Royal New Zealand Air Force

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1047785077848113152

In brownout conditions, temporary spatial disorientation is always a concern for troops, as they ingress and egress from helicopters on uneven ground — it’s not a big deal, as tactics will evolve based on technical limitations of each platform type and it is a problem to be managed on all helicopters. And there are various technical solutions being developed for various platforms to de-risk for a brownout.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1467947599332188166

As you can see, the side pod in the UH-1Y Venom above blocks easy access.

In the Bundeswehr a NH90 will if possible always approach and land such that it can be loaded, unloaded and serviced from the right side (pilot's perspective) through ramp and sidedoor. The fuel filler neck as well as the winch is also on the right side btw. In combat configurations the bottom third of the left side door is blocked by a ballistic armour plate (*), and if certain equipment (e.g. stretchers) is installed they similarly block the left side.

Thank you for teaching.

I guess it’s theoretically possible to lead pax on a level tarmac or level pitch to enter/exit via a determined path during choreographed training activity, or under very supervised conditions.
but this is fraught with hazard to the pax themselves and the aircraft.

Uneven ground to aft will eat up any height advantage of a higher tail boom/rotor design. If that’s in a hot zone with already disorientated pax it’s a recipe for disaster to exit anywhere aft. Anything projecting higher (antennae, gun barrels, arms) will reduce safety margins to zero.
Uneven ground is even a hazard with the main rotor arc, and any movt under it, even to the 10-2.

An agency advocating a practice of normalising movt under the tail boom during any turning & burning is institutionally sanctioning a ‘trip hazard’, which just might bite them one day. I suggest the helicopter community would instinctively recoil at the practice.

Agreed. Your kind input to bring balance to the discussion is greatly valued.

That's stating the obvious, on the other hand sometimes the tail may well be higher off the ground giving even more clearance. You use the best option to exit given the circumstances at hand.

In other words, based on Wombat000’s, Raven22’s and kato’s inputs, the NH90 is not well suited for air assault in a hot LZ, when compared to the Blackhawk — it is also clear that the base design is not well suited to establish an easy all round defence at ingress and egress — a common tactic used to defend the helicopters. Therefore, you are kind of beating a dead horse on the tail boom height discussion. Cheers.

 

[ngatimozart]

The point is other countries use the loading ramp of the NH90 for exit and entry, that it's not standard procedure isn't obviously followed by other countries who operate these helicopters. Different countries different procedures. It would be fairly obvious that soldiers would keep well away from the tail rotor.

What you might think may be obvious is not something that is necessarily taken for granted. Hunched down and moving away from a helo in a noisy environment with full combat kit on in cold wet condition on uneven ground, or in hot dry conditions with dust and / sand being thrown up by rotor wash, possibly under fire makes for temporary spatial disorientation by individuals probable. That's what the SOP are based on and that's what the soldiers and aircrew are trained for. That's why movement anywhere near the tail rotor vicinity is avoided at all costs.

What maybe SOP for some militaries may not be SOP for NZDF for valid reasons. The main one being safety around the aircraft and the RNZAF is very strong and strict on that. It always has been, especially WRT rotary wing aircraft.

That's stating the obvious, on the other hand sometimes the tail may well be higher off the ground giving even more clearance. You use the best option to exit given the circumstances at hand.

Don't disrespect a defence professional who's forgotten more than you'll ever know. You don't even know what Raven22 does and in this particular case he is a SME. Your posting attitude leaves a lot to be desired. Consider this a formal warning. Dial back the attitude or the Moderators may consider sanctions against you.

3 demerit points for one month awarded.

 

[OPSSG]

Please bear with me, as I share my last on this point.

What maybe SOP for some militaries may not be SOP for NZDF for valid reasons. The main one being safety around the aircraft and the RNZAF is very strong and strict on that. It always has been, especially WRT rotary wing aircraft.

Agreed.

The RNZAF does not operate attack helicopters. As I see it, landing in even a semi-hot LZ is not really workable for the NH-90 (without significant risk) — as door guns are a last resort, self defence tool for NZ.

