GermanHerman
Active Member
Can you give us a source for the claim that Putin "wants a victory before May the 9th"?
Michael Kofman dosnt seem to think that Victory Day plays a significant role in the current military build up of russian forces.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
Michael Kofman dosnt seem to think that Victory Day plays a significant role in the current military build up of russian forces.
Intense fighting released from the UA side in Mauripol today. While it was posted today on the official Azov channel, I cannot ascertain when this incident actually took place. This does look like Multiple DPR soldiers dying agsint the wall.
Could these be fresh DPR recruits?
WARNING- Multiple corpses and dying bodies.
Another Great video, a Russian Marine BTR-82, shruggin off a RPG?. The red backpack marine officer who makes a lot of the more better quality Russian MOD videos from Mauripol was apparently in the BTR and is unharmed.
Ukranians using drones to track a Russian Self Propelled howitzer back to its camp and then guides the UA artillery into destroing them. the camera quality, video stability and zoom are fantastic in the one
Could these be fresh DPR recruits?
WARNING- Multiple corpses and dying bodies.
Another Great video, a Russian Marine BTR-82, shruggin off a RPG?. The red backpack marine officer who makes a lot of the more better quality Russian MOD videos from Mauripol was apparently in the BTR and is unharmed.
Ukranians using drones to track a Russian Self Propelled howitzer back to its camp and then guides the UA artillery into destroing them. the camera quality, video stability and zoom are fantastic in the one
Last edited:
I'm not at all sure what you are saying here, A Ukrainian general didn't say that, the author, mike martin, did
There are some reports on Twitter claiming that there is no (genuine) counteroffensive near Izyum (another possibility could be that it just failed) and that in fact Russian and DNR forces pushed the line to Pisky-Radkivski south of Borova.
Regardless of what actually happened wrt the offensive, the changes on the ground have also been reflected on Ukraine Interactive map - Ukraine Latest news on live map - liveuamap.com
Edit: Typo
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #2,925
The counter-offensive may also have failed. We have reports of a Ukrainian tank attack stopped by Russian forces in my post above, where Russian sources report one tank destroyed, one knocked out, and one captured. That may have been the offensive in question. It's often hard to figure out the sequence of events, because the delays in reporting are inconsistent.
Category error.
NATO does not expand its influence. Neighbours of Russia beg to be allowed to join. Some of them have been turned away in the past.
How could Russia stop its neighbours seeking to join NATO? Easy: be nice to them. But it hasn't. It's consistently been nasty to any neighbour that seeks to be independent & that it sees as weak enough to bully.
Cuba was 60 years ago, & nobody has sought to put nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Quite the opposite, in fact. There were nuclear weapons in Ukraine, & Ukraine gave them up for destruction in return for promises to respect Ukraine's borders & independence. Of the countries which made that promise, one (& only one) has broken it: Russia.
The European countries which were most keen on a friendly & economically mutually beneficial relationship with Russia now feel betrayed. Look at Germany. Formerly pacifist parties are now backing massive increases in military spending & giving weapons to Ukraine.
Putin chose that. If he didn't realise it would happen he's a fool & deluded. That's very, very frightening.
GermanHerman
Active Member
I think if he did realise this and still chose the war it dosnt make him less of a fool and is maybe even more frightening...
Russia is taking "trophy" POW's. After the two british citizens they now caught as the ATGM crew that downed a Ka-52:
Kotsnews
⚡️В Харьковской области взято в плен спецподразделение противотанковых управляемых ракет 95 десантно-штурмовой бригады, которое сбило два российских вертолета Ка-52 Подробности скоро на @truekpru @sashakots
t.me
Hopefully they will get treated decently, although the latest videos of Cossackgundi are not very reassuring given that he expressed concern over being used for propaganda prior to his surrender (clearly indicating that his cooperation is somehow forced).
In general there is a lot of footage of POWs coming out from the Donbass, there are multiple posts of small groups posted on pro russian telegram groups daily.
Seems like this is the main focus of the russian propaganda effort now.
There is also new footage of the shoot down of an ukrainian su-25 near izyum on april 15th (or maybe it's the SU-24 we already saw which was downed on the 10th?)
