with HIMARS, M777s, TB2 UCAVs, and other longer-range weapons, while the sapping enemy’s morale even before fighting occurs in the relevant Kherson sector.

2. A Russian-installed official in Ukraine's Kherson region said that plans for a referendum on joining Russia had been "paused" due to the security situation, Russian state-owned news agency TASS reported.

3. Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of the Ukrainian offensive action over the last 5 days but reported on the further destruction of Russian lines of communication in Central Kherson Oblast. The fight of the reserves has not occurred but will likely take place towards the end of next week.

Feanor · Sep 6, 2022

OPSSG said:
3. Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of the Ukrainian offensive action over the last 5 days but reported on the further destruction of Russian lines of communication in Central Kherson Oblast. The fight of the reserves has not occurred but will likely take place towards the end of next week.

I believe Russia already committed some reserves. We have seen T-90M in Kherson region. I also have footage of a BMP-3M unit in Kherson region, with the new armor kit. This is the first time we've seen that in action.

seaspear · Sep 6, 2022

There are reports that North Korea been supplying shells and rockets to Russia
Russia to buy North Korean artillery shells, rockets: Report | Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera
North Korea supplying arms to Russia - US reports (the-star.co.ke)

Vivendi · Sep 6, 2022

The CEO of Nammo gave an interview to Norwegian National broadcaster NRK recently. Brief summary:

Nammo is producing at maximum capacity, in Norway and the other 8 countries where they have production facilities
This year they are investing 5 times more than what they usually do, to ramp up production capacity (they invest more than1billion NOK this year)
In addition they have this year spent 750 million NOK of their own money to order supplies at risk, to mitigate risks of long lead times
They are asking the Norwegian government to support them with 650 million NOK extra, to allow them to expand production capacity further in Norway
As an example, the demand for the M72 is 18 times larger this year compared to an average year.

Europa ruster opp: – Aldri sett noe lignende – NRK Norge – Oversikt over nyheter fra ulike deler av landet

vikingatespam · Sep 6, 2022

OPSSG said:
Thanks for this clarification.

1. Ukraine is not basing the timing of its Kherson ops to satisfy the impatience of itchy Twitter fingers of those who find it easier to tweet nonsense but miss the bigger picture of this 3 to 5 week offensive— the progressive hollowing out of Russian positions (before attack) — Ukraine is attacking targets with HIMARS, M777s, TB2 UCAVs, and other longer-range weapons, while the sapping enemy’s morale even before fighting occurs in the relevant Kherson sector.

3. Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of the Ukrainian offensive action over the last 5 days but reported on the further destruction of Russian lines of communication in Central Kherson Oblast. The fight of the reserves has not occurred but will likely take place towards the end of next week.

It would appear then that this is an attritional approach. I would assume the UKR, being the attackers, are taking more losses than the RU, which then pits the UKR willingness to take casualties against the RU ability to supply their troops across the Dnepr.

vikingatespam · Sep 6, 2022

seaspear said:
There are reports that North Korea been supplying shells and rockets to Russia
Russia to buy North Korean artillery shells, rockets: Report | Russia-Ukraine war News | Al Jazeera
North Korea supplying arms to Russia - US reports (the-star.co.ke)

If true, I find this very shocking. I thought most estimates of RU artillery stores were quite large and not in danger of depletion any time soon. RU artillery production should also be robust. To buy artillery from NK, and all the baggage that goes with that, is an act of desperation.

There appears to be a rail connection at Pont l'Amite, so large shipping quantities of ammo should be something that is verifiable.

swerve · Sep 6, 2022

See the Ukrainian defence ministry response -

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1567069236597587969

Dead Money · Sep 6, 2022

vikingatespam said:
It would appear then that this is an attritional approach. I would assume the UKR, being the attackers, are taking more losses than the RU, which then pits the UKR willingness to take casualties against the RU ability to supply their troops across the Dnepr.

Given Ukrainian shaping efforts in this area, including hitting ammo dumps, bridges and supply barges degrading Russian logistics, I wonder if the attacker would be taking greater casualties than the defender in this case?
I would expect the UKR to have local fires superiority, high motivation, intelligence advantages due to non combatant allies, and a better ability to pick the timing and location of battles. And I think these items may make current casualty ratios closer than our rules of thumb would indicate.

OPSSG · Sep 6, 2022

Post 2 of 2: Replies to a clarification for context

4. My apologies if I confused anyone.

vikingatespam said:
It would appear then that this is an attritional approach.

5. I wonder where you get your ideas? Is it Twitter or YouTube? I described Ukraine moving from just initial shaping ops to direct offensive action by ABGs to slice Russian forces in defence into progressively smaller sectors. It is then mis-labelled by you as an attritional approach. Ukraine has been attacking for 5 days, in a deliberate attack of multiple objectives — they are not sitting back.

vikingatespam said:
I would assume the UKR, being the attackers, are taking more losses than the RU, which then pits the UKR willingness to take casualties against the RU ability to supply their troops across the Dnepr.