For the Bundeswehr, they have attack helicopters to provide LZ fire support for their NH-90. For mutual support, not uncommon for many air forces to operate helicopters in pairs or flights of 4; all in an effort to de-risk at LZ. A lone helicopter can be a bullet magnet.

 

[ngatimozart]

The RNZAF does not operate attack helicopters. As I see it, landing in even a semi-hot LZ is not really workable for the NH-90 (without significant risk) — as door guns are a last resort, self defence tool for NZ.

For the Bundeswehr, they have attack helicopters to provide LZ fire support for their NH-90. For mutual support, not uncommon for many air forces to operate helicopters in pairs or flights of 4; all in an effort to de-risk at LZ. A lone helicopter can be a bullet magnet.

Agreed. That's an area where NZDF is sadly lacking. The Quigley Report of 2000 noted that:

"We question in particular the recommendation in the Final Report [Final Report of the Air Combat Capability Policy Study, 1998] that New Zealand should not consider further an attack helicopter as a replacement for the A4K Skyhawk and should not consider the P-3K Orion as the sole maritime air strike capability. It seems likely that the policy requirement for an air combat force to perform the three specified roles (as indicated on the table showing Air Combat Operational Roles, above) [Strategic Air, Counter-Air, Anti-Surface Force] arose simply because there is already a fighter attack force in being, those are the roles that the air combat force is capable of performing, and the RNZAF is keen to maintain a fighter attack capability.​

...​

​

Consideration should be given to acquiring a small number of attack helicopters for the close air support role. We are aware that professional military judgement is influenced by "critical mass" considerations, and suggest that the way round the affordability problem is to maintain not whole squadrons of these two types of aircraft, but smaller detachments, posted from time to time overseas to work in close cooperation (like the Skyhawk detachment at Nowra, NSW) with one or other of our closer defence partners in the Asia-Pacific region.​

​

Attack helicopters, if acquired, would also be of value in non-combat situations, including natural disasters in both New Zealand and the South Pacific. They would certainly be utilised in civil defence roles more frequently than an air combat force of Skyhawks or F-16s would be likely to be used on air interdiction missions. Use in civil defence roles has excellent training value and would further develop joint capability involving both the Army and the Air Force."​

Source: Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 - Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: 1999, Forty fifth Parliament, NZ House of Representatives, Hon Derek Quigley, Chairperson.​

​

So the topic of ARH / attack helicopters has been looked at in a Defence Enquiry, but I suggest that the Quigley Enquiry was focussed upon financial "efficiencies" rather than any genuine defence capability gains. There are some who still argue that there is no place in the NZDF for an ARH capability at all because:

1. We haven't required it before and we don't require it now or in the future.
2. Our ally and partners have the capability and we only operate in a Coalition environment so we don't need it.
3. If we get the ACF back it will be responsible for CAS so we won't need it.
4. The country can't afford it.

This quote from Dr Reuben Steffens article, A Wake-up Call For Aotearoa As Global Instability Grows | Newsroom, sums it up for me:

"Despite the unpredictability and instability of the international environment, our low-tax economy, small military, teetering infrastructure and tendency to do things ‘on the cheap’ all contributes to a long-term vulnerability – we may have little ‘surge’ capacity for times of future crisis. New Zealand could easily find its resources and capacities outstripped if and when international or domestic crises break out in the coming years." (Emphasis mine).​

Yep, stingy pollies and tight as Treasury where defence is concerned.