Центр Рубеж
Эксклюзивные кадры попадания российской ракеты в украинский штурмовик Су-25 в районе Изюма Харьковской области. Сняты 15 апреля военным тепловизором. @breakingmash |подписаться|
t.me
Last edited by a moderator:
Just look at Gundi's eyes, very similar to that of the UA commander whose interview got deleted when I posted it ( my bad, I should have put propaganda disclaimers). The eyes are so dead. I have no idea what interrogations they are using, but Russia obviously know better than any one how to tighten metaphorical screws. It makes me fear for the mustached Belarussian guy, I sincerely hope he does not get captured, unlike Gundi who may be paraded until returned, the Belarussian will most likely be handed to Lushenko as a reward and I really dont want to imagine what they have in store for him.I think if he did realise this and still chose the war it dosnt make him less of a fool and is maybe even more frightening...
Russia is taking "trophy" POW's. After the two british citizens they now caught as the ATGM crew that downed a Ka-52:
Kotsnews
⚡️В Харьковской области взято в плен спецподразделение противотанковых управляемых ракет 95 десантно-штурмовой бригады, которое сбило два российских вертолета Ка-52 Подробности скоро на @truekpru @sashakots
Hopefully they will get treated decently, although the latest videos of Cossackgundi are not very reassuring given that he expressed concern over being used for propaganda prior to his surrender (clearly indicating that his cooperation is somehow forced).
In general there is a lot of footage of POWs coming out from the Donbass, there are multiple posts of small groups posted on pro russian telegram groups daily.
Seems like this is the main focus of the russian propaganda effort now.
There is also new footage of the shoot down of an ukrainian su-25 near izyum on april 15th (or maybe it's the SU-24 we already saw which was downed on the 10th?)
Центр Рубеж
Эксклюзивные кадры попадания российской ракеты в украинский штурмовик Су-25 в районе Изюма Харьковской области. Сняты 15 апреля военным тепловизором. @breakingmash |подписаться|
Hopefully the majority of the POWs will be exchanged for Russian ones, but I fear for the 'famous' Belarussian, Georgian, Chechen (anti Kadyrov) ones. If Putin hands them to his allies as a reward.......
I hope that Ukraine keeps some prized high level POWs to exchange for these ones, they have sacrificed everything for Ukraine and their videos did a lot to bring more intl support for Ukraine, despite making them targets for Russia and their demented allies.
Last edited by a moderator:
That is true, information not coming out in sequence in the time it occured can paint one very odd picture. What I do find interesting is the alleged artillery and small arms fire going on in Starovevika which is not far from being the middle point between the two alleged offensive launch points.
With the timing is it just a delayed twitter post by some one, falso information, pure luck or has Ukraine also snuck in a team or teams along the possible routes to be taken (If the alleged offensive hasn't been stalled) to cause havoc behind the lines and give the advancing forces an easier time of it?
While I don't doubt they are incapable of learning from their mistakes it all comes down to is it a mistake in strategy or a mistake in the training and structure of their forces. Strategy is easy enough to fix up, You stop, take a breather, have serious discussion where you went wrong and how to rectify it. However if it is in army structure and training that is no quick easy fix, Ukraine used to be very similar to the Russian training and structure, It has taken Ukraine 8 years to get their forces to where they are now, Can Russia also do it? Yes but they wont be doing it in field. With allegedly the bulk of their combat forces that are available deployed rotating them in and out to restructure and train them will be very slow. It will take them years to get all of that done.
As I believe the Russian issues come down to the structure and training of their forces (Having to get told from above what to do rather then taking the initiative) then IMO it isnt that Russia can't learn from their mistakes but that they dont have the time to learn from them.
Part 3 of 3: Inchoate thoughts at day 53 of the 2022 war
9. Many in the Western online cheer squad are so sure the Ukrainians will prevail in the East because “this is the same Russian Army that was so inept at Kyiv.” But the terrain where the fights are occurring is totally different. No forests and urban areas to sneak up with Stingers, NLAWs and Javelins. I am pretty worried about Ukrainian Army plans to give battle in this terrain. News reports that say, there are now 76 Russian battalion tactical groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine and in the country's southeast. About 11 of those were added over the last several days, a senior Defense Department official said. Besides the 76 BTGs, there are about 22 BTGs north of Ukraine that are likely being resupplied and refitted, the official said.
10. About 11 of those 76 BTGs inside Ukraine are trying to take the last few sectors of Mariupol, an important port on the Sea of Azov. It seems that despite significant surrenders, there are still pockets of fighters there in certain sectors.