6. The purpose of slicing a defence into sectors is to ensure that the attacker preserves the initiative and the relative combat power (RCP) of its ABGs. RCP is an important concept that my country’s war planners use.

7. An attacker wants party in numbers or preferably 3:1 advantage in numbers. To ensure a RCP advantage, a war planner will send a battalion to attack an enemy company; or send a company to attack an enemy platoon.

8. That way, the ABG does not face all the defenders at once but only a smaller and more manageable portion — this approach of protecting Ukraine’s RCP, which will in turn reduce the number of Ukrainian casualties (but hard fighting still needs to be done).

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1567224604510273538

9. You can see the Ukrainian Army in APCs moving forward to war — to f-up the enemy. ABGs have organic vehicles, which enables Ukrainian forces to move faster and surprise the enemy. Given that that they only have APCs, Ukrainian infantry troops need to dismount to screen the tanks and APCs. The tanks with their main guns can provide direct fire support.

Ananda · Sep 6, 2022

Colonelcassad

Вернулись с Андреевского участка боёв на Херсонском направлении. Давно не видел такую плотную работу авиации. Удары наносились один за другим, артиллерия так же - работает непрерывно. Бои продолжаются, десатники, артиллероиды, ДэНэРы сдерживают врага, который за неделю заметно выдохся. Большая...

t.me

This is off course from Pro Russian, however the video on the Andreevsky in Kherson front seems shown increasing tempo of Russian air attack toward Ukrainian in more or less open coverage front.

If this's confirm on that area, shown the progress in Kherson front of Ukranian offensive is not as what Pro Ukranian sources (and being forwarded by Western Media), as smooth as being picture.

Let's see how the real development in the field really progressing, to judge whose side telling more truth or BS at this moment.

vikingatespam · Sep 6, 2022

Dead Money said:
Given Ukrainian shaping efforts in this area, including hitting ammo dumps, bridges and supply barges degrading Russian logistics, I wonder if the attacker would be taking greater casualties than the defender in this case?
I would expect the UKR to have local fires superiority, high motivation, intelligence advantages due to non combatant allies, and a better ability to pick the timing and location of battles. And I think these items may make current casualty ratios closer than our rules of thumb would indicate.

Its certainly possible, if the RU supply situation is pretty bad. I figure, if it gets really bad, we will see a lot more movement.

vikingatespam · Sep 6, 2022

OPSSG said:
5. I wonder where you get your ideas? Is it Twitter or YouTube? I described Ukraine moving from just initial shaping ops to direct offensive action by ABGs to slice Russian forces in defence into progressively smaller sectors. It is then mis-labelled by you as an attritional approach. Ukraine has been attacking for 5 days, in a deliberate attack of multiple objectives — they are not sitting back.

Neither, since you asked.

Attrition is going to happen no matter how slow or fast you are advancing. The implication is that if you arent advancing quickly, the enemy has close to combat power parity, which means more losses. Am I crazy for following Numbers, Predictions and War or Attrition by the Dupuy Institute ? I have concerns, for what its worth, that the UKR risk burning out local forces, for as far as anyone can see, small territorial gains, and unknown degradation of RU forces. I know the Fog of War is heavy, so we dont know exactly what is happening, but I would propose that most of the Kherson front is undergoing at least low level of UKR attacks to prevent the RU from shuttling around forces to important sectors.

I am not claiming that the UKR are sitting back. I am claiming that without being able to manuver more freely through the RU lines, that the UKR casualties may end up being not worth the effect on the RU forces.

Dead Money · Sep 6, 2022

vikingatespam said:
Neither, since you asked.

Attrition is going to happen no matter how slow or fast you are advancing. The implication is that if you arent advancing quickly, the enemy has close to combat power parity, which means more losses. Am I crazy for following Numbers, Predictions and War or Attrition by the Dupuy Institute ? I have concerns, for what its worth, that the UKR risk burning out local forces, for as far as anyone can see, small territorial gains, and unknown degradation of RU forces. I know the Fog of War is heavy, so we dont know exactly what is happening, but I would propose that most of the Kherson front is undergoing at least low level of UKR attacks to prevent the RU from shuttling around forces to important sectors.

I am not claiming that the UKR are sitting back. I am claiming that without being able to manuver more freely through the RU lines, that the UKR casualties may end up being not worth the effect on the RU forces.

I agree. The important thing from an analyses perspective is to determine what is happening, both in terms of positional warfare, and attrition. We should state our reasons for believing what we believe.

As to whether the casualties are worth the outcome, I think that we are too far from the front line to asses these types of value judgements. I hope and pray that the Ukrainians are making the correct decisions

Feanor · Sep 7, 2022

Update.

Kherson-Nikolaev-Krivoy-Rog.

Apparently a Ukrainian 2S3 maneuvering or withdrawing under fire, Kherson region.

The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

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