 

[Rob c]

Agreed. That's an area where NZDF is sadly lacking. The Quigley Report of 2000 noted that:

"We question in particular the recommendation in the Final Report [Final Report of the Air Combat Capability Policy Study, 1998] that New Zealand should not consider further an attack helicopter as a replacement for the A4K Skyhawk and should not consider the P-3K Orion as the sole maritime air strike capability. It seems likely that the policy requirement for an air combat force to perform the three specified roles (as indicated on the table showing Air Combat Operational Roles, above) [Strategic Air, Counter-Air, Anti-Surface Force] arose simply because there is already a fighter attack force in being, those are the roles that the air combat force is capable of performing, and the RNZAF is keen to maintain a fighter attack capability.​

...​

​

Consideration should be given to acquiring a small number of attack helicopters for the close air support role. We are aware that professional military judgement is influenced by "critical mass" considerations, and suggest that the way round the affordability problem is to maintain not whole squadrons of these two types of aircraft, but smaller detachments, posted from time to time overseas to work in close cooperation (like the Skyhawk detachment at Nowra, NSW) with one or other of our closer defence partners in the Asia-Pacific region.​

​

Attack helicopters, if acquired, would also be of value in non-combat situations, including natural disasters in both New Zealand and the South Pacific. They would certainly be utilised in civil defence roles more frequently than an air combat force of Skyhawks or F-16s would be likely to be used on air interdiction missions. Use in civil defence roles has excellent training value and would further develop joint capability involving both the Army and the Air Force."​

Source: Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 - Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee: 1999, Forty fifth Parliament, NZ House of Representatives, Hon Derek Quigley, Chairperson.​

​

So the topic of ARH / attack helicopters has been looked at in a Defence Enquiry, but I suggest that the Quigley Enquiry was focussed upon financial "efficiencies" rather than any genuine defence capability gains. There are some who still argue that there is no place in the NZDF for an ARH capability at all because:

1. We haven't required it before and we don't require it now or in the future.
2. Our ally and partners have the capability and we only operate in a Coalition environment so we don't need it.
3. If we get the ACF back it will be responsible for CAS so we won't need it.
4. The country can't afford it.

This quote from Dr Reuben Steffens article, A Wake-up Call For Aotearoa As Global Instability Grows | Newsroom, sums it up for me:

"Despite the unpredictability and instability of the international environment, our low-tax economy, small military, teetering infrastructure and tendency to do things ‘on the cheap’ all contributes to a long-term vulnerability – we may have little ‘surge’ capacity for times of future crisis. New Zealand could easily find its resources and capacities outstripped if and when international or domestic crises break out in the coming years." (Emphasis mine).​

Yep, stingy pollies and tight as Treasury where defence is concerned.

Totally agree and this is only leaving our future freedom and sovereignty at risk, all so the pollies can buy more votes at election time.

 

[spoz]

Let me get this straight. People have been getting on and off Puma helicopters with a GPMG mounted on a swing arm in both doors for around half a century. But suddenly conducting such a task is now in the to hard category when using an NH90?

If you initially don’t like something, you will probably keep finding more reasons to dislike it. Even in the beginning there were people in Australia who didn’t want it, preferring Blackhawks, and that has continued and grown on the “grass is greener” principle.

 

[ngatimozart]

Totally agree and this is only leaving our future freedom and sovereignty at risk, all so the pollies can buy more votes at election time.

Maybe we should have a pollies training camp in the Tekapo Military Training Area during the dead of winter. Night time temperatures of -12°C and a high of 0°C during the day would be ideal conditions. I think that the huts there are still the WW2 era ones like those that used to be at Dip Flat.

 

[Rob c]

Maybe we should have a pollies training camp in the Tekapo Military Training Area during the dead of winter. Night time temperatures of -12°C and a high of 0°C during the day would be ideal conditions. I think that the huts there are still the WW2 era ones like those that used to be at Dip Flat.

Sounds like a good idea. How about make it a 3 year training exercise, held every 3 years for any pollie not taking defence seriously. Just to make sure they are suitably enlightened. Time off for good behaviour for those who become suitabley enlightened.

 

[Bloke]

Those are mock-ups. Production NH-90’s came with a fixed rear window, so no rear gun... There were design issues with the airframe that meant the gun couldn’t be implemented in that rear-window fashion and apparently arcs of fire issues from that location as well, and so had to be mounted in the middle of the sliding doors, presenting obvious egress issues for troops on-board.