12. The next phase of the fight is on (aka round 2 starts on Day 54) — much more fighting in multiple fronts than just at Izyum. Russian forces began a new phase of large-scale offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on 18 April 2022 likely intended to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
9. Many in the Western online cheer squad are so sure the Ukrainians will prevail in the East because “this is the same Russian Army that was so inept at Kyiv.” But the terrain where the fights are occurring is totally different. No forests and urban areas to sneak up with Stingers, NLAWs and Javelins. I am pretty worried about Ukrainian Army plans to give battle in this terrain. News reports that say, there are now 76 Russian battalion tactical groups in the Donbas region of Ukraine and in the country's southeast. About 11 of those were added over the last several days, a senior Defense Department official said. Besides the 76 BTGs, there are about 22 BTGs north of Ukraine that are likely being resupplied and refitted, the official said.
10. About 11 of those 76 BTGs inside Ukraine are trying to take the last few sectors of Mariupol, an important port on the Sea of Azov. It seems that despite significant surrenders, there are still pockets of fighters there in certain sectors.
(a) Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers, unspecified other aircraft, and heavy artillery continued to pound Ukrainian defensive positions around the Azovstal plant. It is these pockets of fighters that are selling themselves dearly by forcing the Russian Air Force to use bombers to get them in the tunnels.
(b) Mariupol mayor advisor Petro Andryushenko said that Russian forces did not mark the promised “safe exit corridors” through which they demanded Ukrainian forces leave Mariupol on 17 April 2022 and that the Russian ultimatum was likely a trap for Ukrainian defenders.
11. Massive Russian artillery and MLRS fire reported across the entire line of contact in the east of Ukraine — the next few weeks will be a battle of logistics. Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksiy Danilov said: "Residents of frontline areas or areas where hostilities are taking place need to be evacuated." Danilov added: "It's a mistake to believe that we have already won the war," in an apparent reference to Ukrainian forces pushing back Russian forces around Kyiv. Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy said Russian troops have “begun” the battle for the Donbas region, marking a major new offensive in the 54-day war.12. The next phase of the fight is on (aka round 2 starts on Day 54) — much more fighting in multiple fronts than just at Izyum. Russian forces began a new phase of large-scale offensive operations in eastern Ukraine on 18 April 2022 likely intended to capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
(a) Russian forces have been concentrating reinforcements—including both newly-deployed units and damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine—to the Donbas axis for several weeks.
(b) Russian forces conducted large-scale assaults focused on Rubizhne, Popasna, and Marinka with heavy artillery support on 18 April 2022 after previously conducting only localized attacks and shelling along the line of contact. IMO, the injection of 11 BTGs is significant and intended to help the Russian Army advance.
(c) Successful Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Kharkiv will likely force Russian forces to divert some units intended for the Izyum offensive, but Ukrainian forces are unlikely to completely sever Russian lines of communication north of Izyum in the coming days — the series of Ukrainian actions starting on 16 April 2022 southeast of Kharkiv, were successful. They managed to take several small towns on 17-18 April 2022. Ukrainian forces reportedly seized Bazaliivka, Lebyazhe, and Kutuzivka and claimed to capture several unspecified villages near Izyum. This Ukrainian offensive will likely force Russian forces to divert some of the combat power intended for the stalled Izyum axis to defend against Ukrainian advances.
Last edited:
1. Ambassador of the Russian Federation (RF) to the Kingdom of the Netherlands indicated that, the ICC lacked jurisdiction; and added that the question of the participation of the RF in the proceedings was still under consideration by his Government, but that if it decided to participate, a minimum of 18 months from the filing.
2. Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is granted the power to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." The Security Council today consists of 15 nations including the "Big Five" as permanent members of the Council.
(a) The RF, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) will employ 2 tactics in ICC, deny jurisdiction and delay. The RF UNSC veto also can help Russia avoid direct legal consequences at trial for the actions of specific members of the Russian Army in Ukraine.
(b) Only once did the UNSC did act against Soviet interests (and it’s successor to the seat the RF). After communist North Korea attacked South Korea in June 1950, the UNSC granted President Truman authority to send American troops to defend South Korea. This happened due to a fluke of history. The Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council because the permanent seat held by China was then occupied by the anti-communist government on Taiwan rather than the communist mainland government. As a result, the Soviet Union failed to exercise its veto.