NH Industries is now advertising a ‘special forces’ variant that they say apparently addresses this issue…

Meh. They’ve said a lot over the years…

Thanks, I wondered if that was the case.

 

[RegR]

What you might think may be obvious is not something that is necessarily taken for granted. Hunched down and moving away from a helo in a noisy environment with full combat kit on in cold wet condition on uneven ground, or in hot dry conditions with dust and / sand being thrown up by rotor wash, possibly under fire makes for temporary spatial disorientation by individuals probable. That's what the SOP are based on and that's what the soldiers and aircrew are trained for. That's why movement anywhere near the tail rotor vicinity is avoided at all costs.

What maybe SOP for some militaries may not be SOP for NZDF for valid reasons. The main one being safety around the aircraft and the RNZAF is very strong and strict on that. It always has been, especially WRT rotary wing aircraft.

https://www.defencecareers.mil.nz/assets/AirForce/Our-purpose/c58c2649a0/AirForce-OurPurpose-Landscape-01__FocusFillWzEwMDAsNTUwLCJ5Iiw1OF0.jpg

I dont think anyone is taking this for granted....FYI, 3 Sqn and recon SOP.

 

[ngatimozart]

https://www.defencecareers.mil.nz/assets/AirForce/Our-purpose/c58c2649a0/AirForce-OurPurpose-Landscape-01__FocusFillWzEwMDAsNTUwLCJ5Iiw1OF0.jpg

I dont think anyone is taking this for granted....FYI, 3 Sqn and recon SOP.

Cool thanks Reg. Hadn't seen that before. Note that the soldier isn't wearing his battle bowler whilst in the vicinity of the rotors. Whilst the MAG-58 is a good weapon, my own view is that the M3M 12.7mm would be the better weapon for the NH90. I know that some were trialed by either the DST or Army Weapons Lab a few years ago.

 

[RegR]

Cool thanks Reg. Hadn't seen that before. Note that the soldier isn't wearing his battle bowler whilst in the vicinity of the rotors. Whilst the MAG-58 is a good weapon, my own view is that the M3M 12.7mm would be the better weapon for the NH90. I know that some were trialed by either the DST or Army Weapons Lab a few years ago.

Or maybe some miniguns? guess the beans just trying to keep it all simplified, and cheap, as possible for commonality sake but yea I see the heavier calibre didn't eventuate. Recon don't really do helmets...

I got to fire the Mag from a blackhawk in Timor once, about 7 stoppages too many if it was actually needed for my liking

 

[ngatimozart]

Or maybe some miniguns? guess the beans just trying to keep it all simplified, and cheap, as possible for commonality sake but yea I see the heavier calibre didn't eventuate. Recon don't really do helmets...

I got to fire the Mag from a blackhawk in Timor once, about 7 stoppages too many if it was actually needed for my liking

I just like the longer range of the 12.7mm. I think that's more important because it means you can lay off outside of AK range and reach out and touch with some impunity if you have too. It's interesting because the RN replaced all their helo borne crew served 7.62mm weapons with the M3M for precisely that reason. So when they come across a suspect vessel at sea and are flying overwatch or the jungly Merlins are inserting / extracting RMs they have that firepower available.

 

[Shanesworld]

Or maybe some miniguns? guess the beans just trying to keep it all simplified, and cheap, as possible for commonality sake but yea I see the heavier calibre didn't eventuate. Recon don't really do helmets...

I got to fire the Mag from a blackhawk in Timor once, about 7 stoppages too many if it was actually needed for my liking

Was it harmonised before hand? Wierd for a mag58. Can you reach the gas regulator on a chopper mount?

 

[RegR]

Was it harmonised before hand? Wierd for a mag58. Can you reach the gas regulator on a chopper mount?

Wouldn't know, was obviously Aussie kit and we were just having a blat so other then pretty much aim and shoot was pretty limited in what we could/could not do, but was most definitely a recurring theme for all 3 of us firers which I found surprising. I'm sure the crewy got sick of clearing the stoppages.

 

[Kiwigov]

I am intriqued as to why the Quigley Report thought attack helicopters (with the usual tandem seating/no cargo capacities) could be useful in civil defence situations. Was it (perhaps) based on the superior optics and communications capabilities of the available types at the time? I am unaware - and happy to be corrected - of other militaries deploying their attack helicopter assets to respond to natural disasters & civil emergencies.

Certainly agree with Dr Steffens article, though an implication is (considerably) higher wages to attract and retain enough people into the NZDF as it is, let alone an expanded force. Private firms competition for talent and demographics imply a considerable constraint, even if capital expenditure was increased.

 

[ngatimozart]

I am intriqued as to why the Quigley Report thought attack helicopters (with the usual tandem seating/no cargo capacities) could be useful in civil defence situations. Was it (perhaps) based on the superior optics and communications capabilities of the available types at the time? I am unaware - and happy to be corrected - of other militaries deploying their attack helicopter assets to respond to natural disasters & civil emergencies.

Yes that one has me scratching my head for long time. The only thing I can think of was as a throwaway selling point to the pollies and Treasury.

Certainly agree with Dr Steffens article, though an implication is (considerably) higher wages to attract and retain enough people into the NZDF as it is, let alone an expanded force. Private firms competition for talent and demographics imply a considerable constraint, even if capital expenditure was increased.

The NZG and by definition NZDF and its predecessors, has a reputation for being poor wage / salary payers. After WW2 there were mutinies in all three services at different times over pay and conditions.

 

[Kiwigov]

And relativities across the state sector would kick in if there ever was a 'inflation plus' wage rise for the NZDF. The Police would demand the same (they are currently considerably more exposed to gunfire) - then teachers, nurses, etc. Treasury would have an attack of the vapours...
Chronic personnel shortages, and evident technology trends, must reinforce the case for a strong emphasis on drones for future strike and combat surveillance assets - which could possibly be made in NZ (Pacific Aerospace, Rocket Lab should have translatable competencies), always assuming stocks of engines, sensors, and missiles. That last little necessity could even be produced in Australia if the plans across the ditch work out.

 

[Gooey]

Nice questions Kiwigov, as I too was wondering about the AH thought bubble within The Q Report. IMHO, I had assumed it was a not very credible Straw Man or Third Way argument from someone outside of defence that sounds good to civ's/accountant/polies to give the appearance of doing an A-4/F-16 alternative and then quietly dropping that too ... pretty much what you said. As this is a forum, I now dare to say that source could have been Army. It has the veneer of credibility whilst being plain stupid, so fits perfectly with what happened over that unfortunate period of NZ history.

WRT UAS/drones, (again IMHO) they definitely have their place especially for all things recce (ISR); however, against a credible foe they have sever limitations in the strike role. Space too has a huge part to play in our Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability type of thing, keeping an eye on our huge neighborhood. But for a Maritime centric country, like us, Strike means fast jets with P-8A launched missiles (made by our Oz mates, if available) as a distant second.

All in all, its a nice academic answer until loads more lolly is consistently set for defence, with a political consensus b/w Lab & Nat's. If that were to happen and I was King for a Day, I'd think that additional P-8A & LRASM were the way-ahead, first of all (and FFGs for the senior service); Space based EMAC before UAS; Kinetic over-watch be provided by armed UH-60M variants, Reaper, & T-6 equivalents; lastly, some T-50 like fast jets and eventually, F-35s.

 

[Kiwigov]

Appreciate your comments. Gooey - particularly in respect of the plotting against the RNZAF at the time. Even the cartoonists noticed!


My attempted point about drones is really about a emergency response to a (possible? likely?) threat, rather than - as you state - the need for a properly planned and operational force structure over the longer-term.
There is evidently no bipartisan appetite to invest in ACF training and assets, given the usual can-kicking inertia in government. Drones appear to be the only option for a strike capability which is able to be rapidly implemented, shown by the notable example of Turkey's successes in using and selling the cost-effective Bayraktar TB-2 in real wars.