3. We are also awaiting the findings of Independent International Commission of Inquiry (IIC of Inquiry) investigating alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Ukraine, which the UN Human Rights Council mandated. Again the RF UNSC veto also can help here, as this ensures that the UNSC cannot pass the appropriate resolution on any finding of the IIC of Inquiry— it will again have to go to a UN General Assembly vote.
4. If the UNSC, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the UN General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to nembers for collective measures. In this case, UN General Assembly Resolution ES‑11/1 had 141 votes in favour of the resolution. This 2 March 2022 resolution deplored Russia's invasion of Ukraine, demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces and a reversal of its decision to recognise the self-declared People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.
5. What is being posted in this forum is not just from a NATO or Western narrative. There is a good balance shared from multiple perspectives including that of Prof Koh, the former UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Further, the United Nations General Assembly voted on 7 April 2022, to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council over reports of "gross & systematic violations and abuses of Human Rights" by invading Russian troops in Ukraine. Votes in favour of suspension, 93.
6. Gentle reminder to about observing min. quality in posts — keep it fact based. The ban hammer has been over-active in the past few days; please heed prior green and red text warnings in this thread.
Last edited:
@Feanor would be the authorative one on this, but given the history of Russian leadership I think that they would find it very difficult to adapt to the western style of leadership where initiative is expected and rewarded. It's a control thing and the Tsars ran everything top down as was the norm in feudal Europe, the Bolsheviks more so, and Putin has continued with bad habits. In many ways it could be argued that Russia was a feudal society until after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, and they just swapped one feudal overlord for another who just wore different robes. Stalin probably broke the of the feudal system during the late 1920s and into the 1930s with his compulsory rural collectivisation program which resulted in millions of deaths. But the strictures on individual initiative, especially within the then Red Army, remained and still do today in the Russian Federation Military, but not to the same level. Of course Stalin was paranoid about traitors everywhere so he tended to shoot first and ask questions afterwards. Today the military aren't so paranoid, but I am wondering if Putin is starting to be.
It also comes down to force of habit and tradition and anyone who knows the military, will know that tradition runs strong within them. Many of the senior leadership of the Russian Federation Military will have been trained under the USSR military system and orders are orders with few or no exceptions. The same can be said for the Ukrainian military as well, however the Ukrainian government and military faced an existential threat to their homeland and knew that they had to make drastic changes which they did. But I bet there was quite a bit of resistance from within, not because if it being against Russia, but because it was against how things were done. There would be chaos and anarchy in the ranks type of arguments. But the Ukrainian situation was different to the Russian one and the Russians don't / won't see a need to change a basic structural element that has served them for centuries. They will have blinkers on about it. Much like the US military has blinkers on about certain bad habits it has, or the UK military and every other military in the world.
It's a cultural thing as well as a traditional thing and that makes it harder to change. By culture in this context I am talking about Russian military cultural. It's so imbued within the culture that it's almost part of their DNA. If they decide to change their command style philosophy they will have to undertake a thorough cleansing and renewal, and that's something that won't happen overnight. I think that it would take at least a decade for the basics just to bed in, and maybe another decade for them to be really comfortable with the new system. Occasionally they would lapse back into bad habits, but that would be expected. It's not impossible, but it would be a long and difficult journey for them, especially the senior leadership and their political masters.
Worded a hell of a lot better than I ever could and whole heartedly agree. At least Ukraine in the time they adapted had a low key conflict for them to test it out on and realise the benefits without risk of total collapse.
Only way the Russian forces improve is a drastic change in leadership from the government down to the lowest levers of command.
I'm not so sure about the military leadership part. Detail are still very fuzzy. Would Russian commanders been able to produce better results if they weren't hampered by political decisions from the very onset? Even if we go on the basis that at a tactical level the training of many junior Russian commanders leave a lot to be desired; would this have been offset by sound direction and planning at a higher operational and strategic level? What's certain is that the Russians and the Soviets before them have a long tradition of thoroughly analysing things with regards to lessons learnt on an intellectual academic basis/level.
On the part of the political leadership; they have woken up from their slumber and realised that they miscalculated badly in assuming that the Ukrainians wouldn't fight so effectively and with such determination. The question now is whether the political leadership enables military commanders greater leeway?
As the war situation started to improve he also gave commanders more leeway and flexibility to conduct things as they saw fit; as long as they produced results.
Part 1 of 2: Inchoate reply on day 54/55 of the 2022 war
2. Intelligence failure can cascade and affect leadership decision making. The attack on Kyiv is an example of that.
5. Now that the Americans are shipping artillery rounds and Switchblades, the Ukrainian Army can take some risk in having more ambitious operational plans. ISW has reported on the series of Ukrainian actions starting on 16 April 2022 southeast of Kharkiv, were successful. They managed to take several small towns on 17-18 April 2022. Ukrainian forces reportedly seized Bazaliivka, Lebyazhe, and Kutuzivka and claimed to capture several unspecified villages near Izyum. This Ukrainian offensive will likely force Russian forces to divert some of the combat power intended for the stalled Izyum axis to defend against Ukrainian advances.
8. It is possible, I may have misunderstood your point. Please give examples to make your case and I will attempt to refute them point by point.
1. There is nothing fuzzy about the Russian defeat at Kyiv. Many troops particularly of the ill-fated push through the Pripyet marshes North West of Kyiv had lived in horrible conditions in Belarus for weeks and were thoroughly demoralised by the time they were sent into battle. One key detail — the Russians acted on faulty intelligence and wasted a number of their elite units on a heliborne assault on Hostomel Airport.
2. Intelligence failure can cascade and affect leadership decision making. The attack on Kyiv is an example of that.
3. No. The initial operational plan to advance on multiple fronts did not work — as the logistics trains failed to deliver — too many were being destroyed while attempting to keep the BTGs supplied. There are studies on Russian BTGs and how they and their proxy forces can be defeated. There are ways to hinder BTG advance and buy time.
(a) In early Aug 2014, Ukraine’ 95th Air Assault Brigade (Mechanized) conducted the largest and longest armored raid behind enemy lines in recorded military history. The 95th was comprised of two mechanized- infantry battalions, one tank battalion and a battalion of self-propelled artillery. The brigade attacked on multiple parallel axes of advance, and combined-arms company-sized teams penetrated the thinly defended separatists’ positions and regrouped in the rear. The brigade then penetrated in depth along the two separatist regions’ internal border and maneuvered 200 kilometers east along the southern border of the Donbass. They destroyed and captured Russian tanks and artillery, relieved several isolated Ukrainian garrisons and, finally, returned to their starting position near Slovyansk. They marched 450 kilometers behind enemy lines and brought back captured Russian armor and heavy artillery as well. The raid achieved its objective of relieving Ukrainian forces in the separatist provinces, and it proved that Russian regular units were operating in Ukraine.
(b) From July 2014 to Feb 2015, a reinforced Ukrainian Army mechanized brigade defended the key road-rail junction of Debaltseve for five months, even though it was slowly being encircled by Russian- supported separatist units. Russian President Vladimir Putin used this as leverage in the ongoing Minsk II ceasefire negotiations, which only reinforced Ukrainian determination to hold it. Finally, Russia concentrated massive artillery strikes and armored assaults (including the use of T-90 tanks), which finally broke into the town of Debaltseve. Cut off, the Ukrainian brigade exfiltrated through the wooded countryside on foot, leaving behind their heavy equipment and supplies. Despite this, the brigade was able to reconstitute a new defensive line 30 kilometers to the rear because Russian and separatist forces were unable to exploit the success.
(c) In the Feb to Apr 2022 battles, something like 20% of Russian BTGs became combat ineffective. In any war, that is a defeat. Despite its numerous issues during this war, the Russian Army can still inflict a lot of damage with artillery, and armour. Ukraine will find it difficult to defend when these capabilities are used effectively on specific objectives. There is one other thing the Russians have going for them — the ability to mass their forces.
4. No, it will not work given the unexpected level of enemy resistance and the corresponding lack of willingness of some Russian units to fight — the enemy has a vote. The Russians have no NCOs that takes proper care of the enlisted personnel. This is how the Russian Army ended up with demoralised, malnourished, frostbitten enlisted soldiers. Further, prior Russian intelligence also did not provide for the level of Western weapons shipments into Ukraine, that was used with good effect to attack supply lines.
5. Now that the Americans are shipping artillery rounds and Switchblades, the Ukrainian Army can take some risk in having more ambitious operational plans. ISW has reported on the series of Ukrainian actions starting on 16 April 2022 southeast of Kharkiv, were successful. They managed to take several small towns on 17-18 April 2022. Ukrainian forces reportedly seized Bazaliivka, Lebyazhe, and Kutuzivka and claimed to capture several unspecified villages near Izyum. This Ukrainian offensive will likely force Russian forces to divert some of the combat power intended for the stalled Izyum axis to defend against Ukrainian advances.
6. We will find out in 2 to 3 weeks if the Russians can learn, as the fight shifts to terrain that suits the BTGs.
7. No, that is not the case — if you don’t mind me being direct on a minor area of disagreement. The Russian political leadership are in a deep slumber.
8. It is possible, I may have misunderstood your point. Please give examples to make your case and I will attempt to refute them point by point.
9. Does it matter?
Last edited:
No there isn't but I wasn't referring to operations in the Kiev area. I was referring to things being fuzzy at an overall level as to the extent of how the military was hampered by assumptions made on the part of the political leadership. We know that some units were only told they were going in 48 prior; that they were told that the locals would welcome them as liberators and that Ukrainian resistance would be brief and dispirited - that much we know. What we don't know and can only assume [hence my question] if such assumptions weren't made; would the military have gone in better prepared? Would they have gone in with better logistics and ordered units to operate as doctrine lays out?
From the onset the political leadership were in a delusion or in cloud cuckoo land world [Wolkenkuckucksland Welt]. Now that things have gone badly off script they have realised they blundered in a major and very expensive way; they realised that the calculus has changed; one example would be the shifting of focus from the Kiev area to the Donbass [Soviet military thought did emphasise that success; not failure; should be reinforced] based on the fact that the offensive has stalled and was going nowhere.
Do we actually know this for a fact? On my part I'll reserve judgment until I know for sure. Was it a case of Russian intel not anticipating how events would play out [the West made it pretty clear time and again what it would do] or a case of Putin being fed sound intel but not believing it? Alas we don't know yet.
If the military is able to carry out ops as they would like rather than being handicapped by interference from a higher level and are provided with the resources and are able to produce better results; then from their perspective it will matter.
Indeed and we can safely assume that the new Russian theatre commander will attempt to rectify key mistakes previously made; whether he is actually able to is of course the key question.
Exonian
Member
We still do not really know what the Russian aims are.
If the main aim was regime change, and/or full control of the whole of Ukraine, then the gamble of the thrust to Kiev makes sense.
If the main aim was to secure the Donbas then the thrust to Kiev was incredibly risky, perhaps better to make a large demonstration just across the border to pin down Ukraine units in the north.
Political decisions there will have forced the military to plan accordingly, even if they might have had reservations.
As I understand it some of the weaknesses of the Russian BTG are firstly a relatively small staff section able to under take planning, which I believe is offset by a reliance on choosing from a set of pre-rehearsed tactics. Also despite having a relatively large firepower the BTG is light on infantry for screening or holding ground. In this context the presence of rebel infantry in the Donbas presumably means each BTG can to some extent rely on outside help in that respect?
If the main aim was regime change, and/or full control of the whole of Ukraine, then the gamble of the thrust to Kiev makes sense.
If the main aim was to secure the Donbas then the thrust to Kiev was incredibly risky, perhaps better to make a large demonstration just across the border to pin down Ukraine units in the north.
Political decisions there will have forced the military to plan accordingly, even if they might have had reservations.
As I understand it some of the weaknesses of the Russian BTG are firstly a relatively small staff section able to under take planning, which I believe is offset by a reliance on choosing from a set of pre-rehearsed tactics. Also despite having a relatively large firepower the BTG is light on infantry for screening or holding ground. In this context the presence of rebel infantry in the Donbas presumably means each BTG can to some extent rely on outside help in that respect?
We know what their initial stated aims were. Given the setbacks they've met; their aims have changed; to be expected. For now at least they've given up on taking Kiev and are focusing to the south east. As part of their initial aim which was leadership change and controlling a large part of the country; taking Kiev made sense given its political significance.
From Lester Grau's latest book we know that BTGs were seen by the Russians as being suitable for specific operational scenarios and weren't intended or seen as something which was permanent per see or was suitable for every conflict.
Rock the kasbah
Active Member
Mate of mine is an old bushy
Worked for a telecom company
He reckons long grass or wheat, you are buggerred with tracked vehicles, the stuff wraps around the machinery like a rope, pops all the bearing seals. Big job to fix. You put it on the back of a truck and drive it where you need it.
Last edited by a moderator: